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All attorneys in the United States are required to comply with the code
of professional responsibility adopted by their jurisdiction. These codes all
contain a confidentiality principle forbidding disclosure of a client's confi-
dential communications. Because attorneys cannot properly advise their cli-
ents without knowledge of all the facts, the confidentiality principle
theoretically insures full disclosure by assuring the client that confidential
communications will remain secret. Although the confidentiality require-
ment is generally valid, its legitimacy is questionable in a situation where an
attorney is forbidden to disclose an act which has harmed and may continue
to harm an innocent child.
This article discusses an attorney's ethical dilemma when faced with the
confidentiality requirement in light of his client's confessed- incestuous rela-
tionship with the client's nine-year old daughter. Although some states have
enacted legislation and code amendments to encompass this situation, most
jurisdictions have not expressed definitive guidelines for an attorney faced
with this dilemma. The following is a study of an ethics committee in the
mythical state of Marshall exploring three possible courses of action in an





Chairperson, Marshall State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Dear Mr. Sage:
I would appreciate an advisory opinion from the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics on the proper course of conduct in the following situation in
which I am presently involved. Neglect proceedings have been filed against
an indigent family. I have been appointed to represent the mother and fa-
ther at the hearing. The petition alleges that the couple's three children,
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B.A., Smith College; J.D., Stet-
son University; LL.M., Columbia University.
This article is adapted from a Masters Essay submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree
of Masters of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. The author is grateful to Asso-
ciate Professor Andrew Schepard, Columbia University School of Law, for his guidance and
encouragement, and to Professor George Cooper, Columbia University School of Law, whose
article, The Avoidance Dynamic. A Tale of Tax Planng, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1553 (1980), inspired the format.
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aged three, six and nine, are not receiving proper care. They are dirty and
inadequately fed. I learned from the husband that he has been having sex-
ual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the past two years. The
wife confirms this and privately tells me that she is afraid to interfere. I have
reviewed the report of the child welfare investigation ordered by the court.
The report, which includes interviews with the children, confirms my belief
that no one except the mother has discovered the father's mistreatment of
the child.
As court-appointed counsel, what are my ethical obligations? Should I
disclose the father's incest? If I do not, I am afraid it will continue. I think
he needs some kind of treatment or therapy. If the court does not appoint
counsel for the children, should I suggest to the court that counsel be ap-
pointed? Even if counsel is appointed, he or she may not find out about the
incest because apparently no one has during the past two years. I suspect
that the child may be afraid to speak up against her father.
I imagine that other lawyers may have been confronted with this kind
of dilemma, but I cannot find any ethics opinions addressing these questions.





MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Memorandum
TO: Members of the Committee on Professional Ethics
FROM: Lawrence Sage, Chairperson
DATE: January 5, 1984
RE: Inquiry No. 84-1: Disclosure of Confidential Communications
Enclosed are copies of the above-referenced inquiry and supporting
materials. The inquiring lawyer asks:
(1) Whether he should reveal confidential communications that his
client, charged with child neglect, has been having sexual intercourse with
his nine year old daughter for the past two years.
(2) Whether he should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed
for the children.
Contrary to custom, the committee sua sponte will also address a related
question not raised by the inquirer but highly pertinent to his inquiry and a
matter of great public interest.
(3) Whether counsel for the children, if appointed, should reveal con-
fidential communications over the objections of one of his clients, a nine year
old girl, that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the
past two years.
Because of the committee's lack of familiarity with the social, medical
and psychological aspects of incest, I have requested briefing reports from
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experts in those areas on the general problems of incest to aid the committee
in reaching a decision. In addition, I have requested reports by a juvenile
court judge and a legal aid attorney on judicial proceedings that might re-
sult from a charge of incest. Enclosed are reports by:
(1) Dr. Hillary Hope, Director, National Children's Protection
League;
(2) Ms. Mary Noble, Supervisor of Caseworkers, Marshall De-
partment of Protection Services;
(3) The Honorable Richard Chancellor, Circuit Court Judge, Ju-
venile Division, State of Marshall; and
(4) Brenda Challenger, Esquire, Chief Staff Counsel, Marshall
City Legal Services, Inc.
Please review these materials and be prepared to discuss and take a prelimi-
nary vote on this inquiry at our committee meeting on January 25.
REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY DR. HILLARY HOPE,
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CHILDREN'S PROTECTION LEAGUE
Child abuse and neglect have reached "epidemic proportions" in this
country.' The federal government has awarded millions of dollars in local
grants to support programs to increase protective services and reporting of
neglect and abuse of children. 2 Yet, one immense and pervasive type of
maltreatment, sexual abuse, 3 has attracted relatively little concern even
among health care professionals. 4 Doctors and psychiatrists routinely label
complaints of incest as mere fantasy.5 A diagnosis of child sexual molesta-
tion makes everyone uncomfortable 6 and many people angry and outraged.
An annual estimate of over 5,000 cases of father-daughter incest7 is con-
sidered the "tip of the iceberg." 8 Only a small fraction are reported when
they happen; most come to light years later.9 Incest occurs within the pri-
vacy of the family and is kept secret, which makes it impossible to know the
real magnitude of the problem. '0 Dr. C. Henry Kempe, pioneer researcher
and a foremost authority on child abuse, described the situation: "It is usu-
ally hidden for years and only becomes known because of some dramatic
change in the family situation, such as adolescent revelation of delinquent
acts, pregnancy, venereal disease, a variety of psychiatric illnesses, or some-
1. A. GREEN, CHILD MALTREATMENT 285 (1980).
2. Id. at 286.
3. De Francis, Protecting the Child Victims of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, 35 FED. PROBA-
TION, Sept. 1971, at 15, 17.
4. Steele, Psychodynamic Factors in Child Abuse in THE BATTERED CHILD 72 (C. Kernpc &
R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980). See also Sgroi, Sexual Molestation of Children, CHILDREN TODAN'. May-
June 1975, at 18-19.
5. Kempe, Incest and Other Forms of SexualAbuse in THE BATTERED CHILD 198, 198-99 (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
6. Id
7. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 119.
8. Schechter & Roberge, Sexual Exploitation in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 127, 130 (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1976).
9. Kempe, supra note 5, at 198-99.
10. Radbill, Children in a World of Violence:. A Histoy of Child Abuse in THE BATTERED
CHILD 3, 10 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
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thing as trivial as a sudden family quarrel." ' "I The acts often continue over
many years and "may be carried out under actual or threatened violence or
may be nonviolent or even tender, insidious, collusive, and secretive."12 Gen-
erally, the whole family actively or passively supports "incestuous
equilibrium.'
13
Authorities believe that incest is increasing.' 4 Factors contributing to
this increase are the loosening of sexual mores, ready availability of birth
control and abortion, and higher divorce and remarriage rates.' 5 Another
factor is generational cycling, a widely recognized phenomenon of sexual
abuse: those abused become the abusers of the next generation. '6 This cycle
is likely to continue unless the family can be helped to function more nor-




The most common form of incest is between father and daughter,' 8
however, father-son, 19 mother-son 20 and mother-daughter 2' incidents have
also been reported, as well as incidents between siblings. 22 Because father-
daughter incest "is potentially the most damaging to the child and family
[and the] most frequently prosecuted by the courts,"'23 my remarks focus
primarily on the father as abuser and the daughter as victim. In that situa-
tion the mother usually is aware of what is happening but does not protest.
24
In fact, she often condones and even aids and abets the crime, 25 perhaps out
of fear of physical violence or of losing her husband, which would leave the
family destitute.26 This places the victim in a vulnerable position, defense-
less27 against paternal threats, force, or enticements. 28  To the child, her
father is a trusted authority figure who "can do no wrong."
29 This gives him
great power over her. Vincent De Francis, Director of the Children's Divi-
11. Kempe, supra note 5, at 198-99.
12. Id. at 198.
13. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 129.
14. Kempe, supra note 5, at 204.
15. See id. See also Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 130.
16. De Francis, supra note 3, at 20. See also A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 38, 88, 285.
17. Incest and Family Disorder, BRIT. MED. J., May 13, 1972, 364, 365. See also Steele, supra
note 4, at 73.
18. "Seventy-eight percent of all reported incest involves father-daughter; eighteen percent
sibling; 1 percent mother-son; and the remainder, multiple relationships within the family."
Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 131. See, e.g., Adams & Neel, Children of Incest, 40 PEDIAT-
RICS 55, 57-58 (1967) (reporting statistical findings).
19. See, e.g., Bender & Blau, The Reaction of Children to Sexual Relations With Adults, 7 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 500, 502 (1937).
20. See, e.g., Yorukoglu & Kemph, Children Not Severely Damaged by Incest With a Parent, 5 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 111 (1966).
21. Id. at 112.
22. See, e.g., Adams & Neel, supra note 18, at 57.
23. Giarretto, H-umanistic Treatment of Father-Daughter Incest, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
143, 146 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1976).
24. De Francis, supra note 3, at 19.
25. Id See also A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 51, 120; Kempe, supra note 5, at 205.
26. De Francis, supra note 3, at 16-17.
27. Kempe, supra note 5, at 209.
28. De Francis, supra note 3, at 18.
29. Peters, Children Who Were Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J.
PSYCHOTHERAPY 398, 411 (1976).
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sion of the American Humane Association, described the psychodynamics in
a report on a three year study of sexual abuse he directed in New York City:
"The offender used the child's strong desire not to displease him, even
though, to the child, the adult's request may have seemed unpleasant, or
distasteful, or even bizarre. . . . A subtle threat underlies the compliance of
the child in these circumstances. "30 Can the child really be considered a
"willing victim ' 3 ' under these circumstances, or "not always [an] unwilling"
partner, 32 as some commentators assert?
When the mother sides with the father against the child victim, the
child feels isolated and helpless and is usually plagued by feelings of insecu-
rity, confusion, guilt and worthlessness since she does not know where to turn
for help. 33 For older children the dilemma is staggering because they realize
that the reaction to confiding this information may be disbelief, anger, ostra-
cism or maybe even destruction of the family. Dr. Kempe said:
They are in no way assured of ready help from anyone, but risk
losing their family and feeling guilty and responsible for bringing it
harm if they share their secret. Youngsters may only come to the
attention of the health care system or the law through pregnancy,
prostitution, veneral disease, drug abuse, or antisocial behavior.
34
When parents are confronted with their roles in the wrongdoings, some
deny the incest, rationalize it, or even shrug it off. One mother responded
that her husband "gave up smoking and needed something to help him
through." '35 Some offenders righteously defend the incest as natural, 36 the
right of a parent, 37 or good for the child. 38 A frequent defense is that the
child seduced the parent. 39 Although some observers give credence to this
charge, recent researchers view the child's behavior as innocent affection-
seeking,4° and place the entire responsibility for setting appropriate limits of
family intimacy on the parents. 4' If parents do not set appropriate limits, or
if a father's perception and inhibitions are weakened by the use of alcohol or
drugs, he may introduce sex in response to the child's simple affection-seek-
ing behavior and wrongly blame the child for seducing him.42 In a study of
sexual abusers of children referred for psychiatric evaluation, the researcher
discounted the child's role as an important external circumstance inducing
the sexual maltreatment.
43
30. De Francis, supra note 3, at 18.
31. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 141.
32. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
63 (1979).
33. See Peters, supra note 29, at 418.
34. Kempe, supra note 5, at 208.
35. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 132.
36. Summit & Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Clinical Spectrum, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHI-
ATRY 237, 242 (1978).
37. Id at 245.
38. Steele, supra note 4, at 74.
39. Id.
40. See Peters, supra note 29, at 411-12.
41. Summit & Kryso, supra note 36, at 239.
42. See Peters, supra note 29, at 411.
43. Swanson, Adult Sexual Abuse of Children, 29 DISEASES NERVOUS SYSTEM 677-78 (1968).
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The impact of parental incest on the victim is hard to assess because
many of the more serious problems do not appear until years later, 44 and
because there is a paucity of carefully controlled long-term studies of incest
victims. 4 5 Most clinical studies, however, have reported a variety of distur-
bances ranging from personality disorders,
46 psychosomatic complaints,
47
psychological difficulties and sexual maladjustments48  to full-blown
psychoses. 4 9 A number of studies on incest and sexual abuse of children show
that the fact that the child was the victim of a trusted and respected figure
causes confusion, distrust and psychiatric disorders later in life.50 -One team
of researchers said, "It is the recognition of having been exploited and un-
cared for as an individual human being that leads to the long-lasting
residual damages of sexual abuse in development, rather than the actual
physical sexual act itself.' ' 51 Pregnancy, vaginitis and syphilis were among
the physical effects suffered by some incest victims, 52 but the psychological
effects may have been even more serious. While depression and guilt were
prevalent, 53 fatigue, loss of appetite, aches and pains, inability to concen-
trate and sleep disturbances were psychosomatic complaints suffered by al-
most all victims in one study of father-daughter incest.
54
Researchers Bender and Blau found immediate harmful effects on per-
sonality development that varied with the developmental stages of the
child.55 Some children showed reversion to or prolonged infantile behavior,
others showed handicapped educability and social adaptations, while still
others showed precocious and inappropriate development of adolescent
characteristics and adjustment difficulties. 56 The researchers also found anx-
iety and confusion in the victims' social relations, and concluded that incest
distorted their attitudes toward family members and, later, toward society in
general.
57
The turmoil these children endure may not, however, be recognized at
the time of the incident because children frequently repress the experience.
58
They may be emotionally withdrawn and appear unaffected by the rape,
but repression frequently results in psychological problems5 9 which are man-
44. Peters, supra note 29, at 417.
45. A. GREEN, Supra note 1, at 124.
46. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at 11I.
47. Lewis & Sarrel, Some Psychological Aspects of Seduction, Incest, and Rape in Childhood, 8 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 606, 613 (1969).
48. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20 at 111.
49. Id.
50. Steele, supra note 4, at 75; Peters, supra note 29, at 418.
51. Steele, supra note 4, at 75.
52. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 123. See also Bender & Blau, supra note 19, at 502.
53. Kaufman, Peck & Tagiuri, The Family Constellation and Overt Incestuous Relations Between
Father and Daughter, 24 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 266 (1954).
54. Id
55. Bender & Blau, supra note 19, at 516.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Sloane & Karpinski, Effects of Incest On the Participants, 12 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
666 (1942).
59. Peters, supra note 29, at 420.
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ifested in unsatisfying personal and sexual relationships later in life. 60 Yet,
some researchers fail to appreciate the seriousness of "the interpersonal im-
pairment the child has suffered because the victim remains in the same fam-
ily group with the offender and silently tolerates repeated assaults."'6'
Furthermore, "[e]ven if the assaults themselves are not repeated, there can
be extensive psychologic difficulties if the victim and the offender remain
living in the same household when the victim goes through adolescence,"
62
because anxiety impairs the functioning of the ego.63 Researchers have
found that disturbance of the parent-child relationship jeopardized the
child's development, and that "[tihe underlying craving for an adequate
parent, then, dominated the lives of these girls."
'64
"In cases of father-daughter incest, the psychopathology of the daugh-
ters ranged from severe personality disorder and sexual maladjustment to
manifest psychosis."'65 Studies show that their problems have also included
drug addictions, 66 prostitution 67 and homosexuality. 68 With consequences
of such magnitude, every effort must be made to educate parents and to
protect children from sexual abuse at the hands of their trusted caretakers.
For those children who have been victimized, enlightened and sensitive pro-
grams of therapy and treatment must be provided to help salvage their
young lives. Reporting child abuse should be everyone's responsibility.
REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN
BY Ms. MARY NOBLE, SUPERVISOR OF CASEWORKERS,
MARSHALL DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTIVE
SERVICES
The increasing child abuse caseload is placing heavy demands on com-
munity resources to provide protective and rehabilitative services to the
child and the family.69 Ideally, the community should provide the family
with support services such as caseworkers; visiting nurses; visiting homemak-
ers; child day care; mental health services, including individual and group
counseling; and short and long-term therapy for the victim, parents and sib-
lings under social services supervision. 70 When home-based services and
treatment are not available, foster care and court action may be the only
recourse. 7 1 The immediate concern should be the victim's safety which may
require removal, at least temporarily, to a children's shelter or foster home,
particularly if the offender remains in the family home.7 2 Removal from the
60. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 32, at 63.
61. Peters, supra note 29, at 412.
62. Id.
63. Lewis & Sarrel, supra note 47, at 619.
64. Kaufman, Peck & Tagiuri, supra note 53, at 277.
65. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at 111.
66. Giarretto, supra note 23, at 146.
67. Kempe, supra note 5, at 208.
68. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at I 11.
69. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 137.
70. See id. at 288.
71. See id. at 10, 218, 234. See also Newberger & Bourne, The Medcazation and Legalization of
Chd Abuse, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 593, 595, 603 (1978).
72. See Peters, supra note 29, at 419.
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family, even temporarily, may cause the child to feel rejected, banished, un-
loved and insecure which compounds the guilt and shame already felt.
73
The child needs competent counseling or treatment to deal with this stress
and inner-turmoil.
74
Intervention by the state has distinct and predictable consequences for
every member of the family. Examination of the victim in a hospital or
clinic may be required, which can be a bewildering and frightening experi-
ence for a child. Recounting details of the assault to police and intake of-
ficers in what may be an insensitive interrogation, can make the victim feel
badgered, threatened and demeaned.
75
For the family, state intervention invariably engenders shame, humilia-
tion and hostility at having their private lives open to public view and cen-
sure, plus resentment toward the victim for causing this intrusion.
76
Protective measures, viewed by professionals as helpful to a family in crisis,
may seem punitive and vindictive to family members.
77
State intervention for the offender means community indignation and
outrage, the stigma of being labeled "unfit" or "abusive" and, perhaps ulti-
mately, the retribution of the criminal justice system. 78 If convicted and
imprisoned, the offender may be threatened and assaulted by inmates who
regard child abusers as the lowest kind of criminal.79 Furthermore, if the
offender is acquitted of criminal abuse charges, he may feel vindicated and
justified in resuming the incest 80 or punishing the victim by unreasonable
chores and demands, oppressive rules, restrictions, sanctions, and other forms
of blatant or subtle harassment. 8 '
If the victim remains in the home or is later restored to the family, she
may be shunned, ostracized or tormented by her parents and siblings for
causing so much trouble and embarrassment for the family, thus reinforcing
her feelings of guilt, unworthiness and low self-esteem.
82
The abuse charges may be followed by proceedings to terminate paren-
tal rights. The judicial process, whether criminal or civil, makes adversaries
of family members by requiring them to testify against each other.83 Ques-
tioning the victim about details of the assault, testifying, and being cross-
examined may be as harrowing and harmful as the incest itself, if not more
SO.
8 4
73. See Sgroi, supra note 4, at 21. See also A. GREEN, supra note l, at 219.
74. See A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 187. See also Johnson, The Sexually Mistreated Child- Diag-
nostic Evaluation in THE ABUSED CHILD IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 943, 949 (C.
Kernpe, A. Franklin & C. Cooper eds. 1980).
75. See De Francis, supra note 3, at 17.
76. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 227. See also Giarretto, supra note 23, at 148.
77. Newberger & Bourne, supra note 71, at 602.
78. Id at 601.
79. Incest and Family Disorder, supra note 17, at 365.
80. Newberger & Bourne, supra note 71, at 600. See also Duquette, Liberty and Lawyers bi
Child Protection in THE BATTERED CHILD 316, 317 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
81. Giarretto, supra note 23, at 144.
82. Id
83. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 129.
84. De Francis, supra note 3, at 17.
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Once the judicial process is invoked, the outcome is unpredictable. At
worst, from the family's viewpoint, the offender may be imprisoned, the wife
and children made destitute, the victim removed from the loved ones' home
and placed with strangers, and parental rights terminated.8 5 At best, with
good family support resources, a humane and enlightened program tailored
to the individual family may provide the treatment and therapy necessary to
stop the incest, protect the child, rehabilitate the offender, and stabilize and
reunite the family, which should be the ultimate goal. 8 6 When it succeeds,
state intervention is vindicated, but when it fails, harm and suffering may be
compounded. It is incumbent upon the community to provide the resources
and upon professionals to work together to make it succeed.
CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: A JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE
By HONORABLE RICHARD CHANCELLOR, CIRCUIT COURT
JUDGE, JUVENILE DIVISION, STATE OF MARSHALL
Because of the very nature of the offense and the almost certain
danger to the child, any known cause of apparent child battering
should be brought into the legal process of investigation, referral to
court and a court proceeding.
The quality of this process determines the kind of results ob-
tained. To deal effectively with child abuse, all parts of the system
must have the same goals. These include the immediate protection
of the child, ascertaining the reasons for parental abuse, treatment
of such causes and, ultimately, a permanent return of the child to a
well-adjusted home, preferably his own.
Judge James J. Delaney
8 7
Several types of laws are designed to protect children from abuse.
Criminal statutes and ordinances can be invoked to punish offenders. Under
juvenile or family court acts, the court may institute protective supervision
or termination of parental rights when parents are found to have abused or
neglected their children. Protective services are part of public child welfare
laws in most states and all states have laws that require reporting known or
suspected child abuse or neglect. 88
Criminal statutes protect children from sexual misconduct, such as stat-
utory rape, indecent liberties, incest, and sexual battery.89 Once set in mo-
tion, the criminal process is "formidable, impersonal and unrelenting .... ;
its aim is primarily punitive rather than therapeutic. "90 The process usually
begins with an information filed by a public prosecutor, followed by an ar-
rest warrant, arraignment at which the offender receives formal notice of the
charges and of his rights, including court-appointed counsel for indigent de-
fendants, and posting bond or release on his own recognizance pending
85. See Kempe, supra note 5 at 199. See also Giarretto supra note 23, at 144.
86. See Kempe, supra note 5, at 209.
87. Delaney, The Battered Child and the Law in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS
FAMILY 187, 198-99 (C. Kempe & R. Helfer eds. 1972).
88. Paulsen, The Law andAbused Children in THE BATrERED CHILD 175, 175-76 (R. Heifer
& C. Kempe eds. 1968).
89. Delaney, supra note 87, at 188.
90. Id at 189.
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trial.9 1 After investigation by the prosecution and defense counsel, the court
may accept a plea bargain. "Depending on the strength or weakness of the
state's evidence, the severity of the injury and the public climate, the prose-
cutor may agree" to reduce the charge to a lesser offense in exchange for a
plea of guilty, for example, from felonious assault to simple assault, a
misdemeanor.
92
After a "guilty" plea or conviction following a trial, the defendant may
apply for probation if he is not a persistent offender. A presentence or pro-
bation investigation is usually conducted and may include psychological or
psychiatric evaluation, but seldom delves into the underlying cause of the
abuse or proposes a positive plan for supervision or treatment of the of-
fender. 93 Probation services seldom have any therapeutic effect because per-
sonnel usually are not trained to understand or deal constructively with the
pathology of child abuse. This deficiency and the repugnancy of the crime
often result merely in punitive, restrictive surveillance, making rehabilitation
improbable under the criminal justice system. Judge Delaney observed that
after acquittal or release, the offender is likely to resume the conduct, but
more cautiously. 94 He described the situation in this way:
[T]he criminal process as a solution to child abuse is usually totally
ineffective. Probably it has some deterrent effect on the parent ca-
pable of controlling his conduct, but its chief value lies in satisfying
the conscience of the community that the wrong to a child has been
avenged. That the true causes of the battering parent's conduct
have not been sought out and treated is of little concern.
95
Most cases of child abuse are referred to juvenile or family court and are
tried as dependency cases. 96 The proceedings involve two distinct phases:
first, an adjudication of dependency upon a finding of abuse; second, the
ultimate disposition.9 7 At the initial hearing the court must decide whether
danger of repeated assault requires temporary removal of the child from the
home. The court must weigh the risk of further abuse against the potential
long-range emotional damage to the child and parents caused by temporary
protective care.98
When the case is tried in juvenile or family court,9 9 statutes sometimes
permit limited use of written reports and other types of evidence that might
not be admissible under strict evidentiary rules. The quantum of proof re-
quired to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect is usually a preponderance of
91. Id at 189-90.
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id at 191.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 192.
96. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD Li-
TEM MANUAL FOR VOLUNTEERS 24 (1980).
97. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 691 (3d ed. 1980). Polier & McDonald, The Family
Court in an Urban Setting in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY 208, 212 (C.
Kernpe & R. Heifer eds. 1972).
98. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 212.
99. These are civil proceedings in all states except Delaware. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sex-
ual Abuse of Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Toolfor Families in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
MALTREATED CHILDREN 78 (D. Gross ed. 1979).
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the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required in
criminal court. 0 Pretrial conferences encourage full disclosure of facts and
opinions and provide an opportunity to evaluate the evidence and to narrow
issues in dispute which may result in a stipulation or consent decree.' 0 If
not, a trial or adjudication hearing will follow.
10 2
Whether actions in juvenile or family courts are more effective than
criminal actions in rehabilitating the offender, depends to a large extent on
the resources available. In the absence of the needed therapeutic skills and
services, "the goal of replacing punishment with treatment . . . [and] incar-
ceration with rehabilitation" may not be achieved.'0 3 Recent emphasis on
procedural reforms, stressing safeguards for defendants, has been described
as "cheaper than providing substantive services for those who are mentally
ill, engaged in deviant behavior, or are poor. Paradoxically, while adversary
proceedings are becoming the fashion of the day and are resulting in dismis-
sals of more cases, there is a growing demand for harsher sentences."104
The adversary system pits zealous advocates against each other, each
intent on "winning" for his client. This process, however, impedes courts
from "dealing with the complex emotional and psychological problems of
the troubled family. These people not only desperately need the ministra-
tions of the physician and behavioral expert, but the firm insistence of a
court which can insure those services are accepted."' 1 5 Lawyers and judges
must place the ultimate welfare of the child and parents over winning or
losing the client's goal.
106
By using clever courtroom maneuvers the defense attorney can fre-
quently have a neglect petition denied; this he may define as "win-
ning" the case. But in many situations this, in fact, is not
"winning" as far as the child is concerned. The attorney who fails
to give as much consideration to the child's welfare as he gives to
the legal aspects of the case carries a heavy burden if the child is
wrongly returned to battering parents.
0 7
"The law can never serve the true ends of justice until lawyers and
judges alike view the battered child as more than a legal problem."' 0 8 Child
abuse involves behavior that is social and medical in origin 10 9 and the dispo-
sitional stage of the proceedings is "primarily diagnostic and social in na-
100. See, e.g., Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Child Abuse Cases in HELPING THE BATTERED
CHILD AND HIS FAMILY 225, 236 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1972). A finding of abuse might
ultimately result in termination of parental rights. It should be noted, therefore, that in 1982
the United States Supreme Court held that "[b]efore a state may sever completely and irrevoca-
bly the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state support its
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-
48 (1982).
101. Delaney, supra note 87, at 202.
102. Id
103. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 213.
104. Id
105. Delaney, supra note 87, at 194.
106. Id
107. Paulsen, supra note 88, at 200.




ture." 110 The court should be seen "as another resource, along with the
social and behavioral scientist, the physician, legal services, the police and
other community agencies concerned with prevention, detection and treat-
ment of child abuse and neglect.""'
Judicial authority should be used to rehabilitate the family whenever
possible, or as a last resort, to terminate parental rights. Simply removing
the victim indefinitely from the home is not an adequate final disposition. "12
Foster care results in placing the child in unfamiliar surroundings with stran-
gers at a time of emotional turmoil. The child may perceive this as punish-
ment for her wrongdoings, 113 adding trauma and pain 11 4 to her already
heavy burden of guilt, confusion and shame. The separation may continue
over a long period of time 15 and in a succession of foster homes'16 to which
the child must adapt." 7 While becoming estranged from parents and sib-
lings," 8a she is in a limbo state, not really belonging to a permanent family
Unit.
1 19
"The court must aid in directing the parent through the social service
maze and often must use its authority to insure that treatment is af-
forded."' 120 Treatment should include individual and group crisis and after-
care therapy for the victim, the offender, and other family members to cor-
rect the dysfunctional family patterns in which the incest occurred. Crisis-
oriented social services may also be available, such as visiting nurses, home-
makers, tutors, and day care. 121 Coordination of criminal and family or ju-
venile court proceedings may be necessary to motivate parents to accept the
help that is available and to protect the child from further abuse.'
2 2
Even after disposition, the court should remain involved and schedule
periodic reviews. At these reviews the social service agency providing treat-
ment should give an accounting of the services which have been provided
and report on the progress of individual family members. 123 The parents
should give an accounting of their progress in correcting the underlying
110. Isaacs, supra note 100, at 231.
111. Delaney, supra note 87, at 197.
112. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 223.
113. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children. Standards for Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 645 (1976).
114. Id at 669.
115. Mnookin,Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest? 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 610 (1973). See
also Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 FAM. L.Q.
151, 167 (Summer 1983).
116. Wald, supra note 113, at 645-46. "[Cl]hildren in foster care frequently are subjected to
multiple placements, destroying the continuity and stability needed to help a child achieve
stable emotional development. This may, in fact, be the most damaging aspect of foster care."
Id See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789 n.15 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Wald, supra note 113, at 667. "[E]ach time a child is separated attachments may be
broken generating insecurity and an inability to form future attachments." Id
118. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 214.
119. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977). See also Mnookin,
supra note 115, at 613.
120. Delaney, supra note 87, at 205.
121. Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 99, at 78.
122. Duquette, supra note 80, at 325.
123. Delaney, supra note 87, at 205.
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problems. If the offender is not cooperating or will not or cannot change
after a reasonable period of time has elapsed, termination of parental rights
may be necessary. This will allow permanent placement or adoption of a
child who cannot safely return home 124 and is preferable to allowing the
child "to become a displaced person for [the] years of [her] childhood.'
1 25
REPORT ON JUVENILE COURTS BY BRENDA CHALLENGER, ESQUIRE,
CHIEF STAFF COUNSEL, MARSHALL CITY LEGAL SERVICES,
INC.
Humanitarian impulses and a desire to "save" rather than punish chil-
dren who violate the law, led to the development of juvenile courts resulting
in not altogether satisfactory dispositions. 126 First, juvenile courts often dis-
criminate based on class or culture. 127 Second, juvenile courts deprive chil-
dren of their liberty, 128 while depriving parents of their children in
constitutionally-questionable proceedings.
129
The juvenile court system's genesis is a reaction to harsh prison
sentences and incarceration of youthful offenders with hardened adult
criminals. 13° Theoretically, under the "care and solicitude" of the state' 3 '
"[t]he child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than
punitive."' 3 2 The rationale is that the state, acting as parens palriae,' 3 3 is
merely providing for the child's custody in nonadversary civil proceedings
which are not subject to the procedural restrictions required when the state
seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.' 34 The United States Supreme Court
in In re Gault 135 described the motives that led to development of juvenile
courts and questioned the wisdom of allowing the court to have "unbridled
discretion" in the absence of counterbalancing procedural safeguards. 1
36
124. Baker, Big Brother, 53 FLA. B.J. 672, 677 (1979).
125. Id
The advantage of greater short-term support and less long-term custody is not
only the cost saving, but it means that the family who cannot make it and provide for
its own is much sooner identified. When such families are identified by the failure to
improve despite genuine assistance and opportunity to do so, children may be re-
moved sooner from the home and placed in permanent alternative families, such as by
commitment for adoption.
Id
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
127. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745. 763 (1982). See also Guggenheim, A Call to Abol-
ish theJuoenie Justce System, 2 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS REPORT No. 9, 10 (June 1978).
128. See, e.g., Task Force Report: Juvenile Dehquency and Youth Crime (1967) in MODERN JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 48 (S. Fox. 2d ed. 1981). "In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and
rehabilitative rather than punitive. . . . In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than
deprive a child of liberty without due process of law." Id. See also., e.g., Fox, Philosophy and the
Principles ofPu nshment n theJuvenile Court in MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 60-61 (S. Fox 2d ed.
1981). See also, e.g., Guggenheim supra note 127, at 8.
129. See, e.g., Davidson, Conronting Child Abuse, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 26, 28-29 (Summer, 1982).
130. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 15-16.
133. Id at 16.
134. Id at 17.
135. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
136. Id at 17-18.
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[T]he highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a pecu-
liar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable
context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar
system is-to say the least-debatable. . . . Juvenile Court his-
tory has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however be-
nevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the
Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juve-
nile courts .... "1137
Juvenile courts have traditionally had jurisdiction over three types of
proceedings: delinquency, status offenses, and child abuse and neglect. 138
My remarks are directed primarily at abuse and neglect, although many of
my comments and some authority cited apply to delinquency and status of-
fenses as well. Allegations of abuse or neglect may lead to criminal charges
and may result in removal of children from their families through placement
in foster care or termination of parental rights.
1 39
My first objection to juvenile courts is that they are class-based institu-
tions for the poor and minorities.14° "Certainly in the great cities of the
nation the overwhelming number of children processed through the juvenile
court are the children of the poor."' 4 ' Although abuse and neglect occur at
all social and economic levels,' 42 the upper and middle classes are less likely
to be observed t43 and reported. 144 They are also more likely to stay out of
court because they have access to privately arranged corrective treatment
and private care facilities not available to the poor.1 45 The predominantly
middle-class professionals dealing with families charged with abuse or ne-
glect are removed from the poor by education and way of life and are often
biased in their perceptions and judgments of these families. 146 The United
137. Id
138. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1194 (1978).
139. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child
Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. LJ. 887, 887-88 (1975). Seealso, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
140. See PaulsenJuvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 697
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen I1.
141. Id. at 696.
142. See H. CLARK supra note 97, at 698. See also J. AREEN, supra 138, at 888-89.
143. See Mnookin, supra note 115, at 619. "[Slince poor families are more subject to scrutiny
by social workers who administer welfare programs, their faults, even if no more common, may
be more conspicuous." Id.
144. See, e.g., Didato, Violence in the Home: How Much Do You Know About It? St. Petersburg
Times, October 17, 1983, at 2D, col. 1.
Child abuse cases involving low-income family members surface more often, but the
rate reflects a reporting bias. Clinics and social agencies rarely deal with affluent fami-
lies concerning this matter. Further, police, doctors and therapists are hesitant to re-
port abuse in affluent families. Many experts believe that like alcoholism, family
abuse is a problem that plagues all social classes and economic levels.
Id.
145. See Paulsen 1I,supra note 140, at 696. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 834 (1976). See also Wald, supra note 113, at 674. Many abusive and neglectful
parents are "so burdened with problems that they are unable to adequately protect or care for
their children. Most such parents are very poor, living in very bad housing, and are isolated
from relatives and community support. They generally have few of the skills necessary to cope
in our society." Id.
146. See Paulsen II, supra note 140, at 695.
[Vol. 61:4
INCEST AND ETHICS
States Supreme Court recognized this problem when it observed: "Because
parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or
members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judg-
ments based on cultural and class bias."
14 7
Handicapped by poverty and lack of education, parents charged with
abuse or neglect are no match for the state with its financial resources; access
to records; and witnesses including caseworkers empowered to investigate
and testify.148 Once the child is in custody, "the State even has the power to
shape the historical events that form the basis for termination."' 149 As a re-
sult, "many 'voluntary' placements are in fact coerced by the threat of ne-
glect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of
informed consent."' 150
In the dispositional stage of neglect or abuse proceedings, the "best in-
terest of the child" standard is applied by juvenile courts in deciding
whether a child should be removed from parental custody.' 15  This "allows
the judge to import his personal values into the process, and leaves consider-
able scope for class bias . . . . [C]ases . . . clearly reveal the risks of 'indi-




Moreover, "foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion
into the family life of the poor."'1 53 It is also highly questionable whether
these children will be better off in foster care than in their own homes.154 In
Sanlosky v. Kramer the Court said, "Even when a child's natural home is im-
perfect, permanent removal from that home will not necessarily improve his
welfare. . . . ('In fact, under current practice, coercive intervention fre-
quently results in placing a child in a more detrimental situation than he
would be in without intervention')."' 155 Said one commentator:
For nearly two decades, noted authorities have observed that chil-
dren removed from their homes and placed in 'temporary' foster
care often remain there for many years, frequently until their ma-
jority. Such children often suffer serious psychological damage in
foster care and are commonly subjected to numerous moves-each
of which disrupts the child's need for maintenance of continuity
and stability in his relationships with parental figures.156
My second objection to juvenile courts is that they deprive children of
their liberty, 157 and parents of their children, in constitutionally questiona-
147. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
148. See, e.g. , id.
149. Id
150. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1976). See qlso Wald,
supra note 113, at 675.
151. See Mnookin, supra note 115, at 619-20.
152. Id
153. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1976).
154. See e.g., Sussman, Reporttg Child Abuse. A Review of Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 312
(1974). "[Experts] have warned that the 'cure' of removing a child from a poor environment
may be worse than the harm to which he is subject." id
155. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982).
156. Report of the Task Force onjuvenileJustte and Delinquency Prevention, in MODERN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 49, 49-50 (S. Fox 2d ed. 1981).
157. See Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, supra note 128. See also Gug-
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ble proceedings.158 The right of parents to the custody of their children has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. "The fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents. . . . [W]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."' 59 More-
over, parents are in danger of criminal liability stemming from charges of
abuse or neglect.16 0 For that reason, "[m]any of the evidentiary issues that
arise in civil neglect proceedings result from the tendency to equate such
cases with criminal proceedings."' 16 1 Yet, criminal due process safeguards
frequently are not accorded as they have been in delinquency cases since
Gault .16 2 Unfortunately, the Court in Gault did not expressly extend those
protections to abuse and neglect cases.'
6 3
The Director of the ABA's National Legal Resource Center for Child
Advocacy and Protection, has cited these examples of rules of evidence some-
times ignored in the adjudication phase of child abuse trials in juvenile
court:
[Olpinion testimony is permitted without a proper foundation; case
records, reports of clinical evaluations, and other documentary evi-
dence are considered by the judge without copies first being made
available to counsel for the parents and child; the right to confron-
tation and cross-examination of all witnesses is denied; the burden
of proof inappropriately is placed on the parents to persuade the
courf that they are fit to care for their child; and the child's wishes
are not clearly articulated to the judge.
64
The Supreme Court has characterized termination proceedings as "for-
mal and adversarial,"1 6 5 "accusatory and punitive,"' 166 "a unique kind of
deprivation,"' 167 "few losses more grievous,"' 168 and "few forms of state ac-
tion are so severe and so irrevocable."' 169 Yet, juvenile courts have been
reversed and underlying statutes declared unconstitutional for lack of proce-
dural due process.' 7 ° Examples include: failure to provide court-appointed
counsel for indigent parents, 71 the necessity of which the Supreme Court
genheim,supra note 127, at 8. "So long as we maintain the myth that the juvenile justice system
is designed for the children's own welfare, we leave room for the cynical or myopic to deprive
children of their liberty without cause and without meaningful rights." Id.
158. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 28-29.
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
160. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
161. See J. AREEN, supra note 138, at 1111.
162. Guggenheim, supra note 127, at 4. "Specifically, Gault required that accused juvenile
delinquents be afforded four basic procedural protections: notice of charges; right to counsel;
the right to remain silent; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." Id
163. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 41-42.
164. Id at 29.
165. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id at 43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 27 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
168. Id at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).




has held must be determined on a case by case basis; 172 lack of independent
representation of children; neglect of required notice to parents of hearings;
and failure to ensure prompt hearings before emergency removal of children
from their homes.'
73
Juvenile court becomes, in effect, "little more than a kangaroo court for
young people" when blind obedience to the parens patriae philosophy results
in "disregard of constitutional rights . . . .,174 It is also a kangaroo court
for parents when they lose custody of their children in constitutionally ques-
tionable proceedings. 1 75 Because juvenile courts are class-based institutions
discriminating against the poor and minorities, 176 and for the other reasons
previously recited, I join critics who call for the abolition of juvenile
courts. 1 77
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
MEMORANDUM
TO: Members of the Committee on Professional Ethics
FROM: Lawrence Sage, Chairperson
DATE: February 13, 1984
RE: INQUIRY NO. 84-1: DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
Enclosed are three draft opinions prepared independently by three com-
mittee members after discussion and preliminary vote at our January 25th
committee meeting. As you will recall, the preliminary vote was evenly split
three ways with one member, Mr. Fencestradler, abstaining.
The three views reflected by the vote are:
(1) The parents' attorney should not reveal the incest and should
not suggest appointment of counsel for the children, but if
counsel is appointed, the children's counsel should not reveal
the incest without client's consent unless the client is incapa-
ble of making a considered judgment.
(2) The parents' attorney should suggest appointment of counsel
for the children, and both the children's counsel and the par-
ents' attorney should reveal the incest even without their cli-
ents' consent.
(3) The parents' attorney should suggest appointment of counsel
for the children, and may, but is not required, to reveal the
incest. The children's counsel should not disclose the incest
over the objection of a client capable of making a considered
judgment.
172. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
173. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 29.
174. In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 869, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1977).
175. See Davidson supra note 129, at 28-29.
176. See Paulsen II, supra note 140 at 697.
177. See e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 127 at 5. "Juvenile court will always be unfair; it will
always be second class. The right course is to abolish it entirely." Id. at 11. See also, e.g., Fox,
Abolihing theJuvenile Court, 28 HARv. L. SCH. BULL. 22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fox II]. See
also. e.g., Fox, supra note 128, at 60.
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A member of each group has prepared a proposed ethics opinion em-
bodying the group's answers to the three questions raised by this inquiry.
Because of time constraints, the authors Ms. Truly, Mr. Wright and Mr.
Good, have not seen each other's opinions, therefore, the opinions do not
respond directly to each other. The final opinion will be written after the
committee reaches a consensus and will address opposing arguments on ma-
jor points of contention.
Please send me your written comments after studying the three pro-
posed ethics opinions. All comments received by February 25 will be sent to
you with the agenda for our next meeting. I look forward to receiving your
thoughts on this important inquiry.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number I Prepared by Veronica Truly, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
A lawyer has been appointed by the court to represent indigent
parents in neglect proceedings. The petition alleges that the chil-
dren, aged three, six and nine, are not receiving proper care. They
are dirty and inadequately fed. The lawyer learns from the hus-
band that he has been having sexual intercourse with their nine
year old daughter for the past two years. The wife, who is also a
client, confirms this and tells the lawyer that she is afraid to inter-
fere. The lawyer has interviewed the children and reviewed the
court-ordered child welfare investigation report. He cannot as-
sume from the report or interviews that anyone besides the mother
has discovered the father's sexual abuse of the child.
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
(1) Whether he should reveal his clients' confidential communications
that his client, a father charged with child neglect, has been having sexual
intercourse with his nine year old daughter for the past two years; and
(2) Whether he should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed
for the children.
Additionally, the committee will address a related question not raised
by the inquirer, but which is highly pertinent to his inquiry and constitutes a
matter of great public interest:
(3) Whether counsel for the children should reveal confidential com-
munications over the objections of his client, a nine year old girl, that her
father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the past two years.
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer appointed to represent parents in
child neglect proceedings may not reveal the father's confidential communi-
cation which is confirmed by the mother, who is also a client, that the father
has been having sexual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the
past two years. (2) The lawyer should not suggest to the court that counsel
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be appointed for the children, because it would not be in his clients' best
interests to have counsel appointed for the child who has interests adverse to
his clients. (3) A lawyer appointed to represent children in neglect proceed-
ings should not reveal, over his nine year old client's objection, her confiden-
tial communication that her father has been having sexual intercourse with
her for the past two years, unless her age or mental condition renders her
incapable of making a considered judgment on her own behalf in directing
counsel.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney for
the parents should not reveal the information because disclosure would be-
tray the lawyer's sacred trust to hold inviolate confidences entrusted to him
by his client.' 78  Clients' confidences must be protected from disclosure be-
cause lawyers cannot properly advise or represent their clients without know-
ing all of the facts. 179 Statutes,' 8S0 rules of evidence,"
8 1 and rules of ethics 182
have codified this principle. For example, Canon 4 of the Marshall State
Bar Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to preserve the con-
fidences and secrets of their clients, with narrow exceptions not pertinent
here.18 3 Ethical Consideration 4-1 states:
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our
legal system. . . . The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not
only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper rep-
resentation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance. 184
Clients' confidences are likewise protected under Rule 1.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct recently adopted by the American Bar
Association. 185
178. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE]. ABA CODE is the source for all cites to the Marshall Code of Professional Respon-
sibility in text. The Florida state statutes are the basis for all Marshall statutory citations, unless
otherwise noted. See infra note 228.
179. Id.
180. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974) provides that it is the duty of a lawyer
"to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his
client."
181. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1983) (dealing with lawyer-client privilege).
182. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 4-1 and DR 4-101.
183. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 4 and DR 4-101. DR 4-101 requires that a
lawyer not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his client except
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
Id. at DR 4-101.
184. Id at EC 4-1.
185. MODEL RULES OF PROFESStONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES]. Text should be read as if a special committee of the Marshall State Bar Asso-
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In addition, Canons 6 and 7 of the Marshall Code require a lawyer to
represent his client competently 8 6 and zealously.'8 7 Voluntary disclosure of
information detrimental to a client without his consent is inconsistent with
zealous representation. DR 7-101(A)(3) prohibits a lawyer from prejudicing
or damaging his client during the course of the professional relationship.'
Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client.' 8 9 EC 5-1 states: "The professional judgment of a lawyer
should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his per-
sonal interests . . . nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to
dilute his loyalty to his client."' 190
The Comment to Model Rule 1.2 is even more specific in providing that
the lawyer "should defer to the client regarding . . . concern for third per-
sons who might be adversely affected."'' ABA Informal Opinion 869
(1965),192 applying provisions similar to the earlier Canons of Professional
Ethics,' 93 advised that the wife's lawyer in divorce and custody proceedings
is ethically bound not to reveal information confided to him by the client
that she has become pregnant by a man other than her husband.
94
The Preamble to the Model Rules stresses the importance of maintain-
ing clients' confidences: "[T]he client has a reasonable expectation that in-
formation relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that
disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accord-
ance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product
privileges."1
95
The committee members recognize that paternal incest is a terrible
thing for a child to endure; they also recognize that maintenance of the ad-
versary system by upholding the sanctity of confidentiality is of supreme im-
portance. The inquiring attorney has been appointed to represent a father
charged with child neglect. To reveal his confidential admission of incest
might lead to criminal charges and infringe constitutionally protected rights
against self-incrimination. Confidentiality must be placed above prevention
of the risk of injury to individuals in particular instances. Confidentiality
takes precedence, even if occasionally some people are harmed.
The inquiring lawyer in our fact situation does not know, nor should he
be deemed to know, that the parent's abusive conduct will continue. Re-
quiring disclosure under these circumstances undermines the adversary sys-
ciation is studying the Model Rules to determine whether to recommend their adoption, with or
without changes, by the Marshall Supreme Court, to replace the Marshall Code of Professional
Responsibility [hereinafter cited as Marshall CPR].
186. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 6.
187. Id at Canon 7.
188. Id at DR 7-101(A)(3).
189. Id at Canon 5.
190. Id at EC 5-1.
191. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.2 Comment.
192. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 869 (1965).
193. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
194. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 869 (1965).
195. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Scope.
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tern. If clients cannot be assured that what they tell their lawyers will be
held in confidence, they may withhold damaging information and lawyers
will be prevented from counseling their clients to refrain from contemplated
wrongful acts. The deterrent effect of lawyers' advice to clients undoubtedly
forestalls many actions that would be harmful to individuals or society. In
the case under consideration, the attorney may be able to deter further acts
of child abuse by counseling his client. He should stress the harm and dan-
ger of the conduct and the harsh consequences that may result if he persists.
The attorney may encourage his client to seek therapy or psychological
counseling. 196
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that the parents'
attorney should not suggest to the court that counsel be appointed for the
children because it would not be in his clients' best interests to have counsel
appointed for a child whose interests are adverse to his clients. In an inquiry
to the Committee on Professional Ethics of the State Bar of California,
1 9 7
the inquirer asked: "When a lawyer representing a client in child custody
proceedings discovers conflicting interests of his client and the child, may he
ethically notify the court of the conflict and suggest court appointment of a
separate lawyer for the child?"' 98 The committee answered in the negative
and stated that the committee assumed the information discovered by the
lawyer suggested that it would not be in the child's best interests that his
client have custody "or that other interests of the child, in good conscience,
require independent representation."' 99 Suggesting appointment of counsel
may also be an impermissible breach of confidence. The committee rea-
soned that information indicating conflicting interests would come within
the broad definition of confidences and secrets, which cannot be disclosed
under Canon 4; such disclosure would also be contrary to the Canon 7 re-
quirement of zealous representation.
200
The California opinion reasoned further that the attorney for a parent
in child custody proceedings does not concurrently represent the child. The
child need not be represented because "[p]resumably he or she is protected
by the requirement of substantive law providing that custody is to be
awarded 'according to the best interest of the child.' ",201 Our committee
agrees with that reasoning and in answer to the inquiry advises that the
attorney for the parents cannot ethically suggest representation for the child
to the court.
(3) Regarding whether counsel for the children should reveal the in-
cest over the objection of his nine year old client, the committee believes
that, if the client is competent to make such a decision, counsel has an obli-
gation to maintain the confidences and secrets in accordance with the child's
wishes and should not disclose such confidences. If counsel determines, how-
ever, that the child is not competent to make this decision for any reason
196. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-8.







including immature judgment, the Marshall CPR suggests that counsel de-
cide for her as set forth in EC 7-12:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him inca-
pable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts
additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. . . . If a client under
disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled
in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client ...
If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer
should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care
to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.
20 2
Model Rule 1.14 is more explicit and permits counsel to seek appoint-
ment of a guardian, but "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. '20 3 The rule states
that the lawyer of a client with impaired ability to make adequately consid-
ered decisions "shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client." °2 0 4 The Comment to the rule notes that
"[in many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative
may be expensive or traumatic for the client."'20 5 Since neither the Marshall
CPR nor the Model Rules specify guidelines for determining competency,
standards applied by courts in determining competency for children to tes-
tify may be relevant. For a child to be competent to testify as a witness most
courts require that the child (1) have "sufficient intelligence to receive just
impressions of facts,"' 206 (2) be capable of relating them clearly, (3) have
ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and (4) understand that
an oath requires one to tell the truth.
2 07
Competency to make key representational decisions, however, involves
some different considerations. The Comment to Model Rule 1.14, for exam-
ple, recognizes that "[wihen the client is a minor . . . maintaining the ordi-
nary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects ...
Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competency often has the ability to un-
derstand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the
client's own well-being."'20 8 The Comment continues, "[flor example, chil-
202. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
203. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14(b).
204. Id. at Rule 1.14(a).
205. Id. at Rule 1.14 Comment.
206. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 525 (1895).
207. Id. The Supreme Court held that a five and one-half year old child was competent to
testify in a murder trial, stating:
[T]here is no precise age which determines the question of competency. This depends
on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between
truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former. The decision of this
question rests primarily with the trial judge who sees the proposed witness . . . and
may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence
as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. . . . [Tihe decision of the
trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is
clear that it was erroneous.
Id Most state courts follow the policy established by Wheeler and hold that age alone is not
grounds for refusing to permit a witness to testify. Stafford, The Chld as a Witness, 37 WASH. L.
REV. 303, 304 (1962).
208. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14 Comment.
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dren as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve,
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceed-
ings concerning their custody."
'20 9
With these provisions in mind, the committee believes that counsel for
the children should not reveal the incest over the objection of his client if
counsel has determined that the child is competent to make that decision. If
the child is not competent, counsel should either act as de facto guardian
and make the decision in the child's best interest or see that a guardian ad
hitem is appointed for her.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number II Prepared by Wellington Wright, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
[same facts as stated in Proposal Number I]210
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
[same questions as in Proposal Number I]
21t
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer representing parents in child ne-
glect proceedings should reveal the father's confidential communication,
confirmed by the mother who is also a client, that the father has been having
sexual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the past two years.
(2) If the court does not appoint counsel for the children, the parents' lawyer
should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed. (3) A lawyer ap-
pointed to represent children in neglect proceedings should reveal, even
without consent, the confidential communication of the nine year old client
that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the past two
years.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney
should reveal the information. Because of the helplessness of children at the
hands of abusive parents, the overriding concern for welfare and protection
of children must take precedence over the client's right to confidentiality.
The child may be in great jeopardy and the parents' lawyer may be the only
one who knows of such danger. The child is undoubtedly too intimidated,
ignorant, or embarrassed to tell anyone. She apparently has told no one in
two years. The child placement process has been invoked by filing the ne-
glect petition, and the client's disclosure is highly relevant to the issues
raised. Absent the lawyer's disclosure, however, the information will almost
certainly remain secret. Some intervention is necessary to assess the situation
and devise protection, counseling and treatment.
209. Id




It is for the courts to decide the best interest of the children and, in
order to make a wise decision, courts should have all of the information
available. The attorney has knowledge of activities which indicate his cli-
ent's propensity for sexually abusing his young daughter, and that it may be
a crime of a continuing nature. 21 2 Although Canon 4 requires lawyers to
maintain clients' confidences, an exception is made when the information
relates to a client's intention to commit a crime.2 13 DR 4-101(C)(3) of the
Marshall CPR permits a lawyer to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."'2 14 In
some jurisdictions (Florida, for example), the language of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is mandatory and requires the lawyer to reveal the inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime.
2 15
Model Rule 1.6 prohibits lawyers from revealing information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client consents, with the exception
that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a crim-
inal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm .... ,"216 It is reasonable to believe that, without
some type of intervention, the crime of incest will continue 217 and will have
grave consequences for the child's physical, emotional, and mental health.
2 18
Such conduct is universally condemned 21 9 and studies show that parental
incest is a traumatic experience for a child and is likely to cause severe and
long-lasting harm.
220
Moreover, all states have child abuse reporting laws,22' many of which
require all citizens, as well as certain named health and child care profes-
sionals, to report known or suspected child abuse. 222 Many states also grant
tort immunity to those reporting such crimes and abrogate the privileged
status of communications between the professional and client or patient.
2 23
Some statutes place a statutory obligation on lawyers to reveal child abuse.
212. See, e.g., McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50
MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1965) (communication of abuse by an adult to his attorney may lead to an
inference of further abuse and further criminal conduct).
213. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
214. Id.
215. FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR4-101(D) (2) (1983).
216. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
217. See, supra note 212 and indfa note 263 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
219. See IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, ABUSE & NEGLECT 2. ID commen-
tary at 70 (Tentative Draft 1981).
220. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
221. W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 789
(1983).
All 50 states now have child abuse reporting laws. . . . Today's typical statute defines
the class of persons who must report to include at least health care professionals, teach-
ers and social workers. Most statutes provide for civil immunity for one who reports in
good faith, and there is generally a waiver of both the husband-wife and physician-
patient privileges.
id.
222. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child. Abuse and Neglect, 23
VILL. L. REV. 458, 465 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Besharov II.]
223. Paulsen, supra note 88, at 196, 198-99.
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In Ohio224 and Nevada,2 25 for example, attorneys are expressly required to
report known or suspected child abuse. Some report statutes, Florida's for
example, expressly exclude lawyers from reporting.226 Wisconsin's report
statute was amended during the 1984 legislative session to give lawyers dis-
cretionary authority to report known or suspected child abuse. 227 Marshall's
reporting statute does not expressly exclude or include lawyers among the
named individuals required to report. The statute does, however, require
reporting by "[a]ny person, including, but not limited to [those named]
.... ,228 The term "any person" can be construed as broad enough to
encompass lawyers.
The New Jersey State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics rendered
an advisory opinion on a similar question. The committee's inquiry con-
cerned an attorney representing a mother whose custody of her children was
challenged by a state agency. The attorney learned that in the past his client
had physically abused her children and "engaged in other conduct toward
the children that raises questions as to her fitness as a mother. '229 The com-
mittee's opinion focused on the continuing nature of child abuse and "the
state's concern in child welfare raising policy considerations different from
those involved in the usual criminal or civil case. A child abuse case is a
matter calling for the proper protection and custody of the child. Punish-
ment of the offender may be a separate issue for a separate proceeding.
'230
The opinion advised that the confidentiality privilege does not apply be-
cause "pursuit of the client's objective to maintain parental control will
probably constitute fraud on the court in misrepresenting the parent's con-
224. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1983).
225. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(d) (1979).
226. FLA. STAT. § 415.109 (1983). Florida's report statute abrogates privileged communica-
tions as grounds for failure to report "except that between attorney and cintt. ... Id (emphasis
added).
227. Wisconsin Act 172 (Assembly Bill 296, March 22, 1984).
228. The Florida Statutes are the basis for the Marshall Statutes cited in the text. The
Florida Statutes cited herein are standard reporting statutes comparable to reporting statutes in
other jurisdictions. These statutes were chosen by the author in allegiance to her home jurisdic-
tion, although the principles set forth are applicable in many other jurisdictions. The major
distinction between the Marshall Statutes and the Florida Statutes is that Florida Statute
§ 415.109, cited above, supra note 226, distinctly forbids the attorney from revealing privileged
attorney-client communications. The Marshall Statutes do not contain a provision similar to
Florida Statute § 415.109. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1983).
(1) Any person, including, but not limited to, any:
(a) Physician, osteopath, medical examiner chiropractor, nurse, or hospital personnel
engaged in the admission, examination, care, or treatment of persons;
(b) Health or mental health professional other than one listed in paragraph (a);
(c) Practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing;
(d) School teacher or other school official or personnel;
(e) Social worker, day care center worker, or other professional child care, foster care,
residential, institutional worker; or
(f) Law enforcement officer, who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a
child is an abused or neglected child shall report such knowledge or suspicion to the
Department of Protective Services.
Id But see infra text accompanying note 277.





tinuing fitness .... 1,211
Applying the reasoning of the New Jersey opinion to the matter under
consideration, the committee recognizes that DR 7-102(B) of the ABA
Code 232 and the Marshall CPR 233 has been amended to exempt privileged
communications from the requirement that the attorney reveal a client's
fraud if he refuses to rectify it.2 34 Nevertheless, if not on the basis of fraud,
then on the basis of continuing crime, the lawyer should disclose the infor-
mation. Averting the possibility of grave harm to children should take pre-
cedence over the obligation to preserve clients' confidences.
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that if the court
does not appoint counsel for the children, the attorney should suggest that
counsel be appointed. The parents' lawyer does not represent the chil-
dren.235 They are not parties to the proceedings, 2 36 but will be greatly af-
fected by the outcome and should have their own counsel appointed to
represent their interests.2 37 Courts have inherent, 238 and in some states, stat-
utory239 authority to do so. Child abuse or neglect statutes require or permit
the court to appoint a representative for the child,2 40 although the exact
stage in the proceedings24 I and the representative's functions are seldom
specified. 242 Courts in the State of Marshall are not required by statute or
court rule to appoint counsel for children in abuse or neglect proceedings,
which in Marshall and many other states, are usually tried as dependency
231. Id
232. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 7-102(B).
233. Id
234. Id
235. To do so would be a conflict of interest. Fraser, Independent Representationfor the Abused
and Neglected Child The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 16, 31 (1976-77). See also
Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child
Abuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REv. 521, 527-530 (1977-78).
236. See Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child "You Can't Go Home Again," 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1216, 1225 (1982).
237. See Bross, Legal Advocacy for the Maltreated Child, 14 TRIAL 29, 30 (July 1978).
238. See, e.g., Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 421, 238 A.2d 373, 376 (1968). "It is well settled
that whenever in any judicial proceeding it shall be made to appear that there are interests of a
minor to be protected, the judicial officer presiding has the inherent power to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for the protection of the minor's interests." Id See also Speca, Representation for
Children in Custody Disputes. Its Time Has Come, 48 UMKC L. REV. 328, 330 (1980).
239. In Florida and some other states, courts are required both by statute and court rules to
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child in all abuse or neglect judicial proceedings.
FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1983) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300. See also, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40
§ 506 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). See also Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child- "You Can't go
Home Again," supra note 236, at 1222-23.
240. Comment, Lawyering for the Abused Child" "You Can't go Home Again," supra note 236, at
1222-23. "[Florty-one states have adopted statutes mandating the appointment of an independ-
ent legal representative for abused and neglected children." Id
241. Fraser, supra note 235, at 30.
242. Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child "You Can't go Home Again," supra note 236, at
1229-30. Some statutes that do specify duties appear to give contradictory directions, for exam-
ple, those that require that a guardian ad litem be appointed require that the guardian be an
attorney charged with representing both the child's wishes and the best interests of the child.
See, Chambers, The Ambiguous Role of the Lawyer Representing the Minor in Domestic Relations Litiga-
tion, 70 ILL. BJ. 510, 511 (1982). Those statutes appear to leave the child without a spokesper-
son who will advocate her wishes. See Redeker, supra note 235, at 540. The guardian may not






In the situation under consideration the children should be repre-
sented,244 and if the court does not appoint counsel for them, the parents'
lawyer should suggest that the court do so, because no one else in the pro-
ceeding represents them. Although a petition alleging child abuse or neglect
is filed on behalf of a child by the welfare department, 245 the state attorney
who represents the petitioner is a prosecutor whose goal is to prove the abuse
or neglect alleged in the petition.2 46 The welfare department's responsibility
is toward the entire family which may conflict with the children's best
interest.
24 7
(3) As to the related question of whether counsel for the children
should reveal the incest over the objections of his nine year old client, the
committee believes that given the seriousness of the abuse,24 3 the distinct
possibility that it will continue,24 9 and the questionable competency of the
child, counsel should reveal the information. A nine year old child's compe-
tency to direct counsel in the child's best interest is problematic, both be-
cause of her tender years and the possibility that she has been subjected to
manipulative pressures and intimidation capable of clouding the judgment
of an even more mature victim of parental incest.
250
Disclosure should be made whether the representative is an attorney or
a guardian ad hlem. A nonlawyer guardian ad tem is not subject to lawyers'
codes of ethics imposing confidentiality constraints. 25 ' Statutes or court
rules governing appointment of guardians ad htem may, however, impose an
obligation on the guardian adlitem to maintain the child's confidential com-
munications. Although the distinction in the role of the attorney and the
243. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFMAN, supra note 96, at 24.
244. See, e.g., Note, Due Process for Children.- A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 185 (1974). See also, e.g., Sussman, supra note 154, at 304, noting
the views of two commentators:
Carson supports counsel for children since conflicts often appear between their rights
and interest and those of the state or the parents. Burt points to the necessity for
counsel since children often want to remain with their parents even though they have
been maltreated and state intervention may be benign.
Id
245. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, supra note 96, at 9.
246. Id. See also Isaacs, supra note 100, at 228-29.
247. See, R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, supra note 96, at 9. See also
Redeker, supra note 235, at 540.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 44-68.
249. See supra note 212 and mnfra note 263 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
251. A guardian adlitem's role is to protect the child's best interest during particular litiga-
tion. H. CLARK,supra note 97, at 723. Although generally a guardian adihtem is not required to
be an attorney, see, e.g., FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300, frequently courts appoint attorneys to serve in
that capacity. Presumably, if serving only as guardian ad litem for the child, an attorney is not
bound by the confidentiality requirements of Canon 4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 40 § 506
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (Supp. to Historical & Practice Notes).
[U]nder section 506, the guardian adlitem is also the attorney who has been appointed
to represent the child. Thus, perhaps one of the difficulties inherent in the guardian ad
item procedure may have been obviated, namely the lack of a privilege of confidenti-
ality as to communications between the guardian ad htem and the child.
Id. See also Chambers, supra note 242, at 511.




guardian ad hitem is not always clear, the guardian ad hem at least is required
to consider the child's wishes along with all of the other circumstances and
factors in determining what course of action would promote the child's best
interest.252 The attorney may have a more limited role of advocating the
child's wishes to the court, even if he does not agree with them.
253
If the attorney doubts the child's competency because of her tender
years, he may feel compelled to request that the court appoint a guardian ad
hi'em.
2 54 The lawyer could then advocate the child's wishes and the guard-
ian adlitem could advocate what he or she determines to be in the child's best
interest. The court may, however, perceive this as a wasteful duplication of
effort causing added expense and delay. EC 7-12 of the Marshall Code
2 55
and Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules 256 deal with clients under a disability.
Model Rule 1.14(b) says that a lawyer for a client under a disability is per-
mitted to seek appointment of a guardian, but "only when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest."2 57 Neither this rule nor EC 7-12 is very helpful, however, because
they give so little guidance to a lawyer attempting to ascertain whether or
not a child is competent to direct counsel and to make considered judgments
on the child's own behalf.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number III Prepared by Wallace Good, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
[same facts as stated in Proposal Number I]258
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
[same questions as in Proposal Number 1]259
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer representing parents in child ne-
glect proceedings may, but is not required to, disclose information revealed
in the father's confidential communication, confirmed by the mother who is
also a client, that the father has been having sexual intercourse with their
nine year old daughter for the past two years. (2) If the court does not ap-
point counsel for the children, the parents' lawyer should suggest to the court
that counsel be appointed. (3) A lawyer appointed to represent children in
neglect proceedings should not reveal confidential communications, over the
252. See Bross & Munson, Alternative Models of Legal Representation for Children, 5 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1980).
253. See, e.g., Counsel for Children: Guidelines for Courts and Counsel in Civil Custody Cases, 56
CONN. B.J. 484, 488 (1982).
254. Id at 488.
255. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
256. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14.
257. Id at Rule 1.14(b).




objections of his nine year old client, that her father has been having sexual
intercourse with her for the past two years, unless the child's age or mental
condition renders her incapable of making a considered judgment on her
own behalf.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney
may reveal the information, but is not required to do so. Two important
interests are in conflict: society's interest in protecting children versus the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. The helplessness of children too
young, frightened, and confused to escape the abuse and neglect or to com-
municate effectively, can create severe tensions and conflicts for the lawyer.
On one hand, his duty under Canon 7 of the Marshall CPR is to represent
his client zealously 26° and under Canon 4 his duty is to preserve the client's
confidences and secrets. 26 1 On the other hand, EC 7-10 says, it is the duty of
the lawyer "to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal pro-
cess and to avoid infliction of needless harm.
262
If the lawyer reasonably believes that this two-year pattern of recurring
sexual abuse will continue, in spite of his client's protestations to the con-
trary, the lawyer may regard it as being in the nature of a continuing
crime 263 that may be revealed under DR 4-101 (C)(3) of the Marshall CPR
as an exception to the requirement of confidentiality of client's communica-
tions.264 This is consistent with modern medical and social science data
recognizing a "battered child syndrome" as a recurring pattern of child
abuse. 265 Likewise, under Model Rule 1.6, a lawyer who reasonably believes
disclosure is necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal act
which the lawyer believes is likely to result in "substantial bodily harm" may
make such disclosure. 266 Codes of professional responsibility in some other
states are even stronger, requiring rather than permitting lawyers to reveal
clients' intentions to commit crimes.
267
The Terminology section of the Model Rules defines "reasonably be-
lieves" (a term used in Rule 1.6) as denoting "that the lawyer believes the
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable. ' ' 2 6 8 Incest with a young child is a crime,269 and it is reasonable
to believe that it will continue, 2 70 but whether it will result in "substantial
bodily harm' 27 1 may be less clear. Emotional or psychological harm may be
260. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 7.
261. Id. at Canon 4.
262. Id. at EC 7-10.
263. See supra notes 212 and 217 and accompanying text.
264. ABA CODE, supra note i78, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
265. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). In
Landeros the California Supreme Court reversed dismissal of a suit by a battered child against a
hospital and physician for failure to diagnose and report "battered child syndrome" resulting in
further injury to child after being returned home to allegedly battering parents. Id
266. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
267. See, e.g., FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(2) (1983).
268. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Terminology.
269. Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 99, at 87 n.32. Incest is a statutory offense in all states but
Indiana, whose incest statute has been repealed. Id
270. See supra notes 212 and 263 and accompanying text.
271. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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considered "mental" rather than "bodily" harm. Even if the lawyer reason-
ably believes the sexual abuse will continue and that it will result in substan-
tial bodily harm, he still has discretion under the Marshall CPR 272 and the
Model Rules2 73 as to whether or not to reveal the information. If in exercis-
ing his discretion he decides not to reveal, the child will be left unprotected
from exploitation and harm by parents entrusted with her care.
Also of concern to the lawyer is his knowledge that his disclosure may
lead to invocation of the criminal process, foster or institutional care for the
child or children, and termination of parental rights. These are all drastic
measures which some authorities believe may be even more harmful to a
child than the incestuous relationship itself.27 4 Nevertheless, in some juris-
dictions other than Marshall, disclosure is mandatory and failure to reveal
could subject the lawyer to discipline.2 75 Moreover, statutes in some juris-
dictions, including Marshall, provide criminal sanctions for failure to report
known or suspected child abuse. 2 76 Lawyers, however, are not included
among the named individuals required to report child abuse in Marshall.
2 77
Thus, whether or not the lawyer should reveal his client's incest de-
pends, first, on the substantive law and second, on his own judgment and
assessment of the situation. Since he has discretion in the matter under the
Marshall CPR, 2 78 he will have to decide whether protection of the client's
confidences should take precedence over the safety and welfare of children.
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that the parents'
attorney should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed for the chil-
dren if the court does not do so on its own initiative. This suggestion could
be made without disclosing any confidential information to the court by sim-
ply suggesting appointment of counsel without specifying a reason, and
would be a small intrusion on the attorney-client relationship compared to
the crucial interest at stake.
Even if counsel for the children is appointed, the parents' lawyer cannot
assume that counsel will learn of the incest, and this leads to another ques-
tion: May the parents' lawyer disclose the information to the children's
counsel? Although the question was not raised by inquiring attorney, the
committee addresses it as an important related question, governed by our
answer to the inquiring attorney's first question. Unfortunately, neither the
Marshall CPR2 79 nor the Model Rules280 specifies to whom disclosure of
272. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
273. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
274. See, e.g., Giarretto, supra note 23, at 148. "It is evident that typical community inter-
vention in most cases, rather than being constructive, has the effect of a knockout blow to a
family already weakened by serious internal stresses." Id. See also IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, ABUSE & NEGLECT 8.3 commentary at 70-71 (Tentative Draft 1981); J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 32, at 64.
275. See, e.g., FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(2) (1983).
276. Besharov reported that of the 39 states imposing penalties for failure to report child
abuse or neglect, 30 provide a criminal penalty only, one a civil penalty only, and four states
and one territory provide both civil and criminal penalties. Besharov II, supra note 222, at 480.
277. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1983). But see supra text accompanying note 228.
278. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
279. ABA CODE, supra note 178.
280. MODEL RULES, supra note 185.
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clients' confidences should be made when required or permitted by the rules.
It is the committee's opinion, however, that if the parents' lawyer determines
that he may or must disclose his clients' confidences, he should make disclo-
sure to the tribunal or other authority, but not to counsel for the children,
because the parents' attorney and children's counsel represent conflicting
interests.
(3) As to the related question of whether counsel for the children
should reveal the incest over the objection of his nine year old client, the
committee believes that if he learns of it from the child herself, the informa-
tion is a confidence. 2 11 If he learns of it from some other source during his
representation, it is a secret. 282 Either way, the information is confidential
and he should not reveal it, 28 3 assuming that the nine year old child is com-
petent to make such a decision. In assessing her competence, counsel may
want assistance from other professionals. The Comment to Model Rule 1.14
states that in dealing with a client under a disability, a "lawyer should con-
sult an appropriate diagnostician for guidance. ' 28 4 This guidance may be
helpful in assessing the child's competence.
ABA Informal Opinion 1160 (1971) gives similar advice regarding du-
ties and obligations ofjuvenile court lawyers.2 85 One question was whether
a lawyer who believes his juvenile client needs help, "should 'urge the child
to accept the professional help that is available through the court.' ",286 The
opinion cautioned that a lawyer should not try to substitute his judgment for
the special knowledge and experience of a professional social worker, penolo-
gist, or psychiatrist, and stressed the need for professionals to work
together.
287
If counsel for the children determines that the daughter is not compe-
tent to direct him not to make disclosure, he can either seek appointment of
a guardian ad htem ,288 or take responsibility and decide for himself whether
or not to make disclosure.28 9 If a guardian ad lem is appointed, counsel
should disclose the information to the guardian and abide by his or her deci-
sion as to further disclosure. If counsel takes responsibility himself for the
281. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(A).
282. Id
283. Id at DR 4-101(B)(1).
284. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14 Comment.
285. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1160 (1971).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14(b). "A lawyer may seek the appointment
of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest." Id. The
Comment to Rule 1.14 states,
When the client is a minor . . . maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship
may not be possible in all respects. . . . Nevertheless, a client lacking legal compe-
tence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing
extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For example, children
as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as
having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their
custody.
Id. at Rule 1.14 Comment.
289. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
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decision, he will be governed by the same considerations discussed in answer
to the first inquiry of this opinion.
If counsel decides not to disclose, he still must decide whether his proper
role is advocate for the child's wishes, advocate for what he believes is the
child's best interest, or neutral investigator and presenter of evidence includ-
ing the child's wishes, without advocating that or any other particular posi-
tion.290 The neutral role is the approach adopted by the New York Legal
Aid Society, when clients in neglect and dependency cases are too young to
understand the nature of the action.29 ' The Massachusetts Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics advised a different approach for a lawyer
appointed to represent a "child in need of services." '292 The lawyer "should
handle the case in the manner he or she considers to be in the best interest of
the child, even if contrary to the wishes of the child or the child's par-
ents." 29 3 Although counsel's role is enunciated by statutes in some states,
294
the matter is unsettled in Marshall. The committee believes, however, that
with counsel's advice and guidance, a mutually agreeable position can usu-






Chairperson, Marshall State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Re: Inquiry No. 84-1: Disclosure of Confidential Communications
Dear Larry:
When we took our straw vote on this inquiry a couple of weeks ago, I
didn't fully realize how complicated this "Catch-22" situation is. After stud-
ying the Truly, Wright and Good proposed opinions and the reports of the
experts on child abuse, I am more perplexed than ever about how to vote. I
am glad we will be able to discuss the matter further at our next meeting.
290. See IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
3.1(b) at 79-83 (1980).
291. Id at 82.
292. Mass. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 76-1 (1976).
Massachusetts General Law, chapter 119, section 21 defines a "child in need of serv-
ices" to include a child below the age of 17 who persistently runs away from home, or
persistently refuses to obey the lawful and reasonable commands of his parents or
guardians, or persistently and willfully fails to attend school, or persistently violates
lawful and reasonable school regulations.
Id
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (West 1983).
Sec. 10. The court, in every case filed under this act in which judicial proceedings
are necessary, shall appoint legal counsel to represent the child. The legal counsel, in
general, shall be charged with the representation of the child's best interests. To that
end, the attorney shall make further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain
the facts, interview witnesses, examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory and disposi-
tional hearings, make recommendations to the court, and participate in the proceed-
ings to competently represent the child.
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Here are some random thoughts that occurred to me as I pondered the draft
opinions.
(1) Allowing disclosure to be within the discretion of the parents' or
children's lawyers has some obvious advantages for lawyers in general, such
as providing for flexibility in assessment of the seriousness of the crime and
degree of harm likely to be inflicted. A lawyer cannot be disciplined for
making a bad judgment call. This is supported by a statement in the Scope
section of the Model Rules, "[t]he lawyer's exercise of discretion not to dis-
close information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination.
Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with the general pol-
icy of promoting compliance with law through assurances that communica-
tions will be protected against disclosure."
'295
On the negative side, lawyers exempt from discipline for failure to make
disclosure will be tempted to take the easy way out and never disclose, even
when the Code of Professional Responsibility grants them discretion to re-
veal future crimes. 296 They will pride themselves on their virtue in protect-
ing their client's confidences while ignoring their callous indifference to the
suffering of the weakest members of society, abused children.
(2) Another undesirable result of discretionary disclosure is that the
same set of facts will produce contrary results at the hands of individual
lawyers. The American public will see this as illogical and unconscionable.
Respect for law and our legal system will not be enhanced by such arbitrary
decision-making.
(3) If breach of confidentiality is a possibility, the question arises as to
whether the lawyer should advise his client of the possibility of disclosure at
the outset of representation. This question embodies what Professor Monroe
Freedman described as "Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma." The lawyer is
required "to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the
court. '297 Some commentators have suggested that lawyers should give cli-
ents a "Miranda warning" that breach of confidentiality is a possibility.2 98
Yet, in effect, this is cautioning them "not to be completely candid, '299 and
treating them as "nonclients. ' ' 300 This approach to client perjury is used by
the Canadian bar.30' A similar "preventive solution" was suggested by a
pair of Florida lawyers who wrote, "The dilemma embodied in Canon 4...
is perplexing but not insoluble. Education of the client as to the boundaries
of the attorney-client privilege is the key to the problem. ' 30 2 This simplistic
approach would, in Professor Freedman's words, "take us out of the
trilemma by one door only to lead us back by another. '30 3 In other words,
295. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Scope.
296. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR4-101(C)(3).
297. Freedman, Perjuty: The Lawyr 's Tn'emma, I LITIGATION 26, (1975).
298. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 50 (1978).
299. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
300. G. HAZARD, supra note 298, at 50.
301. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
302. Thomas & Barton, Ethical Dilemma: The Problem Posed by Canon 4, 3 FLA. B. CRIM. L.
NEWSLETTER 3 (June 1979).
303. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
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the lawyer would not "know everything" if his client withheld potentially
harmful facts for fear his lawyer would reveal them.
(4) Another question is whether silence on the lawyer's part as to the
damning information of his client's incestuous activity constitutes a decep-
tion on the court. The court needs all relevant information bearing on the
best interest and welfare of young, helpless children. By remaining silent,
the lawyer is allowing confidentiality to take precedence over his own hu-
manitarian impulses to help extricate an innocent third party from a harm-
ful and perhaps dangerous situation. Many laypersons would be shocked at
the lawyer's professionally-imposed callousness in keeping the information
secret.
Philosopher Sissela Bok would probably be shocked, as can be seen from
her writings, "[Tjhe bond of confidentiality can dim the perception of the
suffering imposed on outsiders .... "304 She recognizes, however, that in
making a promise, one sets up expectations, an equilibrium that is upset by
breaking the promise and failing to live up to these expectations, which is
unfair. 30 5 "[P]rofessional promises . . .are granted special inviolability so
that those who most need help will feel free to seek it."'30 6 Although she
cautions that promises must have limits,307 she advocates public debate to
set limits and standards for confidentiality and to increase knowledge about
what she considers to be "deceptive professional practices. ' 30 8 She recom-
mends that those affected should be included among the participants in the
debate.30 9 This philosophy makes one wonder whether laypersons were suf-
ficiently involved in the Kutak Commission public hearings on the Model
Rules.
(5) Let's assume the parents' lawyer decides that his duty is to reveal
their secret; how would he go about it? For one thing, he could tell the
parents that professional ethics require or permit, depending on whether the
language of the pertinent ethics code is mandatory or permissive, that he
reveal the information. In Marshall it is permissive. 3 10 (Should he have
advised them of this possibility at the outset before he received the informa-
tion, as discussed in my third question?) 3 1' The lawyer could suggest in his
advice to the child protection agency that the prosecutor or the court set up
an appropriate treatment program for the entire family which would be su-
pervised by the agency or the court. If the parents agree to cooperate and
participate in such a program, the prosecutor or the court might agree to
drop or suspend the neglect charges and to take no immediate action in
regard to the incest admission. With this kind of intervention and help it
might be possible to keep the family together and to spare the child the
further trauma of court proceedings and possible foster home or institutional
304. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 150 (1978).
305. Id. at 152.
306. Id.
307. Id
308. Id. at 162-63.
309. Id at 98-106.
310. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
311. See text immediately preceding note 297.
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care, or permanent parental severance. If this kind of help is not available or
the parents do not want it, then whether or not the lawyer should reveal,
depends on which of the three proposed opinions prevails.
I look forward to comments from other committee members before we






Although the State of Marshall and the individuals named in these
materials are purely fictional and bear no resemblance to persons living or
dead, the problems described occur. This item appeared in Newsweek on
January 23, 1984:
Punishing a Victim
After spending eight days in solitary confinement, a 12-year-
old girl named Amy was sent home last week by a California judge.
Her crime? Refusing to testify against her stepfather, a physician
charged with molesting her. How did authorities learn of the
crime? The family voluntarily sought help from a therapist who,
under state law, must report all cases of child abuse to the welfare
authorities. Will the father be punished? No, all charges were
dropped last week when Amy kept her silence. Now, can the family
begin therapy? Yes. As Amy has learned, home isn't the only
place where a child can be abused.
3 12
312. Punishtng a Victim, Newsweek, Jan. 23, 1984, at 70, col. 3.
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IMPEDING UNLAWFUL ARREST: A QUESTION OF
AUTHORITY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PENN LERBLANCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is it a crime for a person, otherwise acting in a lawful manner, to im-
pede the unlawful action of a police officer? This simple question springs
from an evolving historical context and evokes larger questions about the
interaction of a government with its citizens.
The existence of a sovereign state is predicated upon its ability to func-
tion effectively. Officials of the state are granted certain powers and duties
and, at the same time, are afforded certain privileges and protections in their
respective capacities. The grant of authority, coupled with the protection of
its exercise, is the basic scheme by which sovereign functions of the police
power are exercised. In part, soveriegn authority is protected by statutes
which make it a crime to resist a law enforcement officer in the performance
of his police duties. Offenses against officers are distinguishable from most
crimes because they are designed primarily to protect the state's authority.
This essential nature is illustrated by statutes which provide that while it is a
crime to assault a person, assault on an officer in the performance of his
duties is a distinct, more serious crime.'
The purpose of the general assault law is to protect against wrongful
attacks upon any person, citizen or official. It is the authority of the state
that is protected by the specific law prohibiting assault on an officer. The
enactment of these laws is one way the state implements its authority. How-
ever, values other than preservation of soveriegn authority are at stake, espe-
cially when someone impedes an official who is acting outside his authority.
Some insight to these values is gained by concentrating on the narrower
question of whether a person should be deemed to have committed a crime
when he resists or otherwise impedes an unlawful arrest by a known law
enforcement officer. The question of whether a citizen should be held crimi-
nally liable for impeding an unlawful arrest turns upon notions of authority.
An initial example may serve to illuminate the problem. A uniformed
police officer is directed by a police radio dispatcher to the Central Bank,
where a robbery has taken place. According to the report, the robbery was
committed by two male suspects who fled the bank, with $10,000 in two
bank money bags, in a light-colored, four-door sedan. When the officer ar-
* Vice Dean and Professor, California Western School of Law. LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity; J.D., University of Oklahoma; B.A., Oklahoma City University.
1. Battery on an officer is punishable by maximum imprisonment of one year while bat-
tery on one other than an officer is punishable by maximum imprisonment of six months. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 243 (West Supp. 1978). Greater punishment for battery on an officer is justified
because such an attack is a "greater social evil" than a similar attack upon a private citizen.
People v. Hanson, 53 Ill. 2d 79, 289 N.E. 2d 611, 613 (1972).
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rives at the bank, he stops a man walking on the sidewalk in front of the
bank. The officer tells the man that he is being detained for investigation in
connection with the robbery, and will be taken to the police station. The
man protests, declares his ignorance, and pulls his arm from the grasp of the
officer. A woman, claiming that the man, her husband, is innocent, moves
between the officer and the man, enabling the man to walk a few steps
before he is apprehended by another officer. The man and woman are then
taken by force to the police station, where they are jailed. Because no evi-
dence is found connecting the man and woman with robbery, the robbery
charge is dismissed. The man is prosecuted for resisting arrest, however, and
the woman for obstructing an officer. Subsequently, a court concludes the
officer had no warrant or probable cause to arrest the man. Thus, the arrest
for robbery is declared unlawful. What then is the legal consequence of the
finding that the arrest was unlawful on the resistance and obstruction
charge? Should the citizen be held criminally liable for impeding the unlaw-
ful action of an officer? This inquiry starts with an examination of the na-
ture of the various offenses against law enforcement officers. The inquiry
then reviews the common-law approach of allowing the right to resist an
unlawful arrest. The inquiry also considers the intriguing policy and legal
issues underpinning the position favoring a right to resist and the contrasting
position favoring a duty to submit in the face of an unlawful arrest. This
author submits that, upon examination, neither of these positions as a fixed
rule is desirable. It is argued that making a crime of resistance to an unlaw-
ful arrest is a conceptually flawed proposition and incapable of producing
the effects alleged by its advocates. Likewise, the common-law rule, that
resistance to unlawful arrest is not a crime, 2 in its rigidity and broad sweep,
has also reached beyond its logical justification. It is suggested here that
with or without a legal duty to submit to an unlawful arrest, the resistance
by a person thereto must be judged by the reasonableness of the circum-
stances to determine the criminality of the resistance.
II. OFFENSES AGAINST AUTHORITY
In the Anglo-American legal tradition, law enforcement officers have
the authority to arrest a person only under circumstances specified by law.
3
Obviously, arrest is an exercise of governmental authority. When the arres-
tee or another impedes the officer's performance of his arrest authority, effec-
tive law enforcement is impaired; the officer's person is imperiled, and the
authority of the state is jeopardized. For these reasons, such impairment has
universally been made a crime. To discourage behavior designed to impede
or defeat the lawful operation of government, the state may treat a knowing
attack upon a peace officer as involving a greater social evil than a similar
2. See, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950).
3. The prevailing rule is that while an officer may arrest with a warrant for any crime, an
officer is permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if reasonable grounds exist for
making the arrest. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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attack upon a private citizen. 4 The aim in criminalizing conduct which im-
pairs law enforcement is to prevent interference with the execution of official
duties and to protect law enforcement officers. 5
A. Forms of Prohibited Conduct
The category of crimes in which the gravamen of the offense is imped-
ing authorized conduct includes several differently named offenses, such as
obstruction, resistance, delay, impediment, assault, battery, or interference.
Although the name of the offense and nature of the prohibited conduct var-
ies, there is a common bond: the protection of authorized enforcement in a
variety of encounters. By way of illustration, California has enacted several
laws of this nature: it is a misdemeanor to "resist, delay, or obstruct" an
officer in discharging any duty;6 it is a felony to commit a battery on an
officer engaged in the performance of his duties;7 it is a felony to assault with
a deadly weapon an officer engaged in the performance of his duties;8 and it
is a crime to advocate injury or death to an officer.9
The New York Statutes provide that it is a misdemeanor for one to
obstruct, impair or pervert the administration of law or prevent public ser-
vants from performing official functions by means of intimidation, physical
force or interference, or unlawful act; 10 that it is a misdemeanor to resist
arrest;" and that it is a felony to assault an officer with resulting injury.'
2
4. People v. Hanson, 53 11. 2d 79, 289 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1972).
5. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 678 (1975); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S.
169, 175-76 (1958); MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West Supp. 1984): "Every person who wilfully resists, de-
lays, or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his
office, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 1984):
A battery is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both. When it is
committed against the person of a peace officer or fireman among others, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a
peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his duties, and such peace
officer or fireman is engaged in the performance of his duties, the offense shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $1000 or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year or by both. When it is committed against such a person and seri-
ous bodily injury is inflicted on him, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail for a period of not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding $1,000
or imprisonment in the state prison for sixteen months, two, or three years ....
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(c) (West Supp. 1984) provides:
Every person who commits an assault with a firearm upon the person of a peace
officer or fireman, and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a
peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the
peace officer or fireman is engaged in the performance of his or her duties shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for four, six, or eight years.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 151 (West Supp. 1984).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.05 (McKinney 1975):
A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intention-
ally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental
function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an offi-
cial function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of
any independently unlawful act.
Obstructing governmental administration is a class A misdemeanor.
11. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84): "A person is guilty of
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Congress also has made it a federal crime for a person to forcibly assault,
resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with a federal officer while
engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties.' 3 Most
jurisdictions have similar provisions. 14 This sampling of statutory language
employs different words, but the objective is the same: the protection of
authority.
The types of situational encounters which may evoke these criminal
sanctions are diverse and virtually indefinite. Potentially criminal conduct
may be classified into affirmative acts, passive conduct, and verbal en-
counters. As to affirmative physical acts, the striking or using of a weapon
upon an officer would be punishable conduct. Likewise, minor scuffling
which might occur in an attempt by the arrestee to pull away from an of-
ficer's grasp would be prohibited conduct impeding the officer function. 5
It is not necessary that the conduct amount to a battery. For example,
fleeing from the presence of an officer attempting to make an arrest is imped-
ing the officer's performance of his duty. 16 When a person is not the subject
of an officer's attention, he may nevertheless impede and obstruct the execu-
tion of a lawful process by an officer as when a citizen, not personally the
target of the process, conceals the subject of the arrest. I7 Likewise, a criminal
impediment will occur if a person blocks the access of an officer who is exe-
cuting a process or otherwise carrying out a duty. 8
The second category, passive conduct, may be defined as resistance by
physical inaction as where the arrestee takes no "affirmative" action in re-
sponse to an officer's order. Refusal to obey the orders of an officer, although
not involving physical force against the person of the officer, can interfere
with the performance of an officer's duty.19 Thus, it has been held to be a
resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a Police officer or peace
officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.
Resisting arrest is a class A misdemeanor."
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 1975) provides, in pertinent part: "A person is
guilty of assault in the second degree when: . . . (3) With intent to prevent a peace officer...
from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982), provides:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
14. See Annot. 44 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1972).
15. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 58 Cal. App. 3d 349, 129 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976) (assault
upon an officer with a deadly weapon); State v. Best, 91 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1922) (slight
pushing is obstruction).
16. See, e.g., In re Culver, 69 Cal. 2d 898, 447 P.2d 633, 73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968) (fleeing
arrest is resistance or obstruction). Contra Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74
(1925).
17. See, e.g., Campf v. State, 80 Ohio St. 321, 88 N.E. 887 (1909); State v. Johnson, 134 W.
Va. 357, 59 S.E.2d 485 (1950).
18. See, e.g., State v. Beck, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 587, 259 A.2d 149 (1969); Clovis v. Archie, 60
N.M. 239, 290 P.2d 1075 (1955) (blocking path of officer is obstruction).




crime if a person fails to leave the premises as ordered, 20 fails to submit to
inspection, 2 1 or fails to show identification or answer questions. 22 Ostensibly
passive conduct, mere inaction, may constitute a crime when a person refuses
to accept a ticket or otherwise delays or hinders an arrest. 23 A number of
cases have resulted in conviction because the arrestee sat down, went limp,
or otherwise did not cooperate with the arrest.
24
In the third category, verbal encounters, verbalization has been held to
be a crime, absent any physical conduct, be it affirmative or passive. This is
so, the courts reason, because comments have the potential to impair and
obstruct an officer's performance. 25 Criminal convictions have been based
on threats of physical violence, and threats of interference, absent other con-
duct, provided there was some apparent ability to carry out the threat.
2 6
Threats intended to terrify an officer are sufficient to constitute a crime.
27
Profanity toward an officer may constitute an offense where the language
used hindered or impaired the officer or made his job more difficult. 28 Some
limitation is found in the generalization that mere arguments or demonstra-
tions do not constitute a crime. 29 The intensity of such comments or the
totality of the circumstances, however, may amount to a criminal interfer-
ence.30 It has been held that criticism of an officer alone may not be suffi-
cient to constitute a crime unless it incites resistance or interference by
others. 3' Mere verbal intervention on behalf of another may be sufficient to
20. See, Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 253 N.E.2d 400 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1024
(1969) (refusal to obey police order to move is interference). Contra Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C.
570, 124 S.E. 2d 332 (1962), rev'd on other groundr, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (delay in moving as
ordered is not resistance).
21. See, e.g., State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060 (1955); People v. Mann, 44
Misc. 2d 786, 251 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1964).
22. The United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) that,
absent suspicion or cause to believe a person has committed a crime, an officer may not demand
identification. Prior to this decision some jurisdictions had held that refusal of a person to give
his name or address was a crime, East Brunswick v. Malfitano, 108 N.J. Super 244, 260 A.2d
862 (1970).
23. See,e.g., Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 102 N.W.2d 363 (1960) (refusal to accept
ticket); State v. Keehn, 135 Minn. 211, 160 N.W. 666 (1916) (refusal to accept summons); Peo-
ple v. Williams, 25 N.Y.2d 86, 250 N.E.2d 201 (1969) (refusal to act is resistance).
24. See, e.g., People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E. 2d 595 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1083 (1968) (went limp); People v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1962) (laid
down); People v. Schehr, 88 Ill. App. 2d 287, 232 N.E. 2d 566 (1967) (sat down).
25. Offenses against officers such as obstructing or resisting arrest are inchoate crimes in
that it is not necessary that the officer be prevented from performing his duty in order to sustain
a conviction. All that is necessary for conviction is that the defendant's action could have ob-
structed or interfered with the officer. See, e.g., People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich. App. 453, 166
N.W.2d 477 (1968).
26. See, e.g., People v. Maggio, 140 Cal. App. 246, 35 P.2d 369 (1934); State v. Jones, 202
Kan. 31, 446 P.2d 851 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 103 Ark. 391, 147 S.W.76 (1912); People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich.
App. 453, 166 N.W.2d 477 (1968).
28. State v. Harris, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967); State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752,
117 S.E. 581 (1923).
29. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'don other grounds, Boyle v. Lan-
dry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969).
30. State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969); State v. Harris, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967).
31. Gaston v. State, 239 Miss. 420, 123 So. 2d 546 (1960) (criticizing an officer does not
amount to an attempt to impede).
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constitute an offense when the advice has a tendency to encourage others to
resistive action. 32 Likewise, it is a crime to counsel others to interfere with
an officer even though the speaker does not participate in any actual
interference.
33
B. Blameworthy Mental State
The foregoing suggests that almost any conduct in the presence of an
officer could tend to hinder an officer in the performance of his duties. Ac-
cordingly, the requisite mental state sufficient to convict for impeding an
officer takes on critical significance.
In traditional criminal law analysis, it is generally recognized that there
are two components of every crime.34 One of these is objective and physical,
the prohibited conduct, known as the actus reus. The other component,
known as mens rea, is subjective and psychical. 35 The latter element can be
described as a state of mind that is: 1) "free from every factor which would
be recognized as sufficient for exculpation;"' 36 and, 2) characterized by an
"intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus of the offense, or some
other mental state recognized by law as a substitute therefore .... ,,37 By
way of restatement, it may be said that the mental component is a wrongful
or blameworthy mental state of some kind. Additionally, there may be a
special mental element necessary to convict for certain crimes.38 The Model
Penal Code has rejected this traditional terminology of general mens rea and
a special mental state component for certain crimes. 39 Jurisdictions follow-
ing the Code's lead set as a minimum requirement of culpability that a per-
son is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently with respect to each material element of the
offense.4°
In short, merely impeding an officer is insufficient to support a convic-
tion absent a finding that the requisite mental state was present while com-
mitting the prohibited conduct. That is, the impeding conduct was done by
one having a blameworthy mental state. There is no support at common
law or under modern statutes for the proposition that crimes against officers
are strict liability offenses, making actions criminal regardless of culpability.
There must be a finding that the actor's state of mind was wrongful, blame-
worthy, or culpable. 4 1 Most of the statutes describing a crime of impeding
an officer require that the offending conduct be "knowing" or "willful."
Moreover, the courts have spoken of the "scienter" requirement necessary for
32. See e.g., People v. King, 236 Mich. 405, 210 N.W.2d 235 (1976).
33. Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 41 N.W.2d 642 (1950).
34. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 546, 739, 834 (2d ed. 1969);
W. LAFAVE & A. SCo=t, CRIMINAL LAW (1972) 237.
35. R. PERKINS, supra note 34, at 743.
36. Id at 744.
37. Id
38. See generalbi R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed. 1969) 762.
39. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 and comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, (1955)).




conviction for resisting or impeding an officer.
42
The exact state of mind necessary for conviction, however, may be a
subject of debate. The accused's knowledge of the victim's status as an of-
ficer has been a particular point of contention. Some courts have held that
to support a conviction it must be shown that the defendant knew, or should
have known, that he was interfering with an officer and that the officer was
in the performance of an official duty.43 Other courts have held that it is not
always necessary that the defendant have knowledge that the person as-
saulted was an officer.4 4 The latter position does not, however, suggest the
elimination of the general mens rea or culpability requirement because there
must always be the intent to assault, even if the person arresting is not
known as an officer.
The prerequisite of an assault intent is best illustrated in the decisions
holding that a defendant may be exonerated if his actions were in self-de-
fense. 45 Actions in self-defense are inconsistent with an assault intent. An
action in self-defense is exculpatory because such action evidences a state of
mind which the law deems to be neither blameworthy nor culpable.
In view of the requisite mental state necessary for conviction, a critical
question is presented: Is it essential that an officer be performing an official
and lawful duty before one may be convicted of impeding that performance?
The question may be analyzed from two perspectives. First, has the crime of
impeding unlawful arrest been committed when the arrest is not a lawful act
because the officer lacks either the authorized means or objective for making
such an arrest? The focus of this first perspective is on whether there has
been an impediment to the officer's authorized performance. Second, if
there is conduct which has impeded an officer's act and that act is not a
lawful performance of an official duty, is the conduct the product of a
blameworthy state of mind? The focus of the second perspective is on culpa-
bility. From the first perspective, the absence of a lawful performance by the
officer has a bearing on whether the conduct is a criminal deed. From the
second perspective, the absence of a lawful performance by the officer may
be an exculpatory factor.
The issues presented by the absence of a lawful performance by the
officer suggests that crimes of resistance are not so much offenses against an
officer as a person, but rather are offenses against authority. This somewhat
elementary observation is nonetheless a valuable touchstone. The absence of
lawfulness contradicts the idea of authority. Impeding an unlawful act
would thus appear to present no threat to authority. Before analyzing this
problem from either of the above perspectives, a useful understanding is pro-
vided by a review of legal concepts related to criminal liability for impeding
an officer who is performing an unlawful arrest.
42. Set, e.g., Hargett v. United States, 183 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Bell,
219 F. Supp. 260 (N.Y. 1963).
43. See, e.g., People v. Young, 100 Ill. App. 2d 20, 241 N.E.2d 587 (1968); People v. Curtis,
70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 655.
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III. RESISTANCE TO UNLAWFUL ARREST
A. Unlawfulness
In what respect is an arrest considered unlawful? And what effect, if
any, does invalidating the arrest have on the lawfulness of the resistance?
Any arrest is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the per-
son seized is guilty or innocent.46 Whenever a police officer accosts an indi-
vidual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person.
Seizure of a person by an officer "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,
and it is not to be undertaken lightly."'47 The authority of an officer to arrest
is generally limited to certain circumstances delineated by statute.48 When
so executed, the arrest is a lawful performance of an official duty by the
arresting officer. An officer's authority to arrest or otherwise seize an indi-
vidual is further defined in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has
fashioned the constitutional limits on the lawful seizure of a person by an
officer.4 9 An arrest is lawful only to the extent that it was executed within
the statutory and constitutional authorization. Otherwise, the arrest is
deemed unlawful. If the arrest is not lawful, it is questionable whether the
officer was engaged in the lawful performance of an official duty. 50
As to a lawful arrest, an officer is authorized by law to execute an arrcst
when he has been issued a warrant to arrest a named person."' Additionally,
under the traditional standard, an officer may arrest without a warrant for a
felony or misdemeanor committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable grounds to believe that the
person arrested committed a felony.5 2 The absence of probable cause to
believe that a crime was committed by the person being arrested would
render the arrest invalid whether it was executed with or without a
warrant.
53
The circumstances which render an arrest unlawful vary, but they can
be roughly categorized into four groups. First, where the officer is executing
an arrest under a warrant, the arrest may be unlawful if the warrant was
facially defective. Second, although the warrant is facially sufficient, it may
be found invalid if not lawfully issued. Third, in the instance of a warrant-
less arrest, the arrest will be unlawful if the arresting officer did not have
probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed a crime in his
presence or lacked probable cause to believe the arrestee had committed a
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Id
48. Id See, e.g., N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW, §§ 120.20, 140.05, 140.10 (McKinney
1981).
49. See generally WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITS ON
LAWFUL SEIZURE, § 2.03 (1980).
50. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn. Supp. 531, 375 A.2d 417, 425 (1977);
see tnzfa notes 155-173 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 48, 49.
52. Id
53. See,e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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felony outside his presence. Finally, an arrest which is otherwise lawful may
be unlawful if the officer employs excessive force in executing the arrest.
The first three kinds of unlawful arrests are determined primarily by the
objective facts of the situation, focusing on the conduct of the arrestee. The
officer's state of mind is another factor that may have a bearing on each of
these instances; that is, did the officer act in good faith, bad faith, or negli-
gently in executing the arrest? There has been no serious suggestion that an
otherwise lawful arrest will be rendered invalid if the officer acted negli-
gently or in bad faith. It may make a difference if an unlawful arrest is
executed in good faith. Generally, courts have held that if there is no prob-
able cause for an arrest, the arrest is nonetheless unlawful for numerous pur-
poses even though the officer may have acted in good faith. The officer's
good faith is, however, a critical factor in deciding whether the officer, in
performing an unlawful arrest, is guilty of false arrest or some other tort.
The Supreme Court now takes the view that if an officer acts in a rea-
sonable, good faith, though mistaken, belief that his actions were authorized,
evidence seized thereby will not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. 54
Thus, it could be argued that the officer's good faith in executing an unlaw-
ful arrest may be considered for purposes of deciding whether the officer,
when making an unlawful arrest, is performing a lawful duty. It is interest-
ing that the courts in discussing resistance to an unlawful arrest, ordinarily
have not analyzed the problem in terms of good faith or negligence by the
officer. Rather, the lawfulness of the arrest, without reference to the officer's
good faith or negligence, has been the sole determinative factor in judging
whether the resistance was justified.
B. The Right to Resist
The early common law might have developed differently had it fash-
ioned a notion that all arrests made by a known officer must be considered
lawful at the time of their occurrence, with continuing legality until such
time as a court ruled otherwise. A presumption of legality, applied to the
circumstance of an arrestee's resistance, would have meant that failure to
submit to an arrest would be a crime, even though the arrest was later ruled
unlawful. The rationale could have been that willful defiance of apparent
legality, not yet proved otherwise, should not be excusable. This is not, how-
ever, how the law developed.
The judicial determination of guilt for resistance focused on the re-
quired elements of the resistance offense. One such critical element, the
courts reasoned, was that the officer must be performing a lawful duty of his
office. As a result, there quickly emerged an almost universal rule that an
unlawful arrest, one without a valid warrant or probable cause, is not a
54. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984). See also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). Seegeneraly Com-
ment, The Good Faith Exception: The Seventh Circuit Limits the Exclusionay Rule in the Adminrstratioe
Context, 61 DEN. LJ. 597 (1984).
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"duty" of an officer. 55 Partly for this reason, the prevailing common-law
rule is that if an officer conducting an illegal arrest is not performing a law-
ful duty, the arrestee has a right to resist and defend against the unlawful
arrest.
56
The genesis for this centuries old common-law rule is rooted in the view
that an action by an official in excess of his authority constituted a trespass.
Trespass by the official was a "provocation" to the arrestee justifying the use
of physical force in repelling the trespass.
In Hopkin Huggett's Case,5 7 the defendant and others had killed a consta-
ble who was illegally attempting to impress a man into the army. Although
the victim of the impressment apparently offered no resistance, others had
sought to physically prevent the constable's action. Because their efforts had
resulted in the death of the constable, they were charged with murder. The
court, however, stated that "if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his
liberty . . . [it] is a provocation to all other men . . . to endeavour his res-
cue." 58 Since the defendant's initial intrusion was thus justified, he was not
guilty of murder, but of manslaughter. This rule was amplified in the often
cited case of The Queen v. Toley.59 Tooley and others had interfered with a
constable, causing his death, while the constable was attempting an unlawful
arrest. Tooley's murder conviction was set aside because "if anyone against
the law imprison a man, he is an offender." 6 The court reasoned the con-
stable's offending conduct "to be a sufficient provocation", 6 1 justifying the
defendant's interference. Where an unlawful arrest by a constable provoked
an assault on the constable not resulting in homicide, the English courts held
that there was no crime committed by the arrestee because the assault was
excused by the officer's unlawful arrest.
62
The common law in this country adopted the same rationale where an
officer, without probable cause, attempted an arrest. By 1900, this rule was
so firmly established that it was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in John
Bad Elk v. United States.63 In that case, a conviction for murder of an officer
was reversed because "the court clearly erred in charging that the policeman
had the right to arrest the plaintiff in error, and to use such force as was
necessary to accomplish the arrest, and that the plaintiff in error had no
right to resist it."'64 The court stated this rule: "If the officer had no right to
arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no
more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the
55. Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950); People
v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1969).
56. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900);see Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1078
(1972).
57. 84 Rev. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
58. Id.
59. 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
60. 92 Eng. Rep. at 353.
61. Id
62. See, e.g., The King v. Curvan, 168 Rev. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826); The King v. Thomp-
son, 168 Rev. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
63. 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
64. Id at 534.
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attempt to arrest." '65 If such resistance causes the death of the officer, "the
offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have
been murder . . . to manslaughter.
'66
In 1948, the Supreme Court again had occasion to observe that "[o]ne
has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold
the right of resistance in proper cases."16 7 During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, this right became well established in American jurisdic-
tions. Although subjected to some limitations, the common-law rule remains
preeminent, having been rejected in only a few modern cases. 68 The rule,
however, has been abrogated to a significant degree by a recent legislative
trend.69 Before examining the trend of abrogation and its impact, this arti-
cle examines the scope of the common-law rule as employed in the United
States.
Under the common-law rule, a person has the privilege to resist an un-
lawful arrest with force sufficient to avoid the arrest, 70 short of resistance
which results in homicide. 7i The degree of force allowed is that "absolutely
necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest."' 7 2 Unneces-
sary force in revenge or disproportionate to effect an escape, as determined
by the circumstances of each case, is not privileged. 73 As noted in the early
English and American cases, the privilege to resist an unlawful arrest does
not permit the killing of the arrestor. 7 4 If death of an officer occurs, the
illegality of the arrest would most likely serve only to reduce the resulting
charge from murder to manslaughter. Some courts have found the force
employed by the arrestee, although not causing death, to be excessive and
not privileged where the arrestee inflicted great bodily harm7 5 or used a
deadly weapon.
76
These limitations on lawful resistance are based on the familiar criminal
law concept that the privilege of self-defense is limited to the use of force
65. Id at 535 (citation omitted).
66. Id at 534.
67. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948).
68. Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1078, 1081 (1972) ("it is not true that the common-law rule has
been abandoned more often than upheld in the modern cases"). The courts in five jurisdictions
have rejected the common-law rule. See intfa note 117.
69. For jurisdictions which abrogated the common-law rule by statute see tnfra note 117.
70. See, e.g. , Jones v. State, 4 Md. App. 616, 244 A.2d 459 (1968); People v. Gray, 23 Mich.
App. 139, 178 N.W.2d 172 (1970); Long v. State, 223 Tenn. 238, 443 S.W.2d 476 (1969).
71. See, e.g., State v. Cadena, 9 Ariz. App. 369, 452 P.2d 534 (1969); Morris v. Common-
wealth, 411 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1967); State v. Messley, 366 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963); Banner v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 133 S.E.2d 305 (1963).
72. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535 (1900).
73. State v. Miller, 253 Minn. 112, 91 N.W.2d 138 (1958) (disproportionate resistance);
People v. McNeil, 21 A.D. 2d 1, 247 N.Y.S.2d 734, affid, 15 N.Y.2d 717, 204 N.E.2d 648, 256
N.Y.S.2d 614 (1964) (revenge); Shelton v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 310, 460 S.W.2d 869
(1970) (unnecessary force).
74. See supra note 71. There is authority in a few states justifying use of deadly force merely
to prevent arrest. See,e.g., Perdue v. State, 5 Ga. App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909); State v. Bethune,
12 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919).
75. Abrams v. United States, 237 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1018 (1957).
76. Walters v. State, 403 P.2d 267 (Okla. Crim. 1965) (pulling gun not justified).
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which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.7 7 Indeed, it has
been said that a warrantless arrest, without probable cause, may be resisted
as self-defense. 78  Thus, a peaceful arrest by one known to be an officer,
where the arrestee has no reason to apprehend maltreatment, other than
normal detention, would justify only reasonable force to avoid capture. This
standard of reasonable force is violated when the arrestee inflicts great bod-
ily injury on, or creates a great risk of death to, the officer or others.
79
The rule permitting forceful resistance does not extend to an arrest
under a warrant which is legally sufficient on its face, although suffering
from some latent defect.80 English cases disallowed the privilege to resist
where there was a mere technical defect in the arrest warrant.8 1 A legal
process which is valid on its face must be obeyed without forceful resistance,
but one that is patently unlawful would justify resistance, at least in theory.
The American courts have recognized a similar exception to the resist-
ance privilege when an officer is acting under the authority of a court.
8 2 If
the court writ is sufficient on its face to show its purpose, even though it may
be defective or irregular in some respects, the party being served is not privi-
leged to forcefully resist the officer serving the writ.83 One court reasoned
that a contrary rule would jeopardize the life of all officers by requiring
them to determine the strict legal sufficiency of every precept placed in their
hands.
84
A more sound theoretical foundation for this exception to the common-
law rule would seem to be that the arrestee, unaware of the latent defect,
should perceive that he is being lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid war-
rant and thus has no justification to defend himself against an unwarranted
intrusion upon his liberty. Justified self-defense is predicated upon the rea-
sonable appearance of necessity. Thus, because the impending custody ap-
pears to be lawful, the arrest under a facially valid warrant is not a
circumstance giving occasion to defend one's liberty.
C. Resisting Excessive Force
Closely related to the right-to-resist rule, is the common-law rule that
the subject of a lawful arrest, where probable cause exists, is privileged to
resist the arrest to the extent necessary to protect against excessive or unnec-
essary force.85 Just as one who is subject to attack by another citizen has the
77. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 993-95 (2d ed. 1969); W. LAFAVE and A.
Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAW 391-94 (1972).
78. State v. Wright, 1 N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, afld, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897
(1968).
79. See Abrams v. United States, 237 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 1018
(1957); Long v. State, 223 Tenn. 238, 443 S.W.2d 476 (1969).
80. State v. Wright, I N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, affd 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897
(1968).
81. See The Queen v. Davis, I Leigh & Cave's C.C. Res. 64 (Camarthen Assizes 1861); J.
TURNER, I RUSSELL ON CRIME 508-11 (11th ed. 1958).




85. Seegenerally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 3d 281 (1977).
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right to meet the attack with such force as he reasonably believes is necessary
to save his life or prevent a serious bodily injury, an arrestee retains the right
of self-defense to meet excessive force by an officer.
86
The use of excessive force by the officer in effecting an arrest amounts to
an assault against which the arrestee or another is justified in defending.
When an officer uses excessive physical force to effectuate an arrest the of-
ficer is said to exceed the scope of his authority.8 7 If the arrestee defends
himself from such force, the officer could not be considered to have been
injured or attacked while engaged in the performance of his duties. 8 The
absence of authority gives rise to the privilege to resist. Not only would the
arrestee not be guilty of assault when resisting excessive force by an officer
during a lawful arrest, but if it was necessary, or appeared necessary, for the
defendant to kill the officer in self-defense, the arrestee would be guilty of no
offense.8 9 In short, the arrestee is privileged to defend against an unneces-
sary life-endangering attack by an officer.
This privilege to resist is premised on the right of a person to defend
against unlawful attacks. When an officer exceeds his authority, he becomes
the unprivileged attacker. As such, he is no longer immune from attack.
The force that may be employed under this privilege is all force, even
deadly, which would appear to a reasonable person to be necessary to pre-
vent the impending injury.°0 The privilege to resist an unlawful arrest and
the privilege to resist excessive force during lawful arrest are grounded on the
same principle: defensive resistance by an arrestee is privileged, excusing
otherwise criminal acts, when the officer has exceeded his authority. As to
criminality of the arrestee who resists the unauthorized acts of the officer,
such resistance can not be the basis for a conviction for resistance, obstruc-
tion or assault, assuming the resistance is reasonable. Under this rule, ac-
tions of an officer exceeding his authority will defeat a conviction for an
offense designed to protect an officer while in the performance of his duties.
D. Criticsm of the Right to Resist
Despite the wide acceptance of the historic rule allowing forceful resist-
ance to an unlawful arrest, the rule has been subject to criticism.91 The
fountainhead of this criticism is found in a remarkably short passage, unen-
cumbered by the citation of authorities, in a 1942 article proposing "The
Uniform Arrest Act." 92 According to this proposal, the common-law rule
86. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 39-40, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719-20
(1969); State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 280 (1970); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569,
27 S.E. 2d 91, 98 (1943).
87. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320, 285 A.2d 399, 404 (1971).
88. Id
89. Condron v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 513, 155 S.W. 253, 257 (1913).
90. Id If an officer uses excessive force, but not deadly force, in executing a lawful arrest
and is killed by the defending arrestee, the arrestee is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If the
officer was unnecessarily employing deadly force and is killed by the defending arrestee, the
arrestee is guilty of no crime. See also Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).
91. See generally Comment, The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119
(1967); Note, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Out-Dated Concept? 3 TULSA L.J. 40 (1966).
92. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 330 (1942). This proposed act was
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allowing resistance was predicated upon two factors which no longer obtain:
1) the likely success of resistance,93 and 2) avoidance of the dangers attend-
ing early day incarceration.
94
As to the possibilities of successful resistance, the article argued that the
law of arrest had its origin at a time when resisting constables "armed only
with staves and swords" 95 did not involve serious dangers whereas today the
modern officer is armed with firearms. 96 While at early common law, an
arrestee might successfully avoid arrest without causing death or serious bod-
ily injury, in modern times, "successful resistance is usually possible only by
shooting the officer."'9 7 Since "an innocent man will not kill" to avoid arrest
and will probably be unarmed, he "will be unable to resist successfully.
'" 9 3
Thus, it was reasoned that the right to resist "can be exercised effectively
only by the gun-toting hoodlum or ganster." 99 As to the second factor, com-
mentators argue that the right to resist was formulated at a time when arrest,
lawful or unlawful, would result in certain dangers of long imprisonment
and probably physical torture. 100
Through this logic, it was reasoned that the basis for the common-law
rule had eroded to the point where the rule should be rejected. Because the
common-law rule was an anachronism, a new rule should be adopted to the
effect that: "If a person has reasonable ground to believe that he is being
arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any
weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis
for the arrest." 10' The duty to submit is triggered not by the lawfulness of
arrest, but by the presence of a known officer. According to its author, this
proposed rule "imposes no penalty for using force to resist an arrest by a
known officer. Making such action illegal, however, prevents the person the
officer was seeking to arrest from defending a prosecution for murder, man-
slaughter, or felonious assault on the ground that the resistance was
legal." 1
0 2
There is no comment under the proposal as to whether resistance, short
of a serious injury, would constitute a crime of obstruction or resistance. Ar-
guably if the proposal "imposes no penalty" for resisting, the duty to refrain
from using force or a weapon seeks only to eliminate an effective defense in
the event of substantial injuries to the officer. If this is the case, then resist-
ance to an arrest which does not involve serious force is outside the proposed
duty to refrain and would not constitute the less serious crimes of resistance
or obstruction. This conclusion, however, is troublesome if the effect of the
apparently drafted under the auspices of the "Interstate Commission on Crime." It was not a
uniform act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.








101. Id. at 345.
102. Id at 331.
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proposed rule is simply to remove any privilege to resist an unlawful arrest.
If there is no privilege to resist, it seems to follow that any resistance, whether
serious or not, would be criminal.
The criticism of the common-law rule allowing resistance is also pre-
mised on the ground that the rule has no social utility.' 0 3 Resistance is seen
as futile in view of modern police weaponry which makes it quite "unlikely
that a suspect . . . can escape from or effectively deter an arrest .... 04
Resistance is not only perceived as futile, but "[florce begets force, and esca-
lation into bloodshed is a frequent probability."' 10 5 Resistance, it is argued,
is likely to result in great injury to the party resisting as well as to the officer
and innocent bystanders.
The critics also contend that the "concept of self-help is in decline."'
10 6
This decline is desirable because the arrestee should challenge the illegality
of the arrest in court rather than in the street through violence. 10 7 Moreover,
it is suggested that self-help is no longer necessary because adequate legal
remedies are available for unlawful arrests through bail, civil action for dam-
ages, civil injunction to prevent police abuse and administrative review of
unauthorized police conduct.10 8 Resort to legal and administrative remedies
is urged as preferable to forceful resistance, especially when the decision that
an arrest is illegal may be a close question. 10 9
The more appealing criticisms of the common-law right to resist are
premised on a pragmatic consideration: decreasing the risk of violence and
encouraging "a far more reasonable course" in resorting to legal process to
challenge the validity of an arrest.'10 Opponents of self-help urge that the
most sensible way to develop the law is to incorporate provisions intended to
reduce clashes of force. The underlying assumption of this viewpoint is that
a changed rule, abolishing a right to resist, will have a significant impact on
private conduct, encouraging socially desirable behavior. This assumption
may or may not be accurate, but it is undoubtedly the motivating force for a
new rule that a person is not justified in forcefully resisting an unlawful ar-
rest by a known officer."I'
E. Abrogation of The Right to Resist
The Model Penal Code, section 3.04(2) (a) (i), as proposed by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in 1958, provides: "The use of force is not justifiable...
103. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
104. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1969).
105. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 184, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (App. Div. 1965).
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id.; State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
109. Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Crim. 1976) ("The line between an illegal
and legal arrest is too fine to be determined in a street confrontation; it is a question to be
decided by the courts.").
110. State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347,
450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 436
(App. Div. 1965).
111. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 92 at 330; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) comment 2
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer,
although the arrest is unlawful. ' ' 2 The comment to the Model Penal Code
acknowledged that this provision was a departure from and contrary to ex-
isting law, both penal and tort.11 3 The American Law Institute submitted
that there ought not be a privilege to use force against a known public officer
attempting to arrest an individual since "[i]t should be possible to provide
adequate remedies against illegal arrest."
'"14
This denial of a justification for the use of forceful resistance has no
application when the arrestee foresees bodily injury, unlawfully threatened
by the arresting officer. Moreover, this provision does not apply to resisting
an unlawful arrest by a person not known by the arrestee to be a peace
officer. According to the American Law Institute, the reasons for demand-
ing submission to official action "are obviously less persuasive in the case of
private action."' 15
Apparently only three jurisdictions had enacted legislation which abro-
gated the common-law right to resist before the promulgation of the Model
Penal Code in 1958.'16 Since that date, at least twenty-one jurisdictions
have enacted provisions, similar to section 3.04(2)(a)(i) of the Code, provid-
ing that there is no justification for forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest
by a known officer. 11 7 At least five jurisdictions have, by judicial decision,
abrogated the common-law right to resist, a development which itself adds
another dimension to the discussion."
8
While it may be true that the common-law rule has been upheld more
often than abandoned in modern cases, the trend clearly has been towards
legislation which abrogates the common-law rule. The primary impetus for
this trend may be the Model Penal Code. The rationale of the Model Code
has been followed to the extent that in recent legislative revisions all jurisdic-
tions have continued to allow persons to resist unlawful arrests by persons
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1958).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i) comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
114. Id
115. Id
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West Supp. 1970) (enacted 1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 594.5 (1974) (enacted 1941); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-10 (1981) (enacted 1941).
117. ALA. CODE tit. 13A § 3-28 (Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.400; ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 13-404(B) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-512(1) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-103(2)
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-23 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(d) (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.051(1) (West 1976); HAw. REV. STAT. § 703-304(4)(a) (1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 § 7-7(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.12 (West 1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3217 (Vernon); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.060(1) (1975); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-3-
108 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-904(2) (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney's 1975 &
Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(1) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.260; 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i) (1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-11-5 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 9.3 1(b)(2) (Vernon 1974).
118. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426-27 (Alaska 1969); State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446,
511 P.2d 263, 266-68 (1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d
607, 611-12 (Iowa 1978) (judicially applied before effective date of statutory abrogation); State
v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 433-36 (App. Div. 1965), approved in State v.
Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 279 (1970); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St. 2d
173, 324 N.E.2d 735, 739-40, cert. dented, 423 U.S. 872 (1975).
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not known to be officers.' 19 All jurisdictions have continued to allow the use
of force to resist excessive force by the officer in making a legal or an illegal
arrest. 120 At least eleven jurisdictions which have recently enacted revised
penal codes have rejected the position of the Model Penal Code, thereby
retaining the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest by an officer.' 2 '
There is also a noteworthy judicial trend abrogating the right to resist.
In five states, the courts have taken it upon themselves to change the law,
disallowing the justifiable use of force to resist a mere unlawful arrest by a
known officer.' 2 2 This judicial trend has origins in State v. Koonce,' 23 a lower
New Jersey case which acknowledged the existence of the common-law right
to resist. The Koonce court, however, observed that it was free to examine the
continued appropriateness of such a rule absent statutory enactment or ex-
press adoption by a higher New Jersey court. After acknowledging the force
of the arguments to abolish the common-law rule, the court in Koonce de-
clared the new law that: "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest
by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer
engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal
under the circumstances obtaining."'
24
Since the defendant, Koonce, resisted arrest when the common-law rule
was still operative in New Jersey, the court held that the law would have
prospective application only. Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously approved the rationale of Koonce and formally "put to rest the
notion that the common-law rule" was applicable in New Jersey. 1
25
The courts in four other jurisdictions have followed the lead of New
Jersey in abandoning the common-law rule.' 26 Somewhat surprisingly,
these decisions did not limit their revisionist holdings to mere prospective
application. Rather, in these jurisdictions, the courts gave their new rule
retrospective application. Three of the courts did not address the problem of
retrospective application, but the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas,
12 7
found no reason not to apply a no-resistance rule to conduct occurring
before the court announced its changed position. According to the court in
Thomas, "the constitution neither commands nor forbids retrospective appli-
119. All of the statutory revisions speak of force not being justified in resisting an arrest "by
a peace officer" even though the arrest is unlawful. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (b)
(Vernon 1974).
120. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(c) (Vernon 1974): "The use of force to resist
an arrest or search is justified: (1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or
person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the
arrest or search; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is imme-
diately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or at-
tempted use of greater force than necessary."
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 108; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.03 1; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 627:4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-8; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3095; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
402; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A. 16.020(3); WIs. STAT. ANN § 939.48.
122. See supra note 118.
123. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
124. Id., 214 A.2d at 436.
125. State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 279 (1970).
126. See supra note 118.
127. 262 N.W.2d 607"(Iowa 1978).
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cation of the above judicial ruling to these defendants."' 28 The court rea-
soned that "because blind reliance on old case law is patently unreasonable
in light of widespread criticism during recent years, no equitable impedi-
ment to retrospective application here exits.'
1 29
Thus there has been a significant erosion of the universal privilege to
resist an unlawful arrest both by legislative enactments and court rules
forbiding forceful resistance. This change is premised on a policy judgment
that resistance is imprudent and unnecessary. The resulting impact on the
criminalization of resistance, to be explored next, may be something quite
different than that anticipated by the revisionists.
IV. DUTY TO SUBMIT AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE
TO SUBMIT
In jurisdictions where the common-law right to resist has been abro-
gated, the question arises: Does the abrogation of a privilege to resist create
a "new crime" or otherwise expand criminal liability for resistive conduct?
Since the legislative changes disallowing a right to resist are found in codes
under the general rubric of justifications,13 0 it can be said that such provi-
sions do not create a new crime as such. But if a legal justification for em-
ploying force against another is eliminated, is it not the practical effect to
make that force unlawful, and therefore criminal? Prohibiting resistance
may not establish a new crime as such, but in making resistance illegal, the
resisting arrestee is arguably subject to punishment for the typical offenses of
resisting arrest, obstruction, or assault on an officer.
The Uniform Arrest Act provision prohibiting resistance imposes "no
penalty" for using force to resist a known officer.'l 3 The author of this pro-
posal suggested that the provision, by "making such action illegal," elimi-
nates the justification defense that the homicide and felonly assault offenses,
springing from the resistance, were legal.' 32 Is this to say that obstruction
and resistance, short of felony assault or homicide, would not be committed
by an arrestee who forcefully resists an unlawful arrest by a known officer?
It might be argued that passive resistance is not obstruction or resist-
ance under this reading of a provision disallowing a privilege to resist. It
would be more difficult to say that forceful resistance involving some affirm-
ative contact with the officer, such as struggling to escape the grasp of the
officer, is not obstruction or resistance. Such a touching of the officer
amounts to a common-law battery, absent a justification for doing so. It is
incongruous to say that a person's conduct amounted to a battery of the
officer, but did not amount to obstruction or resistance. It is a more plausi-
ble reading that a non-injury resistance, although involving some touching
of an officer, would not constitute a felony assault on the officer but would
128. Id. at 611-12 (emphasis in original).
129. Id
130. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (Mc-
Kinney 1975 & Supp. 1983).




constitute the crime of obstruction or a resistance. This may, however, be an
unlikely projection in view of the traditional definition of obstruction or
resistance as any conduct that might hinder the performance of an officer.
Consideration of the problem of whether disallowance of a privilege to
resist renders resistance a crime suggests another formulation of the issue: Is
it necessary for the officer to be performing a lawful duty in order to convict
a person for resisting arrest, obstruction, assault or any crime of impairing
the performance of an officer? If so, does the disallowance of resistance
transform an unlawful arrest into the performance of a lawful duty? It is one
thing to say that there is no justified use of force against a known officer
during an unlawful arrest. It is quite another to say that an unlawful arrest
has thereby been "authorized" as a lawful performance of an official duty.
It should be remembered that the offenses of obstruction, resisting ar-
rest, and the like, include the essential elements that the officer be attempt-
ing a "lawful arest," 133 an "authorized arrest,"' 34 or otherwise be in the
performance of a "duty."'
135
What then is the effect of the arrestee's duty to submit to an unlawful
arrest upon the question of whether an unlawful arrest can be classified as an
authorized performance of an officer? Interestingly, at least three different
views have emerged in answer to this question: First, that an unlawful arrest
is authorized for the purpose of criminalizing resistance thereto; second, that
abrogation of a right to resist an unlawful arrest does not convert resistance
into a crime; and third, that resistance is not the crime of resisting, but does
constitute a lesser crime of simple assault.
A. Unlawful Arrest as "Authorized Conduct"
The prohibition against forcefully resisting an unlawful arrest has been
interpreted by several courts to mean that an unlawful arrest is an author-
ized act of the officer for purposes of deciding whether forceful resistance is a
crime. This is the position articulated by the courts in Illinois.
The Illinois Criminal Code, section 31-1, provides that it is a crime,
punishable by fine and imprisonment, for a person to knowingly resist or
obstruct "the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
of any authorized act within his official capacity .... *136 In another part
of the Illinois Criminal Code, under the heading of justifications, section 7-7
provides: "A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he
knows is being made . . . by a police officer . . . , even if he believes that
the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful."' 3 7 The Illinois
133. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a), which provides that an attempt to inflict bodily
injury upon a peace officer making an "unlawful arrest" is aggravated assault.
134. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAws § 205.30 (McKinney Supp. 1983), which provides that it is
a misdemeanor for a person to prevent or attempt to prevent a peace officer from effecting an
"authorized arrest."
135. See,e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (1970 & West Supp. 1984), which provides that it is a
felony for a person to commit a battery upon a peace officer "engaged in the performance of his
duties."
136. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
137. Id § 7-7.
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Supreme Court in People v. Locken 138 held that "the legislature, by adopting
section 7-7, intended that the making of an unlawful arrest is to be consid-
ered an 'authorized act' for purposes of section 31-1." 13 9 Consequently, the
court reasoned, resistance to an unlawful arrest by a known officer is the
crime of resisting or obstruction under section 31-1.
A fuller explanation for this conclusion is not found in Locken, but can
be found in other Illinois judicial decisions. One court reasoned that "au-
thorized" as used in the crime of resisting or obstruction, section 31-1, means
"endowed with authority." 14 Since "a peace officer is endowed with au-
thority to make an arrest . . . his act of arrest is authorized to the extent that
a person may not use force to resist or obstruct the arrest, even though it may
in fact be an unlawful arrest." 14 1 In another case where there was no prob-
able cause for an arrest, the Illinois court held that the arrestee's conduct of
running into his house after being arrested was an act of physical or forceful
resistance. 142 Thus, in fleeing the officer, the arrestee committed a crime
under section 31-1 since the policeman's "office gives him the authority to
make an arrest," notwithstanding that it is an unlawful arrest.
143
An early federal court decision interpreting these Illinois provisions
ruled that "authorized" as used in the resistance or obstruction offense, sec-
tion 31-1, would "include only resistance or obstruction of the legal acts of
police."' 4 By virtue of section 7-7, the exception to this rule would be ob-
struction or resistance to unlawful arrest, according to the federal court.
145
Thus, the Illinois statutes, as interpreted by State and Federal courts, pro-
vide that an unlawful arrest is an "authorized act" of an officer for purposes
of deciding guilt for the crime of resistance or obstruction.
A similar view has evolved in a series of federal cases construing 18
U.S.C. § 111, which makes it a felony to assault, resist, or interfere with a
federal officer "while engaged in or on account of the performance of his
official duties."'14 6 In United States v. He/iczer 14 7 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
Engag[ing] in . . . performance of official duties is simply acting
within the scope of what the agent is employed to do. The test is
whether the agent is acting within that compass or is engaging in a
personal frolic of his own. It cannot be said that an agent who has
made an arrest loses his official capacity if the arrest is subse-
quently adjudged to be unlawful.
148
Under this view, authorized performance refers to the general functions
of the office rather than the lawfulness of any specific act by the officer. A
138. 59 11. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1975).
139. Id 322 N.E.2d at 54.
140. People v. Shinn, 5 Ill. App. 3d 468, 283 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972).
141. Id
142. People v. Carroll, 133 Ill. App. 2d 78, 272 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1971).
143. Id
144. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959-60 (N.D. Il. 1968).
145. Id at 960.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
147. 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967).
148. Id at 245.
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specific act, although unlawful under given circumstances, is an authorized
performance if it is the kind of act which generally the official has the power
to do under proper circumstances. So it was held that, "[a]n agent, even if
effecting an arrest without probable cause, is still engaged in the perform-
ance of his official duties, provided he is not on a 'frolic of his own,' and is
protected from interference or assault."' 149 Thus, it is the position of the
Second Circuit that "performance" of official duties is a broader concept
than the legality of a specific act undertaken by an officer. It should be
noted that the Second Circuit view, in contrast to the Illinois position, is not
based on a statute prohibiting resistance to an unlawful arrest.
This "generally authorized" definition of performance does not address,
however, the notion that general authority to perform certain duties does not
authorize unlawful acts to accomplish those duties. The question, it would
seem, is not whether by virtue of an unlawful arrest the officer is no longer
an officer with the general power to arrest, but rather whether his general
authority to arrest ends when he does so unlawfully. Inevitably, the focus
must shift from the officer's status to his conduct.
B. Unlawful Arrests Are Not "Authorized Performance"
The question of whether resistance to an unlawful arrest automatically
becomes a crime has been answered in the negative by the courts in a
number of jurisdictions.
In 1968, the New York legislature changed the common-law resistance
rule with the enactment of Penal Law section 35.27 which provides that "[a]
person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or
unauthorized," when the arrest is effected by a known officer.' 5 0 According
to the New York courts, the legislature in adopting this so-called "no-sock"
principle did not intend to expand the substantive scope of the resisting ar-
rest offense.' 5' Nor did it create a new substantive crime.15 2 As one court
viewed section 35.27: "[i]t is nothing more than a limitation upon the invo-
cation of the traditional self-defense exemption where police officers are in-
volved." 153 The court reasoned "[i]t can hardly be said that the concept or
principle of defense can be used to enlarge or extend a crime specifically
defined by the legislature."
' 15 4
If the "no-sock" statute does not create a new crime, nor expand the
scope of existing offenses to protect officers, can there be a conviction for
such offenses when the officer was engaged in an unlawful arrest? The New
York courts have answered this question in the negative. Since "[an author-
149. United States v. Martinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972).
150. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
151. People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (Co. Ct. 1973); People v. Doe,
85 Misc. 2d 592, 380 N.Y.S.2d 549, 554 (City Ct. 1976).
152. People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (Co. Ct. 1973); People v.
Lattanzio, 35 A.D.2d 313, 316 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (1970); People v. Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23, 319
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1971).




ized arrest is an indispensible element of a resisting arrest offense," 1 55 that
crime "does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful."' 156 The New York
resisting arrest offense makes it a misdemeanor when a person "intentionally
prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an authorized
arrest.' 57 One court reasoned that the word "authorized" in this statute
refers to "legality of the arrest as determined by the probable cause standard
and not merely to the presence or absence of statutory authority for making
an arrest for the offense charged."'
58
Another New York Statute provides that it is a felony assault if a person
with intent to prevent a peace officer "from performing a lawful duty"
causes a physical injury to such officer. 159 Whether the conduct constitutes
the crime of misdemeanor resistance or felony assault, "in both situations the
arrest must in fact be one that is authorized by the rules of arrest."' 60 That
is, it must be a lawful arrest supported by probable cause. The New York
Penal Law also makes it a misdemeanor for a person to obstruct the adminis-
tration of law or "to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function."' 6 ' The New York courts have held that if the function obstructed
is not a lawful one, there is no crime under this provision.'
62
The New York approach is that there is no offense against an officer if
the officer is not engaged in a lawful function, meaning the specific circum-
stances of a given arrest or other function, rather than whether the act is of
the general kind within an officer's official duties. The question is not
whether the officer has the general authority to arrest, but whether he had
the authority to make a specific arrest during which there was resistance or
obstruction. If an authorized arrest or lawful function is an element of the
crime charged, there can be no conviction if the arrest or specific action by
the officer was unlawful.
The Connecticut courts have adopted a similar view. Connecticut en-
acted a statute, Penal Code section 53a-23, disallowing a justification for the
use of physical force to resist a legal or illegal arrest. 163 Nevertheless, the
Connecticut courts have held that to convict a defendant for interfering with
an officer in the performance of his duties the "officer cannot be found to
have been in the performance of his duties unless he was acting within the
law at the time of the alleged interference."' 16 4 If at the time of the interfer-
ence the officer's action was illegal, there is no crime of interference,
"whether or not § 53a-23 [was] applicable."' 65
155. Id 350 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
156. People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56, 286 N.E.2d 445, 448
(1972).
157. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
158. People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S. 2d 357, 360 (1973).
159. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(3) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
160. Id at § 205.30 (Practice Commentaries).
161. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05 (McKinney 1973).
162. People v. DeMartino, 323 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1971).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-23 (1972).





In 1973 Pennsylvania enacted a "no-sock" statute, denying any justifi-
cation for forceful resistance of a known officer, even though the arrest may
be unlawful.1 6 6 Notwithstanding this enactment, the offense of aggravated
assault on an officer, Penal Code section 2702,167 and resisting arrest, section
5104,168 require a "lawful arrest" as an essential element of both offenses.
One Pennsylvania court, in reversing a conviction for aggravated assault on
an officer, held that although the "no-sock" statute, 505b, was inconsistent
with the aggravated assault offense, the "no-sock" enactment "cannot render
the legality of the arrest irrelevant in a prosecution for aggravated assault on
a police officer, because the legality of the arrest is an element of the crime
and must be proved by the Commonwealth."'
6 9
The thrust of these decisions is that where the offense has an element of
"lawful" or "authorized" performance by the officer, or that the officer be in
the performance his duties, there can be no conviction for a crime of imped-
ing an officer if the officer is engaged in an unlawful arrest. Such a conclu-
sion gives rise to the question of whether the legislative intent has been
accomplished with the enactment of no-resistance or "no-sock" statutes. Did
the legislatures intend a person to be guilty of obstruction or resistance if
they forcefully resisted an unlawful arrest? Or did the legislatures intend
merely to remove an affirmative defense in the case of homicide or serious
physical injury resulting from a forceful resistance? If the lawmakers in-
tended the former result, perhaps they should have corrected the statutory
wording of the offenses by removing such words as "lawful arrest".
The legislatures should have also altered the essential element of a law-
ful action by the officer. One possibility could have been to replace the
words "lawful arrest" with "good faith arrest." Where the legislatures have
not done so, one may conclude that there was no intent to criminalize force-
ful resistance to an unlawful arrest which does not involve a serious injury or
death.
Texas, in its revised penal code, when defining crimes against officers,
omits the express language that the officer be in "lawful" performance of an
arrest or search. The offense of resisting arrest or search is committed if a
person "intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace of-
ficer . . . from effecting an arrest or search of the actor or another by using
166. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b): "The use of force is not justifiable under this section: (i)
to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is
unlawful; ....
167. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a): "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: . . . (3)
attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a police officer making
or attempting to make a lawful arrest .... "
168. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104: "A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,
with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest . . . , the person
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance."
169. Commonwealth v. Bartman, 240 Pa. Super. 495, 367 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1976). See also
Commonwealth v. Stortecky, 238 Pa. Super. 117, 352 A.2d 491, 493 (1975) (Huffman, J., Dis-
senting) ("The requirement that the arrest be lawful, therefore, constitutes an element of [re-




force against the peace officer or another."1 70 Furthermore, the code pro-
vides "it is no defense to prosecution under this section that the arrest or
search was unlawful."'' 7 It appears that this language would aid in a find-
ing that "resisting" is committed even though one resisted an unlawful ar-
rest, since the officer need not be performing a "lawful" arrest.'
72  To the
contrary, it could be argued that although the word "lawful" is not express,
it is implied that the officer be performing a lawful arrest before a resistance
crime is committed. This argument would be untenable if it were concluded
that there was an intent to criminalize any resistance to unlawful arrest by a
known officer.
In addition to the question of whether the element of a lawful perform-
ance is present, there may be a separate issue going to the purpose of the
crimes of resisting, obstructing or impeding an officer. As noted previously,
aside from protecting the officer's person from attacks, crimes of impeding
an officer during the performance of his duties are designed to criminalize
acts which would impede or defeat the lawful operation of the govern-
ment. 173 Thus, aside from the issue of failure to prove the element of a
lawful arrest, there is a question as to whether the purpose of such criminal
offenses is served by convicting a person for resisting an unlawful arrest. It
can be argued with conviction that the objective of protecting the lawful
operation of the government and its officers is ill-served by convicting a per-
son for resisting an unlawful action of a governmental officer. Even if there
is a duty to submit to all arrests, it may be argued that such a duty is ne-
gated when the arrest is illegal because the reason for submission, protection
of lawful governmental functions, has come to an end by virtue of the of-
ficer's illegal action. The idea of a duty to comply with an unlawful govern-
mental action is perhaps why the United States Supreme Court has
advanced this simple proposition: "One cannot be punished for failing to
obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the
Constitution." 
74
C. Resistance." A Lesser Crime Absent Authorized Performance
There is something of a middle ground between the opposing positions
adopted by the courts in Illinois and New York as to the impact of a no-
resistance rule. In 1957 California enacted a no-resistance provision, Penal
170. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a) (Vernon 1978).
171. Id § 38.03(b).
172. Cf Ford v. State, 538 S.W. 2d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (court assumed illegal ar-
rest, found no-sock statute was constitutional, and affirmed conviction for resisting arrest).
The Montana Criminal Code, like that of Texas, has made it a crime to resist arrest or
obstruct an officer if the officer was acting under color of his official authority, although he was
"acting in an illegal manner." MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 94-7-301, 94-7-302 (1973). The Colorado
and South Dakota Codes also prohibit forceful resistance to an arrest by an officer made under
"color of his authority," which means a "good faith" arrest. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-103(2)
(1973). S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 22-11-5 (Supp. 1978). Apparently, if the arrest is not in good
faith the officer could be forcefully resisted.
173. See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1958); United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 671, 678 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 208.30, comment 125 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958); People v. Hanson, 53 Ill. 2d 79, 289 N.E. 2d 611, 613 (1972).
174. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
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Code section 834a, 175 using the language of the Uniform Arrest Act. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Curtis ruled that this enactment "was
meant at most to eliminate the common-law defense of resistance to unlaw-
ful arrest, and not to make such resistance a new substance crime."' 176 In
reaching this conclusion the court noted that both the Uniform Arrest Act
and the Model Penal Code take the approach that the elimination of the
defense of resistance does not make resistance a separate and additional
crime. 177
The next inquiry is whether, after adoption of a no-resistance rule,
resistance to an unlawful arrest constitutes one of the existing offenses
against officers. In the California case of People v. Curtzs, the defendant was
charged with battery upon a peace officer while the officer was "engaged in
the performance of his duties."' 78 Since an officer is under no duty to make
an unlawful arrest, the court construed the statute making battery upon an
officer an offense as "excluding unlawful arrests from its definition of
'duty.' -179 Thus, the defendant could not be convicted for battery upon an
officer engaged in the performance of his duties if the officer were attempting
an unlawful arrest. This is not to say, however, that resistance to an unlaw-
ful arrest has not been made criminal by virtue of the statutory disallowance
of a justification to resist a lawful or unlawful arrest. To find the defendant
not guilty, according to People v. Curtis, would thwart the legislative purpose
to consign to the courtroom all controversies over legality of the arrest.' 80
The Curtis opinion concluded that an arrestee resisting an unlawful ar-
rest, although not guilty of an offense where an officer must be performing a
duty, "can be validly convicted only of simple assault or battery.'' a The
apparent rationale for this position is that a general crime of assault or bat-
tery, as contrasted with felony battery, does not have the additional element
that the victim officer be in the performance of a lawful duty. This conclu-
sion attempted to fulfill the legislation intent to criminalize resistance, and
yet avoid the requirement, for a felony offense, that the officer be engaged in
a lawful duty.
This position of the California Court, however, is not without flaws.
Battery is generally defined as an intentional bodily injury or offensive
touching of another. '8 2 Assault is defined as attempted battery or intentional
175. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 1970): "If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise
of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the
duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."
176. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P. 2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969).
177. Id 450 P.2d at 37.
178. The applicable section now states:
When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial officer as defined in
Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the offense knows or rea-
sonably should know that such victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance
of his duties, and such custodial officer is engaged in the performance of his duties, the
offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.1 (West Supp. 1984).
179. Curtis, 450 P.2d at 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
180. Id
181. Id
182. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 107 (2d ed. 1969).
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threat with apparent ability to inflict physical injury, causing another to fear
an immediate battery.18 3 The Curtis rationale is that since resistance is not
justified, the arrestee's resistance to an unlawful arrest will be either an as-
sault or battery upon the officer, an unprivileged touching or threat of
touching. An officer's attempted seizure of the arrestee, however, involves
the threat or use of force which is privileged by the law to the extent neces-
sary to fulfill his authority to arrest.' 84 Because an officer, in executing an
unlawful arrest is not performing a duty, it may be argued that the officer is
not privileged to threaten or use force against the intended arrestee. If the
officer's acts toward the intended arrestee are not privileged, the officer com-
mits a crime, a trespass, against which the victim, the intended arrestee, has
the inherent right to defend himself.1 8 5 It would seem that the California
court has, without expressly stating, recognized an unlawful arrest as a law-
ful or privileged action by the officer. If an arrestee cannot resist an unlaw-
ful arrest without committing a misdemeanor assault on the officer, there is
an implicit holding that an unlawful arrest is privileged to the extent that
the victim-arrestee is not free to resist.
The degree of the crime committed by the arrestee, be it felony assault
on the officer or misdemeanor assault, is immaterial. If the unlawful arrest is
not priviledged, then the victim-arrestee should be free to defend the unlaw-
ful arrest without being criminally liable. Thus, while the California court
speaks in terms of the missing element of lawful performance in concluding
the arrestee is not guilty of felony assault on an officer, the holding stands for
the proposition that the officer is privileged to make an unlawful arrest at
least to the extent that the arrestee has no right to defend with resistance.
Seen in this perspective, the no-resistance rule is indeed a significant change
in the law of self-defense; namely, one cannot defend an unlawful assault
because the attacker is an officer.
V. THE DUTY TO SUBMIT: NEED, EFFICACY & LEGALITY
The adoption of a rule prohibiting resistance to an unlawful arrest by a
known officer is prompted by a policy judgment which, to a great extent, is
based on speculation. Some of the theoretical underpinnings for a no-resist-
ance rule have been noted above. When the American Law Institute
promulgated a no-resistance rule in the Model Penal Code, section 3.04, it
was urging legislative reconsideration of a privilege to forcefully resist an
unlawful arrest.' 86 Since promulgation by the American Law Institute of a
no-resistance rule, that model, with variations, has been adopted by several
183. d at 114.
184. Id at 977-86.
185. Id at 979. Unless the arrester has authority to make the particular arrest, any force to
effect the apprehension is unprivileged. If the application of force to the person of another is
not privileged it is a battery. Id. at 113. Touching to effect an unlawful arrest is a battery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 118, comment b (1965). Furthermore, the privilege to
use force in self-defense is not limited to prevention of death or great bodily harm. The privi-
lege to use reasonable nondeadly force in defense against nondeadly force is well established.
State v. Evenson, 122 Iowa 88, 97 N.W. 979 (1904). State v. Sherman, 16 R.I. 631, 18 A. 1040
(1889).
186. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.04( 2 )(a)(i), comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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jurisdictions without a common agreement as to the criminality of the re-
sisting party. Therefore, it seems appropriate to identify the primary argu-
ments in support of a no-resistance rule. The arguments should be weighed
in reference to impact; that is, does the resisting person thereby commit a
crime? In such an evaluation the policy considerations and legal analysis
underpinning one decision or another speak to a larger question about the
nature of authority.
A. The Case Against Resistance Re-Examined
1. Changed Conditions
As stated earlier, it has been contended in support of a duty to submit to
an unlawful arrest, that the conditions which spawned the common-law
right to resist have changed. Historically, the plight of the arrestee was par-
ticularly unpleasant in England at the time the courts recognized a right to
resist an unlawful arrest. At that time arrest typically included long periods
of incarceration, under unsanitary conditions, with the likelihood of physical
abuse. 187
The fate of the present day arrestee in this country is greatly improved.
More humane treatment for the arrestee does not, however, obviate the
right-to-resist premise. It is highly suspect that the harsh treatment of ar-
restees played a significant role in the development of a right to resist. At
least the arrestee's treatment was not identified as a motivating factor by the
courts that announced the right to defend oneself or another who is unduly
"restrained of his liberty.' '5 88 The early decisions did not ground the right to
resist on adverse prison conditions. Rather, the resistance rule was premised
on defense, that is, an officer in making an unlawful arrest is an attacker who
can be reasonably resisted like any other attacker. 8 9 The principle is one of
self-defense, not jail avoidance.
The fact that early common-law officers were not armed with firearms
is another changed condition from which it is argued that the right to resist
should be abandoned. The gist of the argument is that, due to the use of
modern police weapons, resistance is no longer an effective means by which
an arrestee can avoid an unlawful detainment.190 It is obvious that modern
police weaponry reduces the likelihood that an arrestee will be successful in
resisting arrest. Moreover, police weapons probably reduce the number of
occasions when the arrestee would resist. The prospect of successfully avoid-
ing an unlawful arrest, however, was not the articulated rationale in the
187. See Warner, supra note 92 at 330. Comment, supra note 91, at 123. The court in State
v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978) notes: "In essence, factors which at one time
justified the common-law rule have long since ceased to exist. Constitutionally mandated pro-
cedural safeguards such as immediate arraignment, reasonable bail, appointed counsel, and
prompt probable cause determination as well as speedy trial were all nonexistent in 18th and
19th century jurisprudence."
188. Hopkins Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666); see generally Chevigny, The
Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128, 1129-32 (1969).
189. "[1]f anyone against the law imprison a man, he is an offender . The Queen v.
Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 352 (K.B. 1710).
190. Warner, supra note 88, at 330.
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evolution of the right to resist.1 9
To argue futility as a reason to abandon the right to resist is something
of a non sequitur: the subject of an unlawful arrest cannot successfully avoid
arrest; therefore, he should be penalized if he attempts to do so. If resistance
is futile for the law-abiding citizen, it is argued that only gun-toting hood-
lums will effectively exercise the right to resist. This argument ignores the
premise of the resistance rule while evoking a natural emotional desire to
grant no ground to the unworthy criminal. The right to resist, however,
recognized that free men are provoked to resist any unwarranted deprivation
of liberty, including a false arrest. Abrogation of that rule affects more than
gun-toting gangsters, because it criminalizes the natural defensive human
reaction.
A more convincing argument in favor of a no-resistance rule is postu-
lated on a notion of decreasing the likelihood of violence and physical harm
for the arrestee, officer, and bystanders. It is, however, somewhat curious
that to protect the subject of an unlawful arrest from harm, his resistance is
made criminal-bitter medicine indeed from a paternalistic state. In theory,
however, a duty to submit without resistance would seem to decrease the
potential for violence. This thesis might also support other prohibitions on
forceful defense such as resistance to excessive force employed by an arrest-
ing officer wherever the life of the arrestee is not endangered. Such a posi-
tion has not been urged by the Model Penal Code, nor adopted by
jurisdictions abrogating the common-law right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest.' 92 Moreover, it is problematic that a no-resistance rule will have the
desired effect on the street conduct of potential arrestees. The general citi-
zenry, faced with an unlawful arrest, will seldom have a working knowledge
of the legal niceties of a right to resist or duty to submit. Legal consistency
and efficacy aside, the speculative hope that a no-resistance rule will avoid
violence must be weighed against the reality that such a rule might result in
conviction for resisting unlawful arrest.
A further argument in support of a duty-to-submit rule rejects the obso-
lete self-help concept in favor of civil recourse. The wrongfully arrested
should forego resisting in light of increased remedies for police abuse.193 But
to speak of the right to resist as "self-help" is misleading, if not inaccurate.
Self-help connotes the idea of retribution, taking the law into one's own
hands. It has an affirmative rather than defensive connotation. Self-help
and self-defense are not synonymous. Self-defense does not allow one to vin-
dicate an attack in the sense of retribution for a wrong suffered.' 94 Rather,
191. The early cases make no mention of successful avoidance of arrest as a reason for the
right to resist. See, e.g., Hopkins Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666); The Queen v.
Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710); John Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529 (1900).
192. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 327, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment (Tent Draft No. 8, 1958); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 9.31(c) (Vernon 1974).
193. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J.
Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (1965).
194. The privilege to use force in self-defense exists only when the defender reasonably be-
lieves he cannot avoid imminent harm without the use of defensive force. See, e.g., People v. La
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one is privileged to defend against an attack because it is a natural, protec-
tive reaction. Similarly, resistance is a defensive, protective reaction to avoid
an immediate and impending unlawful attack upon one's liberty and person.
The right to resist an unlawful arrest is a justified defense against attack,
without any privilege to strike out in retaliation for the wrong suffered. Self-
help in the sense of retaliatory conduct may be an obsolete legal notion, self-
defense is not.
2. Remedial Alternatives to Resistance
It is desirable for those challenging the legality of the conduct of govern-
mental officials to seek determination and redress of such claims through
civil process, legal or administrative. Given the modern state of this pre-
ferred course, it has been argued that there is no need to continue a right to
resist illegal arrest. This is an appealing argument. No doubt people should
be encouraged to resolve their claims in a civilized manner, through official
channels, avoiding resort to physical confrontations. It is, however, debata-
ble whether the availability of official legal and administrative remedies to
redress illegal arrests obviates any need for a right to resist an unlawful ar-
rest. The modern-day remedial alternatives include bail, speedy trial, ad-
ministrative review of police conduct, civil injunctions to curb police
misconduct, and damages for injuries caused by the police. Impressive as
this list may sound, these desirable safeguards have limitations for one sub-
jected to an unlawful arrest.
Bail is increasingly available, even for those without funds for the tradi-
tional bailbond. But bail availability does not mean that all arrestees will be
promptly released.1 9 5 Those who are released pending judicial determina-
tion of the legality of the arrest are subject to considerable expense in addi-
tion to the stigma of the booking process and arrest record. The prospect of
an early trial has been greatly increased in modern times, but the possibility
of long incarceration remains a fact.' 96 The prospect of incarceration may
not be as onerous as in seventeenth century England, but arrest and incar-
ceration without probable cause remain a substantial denial of liberty with
Voie, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
195. One study revealed that nearly half the defendants in a sample of cases pending before
New York City courts remained in jail prior to trial. Foote, A Study of the Administration ofBal in
New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 707 (1968). See also R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRI-
TIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965).
196. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Constitution, although that right is
subjected to a balancing test and is not defined by a fixed time approach. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 523, 530 (1972). The legislature has attempted to ensure that an accused is brought to
trial within a certain number of days after arrest. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
However, recommended standards calling for trial within 60 days of arrest have not been fol-
lowed in most jurisdictions. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, Standard 4.1, Courts (1973); see Poulos and Coleman, Speedy Trial,
Slow Implementation.- The A.B.A. Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1976).
A period of incarceration of two months is a "long period" from the perspective of one who
may lose his job and otherwise suffer substantially. Such a denial of liberty where there was no
probable cause to arrest is indefensible.
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serious financial and social consequences.
197
In many jurisdictions administrative procedures have been established
by which the city or state can hear complaints about police abuse.1 98 Vic-
tims of police misconduct also have recourse to civil injunctions and damage
actions.' 99 Clearly these remedial processes afford an increased prospect
that police misconduct will be discouraged and victims granted some relief.
Few would argue, however, that the demise of police misconduct has been
effected through these remedial devices.200 Administrative procedures for
review of police conduct are nonexistent in many localities. Where such pro-
cedures have been established, there are limitations to their ability to fully
redress potential wrongs. Most complaints alleging police misconduct are
dismissed for lack of corroboration. 20 1 Police review boards, usually domi-
nated by officers, are predisposed to accept an officer's version of an incident
over that of an arrestee, especially if there are no other witnesses. Because in
most instances it is difficult to prove a pattern or policy of unlawful action,
civil injunctions to curb police abuse are rare.
202
Prosecution of a false arrest requires a rather uncommon degree of cour-
age and tenacity, with the process taking several years for final adjudication.
Such suits do not afford the prospect of success absent significant personal
injury or independent corroboration. Moreover, where it is found that an
officer while acting unlawfully did so in good faith, the victim will not be
successful in his action.
20 3
It has been observed that modern remedies available for false arrests are
probably not "enough to induce [a person] to accept his detention in si-
lence.' '2 4 This is assuming that one faced with an unlawful seizure of his
person has the presence of mind to defer any immediate resistance in favor of
subsequent administrative and legal remedial actions. In urging a no-resist-
197. A recent survey revealed that nearly half the defendants in a sample of cases pend-
ing before the New York City courts remained in jail prior to trial. Many lose their
jobs as a result. And even if an individual is released on bail, he will have been
subjected to the expense of paying a bondsman and to the stigma of arrest, which, in
the case of minor offenses, may have consequences as serious as those of conviction.
When these considerations are combined with the great delay and congestion in urban
criminal courts, bail hardly seems an adequate remedy.
Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1134. Foote, supra note 189, at 707. See also R. GOLDFARB, supra
note 195 ch. II.
198. Note, Administration of Complaints by Civihans Against Po/ie, 77 HARv. L. REV. 499
(1964).
199. Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedyfor Unconstitutional Polce Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143
(1968).
200. See, e.g., Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1134.
201. See Note, supra note 198 at 504, 506; President's Comm. on Law Enforcement and the Adminis-
tration ofJustice, Field Survey V NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS
217 (1967); P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER, ch. 14 (1969).
202. See Note, supra note 199, at 146.
203. See, e.g., Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 1974) rev'don othergrounds 423 U.S.
362 (1976) (qualified immunity for official acting in good faith). Additionally, an officer's good-
faith-though-mistaken belief that probable cause exists will defeat the usual suppression of evi-
dence obtained in an unlawful arrest or search. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
204. Chevigny, supra note 182, at 1136. Se also Comment, The Right to Resist an Unlawful
Arrest, 31 LA. L. REV. 120, 122-123 (1970), which states that tort and criminal remedies against
officers are in fact empty ones since the officer may be judgment proof and a prosecutor's office
will be reluctant to press a criminal action against an officer.
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ance rule, the Model Penal Code comment stressed that "[i]t should be possi-
ble to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest." '20 5 That possibility
may exist, but so far, the existing remedies have not been effective in abating
significant police abuse.
20 6
The debate concerning the efficacy of remedial actions is, however, a
subtle distractor to the real issue at hand. Talk of post encounter remedies
evades the nature of the immediate problem, specifically, that resistance is
defensive behavior. In situations not involving unlawful arrest, the victim of
an assault also has similar post encounter remedies. Yet, there does not ap-
pear to be a serious movement to abrogate a citizen's immediate right to self-
defense when faced with an unlawful assault. Resistance to an unlawful
arrest is often an act of self-defense. It is an immediate act which should be
judged for reasonableness by the circumstances of the encounter, not by the
availability of subsequent legal and administrative remedial procedures.
The preference for post encounter legal remedial actions is grounded to
a great extent on the very appealing motivation to discourage physical vio-
lence which may be associated with resisting an officer executing an illegal
arrest. 20 7 Decreased physical violence is surely a worthy objective. It is
doubtful, however, whether such a decrease has been, or will be, obtained
through abrogation of the right to resist. Theoretically, the risk of physical
violence would appear to be reduced if the subject of an illegal arrest refrains
from resisting an officer. But this presupposes that the decision to resist is a
calculated judgment in which the arrestee considers whether or not the law
affords such a privilege, whether his efforts can successfully avoid arrest, and
whether he has official remedial recourse. This supposition is highly
suspect.
208
There are no data indicating that a reduction in physical violence has
been achieved since the advent of the no-resistance rule. It is submitted that
for such purpose the rule is essentially impotent. Most often resistance to an
unlawful arrest is a reaction of the moment which is instinctive. As one
court observed: "For most people, an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront
and intrusion-the more offensive because under color of law-to be resisted
as a violent assault."' 20 9 An illegal arrest is an outrageous affront to liberty
and one's sense of justice. Such an arrest can easily provoke defensive reac-
tion. The real question is not whether violence should be discouraged, but
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
206. See,e.g, People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969).
("We are not unmindful that under present conditions the available remedies for unlawful ar-
rest-release followed by civil or criminal action against the offending officer-may be dceemed
inadequate."). See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Annot., 50
A.L.R. 2d 513 (1956); Note, State v. Koonce, 27 U. PrT-r. L. REV. 716 (1966); Wilson, Poce Arrest
Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
395, 399 (1960).
207. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
208. Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1137 ("The decision to resist is the work of a moment
rather than the result of carefully considered alternatives."); Leibrovitz,Justifwable Use of Force
Under Article 35 of the Penal Law of New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 285, 297-98 (1969) ("The use
of necessary force to resist an unlawful arrest arises essentially from . . . spontaneous
motivation.").
209. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238. 240 (1954).
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rather whether the law should excuse or penalize defensive reaction to an
unlawful attack. To rephrase the question from this perspective, is the prov-
ocation sufficient to excuse the resistive force employed by the victim of an
unlawful arrest? This is a question that should be addressed free of the pre-
tentious assumption that its answer will significantly alter human behavioral
reaction to an illegal seizure by an officer.
B. Fourth Amendment Considerations
A paramount concern is whether the prohibition of forceful resistance
by the subject of an unlawful arrest permits an unreasonable seizure of the
arrestee in violation of the fourth amendment. 210 Generally, an arrest with-
out a warrant or probable cause is unlawful within the purview of the fourth
amendment. 2 t ' Arguably, the no-resistance rule denies a citizen the right to
avoid an unlawful seizure by an officer. The no-resistance rule thereby im-
poses a legal duty to submit to the denial of a constitutional right. Freedom
from unreasonable seizure is denied to the extent that the subject of an un-
lawful arrest has a duty to submit to an unlawful seizure and incarcera-
tion. 21 2 A state, in promulgating a no-resistance rule, sanctions
infringements upon the fourth amendment constitutional right of a citizen to
be free from an unreasonable seizure by the state.
Such a seizure may be viewed as reasonable because it is effected by an
officer, albeit absent probable cause. Allowing state compelled submission to
an officer, with an attending criminal penalty, is to allow the seizure and
detention of a person without probable cause until such point in time as a
judicial release is effected. This thesis, that a seizure without probable cause
is reasonable, is inconsistent with conventional interpretation of the fourth
amendment under which reasonableness of a seizure is tested by the presence
of probable cause, not by the presence of an officer.21 3 Moreover, this novel,
if not illogical, position has significant implications in defining a person's
fourth amendment protections.
Although an unlawful arrest, one where there is no proper warrant or
probable cause, violates the fourth amendment, California courts have taken
the view that "a state in removing the right to resist does not contribute to or
effectuate the deprivation of liberty."'2 14 In so ruling, the California courts
and others have viewed the problem in terms of remedy. They have rea-
soned that since "self-help as a practical remedy is anachronistic," deletion
of a right to resist does not diminish the remedies for the subject of an illegal
210. At least one Supreme Court Justice has spoken of "a Fourth Amendment right to re-
sist." Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 603 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting
from certiorari dismissal).
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479
(1963).
212. Chenen, California Penal Code Section 834-a." An Infringement of the Constitutional Right to
Resist UnlawdlArrest, 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 195, 210-211 (1971); Chevigny,supra note 182, at 1141-43
(1969); Comment, supra note 198, at 123-28.
213. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969) (no fourth
amendment violation); Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. 1976) (constitutionality
of no-resistance statute upheld).
214. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1969).
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arrest. Thus, there is no constitutional denial. 2 15
The "remedy answer" evades the central dilemma of whether a state
imposed duty to submit to an unlawful arrest, with attending criminal sanc-
tions, is state action amounting to an unlawful seizure prohibited by the
fourth amendment. Coerced submission to an unlawful arrest and seizure
would seem to violate the general "principle that a citizen can defy an un-
constitutional act."' 2 16 Casting the issue in terms of remedy misdirects the
analysis. It should be remembered that "[tihe Fourth Amendment is
designed to prevent, not redress, unlawful police action. ' 217 The issue is not
whether an ineffective remedy (resistance) has been discarded, but whether
the state has commanded submission to the denial of a constitutional right.
Thus, it may be argued that a state imposed duty to submit to an unlawful
seizure has denied the constitutional right to be free from an unlawful
seizure by an officer of the State.
In addition to this primary problem of a state requiring submission to
an unlawful seizure, there is also the practical problem of how the require-
ment affects the operation of the exclusionary rule. One of the chief conse-
quences of an unlawful seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is the
exclusion of any evidence resulting from such seizure. 2 18 When the arrest of
an individual is unlawful any evidence obtained from this arrest is inadmissi-
ble. If resistance to an unlawful arrest is itself a crime, however, it could be
argued that any evidence obtained in connection with the arrest, now justifi-
able on the basis of resistance, is admissible because it was obtained from a
lawful seizure. This circumvents the exclusionary rule in a situation where
the unlawfully arrested person resists.
If the seizure of a person without probable cause is reasonable until the
point ofjudicial release, there would be no basis to exclude evidence result-
ing from that seizure. This would be the case because exclusion under the
fourth amendment is effected only for unreasonable seizures. Thus, the force
of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule will be lost to the resisting sub-
ject of an unlawful arrest in a jurisdiction which has ruled that seizure for
resisting an unlawful arrest is reasonable. Given the purpose of the fourth
amendment, to protect privacy and liberty, the unlawful arrest under this
view has the effect of denying both the enjoyment of liberty and the right to
employ the judicial exclusionary sanction designed to protect against the un-
lawful denial of liberty.
2 19
215. Ad.
216. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598. 613 (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
217. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969).
218. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that whenever an
officer restrains an individual's freedom to walk away it is a seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. To be constitutional, such a seizure requires probable cause to arrest or
reasonable suspicion to frisk for weapons. Otherwise, seizure of an individual is an unreasona-
ble seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. See alro Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41
(1968).
219. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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C. Due Process Implications
A single action by the State may violate more than one provision of the
Constitution; therefore a duty to submit to an unlawful arrest may invoke
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that no state shall deny life, liberty or property without due
process of law. 220 Related to the Fourth Amendment considerations just
discussed is a separate inquiry of whether a state imposed duty to submit to
an unlawful arrest by a known officer is a denial of liberty without due pro-
cess of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.22' Where a state legis-
lature or state court has abrogated the right to resist there is undoubtedly
state action for purposes of due process analysis. Whether a duty to submit
is a denial of liberty without due process, however, requires further
consideration.
1. Seizure Without Due Process
In the context of an unlawful arrest and seizure, the liberty interest is
readily apparent: the right to privacy and an accompanying right of self-
defense to protect privacy, freedom, and physical well-being. While these
rights are not absolute, their denial and curtailment must be in accordance
with due process of law. Where certain fundamental rights are involved,
such as the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has held that a state regula-
tion limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest
and that such legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.
222
The state regulation, moreover, must be so designed that it has the ca-
pacity to fulfill the compelling state interest.2 23 The desire to decrease vio-
lence is undoubtedly a compelling state interest. Accordingly, a prohibition
on resistance and making resistance to an unlawful arrest a crime can be
justified on the basis that such prohibition will serve to reduce potential vio-
lence occasioned by a resisting arrestee. The finding of a compelling state
interest, however, does not necessarily satisfy the second and third prong of
the due process test: namely that the enactment sweep no broader than nec-
essary to serve the compelling state interest and that the enactment have the
apparent capacity to accomplish that purpose.
As to whether a state regulation imposing a duty to submit reaches only
the identified state interest, it must be remembered that the courts have
viewed "forceful" resistance to include all manner of passive, noncooperative
conduct by the arrestee. It is only remotely plausible that passive conduct or
verbal demonstrations, as opposed to an affirmative assault on an officer, is
likely to increase violence. Yet, the denial of any right to resist an unlawful
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
221. See, e.g., Curtis, 450 P.2d at 39 n.8, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719 n.8. The court in Curtis sepa-
rates the right of resistance from the general right of self-defense and thus avoids the question of
whether the elimination, by statute, of the right of self-defense would constitute a denial of due
process of law. Id.
222. Roe v. Wade., 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
223. Id at 156.
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arrest encompasses nonviolent resistance as well as violent resistance. One is
equally guilty of resistance whether he strikes the officer, struggles, goes limp,
or merely declines to answer questions.
To criminalize one's exercise of liberty in passively resisting an unlawful
arrest is to reach beyond the declared compelling state interest in decreasing
violence. It is possible to forge a line between forceful resistance involving a
substantial risk of violence by the arrestee and situations of nonviolent resist-
ance. But this distinction has not yet emerged from either the courts or the
legislatures.
The failure of duty-to-submit enactments to satisfy the third prong of
the due process test results from the broad prohibition on resistance being of
marginal utility to the declared objective of reducing violence during an ar-
rest encounter. The contention that a no-resistance rule will reduce violence
is premised on the assumption that such a prohibition will have the effect of
altering the conduct of potential arrestees. As noted previously, such an as-
sumption is highly suspect, 224 especially in view of the historical judicial ra-
tionale supporting a resistance right.
2 25
An unlawful arrest can be an outrageous affront to one's liberty and
sense of justice. As such, unlawful arrests provoke defensive reaction-an
instinctive resistance quite apart from a calculated judgment made with de-
tached reflection. Aside from the issue of whether the arrestee has knowl-
edge of a state prohibition on resistance, the unlawful arrest encounter is
hardly a situation marked by careful deliberation in which the arrestee
thoughtfully weighs the various alternatives and their relative advantages.
Provocation in the law of homicide is a suitable analogy. Where there
has been an adequate provocation sufficient to excite passion and a person
kills as a result of this passion, the law says such a killing is not murder.
Although the killing may be viewed as intentional, it is an action prompted
by circumstances where an ordinary person is likely to act rashly and with-
out due deliberation. Such a killing is not murder because the law recog-
nizes human infirmity when suddenly provoked into instinctive behavior.
Likewise, a reaction to an unlawful arrest is likely to be an instinctive act
resulting from an emotional disturbance, without due deliberation for the
niceties of the law. Given this context, it seems that a broad prohibition on
resistance, and resulting criminalization of resistance to an unlawful arrest, is
of marginal utility to the declared objective of reducing violence. Accord-
ingly, a state-imposed duty to submit to an unlawful arrest is a denial of due
process because the state action sweeps more broadly than necessary in an
attempt to preclude violence and such a rule has little or no capacity to
accomplish its stated purpose.
2. Vagueness and Other Constitutional Problems
It is a fundamental requirement that penal statutes, because their viola-
tion may result in a deprivation of liberty, must be drawn in language suffi-
224. See supra notes 187, 208 and accompanying text.
225. Sme supra Part III, sections B and C.
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ciently certain to communicate precisely what conduct shall constitute a
crime. 226 The Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the stat-
ute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held crimi-
nally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.
22 7
It is unclear whether the statutes that have disallowed a privilege to
resist an unlawful arrest have thereby converted resistance into a crime. As
noted previously, some jurisdictions have ruled that such statutes do not
render resistance a crime. At the same time, other jurisdictions have ruled
that such statutes do render resistance to an unlawful arrest a crime. Surely,
if the courts are confused as to the penal impact of a statute disallowing
resistance, it is unlikely that citizens of ordinary intelligence have been put
on notice that resistance to an unlawful arrest is a crime.
Pure luck and jurisdictional happenstance, not fair notice, would seem
to be the citizen's only hope of avoiding prison for conduct once universally
deemed to be lawful. Surely this predicament flies in the face of the consti-
tutional mandate that "[n]o one may be required, at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.' ' 22 8 Because a
legislative intent to criminalize resistance is not readily apparent in no-resist-
ance enactments, such statutes are constitutionally infirm. One court was so
persuaded and ruled that a statute making it a crime to interfere with an
officer making an arrest, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the
arrest, was unconstitutionally vague. 229 The court reasoned the statute was
constitutionally defective because it was subject to various meanings and
interpretations.
230
Closely related to the void-for-vagueness issue is the rule of statutory
construction that an ambiguous penal statute will be strictly construed in
favor of the accused.23 1 In the present context this principle gains added
dimension when tracked with the rule that statutes are not presumed to alter
the common law unless such an intention is expressly provided. 232 As de-
scribed above, the no-resistance statutes are less than express on whether
they penalize resistance. If there is ambiguity, it should be resolved in favor
of one charged with a crime of resisting an unlawful arrest. Even if this
latter rule is not of constitutional dimension, its independent force is en-
226. "And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Construction Com-
pany, 269 U.S. 385, 391, (1926) (citations omitted). St generaly W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1972).
227. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
228. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
229. State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1975).
230. Id.; see alo In re Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313, 317, 437 P. 2d 764, 66 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1968).
231. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 72 (1972).
232. See generally PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 34-38 (3d ed. 1982).
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hanced by the collateral problem of constitutional vagueness. 233
Still another kindred argument is grounded on the imperative of judi-
cial integrity. To sanction a conviction on the basis of evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest defiance of the Constitution.23 4 The protection of the Constitution,
according to Justice Holmes, generally precludes the use, for purposes of
convicting a person, of any advantage gained by the government through
the commission of a forbidden act. 23 5 Justice Brandeis rationalized this
principle most eloquently:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this court should resolutely set its face.
23 6
If it is held that resistance to an unlawful arrest is a crime, it can be
argued that the conviction for resisting is the direct result of an unlawful act
by the officer, there being no resistance but for the officer's unlawful arrest.
Conviction would reward the unlawful act of an officer, thereby providing
an impetus for future abuse.2 37 Thus, what the government cannot do di-
rectly, it can do indirectly. This would seem an effective circumvention of
the exclusionary rule, permitting an otherwise unlawful intrusion into one's
privacy through arbitrary intrusion by the police. This insidious situation,
with its unworthy governmental baiting of innocent and guilty alike, would
breath new life into the pernicious doctrine condemned by Brandeis. Con-
victions for resisting an unlawful arrest, with the attending admissibility of
evidence of such encounters, would be judicial sanctioning of governmental
lawlessness and a breach of judicial integrity.
D. Crimtiaity
The basic components of every true crime are twofold: the actus reus,
or prohibited conduct, and the mens rea, or blameworthy state of mind of
the actor. 238 In a prosecution for resisting arrest, the unlawfulness of the
arrest is an aspect of special concern with the employment of this traditional
twofold analysis. Given the unlawfulness of the arrest, it is questionable
whether resistance to such unlawfulness is a prohibited act and the product
233. See, e.g., Guardianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal. App. 2d 669, 674, 141 P.2d 498, 500 (1943).
234. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 384 (1913).
235. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
236. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It has been
argued elsewhere that punishment for resisting unlawful arrest constitutes judicial validation of
unconstitutional conduct. Chenen, Californa Penal Code Section 831a." An Inftingenent of the Consti-
tutional Right to Resist Unlaw#ulArrest, 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 195, 214 (1971).
237. Similar criticisms have been raised by opponents to the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3430-46 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 30-40 (1984) (minority view of Senator Mathias
on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983).
238. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1958).
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of a blameworthy state of mind. The argument that resistance is a crime is
grounded on the disallowance of any privilege to resist. Absent a privilege,
the resistance is a prohibited act of a blameworthy state of mind. To be
credible, however, this argument must address two points. The first point
concerns the nature of the conduct prohibited by a law abrogating the right
to resist. Second, the statutory removal of any privilege to use force in re-
sisting an unlawful arrest does not necessarily mean that such resistance is
the product of a blameworthy state of mind.
As to the first point, it is helpful to keep in mind the function and pur-
pose served by the punishment of acts which impede an officer in the per-
formance of his duties. The thrust in this special category of crimes is not
merely to punish force used against the person of the officer, since un-
privileged force against any person, officer or not, is a crime. Rather, these
crimes seek to punish, and, thereby deter conduct which impedes the exer-
cise of official authority. 239 The focus is not on whether there was force
against an officer, but on whether there was a forceful impediment to au-
thority. This is a significant distinction because an unlawful arrest is not
generally an exercise of authority.
Some courts and legislatures have reasoned that an arrest is an author-
ized function of an officer, even though the particular arrest in question may
be unlawful. 240 The trouble with this position is that authority is defined in
terms of status, rather than the lawfulness of specific acts as performed. This
reasoning ignores the basic premise that authority is nothing more or less
than what the law allows. If an act is not allowed by the law, it is not au-
thorized. The assertion that an unlawful performance is authorized by law,
even for a limited purpose, is a bothersome notion especially in a legal sys-
tem characterized by the axiom that all are subject to the law, including
government officials. The unlawful-but-authorized position suggests that a
governmental officer must be obeyed under pain of criminal sanction merely
because he is an officer, not because his acts are lawful.
Logical flaws aside, the assertion that an unlawful act may be consid-
ered authorized, even for limited purposes, is a precedent with a great poten-
tial for mischief. This potential is a motivating force behind court decisions
holding that there can be no crime of resisting unless the officer was engaged
in a lawful arrest because performance of lawful duty is the essence of the
offense.24 1 As courts have observed, one cannot be punished for failing to
obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the
constitution.2 42 These decisions have held that the unlawfulness of the of-
ficer's action, an unlawful seizure of a person, negates any legal duty of a
person to submit without resistance.
2 43
239. United States v. Marinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Heliczer, 373
F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
240. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
241. Se., e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
242. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
243. "[An] essential element of every orthodox crime is a wrongful or blameworthy mental
state of some kind." In re Hayes, 442 P.2d 366, 69 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313 (1968), vacated, 70 Cal. 2d
604, 451 P.2d 430, 75 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969) (petition for writ of habeas corpus denied).
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Coerced respect for law enforcement gained through penalizing resist-
ance to an officer's unlawful act is of dubious benefit when weighed against
the certain loss of respect by the innocent arrestee when penalized for de-
fending his liberty. The victim of an unlawful arrest gains a revealing pic-
ture of his government upon learning that his defensive reaction is a crime.
The perception of fairness in our legal system will surely suffer with the oper-
ation of this fallacious legalism. As citizen respect wanes, the efficacy of our
legal system is diminished.
In terms of traditional criminal law analysis, the second criteria for a
true crime is mens rea. In order to convict, evidence must support a finding
that the accused committed the unlawful act with a blameworthy state of
mind. In short, culpability is essential to conviction. In determining
whether resistance is a crime, emphasis is misplaced in speaking of a "right
to resist" or a "duty to submit" to an unlawful arrest. Rather, the critical
focus for purposes of criminality is culpability or blameworthiness. 244 For
mens rea to exist there must be an intent to do the deed which constitutes
the actus reus of the offense. At the same time, there cannot be any factor
which is sufficient for exculpation. 245 If there is no conduct by the actor
which constitutes the actus reus of the offense, further discussion of state of
mind becomes moot.246 If it is assumed that the actor's conduct is prohib-
ited, however, a substantial question remains as to whether there exists an
exculpatory factor which would negate culpability. It seems simple enough
to say that the unlawfulness of the arrest is exculpatory; however, further
thought should be given to the nature of the resistance.
It may be said that the statutory denial of any privilege to use force in
resisting an unlawful arrest amounts to the removal of any exculpatory fac-
tor. Thus, forceful resistance by the arrestee is the product of a blameworthy
state of mind. This conclusion does not necessarily follow. Identification of
a blameworthy state of mind requires further inquiry into the trend prohib-
iting forceful resistance and a separate inquiry into whether the resistance
was provoked.
Under the heading of general principles ofjustification, the Model Pe-
nal Code provides that use of force is not justified when the actor knows the
arrest is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. 247 In
another portion listing specific offenses, the Model Penal Code makes it a
misdemeanor for one to obstruct or impair the administration of governmen-
244. There are two components of every crime: One of these is objective and physical, the
actus reus; the other is subjective and psychical, the mens rea. The actus reas is the manifesta-
tion of a socially-harmful consequence, the guilty act or deed of crime. The mens rea will be
wanting unless the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense was free
from every factor which would be recognized as sufficient for exculpation, and included an
intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 743 (1969).
245. For a crime to exist there must be an actus reus, that is, an act which results in a social
harm. Wrongful intent alone is insufficient. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW, 741-43 (2d ed. 1969).
246. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i)(proposed Official Draft 1962).
247. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 (1980).
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tal function by "force, violence, physical interference or obstacle. '248 The
Code also makes it a misdemeanor to resist a lawful arrest by creating "a
substantial risk of bodily injury." 249 Force and risk of injury are essential for
these crimes. Flight and refusal to submit to arrest are expressly excluded
from liability under offense of obstruction of governmental function. The
effect of the resistance offense language is to "exempt from criminal liability
nonviolent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as
running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such con-
duct . . . is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code."
2 50
The Code drafters adopted a narrow concept of criminality for resist-
ance and obstruction. They excluded flight, mere refusal to submit to arrest,
minor scuffling, and other forms of non-submission common in an arrest.
25 1
Reading the Code's justification provisions, together with the definition of
the resistance crime, it is clear that the prohibition on forceful resistance to
an unlawful arrest speaks only to substantial force involving danger to a
person. This means that a considerable amount of conduct, traditionally
considered within the perameters of resistance or obstruction involving inci-
dental force in non-submission, remains unaffected by the Code's disallow-
ance of a privilege to use force in resisting an unlawful arrest.
By enacting the Model Penal Code provision disallowing a privilege to
use force while resisting, some jurisdictions have not enacted limiting per-
ameters for the crime of resistance or obstruction. In such jurisdictions, how-
ever, it would not be unreasonable for the courts to interpret the prohibition
on any privilege to use force as affecting only force involving a substantial
harm. A compelling argument, supported by the Model Penal Code, is that
such a provision in a penal code removes any privilege to use dangerous
force in resisting, but leaves mere non-submissive conduct and insubstantial
force outside the prohibition. Under such an interpretation, there remains
ample opportunity to discuss exculpatory factors in deciding whether the
arrestee is blameworthy when the conduct does not involve the employment
of potentially dangerous force capable of substantially harming a person.
Even in the situation where the arrestee has used dangerous force, a
discussion of exculpatory factors may be relevant, provided the resistance
was reasonable. Employment of dangerous force does not, in and of itself,
resolve the question of whether the arrestee acted with a blameworthy state
of mind. The emphasis should not be on the grant or denial of privilege to
use force, but rather on whether the actor was blameworthy. Conduct which
might otherwise be considered criminal, may be held blameless or less
blameworthy if it is the product of a certain state of mind.
A suitable benchmark from which to analogize is the homicide concept
of a killing in self-defense or as the result of provocation. The law has long
recognized that a killer may be blameless if he acted in self-defense, or less
blameworthy if he acted during the heat of passion caused by adequate
248. Id § 242.2 (1980).
249. Id § 242.2 comment at 214 (1980).
250. Id § 208.31, comments at 129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1959).
251. Segener'ally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 391, 572 (1972).
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provocation. 252 As to the former, if the actor kills, while under a belief that
his action is necessary and reasonable to prevent imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm, the necessary blameworthy state of mind to convict for
a crime is said to be absent. 25 3 Similarly, the law of homicide has long rec-
ognized that if the actor killed as the result of a highly provocative injury
sufficient to excite irresistible passion in a reasonable person, the necessary
blameworthy state of mind for murder is absent and the offense is nothing
more than manslaughter. 254 The inquiry is "whether or not the defendant's
reason was, at the time of his action, so disturbed or obscured by some pas-
sion. . . to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposi-
tion liable to act irrationally or without due deliberation and reflection, and
from this position rather than from judgment.
'2 55
In cases of self-defense and provocation, there are circumstances provok-
ing the action which can, to some extent, exculpate the actor. The mind,
due to the provocative circumstance, is not blameworthy and thus criminal
responsibility is to some degree lacking. The same principle is seen in the
law of assault. 256 An action which would generally be considered a battery,
if committed in response to an attack on the person of the actor, is not
deemed to be the product of a blameworthy state of mind.257 The pivotal
question in these examples is whether the provoking circumstances were suf-
ficient to have affected the actor's mind to the extent that his action, which
would otherwise be criminal, is deemed blameless or less blameworthy.
In considering the criminality of resistance to an unlawful arrest, the
critical question is similarly whether the circumstances were sufficient to pro-
voke the resistance, thereby making the actor's state of mind blameless or less
blameworthy. In this context the issue is not whether there is a grant or
denial of a privilege to forcefully resist an unlawful arrest. Nor is the issue
whether the resistance is prudent or effective. Rather, the issue is one of
blameworthy conduct; that is, whether the circumstances were sufficiently
provocative to exculpate criminal responsibility.
Aside from the general blameworthy state of mind necessary for all
crimes, there is a further inquiry into the requisite mental state necessary for
conviction of a given crime. This specific blameworthiness will rest primar-
ily upon a finding as to the purpose of the actor who has engaged in prohib-
ited conduct. In the carefully drawn language of the Model Penal Code, the
252. People v. La Voie, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964). It should be noted that a
killing by one exercising his privilege of self-defense is no crime and killing in a sudden heat of
passion (irresistible impulse) engendered by great provocation is manslaughter since the mens
rea necessary for murder is not present. State v. Ramey, 273 N.C. 325, 160 S.E.2d 56 (1968).
253. People v. Harris, 8 111. 2d 431, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1956). Se also W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 572 (1972).
254. People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 (1958).
255. Id. 325 P.2d at 102.
256. It is a general proposition that one is privileged to use whatever nondeadly force rea-
sonably seems to him to be necessary to prevent being harmed by the wrongful act of another.
See,e.g., People v. Katz, 263 App. Div. 883, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1942); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 995 (1969).
257. What otherwise may be a battery may be justified, as where one intentionally touches
or injures his adversary in self-defense or defense of others or prevents the commission of a
crime. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 608 (1972).
19841
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
crime of resisting arrest occurs only when the actor creates a substantial risk
of bodily harm to any person "for the purpose of preventing a public servant
from effecting a lawful arrest."'258 The Model Code provides that a person
acts "purposely" if "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature."2 59 When a person reacts defensively to an unlawful seizure, it may
be found that the purpose of the action is to protect and defend against an
unlawful denial of liberty. This defensive purpose, although incidently af-
fecting an unlawful arrest, is not the same as the requisite purpose of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest. Moreover, the
defensive conduct is not the product of a "conscious objective" to prevent an
officer from effecting a lawful arrest.
If the defensive conduct is the product of a mind provoked by an outra-
geous attack on a person's liberty, the conduct is most likely not born of a
calculated judgment to effect impairment of an officer's lawful action. A
"conscious objective" suggests a deliberate and calculated judgment to effect
a given result. It is improbable that an impulsive act can be characterized as
an action done with conscious intent. Impulse and deliberation are mutu-
ally exclusive. It is a sound rule that where the evidence is as consistent with
action in a senseless frenzy as with premeditation and deliberation, the bur-
den of establishing the requisite mental state sufficient for conviction has not
been sustained. 26 0 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the requisite conscious
objective to prevent an officer from effecting a lawful arrest is present when a
person instinctively reacts with resistance to an unlawful arrest. Because the
general blameworthy state of mind and the specific conscious objective are
not present when one instinctively resists an unlawful arrest, it would appear
that the requisite mental state is absent to convict for the crime of resistance.
In this sense, the illegality of the arrest is exculpatory.
In summary, there are substantial difficulties with the case for an abso-
lute abrogation of the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. To
criminalize all conduct which impedes an unlawful arrest is to sweep too
broadly. There are persuasive arguments that complete criminalization of
resistance to unlawful arrest is unconstitutional, rationally flawed, valueless,
ineffectual and fraught with potential for grave abuse. This does not mean
that the common-law rule, although a more desirable rule, is the best solu-
tion. As the next section suggests, there may be a better choice.
It may be that the arguments to abrogate the common-law rule are
spawned by a discomfort with the proposition that citizens have a license to
resist and impede an officer, even though the officer acts unlawfully. There
is a notion, with strong emotional attachment, that citizens should defer to
authority figures. Unqualified obedience to an official is to many the most
desirable norm in a modem society. In advanced societies, the state has a
monopoly on the use of force. One exception is allowing a citizen to force-
fully resist the wrongful use of force by another. Many people, however, are
258. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 242.2 (1980).
259. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
260. See, e.g., Hemphill v. United States, 402 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Cornett,
33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948).
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not comfortable with a rule allowing a citizen to forcefully resist an officer's
attack, even if such is an unlawful arrest. Seemingly, official status alone is
sufficient to tilt the scale against the citizen who would forcefully resist the
officer's wrongful action. This bias may have led the right-to-resist abroga-
tionists to an untenable and unnecessary result, that is, wholesale punish-
ment of all resistive conduct. There is a more viable alternative.
VI. AWAY FROM DOGMATISM: A REASONABLENESS TEST FOR
CRIMINALITY
Offenses prohibiting acts which impede an officer in the performance of
his duties are grouped in the category of offenses designed to protect govern-
mental authority. When the officer, however, is not performing a lawful
duty, it is questionable whether the act of impediment, such as resisting an
unlawful arrest, is a crime. The traditional approach to this question has
been categorical. Conviction for resistance has been controlled by whether
the jurisdiction recognized a right to resist an unlawful arrest or whether the
jurisdiction made submission to an unlawful arrest an obligation with a pen-
alty for noncompliance. Both rules have undesirable features.
Perhaps the most undesirable feature to this categorical approach is
casting the question of criminality in terms of a dogmatic rule: that there is
either a right to resist or a duty to submit. This Procustean formulation,
with criminality turning upon adoption of one rule or the other, is inade-
quate to accommodate the various interests at stake. This misdirection
should give way to a focus on the paramount concerns of protecting the
lawful exercise of governmental authority while accommodating a citizen's
liberty interests and reasonable defense thereof. A clear focus on these con-
cerns would eschew the traditional dogmatic formulation in favor of a test
for criminality based on reasonableness; that is, whether the resistance was
reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances of the encounter.
Critical to reasonableness would be a finding that the subject of an unlawful
arrest acted in good faith.
The traditional categorical approach has failed, in part, because it has
depended on generalized assumptions that may not be accurate in a diver-
sity of particular situations. Potentially relevant factors are ignored or
barred as immaterial if the sole question is whether there was or was not a
duty to submit. The reason for finding the arrest unlawful, the demeanor of
the officer, the degree and nature of resistive action taken by the arrestee,
and other situational factors are not given proper evaluation.
In a jurisdiction recognizing a right to resist, it may be irrelevant that
the arrestee employed a weapon to effect an escape from an officer who was
serving a facially proper warrant, subsequently found insufficient due to an
improperly drawn affidavit supporting the arrest warrant. The resistance
may be desired to escape an arrest which the arrestee perceives to be lawful,
rather than a provoked defensive action to protect against an abusive and
patently unlawful deprivation of liberty. Yet this inquiry into the probable
intent of the arrestee and degree of resistance, judged by the totality of the
circumstances, is irrelevant if the jurisdiction adheres to an absolute duty-to-
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submit law. The traditional dogmatic approach tends to disregard situa-
tional factors which have a bearing on whether the arrestee acted reason-
ably. Allegiance to generalized assumptions supporting one rule or the other
should not pre-judge an encounter so as to prematurely terminate issues of
relevancy and accuracy. Functionally, the traditional approach fails be-
cause it ignores relevant features of a given situation and, in the process,
diverts attention from the paramount concerns of society's values as they
bear on the judgment to criminalize resistance to an unlawful arrest.
To facilitate society's concerns in determining the criminality of resist-
ance, it is imperative to evaluate whether there was a substantial impair-
ment of official conduct and whether the resistance was the product of a
blameworthy mind. Resistance in a particular situation may not constitute
a significant impediment to the officer's performance. If, however, the resist-
ance significantly impedes the arrest, the act may not have been blamewor-
thy. The determination of criminality clearly requires an inquiry beyond
the existence or absence of a duty to submit. A suitable inquiry sufficient to
serve the interests at stake would need a twofold evaluation: the nature of
the resistive conduct and the blameworthiness of such conduct.
The first part of this imperative evaluation would necessitate an inquiry
into the nature of the arrestee's action in the encounter to determine if there
was a substantial impediment. Traditionally, guilt for such crimes as resist-
ance does not turn upon whether there was actual impairment of an officer
in the performance of his duties. Rather, guilt is present if there was an act
with the potential to impair.261 Likewise, the degree of impairment has not
been determinative, passive conduct or significant forceful actions being
equally guilty. If the traditional approach were abandoned in favor of a
reasonableness test, the determiner of criminality would consider whether
there was actual impairment and the degree of impairment. This test would
certainly be relevant to the state's interest in protecting the performance of
authorized functions.
In determining guilt for crimes of resistance or obstruction, the range of
punishable acts is important. Traditionally, guilt has been affixed to an ex-
pansive catalog of conduct, ranging from mere language and passive non-
action to quite harmful physical acts involving weapons. 262 The Model Pe-
nal Code, however, significantly narrowed the range of conduct considered
criminal to actions amounting to an affirmative subversion of governmental
processes, excluding mere flight to avoid lawful or unlawful arrest. 263 The
261. See, e.g., People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich. App. 453, 166 N.W.2d 477 (1968). (Resisting
arrest is an inchoate crime in that it is not necessary that the officer be prevented from perform-
ing his duty in order to sustain a conviction); Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74
(1925) (conviction must be based on acts indicating an intention to prevent the officer from
performing his duty). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1018 (1972).
262. Seegeneral/y Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1018 (1972).
263. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 242.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
A person commits a misdemeanor if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts
the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical
interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except this
Section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to
arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means
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Code draftsmen reasoned that if the arrested person is not convicted of the
offense for which he was arrested, it would be unjust and "invite grave
abuse to permit prosecution for an unsuccessful effort to evade the po-
lice." 264 Likewise, under the Code, guilt for the offense of resistance is nar-
rowed to situations where there was "a substantial risk of bodily harm" or
where a person "employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to
overcome the resistance."2 65 Mere non-submission or minor scuffling fre-
quently found to occur during an arrest would be excluded.
266
A similar narrowing of the range of guilty acts has not occurred in the
jurisdictions which adopted the Codes's disallowance of any privilege to
forcefully resist an unlawful arrest. 26 7 Thus, under the traditional dogmatic
approach in a duty-to-submit jurisdiction, minor scuffling or fleeing would
be criminal even though such acts were in response to an unlawful arrest.
Such a result would be unconscionable and highly conducive to grave abuse.
This potential for abuse could be, however, diminished if the traditional
dogmatic approach were abandoned in favor of a criminality standard tested
by the reasonableness of the resistance.
The second part of the imperative evaluation, whether the resistance
was a blameworthy act, would necessitate a focus on whether the circum-
stances were such as to provoke a person into defensive conduct. Coexistant
with provocation would be whether the arrestee acted in good faith. This
inquiry would render relevant a wide range of evidentiary factors including
the nature of the unlawfulness of the arrest, and the nature of the resistance
taken. It is important whether, using an objective perspective, it is likely the
resistance was provoked by the illegality of the officer's arrest. Resistance
lacking in significant violence which is a reflective, defensive response to a
wrongful denial of liberty is blameless. However, it may well be that an
arrestee resisted because he was attempting to evade an arrest that he
thought was lawful and appeared to be lawful at the time of the encounter,
although the arrest is later judicially determined to be in valid. The arres-
tee's evasion of an arrest which appears to be justified would not be a good
faith, blameless resistance.
The focus at this stage of the criminal evaluation would consider all
circumstances pertaining to the arrestee's probable state of mind. Relevant
would be factors going to the presence or absence of a blameworthy state of
mind. The resistive conduct would be a tangible guide for assessing the ar-
of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental
functions.
264. Id § 242.2, comment at 214.
265. Id § 242.2:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a public servant
from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a sub-
stantial risk of bodily harm to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.
266. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.31, comment at 129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
267. See, e.g., People v. Locken, 59 I1. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1975) (scuffling); People v.
Shinn, 5 Ill. App. 3d 468, 283 N.E.2d 502 (1972) (non-submission and lunging); State v.
Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1978) (grabbing the officer and non-submission); People v.
Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 52, 286 N.E. 2d 445 (1972) (refusal to submit); Ford v.
State, 538 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Crim. 1976) (non-submission and struggling).
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restee's probable state of mind for blameworthiness. The resistance would
be judged in reference to what a reasonable person would do in a like cir-
cumstance, and whether such resistance is deemed to be inside or outside the
limits that society considers tolerable under the circumstances. It is less
likely that an arrestee will be found blameless when he has forcefully resisted
arrest with a weapon under circumstances likely to bring great peril to
human life. This is so because such conduct is inconsistent with what a rea-
sonable, innocent person would or should do in response to an unlawful ar-
rest. A finding of blameworthiness grows more likely as the threat to human
life is increased by the resistance. On the other hand, a finding of blamewor-
thiness is unlikely when the resistance is merely verbal, passive or flight.
Blameworthiness for such conduct is unlikely because the conduct is reason-
able and more acceptable, especially given the circumstance of an obviously
unlawful arrest. Actions in good faith lack the necessary blameworthiness
for criminality.
The above considerations concerning the reasonableness of the resist-
ance would be irreleant under the traditional dogmatic approach. Surely
these factors are relevant in deciding criminality if the objective is both to
facilitate the state's legitimate interest in protecting lawful exercises of au-
thority and to accommodate the citizen's liberty interest. Moreover, such
evidentiary considerations are relevant in order to foster the fairness and
integrity of the legal system.
The imperative approach would fashion a formulation to determine the
criminality of resistance based on reasonableness. A person would be guilty
of a crime of resistance or the like by virtue of resistance to an unlawful
arrest only if it is found that the resistance was not reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances. This is a standard of qualified or situational
privilege to resist. Application of this standard would begin with an inquiry
to the illegality of the arrest. 26 Upon a finding of illegality, the focus would
turn to the nature of the illegality of the arrest and whether such is likely to
be perceived as a wrongful denial of liberty. The next stage of the focus
would be on the conduct of the arrestee. The resistance would be evaluated
to determine if there was an actual and substantial impediment to an of-
ficer's performance of his duties and to determine if it was the product of a
blameworthy state of mind.
A broadened inquiry under this reasonable, good faith standard would,
admittedly, lack a degree of predictability and certainty that may stem from
the traditional approach adopting either the right-to-resist rule or duty-to-
submit rule. Under the traditional approach, once legality of the arrest is
found lacking, the issue of criminality is largely settled. A good faith, reason-
ableness standard, which rests on a finding by the trier of fact, would in one
sense inhibit predictability, but not undesirably so. A reasonableness test is a
familiar concept in the law, especially in the law of self-defense. 269 Any un-
268. A thesis, not examined here, might suggest extension of a reasonableness standard by
which to determine criminality of resistance even though the arrest is lawful.
269. Seegenerally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 993-95 (1969). Another example
can be found in contract law. It is well settled that a test of reasonableness is the stie qua non of
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certainty as to a generalized norm that resistance is or is not a crime with
adoption of a reasonableness test would seem a minor cost for the benefit of
gaining a more appropriate test designed to serve the paramount concerns of
the state and the citizenry. 2 70 While there is much to be said for certainty in
the law, there is even more to be said for justice in the law, both in actual
application and appearance.
In a jurisdiction that adheres to the common-law right to resist rule, the
resistance right should not be read as an absolute right. Rather the resist-
ance right should be tempered by a test of reasonableness. In a right-to-resist
jurisdiction, the traditional analysis turns upon a judicial finding that the
arrest was illegal. If so, it automatically follows that the forceful resistance,
short of killing, is privileged and thus does not constitute a crime. This ap-
proach omits consideration of relevant circumstances such as whether the
unlawful arrest could be viewed as an outrageous affront to liberty and
whether the average person might be provoked to resist under the circum-
stances of a particular encounter.
Many arrests, subsequently found by a court to be illegal, are not pa-
tently illegal at the time of their occurrence and present close questions on
which reasonable persons could disagree. The circumstances leading up to
the arrest may have been such that there appeared to be a lawful basis for
arrest, although a court later finds the arrest is unlawful. In such a situation
it may be that there was no patently unlawful police abuse of authority suffi-
ciently provocative to justify resistance. Thus, a finding that the arrest was
illegal should not conclude the matter because the critical question is
whether the illegal arrest was such that it reasonably provoked resistance.
In a jurisdiction that imposes a duty to submit to a known officer per-
forming an unlawful arrest, and criminalizes resistance thereto, adoption of
the reasonableness standard to test criminality would be both feasible and
desirable. There may be some initial difficulty in the logic of how a duty to
submit may at the same time be excused under certain conditions. This idea
of an excused obligation, however, is not unique in the law. The duty to
submit should not be viewed as an absolute unremitting obligation; rather, it
should be viewed as an obligation excusable by a principle of provocation
and reasonableness. 271' Excusable conduct would be provoked resistance,
judged to be reasonable under the circumstances of an unlawful arrest. The
the enforcement of contract rights in an action in equity; e.g., McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis.
2d 607, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968).
270. As is argued, uzfra, text accompanying notes 270-71, a jurisdiction could have as a
general norm a right to resist or a duty to submit. Either rule should be qualified by a reasona-
bleness test by which to judge criminality of resistance to an unlawful arrest. Even if there is a
right to resist in general, a particular resistance may be prosecuted if it was not reasonable
resistance, provoked by the illegality of the arrest. In short, the reason for the resistance should
be examined.
271. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 211-218 (1973), where the au-
thors articulate the idea of legitimated rule departure through an alternative view of legal obli-
gation as nonmandatory. "The law itself accepts the challenge to legitimate departures from its




determination of criminality is found in a necessary combination of a rule
requiring submission and principles of acceptable reactive behavior.
It has been noted that "there is noa prori reason why a mandatory rule,
in order to rule, must impose an unremitting obligation and rule abso-
lutely." 2 72 Obligations imposed by mandatory rules are and should be tem-
pered by principles of excusability which are grounded in recognition of
acceptable rule departure. For there to be acceptable rule departure, it is
not necessary that a statute mandating a rule express the only recognizable
departures. Rule departure can be fashioned by the courts in response to the
needs of a particular case. The recognition and legitimation of rule depar-
ture provides a necessary vitality and essential dynamic to the law.
273
The nature of the duty to submit to an unlawful arrest is, in substance,
a preference for post-encounter civil remedial processes and for a reduction
in the likelihood of violence. Understanding the nature of the duty to sub-
mit affords a basis to draw the perimeters of that obligation. The perimeters
are defined with reference to the purpose of the submission obligation and
checked by the equally important need to recognize behavior which is rea-
sonable, understandable, and excusable. The submission obligation comes
to an end when equally compelling interests militate in favor of rule depar-
ture. Thus, the determination of whether resistance is criminal, judged by a
standard of reasonableness, is compatible with, if not an essential aspect of, a
duty to submit to an unlawful arrest. Moreover, to judge the criminality of
resistance by a reasonableness test would slacken the need to rely on the
pernicious doctrine that an unlawful arrest is an authorized function of an
officer for purposes of punishing resistance to an unlawful arrest. In short, a
standard of reasonableness would do much for public perception of the law
and enhance the integrity of the legal system.
In the final analysis, an absolute rule for determining criminality elimi-
nates a difficult but important task. That task is a case by case evaluation
which affords the opportunity to define what is acceptable conduct, keeping
sharply in mind the dual need to protect the state's exercise of authority and
a citizen's exercise of liberty. Effective law enforcement does not depend on
a requirement of absolute criminality for resistance to an unlawful arrest.
Criminalization of conduct should occur only when critical societal needs
are served. In the absence of a substantial impairment of authority, or un-
reasonable violence, conviction for a good faith resistance to an unlawful
arrest would serve no critical societal need. Societal needs include not only
protection of the exercise of authority but, of equal importance, the protec-
tion of liberty and fostering a public perception of the law as just. It is im-
portant that these needs be weighed against the facts of a particular
encounter. The basic issue is determining the social utility and cost of im-
posing a criminal sanction for resistance to an unlawful arrest. Rationally,
the failure of a citizen to cooperate in an unlawful arrest must be considered
with reference to whether the citizen went further than was justified under
the circumstances. Resistance to an officer's unlawful arrest merely begins




an inquiry into guilt; it is not categorial proof of guilt.
2 74
Judging the criminality of resisting unlawful arrest on a case by case
basis, according to a reasonableness or good faith standard, will serve to pro-
mote the type of flexibility that is critical to a free society. Conversly, dog-
matic laws that create an absolute bar to resistance may only serve to teach
us that governmental authority can be a capricious exercise of power.
274. Rationally, the failure of a citizen to cooperate in an unlawful arrest is a circumstance
to be considered with all others when determining whether the conduct of the resisting party
was justified. Resistance, and degrees thereof, is but one circumstance in weighing guilt; it is not
categorical proof of guilt. A suitable guide for this notion is found in Brown v. United States,
256 U.S. 335 (1921). The court was presented with the question of whether a person, subject to
a wrongful attack, must retreat before employing deadly force in self-defense. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court, rejected the retreat rule. "Rationally the failure to retreat is a circum-
stance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went
farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt." Id at 343.
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OVER THE HILL TO THE POOR HOUSE-THE
FAILURE OF SECTION 522 BANKRUPTCY
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
THOMAS J. REED*
What is the use of heapin' on me a pauper's shame?
Am I lazy or crazy? Am I blind or lame?
I am willin an' anxious an' ready any day
To work for a decent livin', an' pay my honest way
Will Carleton
The Bankruptcy Reform Act, in its original version, was considered the
answer for real and substantive reform of the bankruptcy system. One of the
salient reform measures was the comprehensive federal debtor's exemption
program, designed to give debtors in bankruptcy a welfare subsidy drawn
from assets otherwise available to their creditors for liquidation. The grand
design of this exemption program was reduced to a series of compromises'
that did not measure up to the constitutional standards for uniform bank-
ruptcy laws or proper delegations of legislative authority to the states.
Using a new federal exemption system, section 522 of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code 2 prescribes exemptions for debtors under chapters seven,
3
eleven 4 and thirteen. 5 These exemption rules make all of the debtor's prop-
erty part of his estate until held exempt. 6 If the debtor is eligible for these
exemptions, he can elect either the federal exemptions, or the federal non-
bankruptcy exemptions and state execution exemptions of the debtor's domi-
cile. 7 Given the extreme diversity of state exemption laws, Congress dele-
gated to each state the authority to restrict a debtor to the state's exemption
laws alone."
The theory behind allowing exemptions is to give individual wage earn-
* B.A. Marquette University (1962); J.D., Notre Dame Law School (1969); Professor of
Law at Delaware Law School, Widener University.
1. See infia text accompanying notes 153-208 (discussing the legislative history and com-
promises made in enacting the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982). The Federal exemptions are discussed in detail infia notes
188-210.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 701-766 (1982) (liquidation chapter).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-174 (1982) (reorganization chapter).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1301-1330 (1982) (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular in-
come chapter).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 541 (1981).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1982).
8. This "opting out" clause reads: "Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individ-
ual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either-(1) property that is specified under
subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under para-
graph (2)(A) of this subsection speciftally does not so authorize; or ... " 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
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ers or salaried persons who took bankruptcy relief a "fresh start" after receiv-
ing absolution from their debts. 9 First, the debtor would receive a discharge
preventing creditors from taking further action against the debtor. Second,
through various exemptions on certain assets, the debtor would receive the
basic necessities of life to begin his fresh start.'° These exemptions are, in the
abstract, a form of a welfare payment from the creditors.
Section 522 was an uneasy compromise between the House and the Sen-
ate I because of conflicting special interest group pressures. 12 Section 522
creates a series of problems for the courts to resolve. The opting out clause
provided to states in section 522(b)(1) permits states to pass a statute confin-
ing their citizens to state bankruptcy exemptions. This "opting out" clause
mandates non-uniform treatment of bankruptcy exemptions, because no na-
tionwide federal exemption statute would exist once one state determined to
"opt out." The United States Constitution requires Congress to pass "uni-
form Laws on the subject of bankruptcies."' 3 Consequently, state-drafted
exemption schemes have been attacked as unconstitutional, as has section
522(b) (1) authorizing such legislation.14
The experience with section 522 in bankruptcy courts and in federal
appellate courts has been chaos. Unresolved tension among bankruptcy
courts on the extent states can enact exemption levels different from the fed-
eral exemptions still exist. Some courts have held state exemptions unconsti-
tutional when they do not comply with the "fresh start" purpose of section
522.15 Other courts have held state exemption statutes constitutional. 1
6
To alleviate many of the problems with bankruptcy exemptions, the
whole scheme should be revised so that the bankruptcy system is more than
just providing indirect welfare payments to debtors. This article will begin
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6087-88 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See id at 6087 (defining "fresh
start" as providing the debtor with the basic necessities of life after discharge in bankruptcy).
See also infra text accompanying notes 315-19 (discussing the theory behind bankruptcy
exemptions).
10. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6087-88.
11. See In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr. 629, 633 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
12. Several people took part in the hearings on section 522 and addressed the exemption
problems. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on HR 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciagr, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (February 20,
1976) (statement of Robert Ward, Esq.) (allow state exemptions but remove any federal ceiling
on amount) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Hearings (March 8, 1976) (prepared statement of
American Life Insurance Association) (retain the 1898 Act exemptions). See also Hearings
(March 8, 1976) (statement of John Creedon, Senior Vice President of Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. and chairman of American Life Ins. Ass'n's Subcomm. on Fed. Bankruptcy Legis.) (retain
the 1898 Act exemptions).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982); In re Kelley, 21 Bankr. 375 (M.D. Fla. 1982); In re
Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982); In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780 (N.D. I11. 1982); In re
Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Curry, 5 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a d, 11
Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
15. See, e.g., In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (states must protect the debt-
ors household goods). See also, In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (state exemption
unconstitutional because it discriminated between homeowners and nonhomeowners) rev'd sub
noma. Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983).
16. See e.g. In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982).
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with a brief history of bankruptcy law pointing out its shortcomings and
improvements. The main aim of this article is to highlight the major techno-
logical and policy shortfalls of section 522 and to suggest a remedy for these
failings.
I. HISTORICAL BANKGROUND
A. English Insolvency Laws and Exemplions
The common law permitted creditors to use three writs to satisfy an
unpaid judgment: elegit-a writ allowing the creditor to take over the
debtor's land and reap the rents and profits until the judgment was liqui-
dated; levarifacias-which allowed the creditor to auction off the rents and
profits from the debtor's lands; and, fierifacias-which permitted the credi-
tor to obtain the aid of the sheriff to seize the debtor's personal property and
sell it to pay off the judgment. 17 A fourth writ, capias adsaisfaciendum, was
available to put a debtor in prison.18 After being clapped in prison, the
debtor had no way out unless his judgment was paid by relatives or friends.
Privy Council eventually intervened in these cases and forced the creditors of
an imprisoned debtor to agree to a composition and discharge the debtor.' 9
In 1670, the House of Lords passed an Act which authorized the courts
to accept these compositions and to release the debtors from prison retaining
their wearing apparel, bedding, and tools of the trade not exceeding £ 10.20
The Act also provided for a cash allowance to debtors based on a sliding
scale tailored to the size of the dividend paid to creditors.2 1 Consequently,
the American colonists from England brought with them insolvency laws for
poor debtors, bankruptcy laws for merchants and traders in financial dis-
tress, and debtor's exemptions from both processes.
17. Riesenfeld, Collection of Monel udgments in American Lau-A Historical Inventog and a Pro-
spectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 157 & note 9 (1957). See generally Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Mone
Judgments in Early American History, 71 MICH. L. REv. 691 (1973) (early American Colonies use of
these writs).
18. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231 (1926). If a writ of capias ad
respondemdum could be issued in the action to compel the attendance of the debtor, a further writ
ofcaptas adsatsfacendum would issue on the signing of the judgment that ordered the debtor to
be jailed in lieu of the writs elegit, levarifacias orferifacias. Id
19. Id. at 233-34. As for dishonest debtors, Privy Council had no interest in assisting debt-
ors who had gotten themselves into financial trouble through fraud. This is illustrated by the
first English bankruptcy law passed during the reign of Henry VIII, which called for imprison-
ment of merchant traders who had fled to avoid paying debts or who had obtained credit under
false pretenses. 34 & 35 Hen. 8 ch. 4 (1542-43). The details of this law and other early English
laws are discussed fully in 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 236-40.
20. By taking an oath that his assets were not above £10 and that he had not made a
fraudulent conveyance of his assets, an innocent debtor could be discharged from custody so
long as his creditors were unwilling to pay his weekly expenses in debtors' prison. Debtors who
were laborers, however, were first sent to a two year stretch in the workhouse before being
released. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 235 (citing 22 & 23 Charles II ch. 20 (1670)).
21. By an act of 1705, if the bankrupt debtors cooperated with the commissioners in locat-
ing their assets and assisted them in the liquidation process, they were given a living allowance
from their assets and a small percentage of the estate upon distribution. See Glenn, Property
Exempt irom Creditors' Rights of Reahzation, 26 VA. L. REv. 127, 130 (1935).
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B. American Exempion Laws
The province of Pennsylvania re-enacted the English Act allowing com-
positions, retaining most of the same English exemption provisions.22 Other
colonies provided exemptions from execution and attachment, and exemp-
tions from distribution similar to the English provisions. 23 Following the
American Revolution and Shays' Rebellion, Massachusetts adopted a com-
prehensive insolvency law and a very forward-looking exemption law which
allowed a subsistance farmer or urban mechanic to salvage a considerable
nest egg from attachment, execution or the insolvency process. 24 Other
American states followed Massachusetts' lead.
2 5
Early American exemption statutes exempted some livestock, fodder,
and the farmer's or trader's tools from seizure.2 6 Sentimental objects such as
the family bible, church pew, and family portraits were also protected.
2 7
Because there were no federal insolvency or bankruptcy laws, these exemp-
tions laws were the only protection debtors had from their creditors' attacks
on their economic subsistence. In their time, these statutes did a fair job of
giving a poor debtor a "fresh start" after economic failure.
C. Federal Bankruptcy Exemptions
The Articles of Confederation did not provide for any continental insol-
vency laws. During the constitutional debates in 1787, the Convention in-
serted into the list of powers available to Congress the power to enact
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."'28 The constitutional con-
vention minutes on the insertion of this clause give little insight as to why it
was included in the Constitution. 29 The United States took no immediate
22. See 4 PA. STAT. ch. 315, p. 171 (1730).
23. See, COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974) (discusses colonial ex-
emption laws).
24. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 100 § 1(1805) (current version at MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
235 § 34 (West Supp. 1983)).
25. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 907 (1902) (originally enacted in 1888, current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b (West Supp. 1984)); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 64 (1904)
(originally enacted in 1887, current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4421 (1983
Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 286, § 27 (1947) (originally enacted in 1857, current version at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023 (West 1968).
26. See supra notes 24-25.
27. See generally id
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4.
29. On August 29, 1787, the convention moved to include in the full faith and credit clause
with the following proposition: "to establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies and
respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." C. WARREN, BANK-
RUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (1935). See also 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (1937) (reprint of Madison's journal).
On examining the debate record, Prof. Nadelmann concluded the bankruptcy clause was
added to the full faith and credit clause due to problems anticipated by some of the convention-
eers in dealing with the enforcement of the judgments of one state in the courts of another.
Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankrupt Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 216, 227 (1957).
On September 3, 1787, the bankruptcy clause was moved to roughly its present position in the
enumeration of congressional powers in article I. WARREN, supra, at 5; 2 FARRAND, supra, at
483 (reprint of Madison's journal).
Madison wrote:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or
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action to enact a bankruptcy law after ratification of the Constitution until
the depression caused by the Napoleonic Wars and caused by a number of
business failures in eastern mercantile cities at the end of the century.
3 0
1. The 1800 Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 allowed involuntary bankruptcy petitions
to be filed against merchant traders, if the petitioners proved the trader had
committed one or more acts of bankruptcy. 3' The 1800 Act empowered the
bankruptcy commissioners in federal courts to examine the bankrupt and his
wife on the nature and extent of their assets and debts. 3 2 The debtor re-
ceived an allowance from his own estate based on what the creditors received
similar to the sliding scale used in England. 33 No specific items of property
were listed as exempt. The act was repealed in 1803. 3 4 The next federal
bankruptcy act did not appear until after the panic of 1837, when President
Van Buren and later President Tyler pushed for bankruptcy legislation. 35
The new act became the Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841,36 and was in-
tended to relieve insolvent debtors.
2. The 1841 Bankruptcy Act
The 1841 Bankruptcy Act was the first American bankruptcy act to
allow for specific items of property to be exempt from the bankruptcy pro-
cess. Like the 1800 Act, it provided for involuntary petitions against
merchants and traders, but it included an innovative section authorizing in-
their property may lie or be removed into different States that the expediency of it
seems not likely to be drawn into question.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (quoted in WARREN, supra, at 7).
Only one other pamphlet of the time carried any reference to the bankruptcy clause:
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal policies of all the
states to discern fully how general bankrupt laws, made by the union, would effect
them or promote the public good. I believe the property of debtors, in the several
states, is held responsible for their debts in modes and forms very different. If uniform
bankrupt laws can be made without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I
wish them to be made by Congress.
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER (R.H. Lee), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 306 (1968).
30. WARREN, supra note 29, at 12-13, 18-19. The bill was introduced shortly after the
collapse of several western land speculation schemes. Id at 12-13. It was passed when the war
with France began to take its toll on American vessels. Id at 18.
31. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19-21 (repealed Dec. 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248).
The statute gave the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy matters, and, similar
to the English model, provided for appointment of bankruptcy commissioners. id. at 21-23.
32. Id at 25-28.
33. Id at 30-31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. During its brief life, the 1800 Act was widely
condemned in Congress and in the press as oppressive to farmers and mechanics because a
merchant in a failing situation could obtain relief from his debts through an involuntary bank-
ruptcy action initiated by a friendly creditor, while no such relief was available to non-
merchants, who either paid their debts or went to debtor's prison. WARREN, supra note 29, at
19-21.
After the repeal of the 1800 Act several bankruptcy bills were introduced and defeated. See
generally WARREN, supra note 29, at 27-45.
35. WARREN, supra note 29, at 56, 69.
36. 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614).
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dividual debtors to file voluntary bankruptcy petitions. 37 Section three of
the 1841 Act directed the bankrupt to surrender all his property to the as-
signee in bankruptcy for sale, except:
necessary household and kitchen furniture, and such other articles
and necessaries of such bankrupt as the said assignee shall desig-
nate and set apart, having reference in the amount to the family,
condition, and circumstances of the bankrupt, but altogether not to
exceed in value, in any case, the sum of three hundred dollars; and,
also, the wearing apparel of such bankrupt, and that of his wife
and children; . . .38
The 1841 Act did not provide for a allowance of a percentage of the estate to
the debtor after payment of a dividend to creditors. It, too, was a stop-gap
measure. As soon as economic conditions brightened, the 1841 Act was re-
pealed in 1843. 3 9 In 1867, Congress passed a third Federal Bankruptcy Act,
to deal with the post-Civil War depression. 4°
3. The 1867 Bankruptcy Act
The 1867 Act allowed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. Bankrupts
would recieve a discharge from all liability if the estate paid fifty cents-on-a-
dollar dividends.4 1 Under court supervision, a debtor could make an ar-
rangement with his creditors and execute a deed of trust to a trustee on all
non-exempt assets for benefit of the creditors,42 in lieu of voluntary or invol-
untary bankruptcy. Section fourteen of the act contained a provision similar
to section three of the 1841 Act exempting certain property from creditors.
4 3
In contrast to the 1841 Act exemptions, however, the 1867 Act allowed every
insolvent debtor a federal exemption floor plus any state exemptions to
which the debtor would have been entitled under state execution laws. This
was a compromise made to get the bill passed.'
4. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act
The 1867 Bankruptcy Act was repealed in 1878. 4 1 Twenty years later,
following the crash of 1893, Congress passed a new, comprehensive and per-
manent bankruptcy act. The 1898 Act contained a special section dealing
with exemption rights:
[The Bankruptcy Act] shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at
the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have
37. Id at 442.
38. Id at 443.
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. Set WARREN, supra note 29, at 85. The act was
criticized by pro-debtor interests as unjust because the mandatory federal exemptions deprived
debtors of more generous state exemptions. WARREN supra note 29, at 82 (citing speech by Rep.
James A. McDougall given January 5, 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.)
40. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (amended at 15 Stat. 227) (containing
federal exemptions similar to the 1841 Act) (repealed, 20 Stat. 99 (1878)).
41. 15 Stat. at 228 (as amended).
42. 14 Stat. at 538 (required a majority of the creditors to consent).
43. Id. at 522-23, and as changed in 15 Stat. at 228. See supra text accompanying note 38.
44. WARREN, supra note 29, at 103.
45. WARREN, supra note 29, at 122. See Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 168, 20 Stat. 99.
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had their domicile for the six months or the greater portion thereof
immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
46
Besides the recognition of state exemptions, the 1898 Act also provided for
voluntary petitions in bankruptcy.4 7 The 1898 Act defined the bankrupt's
estate so as to exclude any exempt property.48 The only duty the trustee had
with respect to a debtor's exempt property was to set it aside upon the
debtor's filing of an exemption claim. 49 A 1938 amendment to section six
added "federal exemptions" to "state exemptions." 50 This scheme governed
all individual bankruptcies filed from 1899 to 1978.
D. State Exemption Laws
By the time the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was adopted, a number of state
exemption laws contained exemptions not found under the old colonial ex-
emption programs. These exemptions were the homestead exemption for the
debtor's personal residence,5 ' the life insurance policy exemption, 52 and the
wage exemptions from garnishment and attachment.
53
1. The Homestead Exemption
Texas led the states by incorporating into its' constitution a homestead
exemption which guaranteed to all heads of families residing in Texas "two
hundred acres of land, . . . or any town or city lot or lots, in value not to
exceed $2,000." 5 4 By the end of the 1860's most states had some form of a
homestead exemption. Typically, if the debtor was the head of a family, the
homestead exemption exempted the debtor's personal residence from seizure
on attachment or execution.
55
Some states today require that the head of the family execute and ac-
knowledge a declaration of homestead to secure the exemption. This decla-
ration would operate prospectively against future creditors, but would not
bar creditors' claims which predated the declaration.5 6 Although other
states do not require a declaration, they also hold once the homestead is
acquired the exemption protects only prospectively. 5 7 The homestead ex-
46. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548.
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547.
48. The trustee shall "be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, except
insofar as it is to property which is exempt. ... Id at 565.
49. Id. §47a(1l), 30 Stat. at 557.
50. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 6 52 Stat. 840, 847.
51. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 298, §§ 15-16 (1857).
52. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 183, § 11 (1885).
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, §§ 4-5 (1878).
54. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 22 (current version at TEX. CONST. art. 16, §§ 50-51).
See aLro GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 5218; FLA. GEN. STAT. ANN. div. 4, tit. 1, ch. 6, § 2520
(1906); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, ch. 267, § 7721 (Howell 1882) (originally enacted in 1848);
MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 48, §§ 2146-47 (1906); WiS. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 23 (1858).
55. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 804 (1974).
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2302 (1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-4 (Supp. 1983). These same states permit the declaration to have a
retroactive effect if it is made shortly before the sale on execution.
57. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.060 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § I
(West Supp. 1983) Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.510 (Vernon 1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 107
(1975); W. VA. CODE § 38-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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emption is usually limited by a dollar amount which is intended to be a sum
sufficient to cover the mortgagor's equity in an ordinary personal residence
or family farm. 58
Under the 1898 Act, the homestead exemption created serious problems
for bankruptcy courts. One such problem was the effectiveness of a home-
stead declaration filed after the bankrupt had subjected his assets to the ju-
risdiction of the bankruptcy court. Under the "strong arm" clause of the
1898 Act,59 a bankruptcy trustee had the power of a levying creditor as
against the debtor's assets at the time of the bankruptcy filing.6° Without
relying on the strong arm clause, the Supreme Court in White v. Stump 6 held
that a trustee could upset a homestead declaration filed after a voluntary
bankruptcy adjudication. 62  Twenty years later, in Myers v. Matly,6 3 the
Supreme Court modified White v. Stump. Myers holds that a homestead ex-
emption filed after the levy but before the sale will not be destroyed by the
trustee if the state law provides such a declaration is effective against a credi-
tor.64 The Supreme Court failed to reconcile the Myers decision with the
earlier decision in White v. Stump up to the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code.65 Myers, in effect, breaches the cut off point found to exist in White v.
Stump, and reliance on the strong arm clause is misplaced, 66 leaving consid-
erable doubt surrounding the trustee's legal position against inchoate home-
stead exemptions.
2. The Life Insurance Exemption
New York's Verplanck Act of 184067 exempted from seizure by the hus-
band's creditors life insurance contracts purchased by a married woman on
her husband's life, up to an annual premium of $300.68 Massachusetts fol-
lowed suit by exempting life insurance from all claims of the named in-
sured's creditors, not only for married women but for all classes of
beneficiaries.6 9 In 1861, Massachusetts further exempted from attachment
or execution the cash surrender value of life insurance policies.70 By the end
of the nineteenth century, many states had passed laws exempting life insur-
58. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 800 (in over half the states the exemption is $5,000 or less).
As of June 1982, the average of all thirty-nine jurisdictions using a dollar limit on the homestead
exemption was $14,296.67.
59. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70c, 52 Stat. 840, 880 (1938) (amendment to the 1898
Act).
60. Id.
61. 266 U.S. 310 (1924) (decided before section 70 was amended).
62. The decision rested on the Court determining the bankruptcy filing date was the point
of time which property not exempted left the debtor's hands. Id. at 313.
63. 318 U.S. 622 (1943).
64. Id at 627-28. Applied in Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.), rev'g on rehearing,
189 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
65. See Countryman, For A New Exeniptin Polic in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678,
690-95 (1960).
66. See generally, id at 693-95.
67. Verplank Act of 1840, NEW YORK LAWS ch. 80.
68. Id See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 583, 589 (1957).
69. MASS. LAWS ch. 82 (1844).
70. 1861 Mass. Acts ch. 186.
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ance proceeds and the cash surrender value of insurance policies from
seizure.7' There is no uniformity among the states on the amount of life
insurance exempted or who can be a beneficiary. 72 Because life insurance
represents investment as well as protection, this has led one scholar to argue
that the life insurance exemption should be limited to a reasonable dollar
amount and apply only to dependent beneficiaries.
73
3. Wage Exemption
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, states exempted an individ-
ual's wages from attachment or garnishment in whole or in part. 74 The state
wage exemption statutes were not uniform. Many of the states excluded a
stated amount of weekly wages from attachment or garnishment.
75
Through decisional law some states have also exempted wages after they are
deposited in the debtor's bank account. 76 When the 1898 Act was enacted,
the amount of wages exempted by the various states was not particularly
generous. 77 Because future wages did not become a part of the bankrupt's
estate in "straight" bankruptcy under the 1898 Act, this exemption meant
little to the bankruptcy process, except as to debts not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
78
Besides the basic wage exemptions, other types of payments were classi-
fied either as exempt or not exempt prior to the 1978 Act. Future earnings
not yet received by the debtor could become part of his bankruptcy estate if
the future earnings accrued prior to the date of bankruptcy and were paid in
71. S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS REMEDIES AND DEBTOR'S
PROTECTION 332-36 (3d ed. 1979). See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 807.
72. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 808-10. There are basically three methods for limiting the
amount exempted: 1) no dollar limitation; 2) a face amount limitation; or, 3) a dollar ceiling on
the annual premium. See id. at 808.
73. Id. at 811-13.
74. See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28; ALA. CODE § 2823 (1876) (current version at § 6-10-7
(1975); D.C. Acts ofJune 19, 1878, ch. 321, 20 stat. 173 (current version at D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 15-503 (1981); FLA. LAWS ch. 2065, § 1 (1875) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11
(1977)); 1861 ILL. LAWS p. 177, § 2 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-803
(Smith-Hurd 1983)); 1886 KAN. SESS. LAWS ch. 11, § 1 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2310(b) (1983)); 1858 MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 61, §§ 90-91 (current version at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.37(13) (West Supp. 1983)); 1897 N.M. LAws tit. 13, ch. 1, § 1737 (current version at
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-7 (1978)); 1893 OKLA. STAT. § 4383-84 (current version at OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 5.105(2) (1983)); 1896 TENN. PUB. ACTS ch. 4, art. I, § 3794 (current
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-106 (1955)); 1893 WASH. LAWS p. 102, ch. 56, § 23 (current
version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.33.280 (1984 Supp.)). See also Vukowich, supra note 55,
at 813-20 (discussing the treatment of wage exemptions).
75. See, e.g., 1861 ILL. LAWS p. 177 § 2 (up to $25.00); 1858 MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 61 §6 90-
91 (up to $25.00).
76. See Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973) (seaman's wages), Rutter v. Shum-
way, 16 Colo. 95, 26 P. 321 (1891); Staton v. Vernon, 209 Iowa 1123, 229 N.W. 763 (1930);
Colonial Discount Co. v. Wilhelm, 40 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1943). But see Holmes v. Blazer Financial
Servs., 369 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that exempt wages lose their character
when deposited in a bank account); John 0. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 88 Wis. 2d 252,
276 N.W.2d 274 (1979) (in considering the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, held that
the exempt wages lose their character when deposited in a bank account).
77. See supra notes 74-75. The exempt amounts ranged from $25-30.00 under the original
wage exemption acts, rather than by percentage of wages often used today. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 6-10-7 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-803 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
78. See 6nfta text accompanying notes 106-07, 114-18.
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the form of income tax refunds.79 Accrued vacation pay, on the other hand,
was exempted from the bankruptcy estate as post-bankruptcy "fresh start"
assets.8 0 Retirement plans and pension annuities were also exempt from the
bankruptcy estate in several states.8 1 Alimony and child support payments
to persons who filed bankruptcy petitions were generally not exempt under
state execution and attachment laws.
8 2
The treatment of wage-based benefits, such as retirement benefits, pen-
sion plan payments, and periodic support payments for alimony and child
support, by state legislatures has not been consistent. For example, life in-
surance policies that are settled under an annuity settlement option are ex-
empt, but a comparable payment to a survivor out of a qualified pension
plan is not.8 3 Not all states specifically exempt worker's compensation pay-
ments and unemployment compensation benefits from seizure or attach-
ment;8 4 nor, do all states protect the insurance industry from attachment of
health insurance or disability insurance payments;85 and, only one-fourth of
the states exempt welfare payments from execution and attachment.8 6 The
1898 Act did little to combat these inconsistencies. Section six of the 1898
Act did not preclude a debtor from claiming his state wage exemptions.
8 7
At the same time nothing in the chapter thirteen amendment to the 1898
Act on wage exemption plans took in account the state exemptions as a limit
79. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
80. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1971).
81. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 821-24 (discussing state exemptions for retirement
funds and similar "fringe benefits").
82. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 824-25. Alaska exempts the amount of a divorced man's
wages necessary to make child support payments. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.085 (1973). New York
exempts support payments from the creditors of the wife and children. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 5205(e)(3) (McKinney 1977).
83. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 822-23.
84. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 826.
The states exempting workers compensation benefits are: ALA. CODE § 25-5-86(b) (1975);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068(B) (1978); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 704.160 (West Supp.
1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.320 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-17
(Burns 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-514 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.821 (West
Supp. 1983).
The states exempting unemployment compensation are: ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.405(b)
(1962 & Supp. 1972); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 704.120 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 8-80-103 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.051 (West Supp. 1983-84); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN., ch.
48, § 540 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.17(2) (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-9-18(c) (1960); N.Y. LABOR LAWS § 595(2) (MeKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-17(c)
(Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.32 (Page Supp. 1983-84); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 2-303 (Supp. 1980).
85. For the states that do provide such exemptions see CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 704.130
(West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.18 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 511.37 (1949); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24A, § 2429 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 100A (West Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.39 (1947); TEX. INS. CODE art 21.22(1) (1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48.18.400 (1961).
86. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11002 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV.
STAT. § 46.111 (West 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 400.62 (West 1976); OH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5107.12 (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-208 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 239.13 (1969); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 27-2-21 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A.36 (Supp. 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-6-
14 (1956); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-190 (Supp. 1983). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-131
(1973) (payments to the blind exempted); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:25 (1977) (payments to
the blind, old age assistance, and disabled aid exempted); ORE. REV. STAT. § 412.115 (1981).
87. 30 Stat. at 548. See supra text accompanying note 46.
1984] BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
on what the debtor contributed to his plan.88
4. The Spendthrift Trust, a Hidden Exemption
A spendthrift trust is not an exemption, but when spendthrift trusts be-
came popular in the late nineteenth century, state courts consistently refused
to enforce attachment, execution, or proceedings supplemental to execution
against the trustee for debts contracted by the beneficiary. 89 Although the
spendthrift trust was not included in state-created exemption statutes, judi-
cial enforcement of the spendthrift trust's forfeiture restraints on alienation
of income and principal made such trusts practically exempt.90 Most bank-
ruptcy courts followed state decisional law and held that spendthrift trust
funds were not part of the bankrupt's estate under section 70(a) of the 1898
Act.9 ' Because of the variations in state laws, treatment of a spendthrift
trust as an exemption was not resolved by the courts under the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act.
E. The 1898 Act and Federal Non-bankmplcy Exemptions
The federal, non-bankruptcy law exemptions which could be elected in
place of state exemptions did provide for many of the exemptions that states
provided. The federal exemptions included federal employee wages, mili-
tary disability payments and others. 92 But because section six of the 1898
Act allowed the federal exemptions to yield to the elected state exemptions,
the federal exemptions did little to make the 1898 Act a uniform act.
93
88. See Chandler Act ch. 575, §§ 601-86, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amendment to the 1898 Act).
89. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 790-92. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 149 comment a (1959).
90. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 790-92, pointing out the differences between a spend-
thrift trust and an exemption.
91. Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th
Cir. 1956); Roundtree v. Lane, 155 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1946); Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1930); Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 652
(1926); Allen v. Tate, 6 F.2d 139 8th Cir. 1925). See also In re Morris, 204 F. 770 (2d Cir. 1913)
(allowing New York bankruptcy trustees to recover against trust assets). Illinois immunizes any
trust fund set up for a beneficiary from execution or attachment. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 22, § 49
(Smith-Hurd 1958);see Hummel v. Cardwell, 390 Ill. 526, 62 N.E.2d 433 (1945),cert. denied, 327
U.S. 793 (1946).
92. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV.
769, 787, 791 (1980).
93. Id at 773. "[T]here is no one thing which makes our uniform Bankruptcy Act more
un-uniform than Section 6. . . which recognizes state laws in the setting aside of exemptions."
Id., quoting King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45 CoM. L.J. 36, 40 (1940). But when
considering the 1867 Act, one senator commented:
The idea of some gentlemen is that the law, to be uniform, must be equal in its
operations. I do not hold to that idea at all. If we make a rule which operates upon
the States equally, that is to say, which is equal in its terms, so far as the States are
concerned, it would not be unconstitutional simply because, owing to the particular
provisions of the several States, the operation would not be precisely similar. The
provision of the Constitution unquestionably was intended to apply to the several
States to prevent any distinction being made between them.
WARREN, supra note 32, at 106-07.
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II. THE FLAWS OF SECTION SIX OF THE 1898 BANKRUPTCY ACT
A. The Evils of Non-Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions
Section 6 of the 1898 Act 9 4 condoned a different federal exemption law
for each state or territory within the United States. Under the 1898 Act
election provision a Delaware debtor in bankruptcy court was able to hold
back only $200 worth of personal property and wearing apparel, $75 worth
of tools of the trade or business, a sewing machine and a rented player pi-
ano.9 5 The same individual, had he been residing in Texas at the time of his
financial misfortune could have saved a 160 acre tract of land or a half acre
town lot from bankruptcy process, regardless of the worth of the property
attributable to improvements.9 6 More importantly, within the same state
different classes of creditors, presumably operating under the same federal
exemption rule, could be treated differently in bankruptcy process. In Mas-
sachusetts, for example, a debtor could take advantage of the liberal home-
stead allowance by filing a recorded declaration of homestead.9 7 This
declaration did not affect creditors holding debts predating the declara-
tion.9 8 When the debtor holding the homestead exemption filed his bank-
ruptcy petition, some creditors could later seek satisfaction against the
homestead property if their debts predated the homestead declaration,9 9 al-
though their debts were supposedly dischargeable in bankruptcy.
In most states, mechanic lien holders and material lien holders had spe-
cial status against exempt homesteads. Labor and material furnished to im-
prove a homestead were not frustrated by the exempt nature of the
homestead property, and could be foreclosed under state law. °° Such credi-
tors were voluntary creditors of the bankrupt and their claims would other-
wise be subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Nonetheless, mechanic lien
holders were allowed to foreclose against exempt homestead property even
though the owner of the homestead had received a discharge in bank-
ruptcy,10 ' on logic similar to that of the creditor holding a debt preceding
the creation of the homestead. Consequently, the 1898 Act federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions worked arbitrarily and capriciously in individual cases.
Section six provided no particular incentive for debtors 
to file bankruptcy'
petitions to receive better treatment than they would have had by a general
grab of their assets by creditors in state courts.
10 2
94. 30 Stat. at 548.
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4902-03 (1975).
96. TEX. [PROP.] CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (prior to amendment); set also
TEX. CONST. art. 16, §§ 50, 51 (200 acres for family outside city, 100 acres for a single person;
up to $10,000 for a lot in the city).
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188 § 2 (West 1977).
98. Id. at § 1 (amended 1979).
99. Id. at §§ 1-2.
100. ALA. CONST. art. 10, § 207 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-1 (Supp. 1983); MD. [CTs.
& JUD. PROC.] CODE ANN. § 11-507 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-103 (1978); TEX. [PROP.]
CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (1973).
101. Ste supra note 99.
102. See Kennedy, Limiations of Exemptzons in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 450-53
(1960). Kennedy argues against a set of specific federal exemptions because such a provision
would encourage creditors to file involuntary petitions against debtors in states which had ex-
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Serious doubts about the constitutionality of such a crazy-quilt system
of exemptions were often raised. Within a few years after Congress passed
the 1898 act, creditors decided to challenge its constitutionality under the
bankruptcy clause of the Constitution.10 3  In Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, 104 Hanover National Bank sued defendant Moyses on a money judg-
ment entered against Moyses in Mississippi on a promissory note in de-
fault. 10 5 Subsequently, Moyses moved to Tennessee and filed a voluntary
bankruptcy petition under the 1898 Act.' 0 6 Moyses received a discharge in
bankruptcy from all of his debts. 10 7 The Supreme Court considered the
Bank's constitutional argument that Moyses' discharge should be void be-
cause enforcing state exemptions under the 1898 Act' 0 8 violated the uni-
formity requirement of the bankruptcy clause.
In affirming the circuit court's finding for Moyses, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress, unlike the states, was not forbidden to pass statutes
impairing contracts.' 0 9 The only limitation imposed was that "[tihe laws
passed on the subject must, however, be uniform throughout the United
States, but that uniformity is geographical and not personal, . . .""o Then,
without addressing the differences between the exemption scheme of the
1867 Act and that of the 1898 Act,' the Supreme Court adopted the point
of view expressed in lower court cases decided under the much different 1867
exemption laws. That view was that the 1898 Act, requiring all federal
courts sitting in bankruptcy to use state exemption laws as a rule of decision,
did not violate the constitutional requirement of uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies.' 12 Justice Fuller claimed uniformity was met because the
trustee "takes in each State whatever would have been available to the credi-
tors if the bankrupt law had not been passed."' 13 The Supreme Court con-
cluded, without stating its reasons, that Congress had made no unlawful
emptions less generous than the federal exemptions. Cf England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641,
643-44 (9th Cir. 1956) (creditors should not be subject to a haphazard "grab law").
103. The bankruptcy clause of the constitution provides "to establish . . . uniform laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
105. Id. at 181-82.
106. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547.
107. 186 U.S. at 182. Claiming no notice of Moyses' voluntary bankruptcy petition, Hano-
ver National Bank continued to prosecute the judgment action against Moyses until Moyses
demurred. Id at 183. The demurrer was sustained by the circuit court. Id
108. See supra text accompanying note 46.
109. See 186 U.S. at 187-88. In support of this argument, Justice Fuller noted that the 1867
Act applied to persons other than merchants and traders without infringing on the "uniform
system of bankruptcy." Id at 187. Set also In re Klein, appended to Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (I
How.) 265, 277 (1843) (quoted in Moyses, 186 U.S. at 186). Congressional jurisdiction in bank-
ruptcy extends "to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor
among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest, is the discharge of a debtor from his
contracts." Id. at 281.
110. 186 U.S. at 188.
111. Under section 14 of the 1867 Act debtors were allowed to claim state-created home-
stead exemptions over and above the federal "floor" exemptions. See In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334
(E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728) (quoted in Moyses 186 U.S. at 189-90). Such an "over and above"
claim was not allowed under the 1898 Act. Therefore the question of uniformity should have
been treated differently in Moyses.
112. See supra text accompanying note 109, 186 U.S. at 188.
113. 186 U.S. at 190.
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delegation of legislative power to state assemblies by means of section 6."4
In effect, Moyses validates as constitutional the non-uniform treatment of a
treatment of a bankrupt's federal bankruptcy exemptions from state to state.
This allows the accident of domicile to control a federal rule.
A few years later, in Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,' 1 5 the Supreme Court
approved the non-uniform treatment by states of different classes of creditors
as constitutionally permissible under the bankruptcy clause. The issue in
Lockwood was whether a bankruptcy court had any jurisdiction over the
bankrupt's exempt property to enforce the rights of a creditor holding an
exemption waiver against the property.' l 6 After Lockwood was adjudged
bankrupt," l 7 Exchange Bank objected to the trustee's designation of the
homestead and other property as exempt." I" Exchange Bank claimed Lock-
wood had waived his exemption rights in their favor." '9 To meet Exchange
Bank's potential levy on Lockwood's exempt property, the district court en-
forced Lockwood's waiver by reducing Lockwood's exemptions to the lowest
permissible amount. 120 The Supreme Court concluded that Congress did
not give the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enforce an exemption waiver
held by a creditor against the bankrupt's exempt property.
We think that the terms of the bankruptcy act of 1898. . . clearly
evidence the intention of Congress that the title to the property of a
bankrupt generally exempted by state laws should remain in the
bankrupt and not pass to his representative in bankruptcy, as did
the provisions of the act of 1867, . . . .121
A contrary holding would have allowed the bankruptcy court to assume
jurisdiction over exempt property, which in the Supreme Court's eyes would
cause an "irremediable" inconvenience to the bankrupt and to other parties
interested in an orderly liquidation in favor of the waiver-holding credi-
tors. 12 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court compromised: although the bank-
ruptcy court had no jurisdiction over the bankrupt's exempt assets, the
waiver holding creditor could require a stay of all bankruptcy proceedings
while it perfected its levy and execution rights against otherwise exempt
property. 
23
114. Id, ctitng In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891). In re Rahrer concerned state's police
power and interstate commerce. Charles Rahrer, without a druggist permit, had sold alcohol
shipped from Missouri in defiance of the Kansas prohibition act. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 546-
47. The Supreme Court held Congress' authorization for states to regulate internal sales of
alcoholic beverages was not an improper delegation of Congress' authority to regulate com-
merce. See id. at 561-62.
115. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
116. Id at 298.
117. Id at 296 (Lockwood had filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition).
118. Id at 294-95.
119. Id.
120. Id at 296. In allowing exemption waivers Georgia provided a minimum exemption of
wearing apparel and household and kitchen furniture, and provisions for not more than three
hundred dollars. See id at 297 (citing GA. CONST. of 1877, art. 9, § 3).
121. Id at 299.
122. Id at 300.
123. Id. at 300-01.
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The Lockwood holding is inconsistent.' 2 4  First, the Supreme Court
stated that the bankruptcy courts had no jurisdiction over the debtor's ex-
empt assets,' 2 5 and as such can not adjudicate a claim by an exemption
waiver-holding creditor against exempt assets. Yet, it directed the bank-
ruptcy court to stay its hand while the waiver-holding creditor sought relief
in state court against the exempt assets. 126 This gave the bankruptcy court
jurisdiction to suspend its operations until some preferred creditor realized
collection against exempt assets. In fact, the Supreme Court conceded the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the exempt assets of the bankrupt. 1
2 7
Thus, no creditor or bankrupt could force an approval of a trustee's report
on exempt property so long as a single waiver-holding creditor required time
to perfect a judgment or execution lien against exempt assets. Non-uniform
treatment of exemptions proper 28 and non-uniform treatment of creditors
were condoned under the 1898 Act 129 despite the bankruptcy clause in the
Constitution.
B. The Question of a Debtor's Domicile
Because the 1898 Bankruptcy Act allowed debtors to claim the exemp-
tions offered by their state of domicile, the federal bankruptcy courts were
plunged into the application of state conflict of laws rules relating to the
enforcement of judgments and the applicability of exemptions. The
Supreme Court, in dicta in Chicago, Rock Island & Paciic Railway v. Stum,'
130
stated that state exemption laws are not constituent parts of the contract to
pay a debt, but should be considered remedies.' 3 ' Thus, it followed that
when an out-of-state debtor was sued by an in-state creditor on a contract to
pay money, and execution was taken in the forum state, the exemption laws
of the forum state would prevail.' 32 Transferring this reasoning to bank-
124. See generally Kennedy, supra note 101, at 462 (the Lockwood decision has been the subject
of much disharmony).
125. See 190 U.S. at 299.
126. See id at 300-01.
The doctrine affords a mode of circumventing the policy and provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act which condemn preferences and secret liens. When a waiver holder is
permitted to prove the full amount of his claim in bankruptcy and to receive dividends
computed thereon and at the same time to enjoy the blessing of the bankruptcy court
while he pursues the debtor's exempt property elsewhere, he is surely getting preferen-
tial treatment in any ordinary sense of that term.
Kennedy, supra note 101, at 463 (footnotes omitted).
127. See id. at 298 (quoting bankruptcy act provisions dealing with exempt property).
128. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
129. Se supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
130. 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
131. "Exemption laws are not a part of the contract; they are part of the remedy and subject
to the law of the forum." Id at 717 (citations omitted). Sturm was an action between Iowa and
Kansas domicilaries on an enforcement of a garnishment judgment. Cf Currie & Schreter,
Unconstituttonal Discrinmmatiin n the Conflict of Laws. Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1, 25-26
(1960) (criticizing the Supreme Court for considering the conflict of law issue when it was not
necessary to the case).
132. This position was later ratified in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 132 (1971):
The local law of the forum determines what property of a debtor within the state is
exempt from execution unless another state, by reason of such circumstances as the
domicile of the creditor and the debtor within its territory, has the dominant interest
19841
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ruptcy practice, this would authorize a debtor to claim exemptions provided
for by the forum state in which he filed his bankruptcy petition. But, the
federal courts reach a contrary conclusion.
Resting in part on the domiciliary provisions of section 2 in the 1898
Act concerning bankruptcy jurisdiction and the express provisions of section
6, the federal courts held a bankrupt could claim the exemptions of his dom-
iciliary state. 133 These exemptions would apply even if part of the bank-
rupt's property was situated in another state that had different exemption
laws applicable to that state's residents. 134 Consequently, property which
would qualify as exempt in the forum state, but not the domicile state,
would not be exempt in bankruptcy. 135 Since residency and domicile are not
equivalent terms, 136 under the 1898 Act a bankrupt could wind up losing
exemptions guaranteed to a resident when the bankruptcy court found that
the debtor was domiciled in a place other than his residence. Such predica-
ments were inherent in the federal exemption system in the 1898 Act because
the Act depended upon state rules of decision for its operation.
C. Critical Reactions to the Section Six Exemption Scheme
Until the 1960's, section 6137 was the subject of very little criticism.
When the critical commentaries began to mushroom, one of the first com-
mentators, Professor Countryman, immediately pointed out that the federal
bankruptcy exemption policy lacked uniformity because it depended on the
individual states' execution exemptions to protect the federal interest. 138
State exemption laws are not designed primarily for use in a
system of orderly liquidation where all of the debtor's estate is to be
converted to cash, but in a system of piecemeal liquidation where
each creditor levies upon and sells such property as he can locate
• . . The problem for the bankruptcy court is usually that of iden-
tifying property other than cash which fits the description con-
tained in the state exemption law-and of appraising that property
where the state law fixes a value limit. 1
39
Professor Countryman's solution to have uniformity without using fifty dif-
ferent state exemption laws was to pass a nationwide uniform exemption act
in the question of exemption. In that event, the local law of the other state will be
applied.
See Currie & Schreter, supra note 130, at 28 (supporting this position because it prevents forum
shopping by an in-state creditor).
133. See e.g. In re Camp, 17 Am. BR. (N.S.) 189 (S.D. Cal. 1931).
134. See in re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631, 21 Am. BR. (N.S.) 290 (2d Cir. 1932),cert. denied, 287 U.S.
652 (1933) (law of the bankrupt's domicile controlled regarding exemption of life insurance
contract even though the policy was located in New York). See also In re Camp, 17 Am. B.R.
(N.S.) 189 (S.D. Cal. 1931) (Texas homestead exemption applied to Texas property because the
bankrupt had not established California as his new domicile).
135. See In re Stevens, 23 F. Cas. I (W.D. Wis. 1870) (No. 13,392) (applying section 14 of the
1867 Act).
136. See generaly Reese & Green, That Eluszwe Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953)
(discussing the differences and similarities between the-use of residence and domicile).
137. See supra text accompanying note 46.
138. See Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGERs L. REV. 678,
680-84 (1960).
139. Id at 681 (footnotes omitted).
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that would only provide for a cash allowance to bankrupts from their es-
tates.' 4 ° Such a cash allowance would be similar to the provisions of the
1800 and 1841 bankruptcy acts.'
4'
Another commentator advocated no change in the use of state exemp-
tion laws in federal bankruptcy cases. 14 2 This commentator recognized, as
did Professor Countryman, 143 that state exemption laws were passed in a
pre-industrial era for the benefit of self-sufficient subsistence farmers and
small town tradesmen, and no longer met the exemption needs of a post-
industrial highly interdependent society.' 4 4 Even though the state exemp-
tions may be ill-adapted to serve their original purpose, the recognition of
state interests in protecting bankrupts from poverty and a dependence on
public assistance should continue.145
Both commentators neglected to consider some of the "hidden exemp-
tions" of the 1898 Act. For example, real or personal property held by ten-
ancy in the entirety was not part of one tenant's bankrupt estate under
section 70(a) unless both tenants filed petitions and the two petitions were
consolidated for disposition. 146  Countryman did note, however, that
"spendthrift trusts" were not included in the bankrupt's estate, and practi-
cally speaking, were treated as exempt.147 Although future earnings were
not exempt, unless they qualified under one of the federal exemption statutes
for wages or other benefits, the discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy
stopped creditors not holding a reaffirmation agreement from attaching or
garnishing the bankrupt's future earnings.'
48
Other critical reviews of the state of the bankruptcy law also included
attacks on the exemption program of section 6,149 along with articles directly
attacking section 6.150 Nearly all the criticism concerning section 6 was di-
rected at the use of antique state exemption laws in a modern commercial
setting as the means for preserving the economic viability of bankrupt debt-
140. Id. at 746-48.
141. See supra notes 33-34, 38 and accompanying text.
142. Kennedy, supra note 101, at 445-46. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
143. See Countryman, supra note 137, at 681-84.
144. Kennedy, supra note 101, at 446-49.
145. Id. If the state exemptions are liberal then creditors should take that into account when
dealing with debtors. Id. at 450.
146. See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.06 (14th ed. 1974).
147. Countryman, supra note 137, at 669-70. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
148. Under the 1898 Act, a reaffirmation of a debt discharged in bankruptcy was a matter
between the bankrupt and his creditors and was supported by an oral promise to pay the debt,
disregarding the statute of frauds. Later the Supreme Court ruled, however, that a pre-bank-
ruptcy wage attachment could not continue after the debtor's discharge, even if the wage at-
tachment was neither a fraudulent transfer nor a preference. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234 (1934). Section 524(c) and (d) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act severely restricts
the debtor's reaffirmation of a debt discharged in bankruptcy and has pre-empted the old com-
mon-law rules surrounding reaffirmation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)-(d) (1982).
149. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 81-84
(197 1); Countryman, Consumer Bankrupt -- Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals, 19 U. KAN. L.
REV. 165, 167-68 (1971).
150. See Note: Bankruptcy Exemptions: Cntique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1959); See




ors.1 5 1 When the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws was established 5 2 to
review current bankruptcy laws with a view toward restructuring the entire
system, exemptions were included in the areas of concern to be addressed by
the Commission. 153  The results of the Commission's work was the 1973
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 154 which was the basis for the four year long strug-
gle of completing a federal bankruptcy code for Congress' approval.
III. THE BIRTH OF SECTION 522
A. Legislative Hzstogy
The 1973 Bankruptcy Reform Act submitted by the Bankruptcy Com-
mission contained a completely re-worked provision for debtor's exemptions.
Section 4-503 of the Commission's report required all debtors, who were en-
titled to take exemptions, to take a single set of nationwide federal exemp-
tions when they applied for bankruptcy relief.' 55 The Commission's menu
of federal exemptions provided for the main course a $5,000 homestead ex-
emption. The homestead exemption would be taken in a personal resi-
dence' 56 with any remaining amount applied toward other exemptions.
15 7
The homestead exemption would function as a general cash exemption
available to debtors in bankruptcy for use as a shield for various family sup-
port and maintenance assets. The Commission served as appetizers a $1.000
exemption in "livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings,
tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles."'
58
For dessert the Commission would have allowed debtors to claim up to
$500 in accrued vacation pay and bonuses, alimony and support payments
without dollar limitation, proceeds from a life insurance policy if the insured
was a spouse of a dependent, rights in a pension plan, disability benefits,
workman's compensation or unemployment compensation payments, and
professionally prescribed health aids.' 59 The cash surrender value of life in-
151. See STANLEY & GIRTH, .rupra note 149, at 81. This Brookings Institute study on the
bankruptcy process concluded that:
Nevertheless the treatment of exemptions is characterized by both inequities and
waste motion.
The inequities are largely due to the often obsolete and extremely diverse provi-
sions of state exemption laws. . . The state laws now in effect tend to reflect the
values of rural life in the nineteenth century and vary greatly in specificity and
generosity.
Id at 81 (footnotes omitted).
152. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (amended Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87
Stat. 140 (1973)) [hereinafter referred to as Commission].
153. For an analysis of the Commission's recommendations on exemptions see generally
Plumb, The Recomendaions of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61
VA. L. REV. 1 (1975).
154. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 125, § 4-503 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
COMMISSION REPORT].
155. Id
156. Id, § 4-503(b)(1). The label given the personal residence would have been irrelevant
as long as it was used as a home, i.e. a boat, a condominium. Id at 128 n.4.
157. Id at 125, § 4-503(b)(2).
158. Id, § 4-503(c)(1). Any remaining homestead exemption could be added to this exemp-
tion. See id § 4-503(b)(2).
159. Id, § 4-503(c).
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surance contracts owned by the debtor was also exempt up to $1500,160 and
if the cash surrender value exceeded $1500, the debtor could redeem the
contract by paying the Federal Bankruptcy Administrator the additional
cash surrender value.16 ' A unique aspect of the Commission's report would
have allowed the family of a deceased debtor, who died during the pendency
of bankruptcy administration, to take a living allowance of $1,000 per de-
pendent from the undistributed property of the debtor. 1
62
Administratively, all property of the debtor, whether exempt or not,
would have been part of the debtor's estate, reversing the 1898 Act's exclu-
sion of exempt property from assets administered by the trustee. 163 The
Commission specifically provided federal bankruptcy exemptions could not
be waived. ' 64 If a debtor transferred property, otherwise exempt, to defraud
creditors, then the right to claim that property as exempt would be for-
feited.' 6 5 Finally, the federal bankruptcy exemptions were to be paramount,
and would supersede any state exemption laws with respect to
bankruptcy. 1
66
It is hardly surprising that the Commission's exemption provisions were
attacked by other parties interested in bankruptcy reform. The National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges introduced their own counter-reform bill
within a few weeks of the filing of the Commission's bill. ' 6 7 The Judges' bill
contained an exemption list materially different from that in the Commis-
sion's list. The Judges' bill would have limited the debtors' claims to federal
exemptions to an aggregate of $25,000 for all property listed as exempt.168
Unlike the Commission's bill, the Judges' bill would continue to allow a
debtor to elect his state-created exemptions in lieu of the federal aggregate
exemption scheme.
169
Items of exempt property proposed by the Judges' bill was similar to the
Commission's bill, only the treatment of that property changed. The unique
family allowance for the survivors of deceased debtors in bankruptcy would
160. Id. at 126, § 4-503(d).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 4-503(e).
163. Id. at 147, § 4-601(a). See supra note 47.
164. Id. at 126, § 503(f). The statute read:
(f) Waiver; Liens. A waiver of exemptions is unenforceable by a creditor without se-
curity in the property allowed to the debtor pursuant to this section. A lien obtainable
by legal or equitable proceedings and, with respect to wearing apparel, household
goods, and health aids, any lien created by an agreement to give security other than
for a purchase money obligation, is unenforceable against the property allowed to the
debtor pursuant to this section as exempt, except that such lien may be preserved for
the benefit of the debtor.
Id. This provision would have overruled the Lockwood doctrine. See supra notes 114-126 and
accompanying text.
165. Id 126-27, § 4-504(h).
166. Id. at 125, § 4-504(a). This would also apply to any Internal Revenue Service exemp-
tions. See id. at 409- 10; Plumb, supra note 152, at 13.
167. See Bankruptcy Revision Act." Heanngs on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomr. on Civil & Const.
Rights of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1 (1975) (appendix) [herein-
after referred to as Appendix to Heartgs].
168. Id, at 146, § 4-503(a). The $25,000 ceiling applied only to the federal exemptions and




have been also included in the Judges' bill. 1 70 The Judges would have pro-
vided a larger homestead exemption of $6,000 plus a $600 additional exemp-
tion for each of the debtor's dependents. 17 1 The homestead exemption could
be used to exempt a burial plot, but no separate exemption existed for such
plot. 172 The homestead could have also been used to exempt cash surrender
value on any life insurance policy owned by the debtor.173 The Judges' bill
would have allowed debtors to take a $3,000 aggregate exemption for "live-
stock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade or
profession, and motor vehicles,"' 7 4 so long as debtors did not elect state
exemptions.
The Judges' bill was based on a different system of administration and
required the debtor to make an election of exempt property or be deemed to
have waived all exemption rights. 175 The Judges did agree with the Com-
mission that the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy would take title to all the
debtor's assets, exempt and non-exempt.1 76 By permitting debtors to choose
to take state exemptions as their federal exemptions, however, the Judges'
bill would have dragged into bankruptcy administration the old problems of
section 6 of the 1898 Act. If the debtor elected state exemptions in states
which permitted waiver of exemptions, then the debtor would have chosen
to allow creditors holding exemption waivers the special status allowed by
such laws. Because the judges voided waivers of exemptions, 177 this would
have given a powerful incentive for the filing of involuntary bankruptcy pe-
titions in the few states recognizing exemption waivers. The "hidden prefer-
ence" rule would be extended to claims for alimony and support payments
and intentional injuries to the person because many states have created ex-
ceptions to the exemptions for such claims.'
78
The proponents of the Judges' bill were the Federal Bankruptcy Judges
seeking status as article three judges. The bankruptcy specialists understood
the reason that others supported the bill was because of the creation of
debtor havens in states such as California and Texas.1 79 The preservation of
highly favorable state exemption laws would be an incentive for eligible
bankrupts to relocate to these states to take advantage of their generous ex-
emption laws. The adoption of generous federal exemptions as an alterna-
tive measure appealed to bankruptcy specialists in states like Pennsylvania
170. Id at 149, § 4-503(g). See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171. Append&i to Hearings, supra note 166, at 146, § 4-503(b).
172. Id
173. Id. at 149, § 4-503(c). The life insurance policy exemption included "key man" insur-
ance proceeds. The debtor could pay for the cash surrender value that exceeded the limits of
the homestead exemption. Id
174. Id, at 147, § 4-503(e)(1). The Judges' did not exempt profit sharing plan rights and
stock bonus plan rights from creditors. Cf COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 153, at 126, § 4-
503(e)(6).
175. See Appendix to Hearings, supra note 166, at 146 § 4-503(a).
176. Id at 163, § 4-601(a). See supra text accompanying note 162.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 114-126.
178. Appendix to Hearings, supra note 166, at 150, § 4-503(h).
179. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, 1660, 1663-64 (March 12, 1976) (statement of L.E.




and Delaware whose state exemption laws grudgingly gave as little as possi-
ble to debtors.1 80 Thus, the proponents of the exemption scheme in the
Judges' bill were from various special interest groups.
The results of four years of debate, testimony,and congressional pushing
and shoving was the final version of the "new" bankruptcy exemptions con-
tained in section 522.11 The final bankruptcy reform bill, contains a mixed
set of exemption rules. As drafted, section 522 includes the exemption
scheme of the Judges' bill. The debtor can elect either the federal exemp-
tions contained in section 522 or the exemptions of his domiciliary state. 182
If the debtor fails to claim an exemption then he waives all rights in that
exempt property.
1 83
Section 522 exempts from bankruptcy claims the debtor's interest in
property held as a tenant in the entirety.' 8 4 Continuing the 1898 Act's pol-
icy on post-discharge exemptions, exempt assets are not liable to the claims
of non-dischargeable creditors after bankruptcy.18 5 Basically, the federal ex-
emption menu includes a $7,500 homestead exemption in personal residence
and burial plot,' 8 6 $1200 in a debtor's equity in a single motor vehicle,1
8 7
$200 per item in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops or musical instruments held ordinarily for
personal, family or household use,188 $500 in personal jewelry,' 8 9 and a $400
general cash exemption allowable against any property together with any
unused homestead. 19° Similar to prior bankruptcy acts, the Committee
Hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1976 and 1977 contain little
testimony on these bankruptcy exemptions.' 9 '
During last minute horsetrading between the Senate and the House,
major portions of section 522 were revised and submitted to the House with-
out comment. Exempt property was added or stricken from the federal
menu, and dollar amounts were altered without explanation.192 A further
administrative change of major proportion was made-allowing states to
180. See e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, 1537, 1539 (March 5, 1976) (prepared statement of
Louis W. Levit, Chairman of Special Committee of the Judiciary Commercial Law League of
America).
181. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549, 2586 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (1982)).
182. Id. § 522(b)(1).
183. See § 522(b)(1).
184. Id § 552(b)(2).
185. Compare id. § 522(b)(2)(B) with supra note 145 and accompanying text.
186. Id. § 522(c).
187. Id § 522(d)(1). These dollar limitations were lowered from those originally recom-
mended. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
188. Id § 522(d)(2).
189. Id § 522(d)(3).
190. Id. § 522(d)(4).
191. Id § 522(d)(5). Other property exemptions allowed are: $750 for tools of trade,
§ 522(d)(6); unmatured life insurance contracts, § 522(d)(7); professionally prescribed health
aids, § 522(d)(9); various public assistance benefits, § 522(d)(10); and, victim reparation act
awards or wrongful death payments, § 522(d) (11).
192. Two statements located that relate to exemptions are: Hearings on S2266 & H R 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machine7y of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 617, 619 (1978) (supplemental statement of the Commercial Law League of
America) [hereinafter cited as Hearings-Improvements]; Hearings-mprovements, at 650-51, 654-55
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vote their citizens out of the federal exemption scheme altogether. 193 The
final product of the federal bankruptcy exemption statute is full of contra-
dictions, unresolved conflicts, and ambivalence.
B. Provisions of Section 522 as Enacted
Today, section 522 provides two alternative exemption menus to debt-
ors: the federal menu in section 522(d) or the state-created menus of each
state. By statute, a state legislature could deprive its domiciliaries of electing
the federal menus, forcing them to take only the state menu. As mentioned
above, the federal menu consists of exemptions limited by dollar amounts,
along with exemptions limited by a court determination of the amount "rea-
sonably necessary for support" of the debtor, exemptions limited both by
dollar amount and a support standard, unlimited exemptions, and alterna-
tive exemptions.
1. Exemptions Limited by Dollar Amount
Besides the dollar limited exemptions, any unused portion of the home-
stead exemption can be used, together with a $400 allowance,' 94 as a "wild
card" against any property of the debtor.' 95 The debtor can also collect an
exemption of up to $200 for "any item" of household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instru-
ments that are held for personal, family or household use.'
9 6
2. Exemptions Limited by Amount "Reasonably Necessary for
Support"
Section 522 exempts benefits payable to the debtor based on a judicial
determination by the bankruptcy judge of what the debtor and his depen-
dents require as reasonably necessary for their support. 197 When an exemp-
tion requires the bankruptcy judge to determine what is reasonably
necessary for the debtor's future support, the judge must exempt what is
necessary from the property right,'9 8 leaving the rest to be turned over to the
trustee in bankruptcy for division among the debtor's creditors. These prop-
erty right exemptions, limited by a support standard, are designed to be
(statements of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Bankruptcy, National Consumer
Finance Association).
The companion measure of the Bankruptcy Reform Act presented to the Senate adopted
the exemption scheme of section 6, of the 1898 Act-eliminating any federal exemptions. See
Hearngs-mprovements, at 835 (prepared statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference) (ar-
guing against returning to such a scheme).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
194. Id. § 552(d)(5).
195. Id. § 552(d)(4).
196. Id. § 552(d)(3).
197. Id. § 522(d)(10), (II).
198. Property rights that require a "reasonably necessary determination are: alimony, sup-
port, or separate maintenance payments, § 522(d)(10)(D); pension, profit sharing, or similar
plan, § 522(d)(10)(E); a wrongful death award, § 522(d)(11)(B); if the debtor is a dependent, life




treated as post-bankruptcy welfare payments to keep the debtor off the relief
rolls.
3. Exemptions Limited by Both Dollar Amount and Other
Standards
Section 522(d)(11)(D) arbitrarily limits debtors to a $7,500 exemption
for recovery on personal injuries to the debtor or to someone whom the
debtor depends on for support.1 99 This exemption excludes any compensa-
tion for pain and suffering or for "actual pecuniary loss". 2° ° Congress did




Certain types of welfare-related entitlements are exempted by Congress
without any limitations. Some of these entitlements are professionally pre-
scribed health aids, social security, and veterans' benefits."'20 2 Congress of-
fered no particular explanation for its determination that these entitlements
should be treated differently than those limited by a reasonable support
standard. 20 3 These exemptions should keep disabled, unemployed, or eld-
erly debtors off the relief rolls.
5. The Alternative Exemptions
If a debtor elected to take the federal non-bankruptcy exemptions, or
was forced to do so by his state's "opting out" statute, the debtor can qualify
for exemptions covered in other statutes. These other exemptions apply to
benefits similar to the ones covered in section 522, such as social security
benefits, 20 4 veteran's benefits, 20 5 and compensation and benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 20 6 Additionally,
the debtor could take whatever exemptions his domiciliary state offered, to-
gether with all the headaches associated with administration of state exemp-
tion laws as federal bankruptcy exemptions, leaving open the question
whether such an "election" destroyed the anti-exemption waiver provisions
of section 522(e) 20 7 and the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(0.208
199. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D).
200. Id.
201. Id "Actual pecuniary loss" was not defined in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 362, reprintedhn 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS,
5787, 6318 ("designed to cover payments in compensation of actual bodily injury, such as the
loss of a limb, and is not intended to include the attendant costs that accompany such a loss,
such as medical payments, pain and suffering, or loss of earnings").
202. See generally §§ 522(d)(9), (10).
203. The committee report on the House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act did not
mention why these entitlements were to be totally sheltered. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
205. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982).
206. 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1982). Other alternative exemptions are: civil service retirement ben-
efits, 5 U.S.C. § 83 4 6(a) (1982); and, railroad unemployment and retirement benefits, 45 U.S.C.
§ 352(a), § 231(m) (1976).
207. Cf supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
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IV. SECTION 522 IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
The drafters of section 522 probably did not intend the disasters pro-
duced by their much-amended version of the old section 4-503 of the 1973
Bankruptcy Reform Act.20 9 Because Congress rejected the notion that the
best possible exemption scheme for administrative purposes would be a sin-
gle uniform federal menu of exempt assets, the drafters tried to harmonize
the debtor's election provisions of the Judges' bill with the comprehensive
scheme of the Commission's bill. During the process of compromising vari-
ous interests in 1978, the House and Senate agreed to a proviso by which
Congress delegated to all fifty states and each territory or district the author-
ity to pass federal bankruptcy exemption laws restricting domiciliaries to the
exemptions offered by the state or territory of their domicile. 2 '0 This ruined
the exemption scheme of section 522 because the subsections within section
522 no longer match up into clear categories. As the bankruptcy judges
struggle with this section, that problem and other major practical concerns
surrounding the section have grown.
A. The Sore Spots in the Categorical Exemption Menu
To claim exemptions, debtors have to fit their assets into the congres-
sional pigeonholes of section 522(d) or into the categorical classifications of
their state exemption laws. Fitting the assets in becomes a chore when terms
used for the exemption have specialized meanings.
1. Automobile as "Tool of the Trade"
Section 522(d)(2) allows a debtor to claim as exempt up to a $1200
equity in a single automobile. Section 522(d)(6) allows a similar exemption
of up to $750 in tools of the trade. Following tradition many states have
identified automobiles as "tools of the trade" for exemption purposes, if the
automobile has been used in any remote fashion for business or work pur-
poses. 21' If the automobile can be classified as exempt under both the auto-
mobile exemption and the tools of the trade exemption, a debtor can take
$1950 worth of equity in any automobile and, more importantly, claim the
right to avoid non-purchase money security interests against the automobile
under section 522(o.212 Taking one aspect of this possibility, several bank-
208. Recently the Supreme Court has held that the lien avoidance provision of section
522(0 can not be applied retroactively to destroy property rights existing before the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
209. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 153, at 125, § 4-503.
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
211. See, e.g., In re Sisemore, 602 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Texas law); Sun, Ltd. v.
Casey, 96 Cal. App. 3d 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1979) (applying California law); see also Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 714, 719-32 (1954).
212. See id. § 522(f(2)(B). This subsection provides:
(0 Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
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ruptcy courts have held that a car or truck can be exempt as a "tool of the
trade" under section 522(d)(6) and a non-possessory, nonpurchase money se-
curity interest on the vehicle can be set aside under § 522(f). 2 1 3 The com-
mon rationale for these decisions is the absence of congressional intent that
each category is distinct and separate, 2 14 and the state's own tradition of
classifying automobiles used in work roles as "tools of the trade". 215
Reaching the opposite conclusion of the interacting of the exemption
categories, a substantial minority of bankruptcy courts have held that sec-
tion 522(d)(2)'s itemization for a single automobile as exempt precludes a
"double-dip" by also exempting the car as a "tool of the trade" under section
522(d) (6).2 16 The rationale applied is that the separate listing of motor vehi-
cles in section 522(d) infers Congress did not intend motor vehicles to be a
"tool of the trade" for purposes of section 522(f). 2 17 These courts did not
inquire into the actual use of the vehicle, but simply held that mere use of
the vehicle as part of the debtor's job would not avoid a lien on the car
because it is not a "tool of the trade".
21 8
Both of these points of view are equally valid, considering the language
of section 522() 2 19 with the foreknowledge that "tool of the trade" has ac-
quired a "term of art" meaning in debtor-creditor law. 220 From the debtor's
viewpoint, setting aside a security interest in a motor vehicle is highly
advantageous.
2. Exemptions in Future Rights of Action of the Debtor
Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to claim a $400 exemption against
"any property".221 Section 522(d) (4) also authorizes the debtor to claim any
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or
the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
213. In re Eagan, 16 Bankr. 439 (N.D. N.Y. 1982) (avoided a security interest in a truck, a
"tool of the trade"); In re Bechen, II Bankr. 939 (D. S.D. 1981) (non-possessory, nonpurchase
money lien avoided on a pickup truck, a "tool of the trade"); In re Seacord, 7 Bankr. 121 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) (creditor's lien avoided on a van, a "tool of the trade"). See also In re Dillon, 18
Bankr. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (avoided creditor's lien so that wild card exemption could apply
towards truck, a "tool of the trade"); cf. In re Damron, 5 Bankr. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (evidence
insufficient to establish a car as a tool of trade). But see In re Curry, 18 Bankr. 358 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (tile setter's pickup truck not a tool of trade for lien purposes).
214. See, e.g.,In re Eagan, 16 Bankr. at 441-42.
215. See, e.g., In re Bechen, II Bankr. at 942; see also In re Goosey. 10 B.R. 285.
216. See, e.g., In re Steele, 8 Bankr. 94 (D. S.D. 1980) (automobile not a "tool of the trade,"
therefore non-possessory, nonpurchase money lien can not be avoided); In re Sweeney, 7 Bankr.
814 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (non-possessory, nonpurchase money lien not avoided because automobile
not a "tool of the trade").
217. In re Sweeney, 7 Bankr. at 818-19. But see In re Dubrock, 5 Bankr. 353, 355 (W.D. Ky.
1980) (enumeration elsewhere does not preclude a motor vehicle from being a tool of trade). See
In re Steele, 8 Bankr. at 95.
218. See, e.g., In re Curry, 18 Bankr. at 359.
219. See supra note 212.
220. See supra note 211.
221. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) provides: "The following property may be exempted under sub-
section (b)(l) of this section: . . . (5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value
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"spillover" homestead exemption in addition to the $400 exemption. 2
This section allows a debtor to choose to take a portion of his exemption in
unliquidated, contingent claims against other parties. A problem with sec-
tion 522(d) is its lack of clarity as to whether a debtor is precluded from
using his "spillover" homestead exemption to take a larger share of future
entitlements, such as alimony, pension plans, or wrongful death payments
over and above the amount "reasonably necessary for support". It is also
questionable whether a debtor can exempt choses in action or the right to
sue some creditor, under section 522(d)(5). The right to sue a creditor for
violating the Federal Truth in Lending Act2 2 3 is one of the more popular
rights of action a debtor may have.
Initially, because of policy reasons, the bankruptcy courts refused to al-
low debtors to take exemptions in pre-filing consumer credit claims.
2 2 4 The
turning point came in In re LaFlamme,22 5 decided by the Bankruptcy Appeal
Panel for the First Circuit. The lower court bankruptcy had denied the
debtor's exemption claim for a Federal Truth in Lending Act action against
a creditor. 22 6 The Appeal Panel reversed, holding that "any property" in
section 522(d)(5) meant exactly that, any property which is property of the
estate with out limitation.
Apparently, Congress has no intention of limiting the ways in which
debtors can use the "wild card" exemption of section 522(d)(5) to protect
their assets. Consequently, because of the In re LaFlamme decision, any future
rights of recovery on claims arising out of credit transactions within the
bankruptcy itself should be held exempt on demand, up to the amount of
the dollar limitation. 227 Thus, any imbalance created by section 522(d)(5)
was intentional.
3. The Joint Petition and "Stacked" Exemptions
In light of section 522(m) 22 8 permitting married debtors to preserve
their own exemption rights upon filing joint petitions, special problems arise
$400 plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under (the homestead exemption], in
any property." .
222. See II U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(10)-(l 1).
223. There are various causes of action for a debtor under the Federal Truth in Lendng Act:
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693retseq (1982); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o (1982); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982); Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1982). Similar rights of action are conferred by the
U.C.C. § 9-507 (1972); U.C.C.C. § 5.203 (1974); Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982); Clayton Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-27 (1982); Robinson, Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13a-b & 21a (1982).
Other possible protection acts for the debtor are the: Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982); Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
224. See In re Smith, 5 Bankr. 500 (D. Ill. 1980).
225. 14 Bankr. 21 (1st Cir. 1981) (construing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r and 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(5)).
226. 14 Bankr. at 21.
227. Id at 24, 26. The limitation would be the $400 general cash exemption plus any spil-
lover homestead exemption.
228. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) provides: "This section [522] shall apply separately with respect to
each debtor in a joint case."
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in administering the exemption rights when one joint debtor takes the fed-
eral exemptions and the other takes the state-created exemptions. The debt-
ors are clearly authorized to make their own elections and to agree to
combine them, even though the result might be to protect a substantial
homestead held as joint or community property and still be able to use the
"wild card" exemption with the spillover federal homestead exemption on
other property. 229 Several cases have legitimized such a procedure, because
the Bankruptcy Reform Act has made no attempt to forbid "stacking" ex-
emptions in this manner.2 30 The debtors' creditors gain nothing by the joint
filing for bankruptcy, and indeed may have lost an advantage, as both
spouses would be discharged, defeating any chance of pursuing the home-
stead property even after a divorce. Yet this result is what Congress desired
by passing section 522(m).
4. The "Any Item" Exemption
According to section 522(d)(3) a debtor can take an exemption in "any
item" of "household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, crops, or musical instruments" which are owned for personal,
family, or household purposes.23 ' The only intrinsic limitation to this ex-
emption is the dollar limit of $200 on any single item. 23 2 Naturally, debtors
perceive that an unlimited number of "items" have a fair market value of
less than $100 would be exempt under this provision. Such a notion is sup-
ported by one bankruptcy court where it was held that two hundred individ-
ual pieces of a family set of sterling silver tableware were exempt under
section 522(d)(3) because none of the two hundred pieces alone were worth
more than $200.233 The aggregate, however, comprised more than $6,000
worth of exempt property.
234
The obvious loophole created by section 522(d) (3) has caught the eye of
at least one commentator, who considers the "any item" exemption to reflect
congressional judgment in permitting debtors to "stockpile" exemptions in
household items and books.23 5 Also by Congress' encouragement to convert
229. Se, e.g., In re Brennan 18 Bankr. 312 (D. R.I. 1982) (stacking federal exemptions); In re
Korff 14 Bankr. 189, (E.D. Mich. 1981) (stacking state exemptions); In re Maitland, 13 Bankr.
923 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (stacking state and federal exemptions).
230. Instead, Congress enacted section 522(m) with full knowledge of the large exemption
amounts possible. See In re Aailland, 13 Bankr. at 926.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3).
232. Id.
233. In re Wahl, 14 Bankr. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1981). In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted "item" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
234. See id at 156.
235. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 783-85.
"[I]tems" seems to indicate that the House was using "items" to refer to the various
categories because of the reference back to those categories through the use of the word
"similar".
The more likely intention, however, was that the $200 limitation should apply to
items within the categories ...
Of course the suggested construction does result in a potentially huge exemption.
This construction would allow debtors to exempt most of their household goods and
personal effects . . . This result is consistent, however, with the House's manifested




non-exempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy fil-
ing,2 36 Congress did not realize the possibility that a debtor could liquidate
non-exempt assets and buy a two thousand volume personal library with
each book being priced under $200, and thus salvage a considerable cash
benefit by selling the books as second-hand materials after discharge in
bankruptcy. Similar conversion techniques can be used by debtors to turn
non-exempt gold Krugerrands into an exempt collection of crystal, or Irish
lace, or other high priced consumer goods. An imaginative debtor can use
section 522(d)(3) lawfully to shield vast sums against creditors in bank-
ruptcy. Congress provided no limits.
Congress aimed at setting up a system for rehabilitating debtors in fail-
ing circumstances. But Congress actually adopted something quite different
from what had been originally intended. The grafting of the exemption
provisions with the Commission bill and the Judges' bill, plus compromises
with other lobbies produced an exemption law which sets aside exemptions
categorically for liquidating bankruptcies. The mish-mash of federal and
state optional or mandatory exemptions has led to the situation in which
cunning debtors' attorneys can use "straight" bankruptcy as a shield for vast
amounts of carefully concocted mixtures of state and federal exempt assets.




Section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code promised to be a trouble-
maker as soon as it was passed. Unlike section 6 of the 1898 Act, this hastily
put together compromise delegates to each state the opportunity to forbid its
citizens to claim federal bankruptcy exemptions.2 38 Section 6 had allowed
state-created exemption laws as a federal rule of decision for the bankrupt's
Id at 784-85.
236. See id. at 809-10.
237. At the time the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, bankruptcy filings began
to increase sharply. Many commentators and interest groups have concluded that the new
exemption laws were the prime cause of this sharp rise, neglecting other possible causes such as a
continuing business recession. &e Shuchman & Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out
Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1982).
According to the House Judiciary Committee, 196,967 personal bankruptcies were filed in
1979, the last year in which a majority of filings were under the 1898 Act. In 1980 the number
of personal bankruptcies increased 22.58% to 241,446. In 1981, 312,914 personal bankruptcies
were filed, for an increase of 29.6% over the year ending June 30, 1980. See Shuchman &
Rhorer, supra, at I n.3, citing House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, Oct. 14, 1981, Table 1.
In a study of bankruptcy exemptions taken in Connecticut, it was found that over a two
year period a substantial number of homeowner debtors filed bankruptcy petitions to save their
homes from levying creditors. See id. at 20-22. The cause for such an increase is the federal law
provides a homestead exemption not available in Connecticut and this increase will likely be
seen in any state where the federal exemption exceeds the state's exemption. Id at 22.
238. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) provides:
[A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the state
law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize; or, in the
alternative, . . .
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domicilary state.2 39 Although the Supreme Court held section 6 was consti-
tutional in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 240 the "opting-out" provision of
section 522(b)(1) is clearly neither a congressional attempt to establish "uni-
formity" in bankruptcy, nor is it a decision not to pre-empt state insolvency
laws. Thirty-one states adopted "opting-out" statutes within a short time
after the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 24 1 Most of the "opting-
out" statutes do not allow state citizens the type and quantity of exemptions
permitted by section 522(d) for persons eligible to elect the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions.
2 4 2
1. Cheeseman v. Nachman
Virginia's "opting out" statute was challenged on constitutional
grounds in Cheeseman v. Nachman.243 Virginia allows a homestead exemption
of $5,000 for "every householder or head of a family" residing in Virginia.
24
"Householder" is defined as someone "who maintains a separate residence of
living quarters, whether or not others are living with him."'245  The
Cheesemans filed a joint petition and claimed the right to "stack" their
homestead exemptions to protect their home. 246 The Fourth Circuit held
such "stacking" was permissible.
247
The Fourth Circuit noted that section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act made exempt property part of the debtor's estate, subject to any exemp-
tion claims.248 Then under section 522(m) debtors filing jointly can take the
same exemptions as if they had filed separate petitions. 249 Because the defi-
nition of "householder" was ambiguous the Fourth Circuit recognized that
the statute could mean either only one person was entitled to take a home-
239. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
240. Ve supra text accompanying notes 102-13.
241. As of June, 1983, the states which have taken advantage of section 522(b)(1) to "opt-
out" of section 522(d) include: ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-211 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4914 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-
100(b) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12-1201 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 627.10 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.170
(Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881B (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.




(g) (1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-2-106 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-15,105 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601( (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page 1981) (repealed
138 H674, § 3, effective Jan. 1, 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(B) (West 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 23.305 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 43-31-30 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-
15 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1983): WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1983).
242. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1984).
243. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
244. VA. CODE § 34-4 (supp. 1983).
245. Id. § 34-1.
246. See 656 F.2d at 61 & n.2 (The Cheeseman's would apply S4,700 to their homestead
with the remaining $5,300 used towards other personalty).
247. Id at 64.
248. Id. at 62.
249. Set supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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stead exemption in a joint petition or "householder" status can be conferred
on any person who contributed to the maintenance of a residence. 250 The
latter construction was upheld because Virginia intended the statute to be
liberally construed to conserve the family home.
2 51
More importantly the Fourth Circuit went on to say that such construc-
tion was required by section 522(m) "[blecause Congress has the power
under the Constitution to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, . . . and has
enacted a specific provision for exemptions, . . . we must adopt an interpre-
tation of Virginia's law that does not conflict with the Act's exemption pro-
vision."2 52 In light of Congress' desire to give debtors a "fresh start" after
bankruptcy, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the state exemptions forced on
debtors by a state "opting out" act must meet all the needs of section 522,
including the right to "stack" exemptions. 253 The inference is a construction
that would allow only one joint debtor to claim a "homestead" would be
unconstitutional, because Congress has pre-empted federal bankruptcy ex-
emption laws by delegating to states the power to pass a federal bankruptcy
statute.254 Thus, only an exemption pattern which allowed debtors all fed-
eral exemption rights would be constitutionally permissible.
2. In re Parrsh
Other federal bankruptcy courts have held section 522(b)(1) and the
"opt-out" statutes of Colorado, Ohio, and Florida as constitutional. 255 The
Colorado case, In re Parrish ,256 illustrates how courts have dealt with "opting-
out". The debtor argued that Colorado's "opting-out" statute violated the
supremacy clause257 because it conflicted with the federal exemption scheme
of providing a "floating" exemption. 258 The court rejected this contention,
holding that Congress meant the states to "opt-out" but in doing so, hopefully
update their statutes to be more in line with the "fresh start" concept. 259 In
250. See id at 63.
251. [Tlhis purpose can best be promoted by a reading of the statute that allows an
exemption to each spouse who contributes to the maintenance of the home: if both
spouses are granted exemptions, for example, they are more likely to be left with suffi-
cient equity to allow them to retain their home.
Id To apply the contrary construction would be "an inducement to separate" so that each may
claim the exemption. Id.
252. Id (citations omitted).
253. It does not follow, however, that the states should be left free to classify which
bankrupt debtors should be entitled to exemptions when the classification conflicts
with federal law. If we were to permit a construction of Virginia law that allows only
one householder per residence, the construction would be inconsistent with section
522(m) of the Act ...
Id. at 64.
254. Id
255. See In re Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982); In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D.
Fla.), aft'g, 12 Bankr. 55 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Curry, 5 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a d sub
nom., Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs., 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981), vacated, 698 F.2d 298 (6th
Cir. 1983); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
256. 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982).
257. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. See 19 Bankr. at 334.
258. The "floating" exemption refers to the $7,500 homestead exemption plus the $400 gen-
eral cash exemption provided in section 522. See id at 335.
259. 19 Bankr. at 334-35.
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rejecting the debtor's argument the court applied the rationale of Perez v.
Campbell: 26° that the court need only compare the two statutes and consider
whether there is a conflict of provisions. 26 1 The court concluded that both
the Colorado "opting-out" statute and the federal exemption statute gave
the debtor a "fresh start," therefore, the Colorado opt-out provision is consti-
tutional regardless of the lack of a so-called "floating" exemption.
262
3. In re Kelley
In re Kelley 263 presented a direct challenge to the Florida opt-out stat-
ute.264 A single person claimed she was denied a homestead exemption in
bankruptcy because Florida's "opting-out" statute required her to claim the
Florida homestead, but to claim the exemption she must be the head of a
family. 265 The statute had previously been sustained in In re Lausch266 on
the more typical challenge that section 522(b)(1) violated the "uniformity"
requirement of the Constitution.26 7 Kelley claimed that it was unconstitu-
tional in her case to allow Florida to fail to provide a homestead exemption
for a single person; whereas, section 522(d)(1) made express provisions for a
single person's homestead. 268 Kelley's claim was rejected by the court based
on the doctrine of Reed v. Reed:269 a classification must be reasonable and
have a substantial bearing on the legislative objective. 270 Allowing a home-
stead exemption for married persons bore a fair and substantial relationship
to the objectives of the Florida exemption law, that of safeguarding the fam-
ily. 27 ' The court ignored the issue of federal pre-emption of bankruptcy
exemptions.
4. In re Sullivan
In In re Sulhvan ,272 the Sullivans had claimed an exemption menu from
section 522(d) after Illinois had "opted out" and enacted its own homestead
and personal property exemptions. 273 The trustee's objection to the claimed
federal exemptions was sustained by the bankruptcy judge and affirmed by
260. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
261. 19 Bankr. at 334, quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 644. Cf infia note 293.
262. 19 Bankr. at 335.
263. 21 Bankr. 375 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
264. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1983).
265. 21 Bankr. at 375-76.
266. 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
267. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. See also supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text.
268. 21 Bankr. at 376.
269. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, a state statute that gave males mandatory preference to
administer the estate of an intestate relative was held to be the type of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
270. See 404 U.S. at 415.
271. 21 Bankr. at 376-77. The court stated that the homestead act was designed to promote
the welfare of the state by "preserving a home where the family may be sheltered and live
beyond the reach of economic misfortune," thus putting the family on a higher plane than
single persons. Id By implication, the court was following the rule of Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819), holding a state may pass its own insolvency law. See infra
note 291 & notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
272. 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), a'g II Bankr. 432 (C.D. Ill. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349
(1982).
273. 680 F.2d at 1132.
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the Seventh Circuit. 274 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the debtors had
contended the Illinois "opting out" statute275 was an unconstitutional act
because it was non-uniform, and that section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act was an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to
Illinois.
276
In dealing with the issue of uniformity, the Seventh Circuit rejected any
contention that section 522(b) requires the state, which "opted-out" of the
federal exemption, to adopt an exemption scheme essentially similar to that
of section 522(d).2 77 "In a limited sense, section 522 meets the test of true
uniformity because the opt-out provision is applicable to each State. True
uniformity as to individual debtors clearly does not exist, however, because
the opt-out provision allows exemption levels to differ among the states. '278
That assertion is somewhat circular. The court accepted the principle of
"geographic uniformity" formulated in Moses,279 and applied it to the Illi-
nois act. 280 Although the Sullivan's cited precedent supporting the conclu-
sion that Congress could not use state-created laws to establish a federal rule,
the court rejected that line of authority because "[w]hatever merit this argu-
ment might have, we think it is foreclosed, at least as to the 1898 Act, by
MAoSeS."281
The debtors contended Moyses was either wrongfully decided or was in-
applicable to the Bankruptcy Reform Act because of the fundamentally dif-
ferent way in which the debtor's estate is administered under the 1978 Act.
After a cursory examination of the lack of any legislative history on "opting-
out" provision, the court stated:
The opt-out provision, section 522(b)(1), for which there is virtu-
ally no legislative history, was added to section 522 as a compro-
mise provision . . . [t]he intention of providing a 'fresh start' can
be attributed only to the House. A resolve to let states determine
the applicable exemptions must be attributed to the Senate. Con-
gress did not resolve this difference. . . This court cannot seize
upon the motivation of the House as representative of the entire
Congress when the enacted legislation clearly warrants a contrary
274. Id. at 1138.
275. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 12-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
276. 680 F.2d at 1131-32. See Comment, Bankrupticy Exemptions.- Whether Illinois's Use of the
Federal "Opt-Out" Provison s Constitutional, 1981 S. ILL. L.J. 65.
Illinois' exemption scheme affords a $10,000 homestead exemption only for real estate oc-
cupied as a residence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 12-901 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (this has since been
lowered to $7,500). The Illinois personal property exemption was limited to wearing apparel, a
bible, school books, and $300 worth of property, compared to the more generous provisions of
section 522(d). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1001 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (these provisions
have been amended). There is no general cash exemption against "any" property in Illinois. See
Id
277. 680 F.2d at 1136.
278. Id. at I133. See supra note 92.
279. See supra text accompanying note 109.
280. Id. at 1133-36.
281. Id at 1135. The debtors had cited Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981), in
which the Fourth Circuit held that the United States could not adopt a state law test for the
requisite lack of "good moral character" necessary to deport. The rationale being that to apply





Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that congressional policy did not
require it to find the 1978 Act so different from the 1898 Act as to make
Moyses inapplicable.
283
The court then turned to the analysis of the preemption claim based on
In re RhodeS284 and Cheeseman v. Nachman .285 The bankruptcy court decision
in In re Rhodes was discredited because it applied the preemption argument
despite the explicit language of section 522(b)(1). 28 6 The Seventh Circuit
refused to accept the line of reasoning in Cheeseman that "opting-out" did not
permit Virginia to avoid the effects of section 522(m). 28 7 If Congress had the
power to delegate to the states the right to set their own exemptions, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, then the Illinois statute was constitutional. 288
The Sullvan court misapplied the debtors' argument on the constitu-
tionality of the "opt-out" clause in section 522(b)(1). 289 First, the debtors
contention that the entire scheme of bankruptcy exemptions in the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act is so materially different from that of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 should be given weight. Moyses is no longer precedent for
supporting the exemption scheme granted to states by section 522(b)(1). 290
Second, the debtors correctly argue that Moyses, if held applicable, is not
now the policy of the Supreme Court and ought not to be followed as the
last word on "unifromity on the subject of bankruptcies". 29 1  Section
522(b)(1) cannot be considered uniform in any sense of the word. It neither
mandates geographic uniformity nor any other form of uniform exemptions
in bankruptcy, but does precisely the opposite. Third, if Congress has the
authority to delegate to states the power to pass a federal bankruptcy exemp-
tion law, an argument seemingly approved by Sturges,292 then that law
282. 680 F.2d at 1136.
283. See id at 1134, 1136. Similar to the decision in Moyses, which did not discuss the differ-
ences between the 1867 Act and the 1898 Act, the Seventh Circuit did not analyze the difference
between the 1898 Act and the 1978 Act in reaching its conclusion. For example, in the old law,
a finding that property was exempt was a finding that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction
over the property; while under the 1978 Act, the trustee is initially vested with title, possession,
and control over all property, and upon allowance of exemptions to the debtor, the trustee re-
vests title, possession, and control of the exempt property to the debtor.
284. 14 Bankr. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 427 (1983). After the In re Sullivan decision, Rhodes was reversed,
following Sullivan's approval of the Moyses doctrine that uniformity is geographical rather than
personal.
285. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
286. 680 F.2d at 1136.
287. Id at 1136-37. See supra text accompanying notes 244-55.
288. Id at 1137. The Seventh Circuit also dismissed the improper delegation of power ar-
gument by relying on Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122 (1819) (state law can not
conflict with federal law).
289. This same argument was misapplied in Rhodes. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159
(6th Cir. 1983).
290. See 680 F.2d at 1134-35.
291. See Brief for Petitioner, at 15, Sullivan v. United States, No. 82-5229 (U.S. filed in Oct.,
1982).
292. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 195-96 (1819).
It is fundamental that the state and federal legislatures share concurrent authority
to promulgate bankruptcy laws, Sturges v. Crowingshie/d [sic], 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 119
[sic], 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819), and that the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemp-
tion will serve to invalidate state promulgations to the extent that they are inconsistent
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should be made by a specific federal pre-emptive power much the same way
that states may "opt-out" of the Truth in Lending Act. 29 3 Therefore, Illi-
nois' exemption statute, should not be decreed "uniform" because it is not a
proper exercise of Congress' delegation power and because the statute frus-
trates Congress' purpose in passing a federal bankruptcy exemption law.
2 9 4
5. The Bankruptcy Reform Act is Not Uniform
In fairness to the country, the Supreme Court should either overrule
Moyses or limit its authority to section 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Moyses
was decided at a time when most of the United States' population lived on
subsistence farms and in small towns. The degree of personal mobility in
1901 was far less than that of today's urban wage earners and salaried help.
In a static rural society, it might have been reasonable to allow the states to
set up federal bankruptcy exemptions which offered no incentive to state
domiciliaries to file bankruptcy petitions when pressed by creditors. Since
the turn of the century, however, Americans have increasingly become citi-
zens of the United States first and citizens of their state only secondarily.
295
Individual state exemption laws do not take into account that debtors are
apt to have property located in several states, or have obligations to support
families living in another state.296 Ignoring for a moment the question of the
adequacy of state-created exemption laws as mechanisms for a "fresh start",
too many debtors have assets in too many different states with vastly differ-
ent exemption laws to make a state-by-state bankruptcy exemption system
appropriate.
Congress is required to make uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
exemptions,29 7 and as such Congress should be held to the requirement that
its bankruptcy exemptions are national in scope as well as in origin. The
principle of "geographic uniformity" is a subterfuge by which the courts
may ignore the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution. The process is not
uniform when a debtor in bankruptcy, depending on his domicile, can claim
a $60,000 homestead exemption in Massachusetts 298 or none if he is in Penn-
with or contrary to federal laws. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 29
L.Ed. 2d 233 (1971). It is equally axiomatic, however, that Congress has not pre-
empted an area wherein it has legislated when it expressly and concurrently authorizes
the state legislatures to disregard or opt-out of such federal legislative area.
Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1983).
293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1982) (states can adopt statutes that are parallel and more
stringent than the federal statutes). The Sixth Circuit presumed that the source of the legal
power to enact exemption legislation was not an act of Congress, but a pre-constitutional resi-
due of general police power regulation.
294. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 292, at 23-27. Purpose refers to the notion of providing
a fresh start. See 680 F.2d at 1136.
295. Since 1890, the percent of Americans who resided in the state census tracts in which
they were born has steadily declined from 90.7% of all Americans in 1900 to 79.4% as of 1970.
Histoncal Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of
the Census 1975) Series C-1-14 at 89.
296. For a description of what little is known empirically about the assets of debtors, see
Schuchman, Little Bankruptcies in New England, 56 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1976) (debtors in bank- (
ruptcy are less stable than the rest of the community, tending to move more often, and to collect
their property in more than one community).
297. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4.
298. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 188 § 1 (Supp. 1984).
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sylvania. 299 If the state has no opt-out law, as is the case in Pennsylvania, he
may elect the section 522 exemption scheme.
C. "Opting-Out" and Lien Avoidance
One of the hidden problems created by "opting-out" of section 522(d) is
the language of section 522(0300, allowing avoidance ofjudicial liens against
exempt property and non-purchase money security interest in household
goods, tools of trade or professional prescribed health aids. Section 522(0
permits avoidance "to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section."
30o
A serious internal conflict exists in section 522. For instance, Ohio has
opted-out of section 522(b) and prescribes in its state-created exemption laws
that a lien can impair exempt property. 30 2 The issue of whether Ohio can
enforce liens on exempt property despite section 522(f) has gone both
ways. 30 3 There appears to be no clear trend among the states on the relation-
ship of the opt-out provision and other parts of section 522 such as section
522().304
1. In re McManus
Consider In re McManus30 5 involving Louisiana's "opt-out" provision
30 6
and whether a debtor can avoid a nonpurchase money security interest in
household goods. Relying on the opt-out provision, the bankruptcy court
had denied the avoidance of the lien because Louisiana's exemption laws
precluded any exemption in encumbered household goods.30 7 In Gipson, the
companion case to In re McManus, the bankruptcy judge had allowed the
debtor to avoid a non-purchase money security interest in household
goods.30 8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed McManus and reversed Gipson .309
299. Pennsylvania, as of the date of this article, has no homestead exemption law.
300. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). See supra note 211.
301. Id
302. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661(C) (1981) reads as follows: "Section 2329.66 of the
Revised Code does not affect or invalidate any sale, contract of sale, conditional sale, security
interest, or pledge of any personal property, or any lien created thereby."
303. See, e.g., Foster v. City Loan & Say. Co., 16 Bankr. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding
household goods can be encumbered because Congress intended states to enact whatever ex-
emption statutes they wished); Curry v. Associates Fin. Serv., 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(holding liens on household goods can be avoided because the Ohio statute directly conflicts
with section 522(o).
304. See generally supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of labeling
a motor vehicle as a tool of trade on section 522(o). See also In re Giles, 18 Bankr. 708 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (applying Georgia's opt-out clause did not prevent the avoidance of a lien on
household goods); In re Frederickson, 12 Bankr. 506 (D. S.D. 1981) (can avoid a non-purchase
money agreement in household goods under section 522(f) even though South Dakota opted out
of section 522(d)).
305. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
306. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881B (West Supp. 1984).
307. 681 F.2d at 354. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West Supp. 1984) (household
goods subject to a mortgage are not exempt).
308. 681 F.2d at 354.
309. Id. at 357.
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The court began its analysis by noting that all assets are vested with the
trustee as part of the debtor's estate, whereupon any exempt property is re-
vested in the debtor. 3 10 Then the Fifth Circuit applied a logical three-step
approach to its holding that Louisiana can hinder exempt property that is
subject to an encumberance. 3 11 First, the court found section 522() is not a
separate statute and is dependent upon the exemption provisions of section
522(b).3 1 2 Second, the court examined section 522(b), noting it provided
two exemption schemes: the federal list or the state-created list. Recogniz-
ing section 522(b) does not limit what a state can enact for exemptions,
3 13
the Fifth Circuit considered Louisiana's statutes in its third step. Because
Louisiana explicitly provides any encumbered household goods will not be
exempt in bankruptcy, section 522(f) does not apply under the authority of
section 522(b).
3 14
Judge Dyer dissented.3 15 He considered the execution of a nonpurchase
money lien on household goods as a waiver of exemptions, "subject to the
avoiding power found in § 522(f).
' 316
If the majority opinion correctly states the law, any state can by
statute preclude a debtor from availing himself of the lien avoid-
ance provisions found in 522(f). . . . There is no provision of the
Bankruptcy Code which grants the states authority to pre-empt
any subsection of § 522(f) other than subsection (b), . . . . Con-
gress intended that even if a state opts out of the federal exemp-
tions, the debtor's lien avoidance power under subsection (0 is not
thereby affected.
3 17
According to Judge Dyer, the majority ignored the conflict between Louisi-
ana's exemption laws and federal policy expressed in section 522(f), which
"must be constitutionally resolved in favor of federal law."' 31 8
If the McManus decision stands, then a state can lawfully "opt-out" not
only from section 522(d), but from sections 522(f), 522(g), and 522(m) as
well. 319 Arguments about congressional intent relative to "opting-out" are
310. Id at 354, cihg section 541 of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 541. This is one ad-
ministrative provision that both the Commission and the Judges' agreed upon. See supra text
accompanying notes 162 & 174.
311. Id at 357.
312. Id at 355.
313. Id. at 355-56.
Significantly, the section does not mandate that debtors be guaranteed a right to ex-
empt particular types of property. The unambiguous language of section 522(b) im-
plicitly indicates a state may exempt the same property included in the federal
laundry list, more property than that included in the federal laundry list, or less prop-
erty than that included in the federal laundry list. The states also may prescribe their
own requirements for exemptions, which may either circumscribe or enlarge the list of
exempt property.
Id (footnote omitted).
314. Id. at 357. The Fifth Circuit noted hypothetically that if Louisianna had not specifi-
cally defined mortgaged household goods and furnishings a different result would have been
granted: section 522(o would have been available to avoid liens encumbering exempt property.
See id.
315. Id at 357 (Dyer, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 358.
317. Id
318. Id
319. These sections of II U.S.C. § 522 and others form a single system of exemption rights
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essentially meaningless, as Congress' intent can be found only by reading
section 522(b)(1). The drastic lack of uniformity, either actual or geographi-
cal, produced by the congressional authorization to state legislatures to man-
gle the bankruptcy exemption laws, simply underscores the
unconstitutionality of section 522(b)(1). Sections 522(f), (g), and (m) may
apply to some states but not others. In Louisiana 320 and in Ohio, 32' a
debtor may have no right to assert a claim to avoid a nonpurchase money
security interest in household goods, but in another state such as Illinois,
322
which has also "opted-out", such a denial would be unconstitutional and
void.
The unsupported conclusion in Moyses that Congress has the power to
delegate to the states the duty to pass bankruptcy exemption laws is as un-
founded as the holding in Moyses that adopting those state bankruptcy ex-
emptions is "uniform". 323 In the past, Congress has delegated authority to
federal agencies to make rules having the force of law. Almost all of these
delegations have been sustained against similar attacks of unconstitutional
delegation based on the "necessary & proper" clause. 324 Occasionally Con-
gress has delegated authority to "drop out" of a nationwide federal regula-
tory scheme, such as the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act.325
No delegation challenge directed at the bankruptcy statutes has been
sustained 326 because of its special article I status.32 7 Congress may delegate
regulation of commerce to the states, but it may not delegate the passage of
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy" to the states, as it has at-
tempted to do in section 522(b)(1). Moyses is the only Supreme Court case
suggesting that Congress has the power to delegate its bankruptcy clause
powers to the states. No jurisprudential history of Supreme Court cases sup-
ports such a delegation. Any reliance on Sturges v. Crown'nshid 3 28 as an im-
plicit authorization for Congress to hand out its bankruptcy jurisdiction to
the states is misplaced. 329 The issue of delegation of authority was neither
under federal bankruptcy law, all of which depends on section 522(b). For instance, an "opting
out" act in a state that wished to deny debtors any of the federal rights in section 522 under the
McManus doctrine could contain clauses stating: that exemptions under state law may be
waived by the debtor; that any voidable preference, or fraudulent transfer, or property under a
lien avoidable under section 724 cannot be held exempt; that any assets of the debtor turned
over to the estate may not be taken as exempt; and, that no citizen of the state may take any
exemption in any property incumbered by a judicial lien or by a non-purchase money security
agreement.
320. See supra text accompanying note 305.
321. See suora notes 301-02.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 272-88.
323. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
149, §§ 3:1-3:7 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1983). Cf Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(delegation of power to coal producers and workers unconstitutional).
325. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1982) (state laws not affected unless inconsistent with the
federal chapter).
326. See, e.g. ,In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (it is not an unconstitutional
delegation but a recognition of concurrent power).
327. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196-97 (1819).
328. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
329. See supra note 291.
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contended for by either party nor addressed in Justice Marshall's opinion.
330
Congressional delegation of a federal power to non-federal entities
should be narrowly circumscribed and carefully limited to those few cases in
which vital, concurrent interests of both the state and federal governments
coincide. 33 1 Bankruptcy law is not such an aggregation of vital, concurrent
interests. But, if it is viewed as such a matter on which both state and fed-
eral legislatures have a mutual interest, the delegation of federal authority
must be limited and precise-not a broadly worded escape hatch. The force
of the argument presented in Cheeseman v. Nachman, cancelling state acts
which conflict with general federal bankruptcy policies, 332 makes good sense.
Congress did not delegate, as alleged in McManus,333 its authority to the
states only to have it exercised helter-skelter. If the courts are willing to hold
the principle of delegation constitutional, the type of delegation done in sec-
tion 522(b)(1) must be judicially confined to statutes which are similar in all
essential respects to sections 522(a) through (m). Deviation, such as that
countenanced by McManus, in enacting exemptions would be not uniform
and too broad an exercise of delegated federal power.
V. A REAPPRAISAL OF EXEMPTION THEORY AND LAW IS REQUIRED
A. Exemption Theoy
The current theory behind the exemptions of section 522 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is that of the "fresh start. ' 334 Although various commentators
have suggested exemption schemes that should be sufficient for a "fresh
start", 335 the words are ephemeral and do not point toward anything defi-
nite that courts are able to follow in dealing with bankruptcy exemptions.
The concept of "fresh start" originated with the National Bankruptcy Com-
330. The primary issue of concern was whether a New York insolvency law impaired the
constitutional right to contract and that such contracts may not be impaired. See 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 197-208. In this setting Justice Marshall wrote:
It has been said, that Congress has exercised this power [to enact uniform laws on
bankruptcy]; and, by doing so, has extinguished the power of the States, which cannot
be revived by repealing the law of Congress.
We do not think so. If the right of the states to pass a bankrupt law is not taken
away by the mere grant of that power to Congress, it cannot be extinguished; it can
only be suspended, by the enactment of a general bankrupt law.
Id. at 196. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d at 1137 (relied on Sturges for delegating to states the
power to pass exemption laws).
331. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 322, at 206-16, § 3:15 (suggesting that the courts
should look at whether the congressional delegation of legislative authority should be limited by
safeguards supplied by the object of delegated authority; and, if not, the court should intervene
to prevent arbitrary exercise of delegated authority).
The Supreme Court has stated that:
the presence or absence of standards is the key to the validity of legislative delegation
that has never been the law and it cannot be, because the behavior of any responsible
officer will be the same whether the statue states no standard or whether it says "just
and equitable" or "in the public interest."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE SUPPLEMENT 21, § 2.00 (1976).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 245-53. See also Rhodes, 705 F.2d 159.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 317-22.
334. See HOUSE REPORT supra note 9 at 6087 (defining "fresh start").
335. See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 149 at 206. This treatise details bankruptcy
exemptions that are "designed to permit the bankrupt to continue his occupation and to main-
tain a standard of living reasonably consistent with his occupation and previous history." Id
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mission's report on the 1973 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 336 It was hypothe-
sized in that report that bankruptcy, which affects larger numbers of wage
earners and salaried persons that it does business entities, should allow the
debtor enough to get by on after bankruptcy has done its work.337 It was
not considered that the debtor would be a functional economic unit after
bankruptcy, save through the mandatory rehabilitation processes of wage
earner plans. Consequently, the property saved from distribution to credi-
tors is essentially the equivalent of a welfare stipend, designed to tide the
debtor over until the wage earner plan took hold.
This theoretical basis is consistent with the theory behind the home-
stead exemption, the life insurance exemption and other state-created ex-
emptions from execution and attachment. 338 According to section 522, a
debtor in bankruptcy should, like Dickens' paupers, be left with the clothes
on his or her back, a pile of furniture or other lumber, and a roof over his or
her head, and little else. 339 This theoretical approach to exemptions had
reached its zenith in the 1840's and has little relevance to American eco-
nomic life in the twentieth century.
Essentially, an individual debtor is a conduit for recycling the money
supply. The debtor's sources of money must be either whatever the debtor
earns as wages or salary, or whatever he can borrow. 340 By discharging the
debtor from debt and future garnishments, bankruptcy shields one primary
source of funding-earnings. As has been well documented, bankruptcy is
no bar to further forays into indebtedness by bankrupt debtors.34 1 What
individual wage-earning and salaried debtors have needed over the years is
protected from their own follies. When Congress rejected the federal bank-
ruptcy administration and mandatory debtor's workouts as proposed by the
Bankruptcy Commission, 34 2 it rejected a true reform of the bankruptcy pro-
cess for wage earners and, instead adopted a scheme which benefits only
those who have an interest in maintaining the traditional control of bank-
ruptcy process.
The current bankruptcy exemptions are intended to mesh with
336. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, Part I, at 75, 78.
337. A third allocative standard relates the goal of fair and equitable treatment with
the goal of a fresh start for the debtor. It imposes the burden of a debt on the party
better able to bear it. This determination should be made on two bases. The first is
the external social policy respecting responsibility indicated by the debt. The second
is an internal policy that looks to the ability of the creditor to pass on risk of loss. The
bankruptcy process affects different creditors to different degrees ...
[A corollary goal is the] preservation of the debtor's property necessary in his house-
hold. A uniform exemption law should set apart such property from that available
generally to creditors. The debtor should be able to retain, in both immediate dis-
charge and payment-plan cases, essential goods that are collateral securing payment of
the purchase price.
Id Part I, at 78-80.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 57-88 (discussing these exemptions in relation to the
1898 Act).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30 (discussing the origin of this notion of "Dick-
ens' paupers").
340. P. NADLER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE ECONOMY 3-6 (3d ed. 1979). See also J.
COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY table 11-19, 194 (1979).
341. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 149, at 62-65.
342. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, Part I. at 7-8.
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mandatory debtor work-outs and counseling conducted by a federal agency:
the objective of which is to protect debtors from themselves. Because such a
system never got off the drawing boards, the law of bankruptcy permits
debtors in failing circumstances to turn over their assets once every seven
years to the bankruptcy courts in return for discharge from their previous
credit mistakes. While such a system preserves the freedom of individuals to
obtain credit and also enshrines the right of individuals to resort to no-asset
liquidations when creditors begin to press them, it does little else for debtors.
The current exemptions are welfare payments to debtors made at the ex-
pense of unsecured, and some secured, creditors. This system of indirect wel-
fare payments in the form of homestead and other exemptions does spread
the risk of a wage-earner's economic failure over a class larger than the wage
earner and his dependents, but it also theoretically spreads the loss of no-
asset cases much further. Because creditors accrue bad debt reserves based
on the frequency of bankruptcies among debtors, as well as other economic
failures causing losses, the cost of the present system is directly allocated to
all persons borrowing money from any creditor. Since 1980, that cost has
been increasing at great rates, due to the pressure of hard times and an ac-
cessible bankruptcy process.
34 3
Exemptions based on the economic and moral theories of 1840, will not
meet the problems of contemporary economic failure. The bankruptcy sys-
tem can, and should provide a cure for debtors in failing circumstances. The
constitutional infirmities of "opting out" statutes designed to placate those
whose vision cannot go beyond the antiquated laws of their state, should
demonstrate the fallacy of leaving it to the states to deal with exemptions as
social policy. The serious problems caused by lien avoidance, and the un-
duly complicated and conflicting management problems produced by the
categorical exemption system, a relic of the nineteenth century's approach to
exemption, makes a new direction in bankruptcy exemptions necessary.
B. A New Direction in Exemptions
Bankruptcy exemptions should be considered as a means of restoring
debtors to functional economic units with income and capital. The tradi-
tional exemption policies give only indirect welfare payments. The bank-
ruptcy exemptions should be an incentive to wage-earning debtors with a
proven bad track record as installment credit buyers and borrowers to pro-
tect themselves from disaster. If that would be the goal of the exemption
process, then what the debtor needs is a flexible cash allowance out of his
assets, which, like the ancient English acts,344 gives a premium to debtors
who made some substantial effort to give their unsecured creditors a divi-
dend. Under our scheme of things, this means an exemption system encour-
aging debtors to file bankruptcy plans with serious thought to repayment in
mind. The debtor's preservation as an economic unit is the goal, and to
343. According to the U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts, 331,088 personal bank-
ruptcy petitions were filed in 1980, 363,847 petitions in 1981, counting joint petitions filed by
husband and wife as one filing.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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achieve this goal the exemption system should provide for aggregation of the
debtor's assets in liquid form for investment purposes. Many consumer-
debtors have not developed a habit of thrift and have not accumulated a
cash reserve. Thus, rehabilitation for them would be a program of court-
supervised thrift.
Debtors should be shielded by an exemption that provides for some im-
mediate welfare substitute and for a long-term accumulation of capital. To
design such a program, Congress would have to reject the preference it has
shown for states' rights and pleasing everyone with every aspect of exemp-
tions. The most feasible program design for such a rehabilitation program
would be an exemption trust fund, which would allow debtors to place liqui-
dated cash exemptions in trust, supervised by a bankruptcy court. The pur-
pose of the exemption trust fund would be to rehabilitate debtors as
economic units, and to encourage debtors to take viable work-out programs,
in lieu of no-asset straight bankruptcies.
Administratively, the trust fund would be administered by a special
trustee under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge. The trust fund would
pay compensation to the trustee out of earnings. Because trust account prac-
tices would require annual reports to the court and investments in a prudent
manner, having regard for the principal as well as earnings, the trust fund
would be restricted to the purchase of United States Government securities.
Congress could in fact authorize the Treasury Department to issue special
obligations that would retire the principal of the national debt, paying a
fixed non-taxable rate for sale only to the nation's Exemption Trust Funds.
The funds held in trust should be free from taxation in the hands of the
trustees and free from taxation in the debtor's hands as dividends.
The assets of debtors in the Exemption Trust Fund would be free from
all claims of creditors, present and post-bankruptcy, whether dischargeable
or not dischargeable, so long as not withdrawn by the debtor. Involuntary
transfer of a debtor's interest as a result of death would not change the ex-
empt status of the fund. Assets in the fund could not be paid over to the
debtor during the year following the debtor's discharge or confirmation of
the debtor's plan. After the one year moratorium, the debtor could with-
draw up to twenty-five percent of the principal and accrued income credited
to his or her account during each of the next four years, or withdraw the
outstanding balance at the end of the fifth year. After the initial accumula-
tion period, Chapter 1 1345 and 13346 debtors could also allocate up to ten
percent of the principal and accrued income in their account for payments
to creditors under their plan. Provisions for future payments from the trust
fund accounts could, therefore, be included as part of the order confirming
the plan in chapter 11 and 13 rehabilitation proceedings.
To encourage debtors to make use of the trust fund for their own bene-
fit, chapter 11 and 13 debtors would be permitted to deposit post-bank-
ruptcy earnings in their fund account for up to five years after confirmation.
345. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (Reorganization Chapter).




Thus, a confirmation order could require that a certain percent of post-peti-
tion earnings be deposited in the Exemption Trust Fund. Upon conversion
of a chapter 11 or 13 case to a chapter 7347 case, the funds deposited in the
Exemption Trust Fund could continue as exempt. Post-conversion deposits
or withdrawals by debtors from the fund would not be part of the dividend
to creditors.
Mechanically, exemptions for chapter 7 debtors would be simple. A
chapter 7 debtor would be entitled to exempt $10,000 in fair market value of
his assets reported on the schedules of his petition for bankruptcy, to the
extent that such assets are unencumbered by enforceable security interests or
liens. This would be the welfare exemption. No categorical limitations
would be placed on the debtor's choice. In addition to the $10,000 exemp-
tion, equities in encumbered assets could be elected. These equities could be
taken as cash allowances by the debtor, as well as a "set-off' of the encum-
bered exempt property to the debtor by the bankruptcy court. These ex-
emptions would be subject to the claims of non-dischargeable debt-holding
creditors.
If the debtor's estate was an asset estate, as opposed to the typical no-
asset case, then the debtor would be allowed an additional exemption of a
fixed percent of the estate as defined by section 541 in the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act. 348 Section 541 would be redefined to make the beneficial inter-
est of spendthirft trust funds34 9 and the debtor's interest in entireties prop-
erty assets of the estate.
350
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 debtors filing petitions for rehabilitation
would be able to claim the same welfare exemption as chapter 7 debtors. In
addition, each would be given, as part of the confirmation order and plan,
the opportunity to contribute a portion of post-petition funds to the Exemp-
tion Trust Fund as part of the plan. If the debtor's work-out produced a
dividend of ten to thirty percent to creditors, the debtor would receive an
additional exemption of four percent of the net dividend. If the debtor pro-
duced thirty-one to fifty percent dividends to creditors, then the debtor
would be entitled to take an exemption of eight percent of the dividend
amount. A dividend of fifty-one to seventy-five percent would merit a
twelve percent exemption payment, and a dividend of seventy-six to one
hundred percent would provide an exemption payment of fifteen percent of
the net payment to creditors, taken from the assets of the debtor used to
meet the plan. This final exemption would be payable at discharge time,
and would be a bonus to the debtor who made a good faith effort to pay his
obligations through a court-supervised work-out program.
There are three main objections to a trust fund of this type and exemp-
tions geared to making debtors viable after bankruptcy: 1) such an enforced
347. It U.S.C. § 701 (Liquidation Chapter).
348. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (estate includes all property that a debtor has legal or equitable inter-
est in, including community property, proceeds, bequests, and others).
349. Se supra text accompanying notes 88-90 (history of the treatment of spendthrift trusts
in bankruptcy).




savings mechanism has never been a part of the bankruptcy law before, and
may not be permissible under the Constitution, 2) it makes no allowance for
state created exemptions which are more, or less, generous to debtors than
this program, and 3) the freedom of the debtor is abridged. The answer to
the first objection is the standing trustee for chapter 13 cases is, in form,
similar to this system and has not been challenged as an unconstitutional
measure.351 The second objection is granted. No preference is given state
exemptions because they serve no federal purpose, unless favoritism of spe-
cial interest groups is a legitimate federal purpose. The third objection is
also granted. Debtors are not free to commit financial suicide after
bankruptcy.
Were the trust fund adopted as the federal bankruptcy scheme, all the
constitutional challenges to the crazy quilt exemption pattern of section 522
would be terminated. The "opt-out" statute with its importation of made by
state bankruptcy laws into the federal bankruptcy courts would be elimi-
nated. The unworkable administration of the categorical exemptions in
bankruptcy would not have to be dealt with each day. An incentive to wage
earning and salaried debtors to pay substantial portions of their debts would
be provided. This would, of course, be at the expense of the debtor's free-
dom to commit financial suicide via chapter 7. It would also provide a
means to retire a portion of the national debt and encourage thrift as a part
of the chapter 11 and 13 plans.
351. See II U.S.C. § 1302, § 1326 (defining the duties of a standing trustee and the percent-
age fee for the trustee).
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THE USE OF ERRONEOUS EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
ANTITRUST CASES AND ITS ESTABLISHMENT AS





Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' prohibits any combination be-
tween market participants which results in restraining interstate commerce.
Although either criminal prosecution 2 or a civil cause of action 3 may be ini-
tiated due to an express agreement to restrain trade, more often little or no
direct evidence exists to prove a conspiracy. Instead, the finder of fact must
usually draw inferences based substantially on circumstantial evidence, pri-
marily witness testimony and written commentary on current economic the-
ories of market structure and price behavior. Unfortunately, the nature of
economics as a social science whose fundamental theories are frequently dis-
puted only accentuates the indefinite character of this circumstantial evi-
dence. Finally, the difficulty and complexity of this dilemma increases when
courts fail to obtain and properly apply predominate economic theory in
their antitrust economic analysis.
This article will discuss this dilemma as it relates to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Pevely Dafry Co. v. United States.4 First we will
demonstrate that the court of appeals did not fully understand the economic
theories of the 1940's and, in fact, misapplied them in Pevelv by failing to
examine the effect of tight oligopoly or duopoly market structure on price
behavior. Second, through the use of empirical studies, we will discuss pric-
ing behavior of market competitors in a tight oligopoly or duopoly given a
standardized product, and given this scenario, the presumption of antitrust
violation which should operate where uniform pricing is present. Finally we
will point out subsequent cases which incorrectly followed or deftly side-
stepped the erroneous economic theories articulated in Pevely, and how
* Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois; B.S. 1951, University of
Southwestern Louisiana, M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1967, University of Houston (economics).
** Associate Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976,
M.B.A. 1977, University of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, University of Virginia.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id
2. Id
3. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982).
4. 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), rev'g sub nom. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F.
Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948), cert. denied 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
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courts should be cautious in citing Pevely as precedent. 5
II. PEVELY DAIRY Co. V. UNITED STATES AND ECONOMIC THEORY AS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. The Case
In 1948 the Pevely Dairy Company and the St. Louis Dairy Company
were convicted in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for
violating section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 6 by conspiring to fix the
wholesale and retail prices of grade A regular milk in the St. Louis area.
7
Following the convictions, separate motions by the defendants for an acquit-
tal notwithstanding the verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial and an
arrest ofjudgment were all denied.8 The defendants' separate appeals were
addressed in one opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit which held in Pevey Dairy Co. v. Untied States9 that, although
the indictment had sufficiently alleged that the defendants had conspired to
restrain interstate commerce, th evidence was insufficient to sustain their
conviction.' 0 The court of appeals reversed the lower court's judgment and
remanded for a new trial." The U.S. Supreme Court denied the govern-
ment's writ of certiorari.
12
The court of appeals decision reversing the convictions was based sub-
stantially' 3 upon expert witness testimony about economic theory, particu-
larly price uniformity in a market with standardized products, and its
relation to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 The record with respect to expert
economic testimony in Peveoy is incomplete. It appears, however, that the
court of appeals did not limit itself to considering only the economic testi-
mony by witnesses, but introduced, sua sponle, writings by economic theorists
as additional evidence.
15
5. These cases and the problems raised by their citation to Pevely are addressed in several
articles. See Note, Conscious Parallelism--Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679, 693-98 (1951) [here-
inafter cited as Conscious Parallelism]. See also Turner, The Definition Of Agreement Under The
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism And Refisals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Turner]; Note, Antitrust Liabiliy For An Exchange 0fPrice Information-- What Happened To
Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. REV. 639 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Liability].
6. See supra note I and accompanying text.
7. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948), rev'd sub nom.
Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
Before the convictions, the court had denied the defendant's preliminary motion to dismiss the
indictment. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 77 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
8. 79 F. Supp. at 12, 20.
9. 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949).
10. Id. at 366, 371.
11. Id at 371.
12. 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
13. See 178 F.2d at 368-69.
14. Id. For a general analysis of the need for an interdisciplinary approach to judicial
decision-making, see Kindt, An Analysis OfLegal Education And Business Education Within The Con-
text 0fA JD./MBA Program, 31 J. LEG. ED. 512, 518-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Education ].
15. See 178 F.2d at 378. See also Legal Education, supra note 14, at 518-19.
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B. Expert Testimony and Documentary Evidence Relied on in Pevely
In Pevely, the court noted that the two defendant dairies sold and dis-
tributed approximately 63 percent of the fluid milk consumed within the St.
Louis geographic area. 16 Specifically, the indictment alleged that the de-
fendants had conspired to fix wholesale and retail milk prices during the
previous ten years by an agreement under which only identical price changes
would be made. 1 7 The expert testimony and determinative evidence cited
by the court in Pevely, however, failed to draw any connection between the
particular market structure in which the defendants operated and the al-
leged conspiracy.
The court cites economic testimony from three expert witnesses to the
effect that in markets where there are standardized cost factors, such as St.
Louis, price uniformity is expected. '8 First, an expert witness identified only
as the Director of Dairy Marketing for the Illinois Agricultural Association
testified that the homogeneity of the milk made it a standardized product for
sellers.' 9 Second, an unidentified Professor of Economics at St. Louis Uni-
versity testified that milk was an extremely standardized product in the St.
Louis market, and that in fact, the product was essentially fungible between
dealers. 20 Finally, another unidentified expert economist testified with refer-
ence to the St. Louis milk market that uniform prices and simultaneous price
changes should be expected.
2'
Despite the indefinite references in the opinion to this expert testimony,
and, consequently, the considerable difficulty in analyzing the decision, the
court of appeals accepted the testimony of expert witnesses and other expert
authority to the effect that: a) the milk as a product was highly standard-
ized; b) the milk product of one dealer was the same as the product of an-
other dealer; c) with slight exceptions, uniformity of price was to be
expected; and d) practically simultaneous price changes were also to be ex-
pected. 2 2 These first two assertions constitute statements of facts; determina-
tions which were true not only when the appellate case was decided in 1949,
but also today. The second two statements were theoretical, however, and
did not represent either the prevailing viewpoint of economists in 1949, or
the current economic thought in this area. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals should have documented this expert economic testimony with author-
ity, instead of assuming its accuracy. The absence of citation to supporting
authority or relevant documentation imposes extreme difficulty upon com-
mentators examining Pevely and the court's ratio decidendi.
The court does eventually give a citation to expert authority. A then
current treatise23 by E. Chamberlin, a Harvard Professor of Economics, is set
16. 178 F.2d at 364.
17. Id.





23. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Chamberlin 1948). All of the editions of "The Theory of Monopolistic Competition"
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forth to support the position that uniform prices do not have to imply price
or other market collusion.24 The court's reliance upon Mr. Chamberlin's
antitrust economic analysis is, however, misleading. First, the court seizes
upon an excerpt from Chamberlin, but then ignores its context. Second, the
court's use of Chamberlin's quote constitutes an oversimplification of his
analysis.
The Chamberlin quote utilized by the Court of Appeals stated specifi-
cally that in a duopoly, which was essentially the case in Pevely, there must
be "complete independence of the two sellers."'25 The Eighth Circuit clearly
misconstrues the context of Chamberlin's analysis. The analysis is predi-
cated upon complete independence of market participants; that is, there
could be no express or actual agreement. The court, however, does not focus
on the distinction Chamberlin's analysis draws between policy independence
and independence from actual agreements. To be sure, when a small
number of participants sells a substantial percentage of a product in a mar-
ket, their fortunes are not independent to the extent that each competitor
must take into account what the other companies are doing. Indeed, this
distinction is fundamental to the definitions of both a monopoly and duop-
oly. By economic definition, an agreement between two or more companies
in a duopolistic situation changes that situation into a monopolistic one.
26
Thus, although Chamberlin's work, which the court relies upon explic-
itly, emphasizes at least twice 2 7 that independence of market participants
does not mean policy independence, but rather an absence of express or tacit
agreement, 28 the court fails to consider this adequately. This failure be-
between 1938 and 1950 read basically the same in the chapter dealing with "duopoly and oli-
gopoly." The quotes utilized by the Court of Appeals in Pevely are identical in all of the respec-
tive editions-even as recently as 1965.
24. 178 F.2d at 368.
25. Id; see E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 31 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Chamberlin 1965]:
One of the conditions of the problem must be the complete independence of the two
sellers, for obviously, if they combine, there is monopoly. This independence must,
however, be interpreted with care, for, in the nature of the case, when there are only
two or a few sellers, their fortunes are not independent. There can be no actual, or
tacit, agreement--that is all. Each is forced by the situation itself to take into account
the policy of his rival in determining his own, and this cannot be construed as "tacit
agreement" between the two.
26. 178 F.2d at 368 (citing Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 31.)
27. See Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 31; Chamberlin 1965, supra note 25, at 31, 46-47.
28. In his book, Chamberlin distinguishes policy independence from independence involv-
ing actual collusion or agreements. In many oligopolistic situations, companies will be aware of
the policies of competing companies without the presence of any actual or tacit agreement.
Chamberlin states that:
[T]he assumption of independence cannot be construed as requiring the sellers to com-
pete as though their fortunes were independent, for this is to belie the very problem of
duopoly itself. It can refer only to independence of action-the absence of agreement
or of "tacit" agreement. For one competitor to take into account the alterations of
policy which he forces upon the other is simply for him to consider the indirect conse-
quences of his own acts.
Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 46-47. See also Turner, supra note 5, at 672-73:
Even in markets with few sellers, a fairly sudden change in pricing patterns is ground
for suspicion. Agreement is indicated if prices have suddenly become much more sta-
ble, over the same range of conditions, than in past years or months. . . And in
general, any facts which would indicate uncertainty as to how competitors would de-
termine their price quotations make the appearance of identical prices strong evidence
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comes extremely important in connection with the fact that in Pevel'y the
evidence shows there was tacit-and probably express-agreement between
representatives of the Pevely Dairy Company and the St. Louis Dairy Com-
pany. 29 The sales manager for St. Louis Dairy, Mr. Gee, and the sales pro-
motion agent for Pevely Dairy, Mr. Wasser, met regularly over a ten year
period and considered several proposed price changes. 30 In fact, the Eighth
Circuit notes that the management of both defendant dairies "thoroughly
and analytically" 3 1 considered proposed price changes. This pattern of co-
operation and agreement constitutes more than competitors accounting for
each others' actions, and is clearly inconsistent with the idea of complete
independence of express or tacit agreement set forth in Chamberlin's anti-
trust economic analysis.
Chamberlin's economic analysis of duopoly and oligopoly behavior was
also oversimplified by the court. Chamberlin asserted that both duopoly
and oligopoly represented an amalgam of problems and not just a single
issue; 32 moreover, that based upon material assumptions and varying condi-
tions, different solutions were required.33 Because not one of the duopolistic
examples he presented in his work fit precisely into the factual situation in
Pereh,34 the Eighth Circuit should have turned its attention to the inherent
uncertainties in duopoly economic theory set forth by Chamberlin. 35 Had
the court focused upon these uncertainties in Pevely, such as the individual
behavior of the market participants, Chamberlin's analysis would be more
applicable, and would demonstrate that a duopoly-and perhaps a defacto
monopoly-was operating in Pevely.
The only other expert evidence cited 36 by the court is an article entitled
"Collusion," 37 which appeared in the December 1948 issue of Farm Econom-
ics, published by the Department of Agricultural Economics of the New
York State College of Agriculture. The Court cited to "Collusion" to show
of intercommunication, if not actual agreement, and thus of plainly unlawful conspir-
acy. The immunization of pure oligopoly pricing from the Sherman Act which I have
argued for here does not extend to agreements or understandings designed to convert
an imperfect oligopoly pricing pattern into a perfect one by eliminating uncertainties.
29. See 178 F.2d at 367. The Court notes that there is:
[U]ndisputed evidence that the matter of price changes was thoroughly and analyti-
cally considered by the management of appellants, consisting of certain of their of-
ficers, at regular meetings, at which the economic factors bearing upon costs were
ascertained, scrutinized and discussed, and that the [price] changes made occurred
only after a complete evaluation of the economic conditions and factors going into the
cost of production.
Id. See also 79 F. Supp. at 13-14.
30. 178 F.2d at 367.
31. Id.
32. See Chamberlin 1965, supra note 25, at 53.
33. Id
34. Id at 30-55.
35. Chamberlin states that:
Uncertainty, where present, as to (a) whether other competitors will hold their
amount or their prices constant, (b) whether they are far-sighted, (c) the extent of the
possible incursions upon their markets, (d) in the case of a time lag, its length, renders
the outcome indeterminate ....
Id at 54.
36. 178 F.2d at 368-69.
37. Collusion, FARM ECONOMICS, Dec. 1948 at 42-43 [hereinafter cited as Collusion].
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that uniform price changes in milk were to be expected. The article indi-
cates that wheat and cotton markets experience simultaneous changes in all
cities as prices fluctuate as competition forces all market participants to buy
at the same price. 38 This behavior reflects what economists expect in a per-
fectly competitive market. As this article will demonstrate, however, the two
defendants in Pevely operated in a tight oligopoly. Even in the 1940's, econo-
mists recognized that there was a distinct difference between farm produce
markets and exchanges where uniform prices were set by market forces,
39
and oligopoly markets where the participants established prices and dictated
price changes. Economists would not expect identical behavior in both situ-
ations. There is also considerable doubt whether the "Collusion" article is
authoritative. The article is a two page editorial whose only footnote admits
to the editorial's fictitious assumptions. 4°
The court also relies heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Cement Manufacturer's Protective Association v. United Slates4 1 as authority that
price uniformity was to be expected between the defendant dairies in
Pevely.42 Perhaps the Eighth Circuit felt constrained by Cement; however,
without challenging the Supreme Court's reasoning, the court of appeals
could have distinguished Cement by focusing on the factual differences pres-
ent in Pevely.
First, the response time between a price change by one company and
the subsequent similar price change by a competing company is greater in
Cement than in Pevel4 In Cement the corresponding price changes allowed
enough time for common knowledge of changed market conditions and
prices to operate, while in Pevely the price changes were either immediate or
38. Id.; 178 F.2d at 368-69.
There is nothing peculiar in the fact that a change in the price of wheat or cotton
occurs simultaneously in all markets. If the price of No. I Northern Spring Wheat in
Minneapolis rises 5 cents a bushel, it advances 5 cents in Baltimore, 5 cents in Buffalo,
5 cents in Chicago and 5 cents in all the small towns in Minnesota, North Dakota and
Montana. These prices not only all advance by the same amount, but they advance
on the same day. This is as it should be. There is no collusion. Under the free enter-
prise system, competition forces all handlers to pay the same price.
178 F.2d at 368-69.
39. See e.g,, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 432, 488-89 (10th ed. 1976).
40. Collusion, supra note 37, at 42-43 n.1. "The percentages are, of course, fictitious, but the
principle is not." Id. In fact, the "Collusion" editorial is so full of inaccuracies and imprecise
terminology that any court should have questioned its authoritativeness.
41. 268 U.S. 588 (1925);see 178 F.2d at 369; see also Antitrust Liability, supra note 5, at 661
n.89.
42. See 178 F.2d at 369. Justice Stone set forth the Court's reasoning in Cement:
It appears to be undisputed that there were frequent changes in price, and uniformity
has resulted not from maintaining the price at fixed levels, but from the prompt meet-
ing of changes in prices by competing sellers.
It is urged by the defendants that such uniformity of price as existed in the trade
was due to competition .... A great volume of testimony was also given by distin-
guished economists in support of the thesis that, in the case of a standardized product
sold wholesale to fully informed professional buyers, as were the dealers in cement,
uniformity of price will inevitably result from active, free and unrestrained competi-
tion, and the government, in its brief, concedes that "undoubtedly the price of cement
would approach uniformity in a normal market in the absence of all combinations
between the manufacturers.
178 F.2d at 369 (quoting Cement, 268 U.S. at 605-06).
43. 268 U.S. at 605. In Cement the price changes were prompt.
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simultaneous. 44 Unreasonably short response times between competitors is
one factor suggesting an anticompetitive conspiracy exists. Second, the
Supreme Court concluded in Cement that no agreement existed between the
manufacturers and no information regarding sales contracts had been ex-
changed. 45 In Pevefr, however, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that repre-
sentatives of the defendant dairies had repeatedly discussed price policy and
proposed changes. 46 Third, in Cement, a standardized product was whole-
saled to dealers,4 7 whereas in Pevely, the milk product was sold directly to
consumers.48 In combination, these factual differences constitute enough to
distinguish the market situation and factual circumstances in Cement from
those in Pevely. Therefore, the court's citation to Cement as supporting au-
thority for economic theory is less than helpful.
III. THE CATEGORIZATION OF ST. Louis DAIRY MARKET AS A TIGHT
OLIGOPOLY
Following the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cement, the court
of appeals in Pevelv held that given a standardized product such as milk,
uniform prices and price changes do not by themselves constitute a violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 49 Without more, this statement is supported
by current economic thought. 50 It must be kept in mind, however, that in
Cement the defendants successfully argued that the uniformity in price re-
flected competition in the market, free from collusion or agreement. 5i The
Pevely case involved tacit, if not actual, agreement 52 which was made more
probable by the tight oligopolistic or duopolistic situation in which the
Pevely Dairy and the St. Louis Dairy operated.
53
44. 79 F. Supp. at 13. In Pevely the price changes occurred on the "next day" or the "same
day." Id
45. 268 U.S. at 593.
46. See 178 F.2d at 367.
47. See 268 U.S. at 605; see also 178 F.2d at 369. In Cement "a standardized product [was)
sold wholesale tofidjl iformedprofessional buyers." 268 U.S. at 605. (emphasis added).
48. See 178 F.2d at 364.
49. Id at 369.
50. Turner, supra note 5, at 659. Specifically:
A large number of producers of a standardized commodity selling under stable market
conditions might be expected to charge the same price, a price set not by agreement
but by market conditions. None could charge more and make any sales, and there
would be no point in charging less because, under competitive assumptions, each
could sell at the established market price all that his costs made it profitable to sell.
But identical prices become suspicious if, for example, price has remained stable de-
spite a substantial decline in demand, if price has risen in the face of excess supply, or
if a large number of hungry producers with excess capacity have submitted identical
sealed bids in response to a large buyer's solicitation.
Id (emphasis added).
51. See 268 U.S. at 605-06.
52. See 178 F.2d at 367; 79 F. Supp. at 13-14.
53. Turner, supra note 5, at 664 (quoting Kaysen, Collustin Under The Sherman Act, 65 Q.J.
EcON. 263, 268 (1951)):
There are indeed many cases of completely or almost completely standardized prod-
ucts; but sellers will always have some differences in cost structures, face somewhat
different demand conditions, and be in ignorance of some relevant market facts.
Moreover, conditions are not static, they change; and change breeds uncertainty. In
short, in real life the "best" price for each seller in even the oligopolistic market will
never be the same; and even if it were, individual calculations by each seller based on
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:4
B. The Categorizaion of the Pevely Dairy and the St. Louts Da'y as a "Tight
Ol'gopol'y"
By definition, an oligopoly exists in a particular industry when a signifi-
cant portion of the entire product output is controlled by only a few or sev-
eral firms. 54  Economists typically classify oligopolies as either loose or
tight.55 A tight oligopoly exists when the market concentration held by the
four largest producing companies is 50 percent or greater. 56 By contrast, in
a loose oligopoly the market concentration held by the four largest produc-
ing companies is between 15 and 40 percent. 5 7 A loose oligopoly tends to
imperfect and usually different information would normally lead, in the absence of
fully recognized interdependence, to different decisions as to price. For a pattern of
noncompetitive pricing to emerge in such a situation requires something which we
could, not unreasonably, call a "meeting of minds," or to use Professor Kaysen's
phrase, an "agreement to agree."
in addition, Turner points out that:
Even if some explicit communication at some time was not involved, though in reality
it probably always has been, explicit communication seems hardly a logically neces-
sary ingredient of the kind of agreement that is an element in the legal concept of
conspiracy. Considered purely as a problem in linguistic definition, there is no reason
to exclude oligopolistic behavior from the scope of the term agreement simply because
the circumstances make it possible to communicate without speech. It is not novel
conspiracy doctrine to say that agreement can be signified by action as well as by
words. And of course if there is agreement in the legal sense, the agreement seems
inescapably an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade because a price-fixing agree-
ment is unlawful per se.
Turner, supra note 5, at 665 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223-24 (1940)).
54. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 116 (1977). But what number
of firms or companies, controlling what percentage of a market, is sufficiently concentrated to
constitute an oligopoly is not a matter susceptible for precise calculation. Id See generally C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY ch. 2 (1959) (developing a system of oligopolistic
classification: Type I oligopoly exists in markets in which the largest eight firms make greater
than fifty-percent of the total output and the largest twenty firms make more than seventy-five-
percent of the total output; Type II oligopoly exists in markets in which the largest eight firms
make one-third the total output and the largest twenty firms make seventy five-percent of the
total output) [hereinafter cited as Kaysen & Turner].
55. W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 62-64 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Shepherd].
56. Id at 63. Specifically:
mhe high concentration enables the leading firms to coordinate well, much as if they
were really just parts of one dominant firm. Such "shared-monopoly" behavior may
not reach the scope and power of full monopoly or of a dominant firm, and it may
break down occasionally. Yet it does involve such intense fewness and interdepen-
dence that a "joint maximizing" of profits can crystallize and last. The rewards of
coordination are great, compared with the penalties of fighting; and the high concen-
tration makes it possible. Tight oligopoly may include, at the upper border, a domi-
nant firm. And it shades down into loose oligopoly. But the key feature still is: joint
behavior by a few leaders, able to make their cooperation stick.
Id at 63-64. A tight oligopoly is also referred to as a highly-concentrated oligopoly. See F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 155 (2d ed., 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Scherer; E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 109 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Singer]; Esposito & Esposito, Excess Capacity And Market Siructure, 56 REV. ECON. & STATIS-
TICS 188, 190, 190 n.12, 193 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Esposito].
57. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 64. See Scherer, supra note 56, at 60 (When a manufactur-
ing industry has a four-firm concentration of 40 percent or more there is an implication of
oligopoly); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 54, at 27-35 (1959) (In 1954, 59 percent of U.S. sales by
manufacturers were by oligopolistic manufacturers); Esposito, supra note 56, at 190 n.12 (A four-
firm concentration ratio of 70 or more indicates a tight oligopoly, while a ratio between 40 and
69 indicates a "partial" (loose) oligopoly, and a ratio below 40 indicates an atomistic industry).
See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 54-55 (1976).
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lead to independent, effectively competitive behavior 58 where price coordi-
nation becomes sporadic and weak. Once stabilized, prices tend to remain
at competitive levels and excess profits are small.
59
The situation in Peve' clearly constituted a tight oligopoly or duopoly.
The two defendant dairies distributed approximately 63 percent of the milk
sold in the St. Louis area.6° As commentators have noted, this type of mar-
ket structure enables the largest companies to coordinate policies extensively
and effectively-competition is virtually absent. 6 1 Although a tight oligop-
oly market structure would theoretically lead to parallel pricing, approach-
ing price uniformity, it would not result in the identical pricing which
occurred in Pevely absent collusion.
B. Empirical Studies of Price Behavior in Oligopoly Markets with Standardized
Products
The evidence in Pevely provided by expert economic testimony and the
court's interpretation of an article and a treatise permitted the Eighth Cir-
cuit to conclude that given a standardized product, simultaneous price
changes were to be expected in an oligopoly market. At least two economic
studies reported during the 1970's indicate that pricing behavior in situa-
tions similar to that in Pevely is inconsistent with the court's reasoning.
1. The 1974 Study of Homogeneous Electricity Markets in
Oligopolistic Situations
In 1974, the pricing behavior of electric utilities was examined in mar-
kets where two utility firms existed in a single city,62 and consumers could
choose to be served by either Firm. This study provides a useful comparison
with Pevely. The market structure constitutes tight oligopolies or duopolies
and electricity, as a product, is standardized similar to the milk handled by
the two defendant dairies in Pevely.
Table A demonstrates that out of a sample of 23 duopoly firms there
were 84 price changes which were not followed within 3 years by a competi-
tor's price change. This behavior is quite inconsistent with the reasoning in
Pevey, in which the court concluded that simultaneous price changes were a
natural result. In fact, the economic conclusions accepted by the court in
Pevely supported the concept of a kinky demand curve for oligopolies, a the-
ory discredited as early as 1947.63 The study corrected for any time-lags due
58. See Shepherd, supra note 55, at 64.
59. See id
60. 178 F.2d at 364; 79 F. Supp. at 14.
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Scherer, supra note 56, at 155-60, 513-
14; Singer, supra note 56, at 74-103. See generay K. CLARKSON & R. MILLER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 137-51, 156-65 (1982).
62. Primeaux & Bomball, A Reexamination of the Kia, Oligopoly Demand Curve, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 851 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bomball].
63. See generally id. at 855-60 (results from study comparing pricing behavior of monopoly
electric firms and duopoly electric firms failed to support the kinky demand curve theory); Si-
mon, A Further Test of the Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 971 (1969); Stigler,
The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 53 J. POL. ECON. 439 (1947), reprinted in G.




STATISTICAL DATA REPRESENTATIVE PRICE INCREASES AND
DECREASES FOR A STANDARDIZED PRODUCT IN A
DUOPOLY:
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
1. Price increases not followed (within 3 years) 42
2. Price decreases notfollowed (within 3 years) 42




4. Delay in following price increases 18
1 year 18
5. Delay in following price decreases 15
1 year 10
2 years 5
6. Delay in changing in the opposite direction 11
Municipal initiated a decrease 1-year delay
in increasing 2
Private initiated a decrease 1-year delay
in increasing 4
Private initiated a decrease 3-year delay
in increasing 5
Price data is from the 1959-1970 time period. 1963 was excluded because the rate
categories were different for that one year, so comparisons could not be made.
Source: Bomball, infta note 62, at 858.
to regulation of prices in the electric industry.64 The table also shows that
during the same period there were 48 simultaneous price changes, but ten of
these were in the opposite direction, indicating that when one firm raised
prices, the other lowered prices. Additionally, although the 33 price changes
indicated on lines 4 and 5 of Table A tend to support the court's position in
Pevely, the 11 other changes on line 6 occur in the opposite direction and are
in conflict with that position.
2. The 1976 Study of the Prescription Drug Industry in
Oligopolistic Situations
In a 1976 article the pricing behavior of the prescription drug industry
was studied. 65 In the study, a duopoly was selected where only two drugs
kinky demand curve theory was independently and almost simultaneously advanced in 1939 by
Paul M. Sweezy of the United States and R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch of the United Kingdom.
Stigler, infra, at 208; Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Ohgopoy, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939);
Hall & Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behavior, OXFORD ECON. PAPERS, May 1939, at 12.
64. Bomball, supra note 62, at 853, 859.
65. Primeaux & Smith, Pricing Patterns And The Kinky Demand Curve, 19 J.L. & EcON. 189
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were competing in a market. Additionally, extreme care was taken to class-
ify the two drugs as substitutes for one another, thereby making the product
standardized. Thus, the competitive conditions resembled the fluid milk
market in Pevdy. Table B presents price data for the prescription drug du-
opolies. The data is annual, so a delayed response of less than a year is
considered to be simultaneous. The table shows that of the 28 price changes
in the prescription drug industry, 15 supported the theory of simultaneous
price change reached by the court in Peve4', however 13 did not. The price
behavior suggested by results from the two studies discussed above strongly
suggests that the simultaneous price behavior observed in the St. Louis milk
market was not due to the particular market structure or the standardized
nature of the product, but rather to collusion between the defendants.
TABLE B
STATISTICAL DATA REPRESENTING PRICE INCREASES AND
DECREASES FOR STANDARDIZED PRODUCTS IN A
DUOPOLY:
THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG INDUSTRY
Pricing Behavior supporting the theory of uniform price change
Simultaneous price changes - decreases 2
Lagged response to price decrease - delay 1 year,
decreased prices 3
Simultaneous price changes - increases 4
Lagged response to price increases - delay I year,
increased prices 6
Total Number of price changes 15
Pricing Behavior inconsistent with the theory of uniform price
change
Price increases not followed in one year 5
Price decreases not followed in one year 3
Simultaneous price changes in opposite direction 2
Lagged response to price increases - delay 1 year,
decreased prices
Lagged response to price increases - delay 1 year,
one increase, one decrease 1
Lagged response to price decrease - delay 1 year,
increased prices
Total Number of price changes 13
Source: Smith, infra note 65, at 193-94.
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. This study of the pharmaceutical industry was undertaken
because a 1958 essay implied, without data, that the kinky demand curve theory applied to this
industry, and the 1958 essay was later read into the record of a Congressional Hearing on the
industry. See McEvilla, Pricing Determination Theory in the Pharmaceutical ndust.y, 82 DRUG & COS-
METIC INDUSTRY 34 (1958); Administered Prices in the Drug Industiy: Hearings on S 238 Before the




IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UTILIZATION OF PEVELY AS PRECEDENT
A. Conspiracy Inferred from Uniform Actions." "Conscious Parallelism" and
Pevely
In 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States,66 set forth the doctrine of conscious parallelism, under which a Sher-
man Act conspiracy could be inferred from uniform action between competi-
tors.6 7 The Court held that if market competitors tacitly agree to participate
in a course of conduct which restrains interstate commerce, it constitutes a
prohibited conspiracy under the Sherman Act.68 In 1954, the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified its Interstate Circuit decision when it held, in Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrbuting Corp. ,69 that conscious parallelism consti-
tuted circumstantial evidence which could assist the finder of fact in infer-
ring an agreement; 70 however, conscious parallelism, by itself, would not
constitute evidence sufficient to find a conspiracy. 71 There have been several
analyses of conscious parallelism since Interstate Circuit which cite Chamber-
lin as authority.
72
Although neither party in Pevely invoked the doctrine of conscious par-
allelism, the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit has become erroneously en-
twined with the doctrine. For example, with respect to nonstandardized
products, price uniformity creates a presumption that the Sherman Act has
been violated, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in C-O-Two
Equipment Co. v. United States. 73 As precedent, however, Revel supports the
opposite presumption with respect to standardized products: that is, that
there is no Sherman Act violation. This difference is reflected in the anti-
66. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
67. For analyses of conscious parallelism and related issues, see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3
ANTITRUST LAW 359-63 (1978); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 217-23 (1967); R. POSNER &
F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 306-07,
330 n. 1 [hereinafter cited as POSNER]; Scherer, supra note 56, at 513-25. See generally Monroe &
Hill, The Predatory Picing Controvery: Academic Theories Enter The Courtroom, 13 U. TOLEDO L.
REV. 539 (1982) (discussion of proving element of predatory intent to monopolize or to destroy
competition within some relevant market); Note, Antitrust Law-Restraint Of Trade--Antirust Im-
plications of the Exchange of Pr.ce Infomation Among Competitors. The Container Corporation Case, 68
MICH. L. REV. 720 (1970) (discusses historically how the court has treated the practice of ex-
changing statistical pricing data among competitors) [hereinafter cited as Prtice Information]. Con-
spiracy Infernedfrom Uniform Action. Conscious Parallelism, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 1.10 (C. Hills ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978].
68. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 227.
69. 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (citing cases).
70. Id. at 540.
71. Id at 541; see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing cases); see also ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978, supra note 67,
§ 1.10 at 9.
Theatre Enterprises has become noted for the fact that the Supreme Court held "not that
conscious parallelism was an insufficient basis for finding of an unlawful contract, combination,
or conspiracy, but only that the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict-i.e., that con-
scious parallelism was not sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of unlawful conspir-
acy." Posner, supra note 67, at 330 n. I (emphasis in original).
72. See, e.g., Price Information, supra note 67 at 727; Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra
note 4A at 679-80; but see Note, Antitrust Liability, supra note 5 at 642-45.
73. 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
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trust literature. For example, in the 1971 edition of the Antitrust Advisor, 74
Pevely is cited for the principle that with regard to a standardized product,
uniform prices do not tend to prove a Sherman Act conspiracy. 75 Moreover,
the 1978 edition of the Antitrust Advisor reinforces Pevely as precedent by in-
cluding the case in a checklist for evaluating conscious parallelism.
76
This distinction in antitrust literature is caused by the misinterpretation
of economic theory with respect to a tight oligopoly or duopoly which was
precipitated by the holding in Pevely. Although the Eighth Circuit in Pevely
perhaps did not recognize, and certainly failed to discuss, the significance of
the oligopoly market structure present, the prevailing economic theory, sup-
ported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that Pevey was decided
incorrectly and should not be used as precedent.
The presumption inherent in the distinction is that a uniform price
tends to infer collusion regarding competitors who sell nonstandardized
products, but not those who sell standardized products. This presumption is
incorrect to the extent it fails to distinguish between tight and loose oligo-
polistic situations. In a tight oligopoly, such as Pevely, a uniform selling price
for a standardized product should raise a presumption of collusion in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. That is, if there is no evidence of an express agree-
ment, and the plaintiff provides sufficient evidence of the following: (1) a
tight oligopoly or duopoly; (2) a standardized product; and (3) uniform
prices, it should be presumed that there is an implied agreement or an agree-
ment to agree. The burden of proof should shift to the defendant to demon-
strate that there was no agreement or collusion in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Although Pevely has received mild criticism, 77 legal commentators con-
tinue to cite it as authority, though usually only by way of qualified support
or accompanied by a caveat. 78 Currently, Peveo's use as precedent continues
74. ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 2.10 (C. Hills ed. 1971); See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra
note 5, at 697-98.
75. ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 2.10 (C. Hills ed. 1971).
76. ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978, supra note 67, at § 1.10. Specifically, the ADVISOR states:
The following criteria should be examined in determining whether uniformity of
action is sufficient to permit an inference of conspiratorial action:
1. How pervasive is the uniformity?
2. Is the product involved standardized or differentiated? Compare, e.g., C-O-Two
Fire Equipment Co. v. US (9th Cir. 1952) 197 F.2d 489, cert. den. (1952) 344 U.S.
892. 73 S.Ct. 211, 97 L.E. 690 with Pevdy Dairy Co. v. US. 8th Cir. 1949) 178 F.2d
366, cert. den. (1950) 339 U.S. 942, 70 S.Ct. 794, 94 L.E. 1358.
3. How nearly identical is the uniformity?
4. Is the market oligopolistic, containing few sellers? See e.g., Wall Products Co. v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co. (Cal. 1971) 326 F. Supp. 295.
5. Does it extend to price alone or to all other terms and conditions of sale?
6. In the case of price uniformity, have the defendants raised as well as lowered
prices in parallel fashion?
7. Can the conduct, no matter how uniform, be adequately explained by independ-
ent business justifications? See e.g., North Carolina v. Chas Pflier & Co. Inc. (4th Cir.
1975) CCH 1975-2 Trade Cases 60.663.
Id
77. See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 693-98; see also Note, Antitrust Liability,
supra note 5, at 651.
78. See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 693-98.
Since the mere "fact" of uniformity, without more, cannot rationally give rise to any
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to discourage a reexamination of price behavior in extreme oligopolistic situ-
ations, thereby indirectly thwarting thorough enforcement of the antitrust
laws.
B. The Major Cases Following Pevely
The major federal cases utilizing Pevely as precedent refer to two princi-
ples: first, that uniform prices for a standardized product do not raise a
presumption of a Sherman Act violation;79 and, second, that where circum-
stantial evidence is employed to prove collusion, all circumstantial evidence
must be consistent with the allegation.8 0 As an aside, this requirement for
circumstantial evidence appears reasonable when there is only circumstan-
tial evidence and not direct evidence available and when the case involves a
criminal prosecution rather than a civil cause of action.81 Despite the lower
standard of proof for civil as opposed to criminal cases, the presumption
should be the same: that in a tight oligopolistic or duopolistic fact situation
involving uniform prices and a standardized product, there is an implied
agreement to conspire and that the defendant must affirmatively prove
otherwise.
It should also be noted that the circumstantial evidence considered by
the Eighth Circuit in Pevely excluded any consideration of that market struc-
ture. As this article points out, however, the presence of a tight oligopoly or
duopoly significantly changes the economic assumptions regarding price be-
havior among competitors. Therefore, the use of Peve'y by courts to support
a particular interpretation of circumstantial evidence should be undertaken
with this infirmity in mind. Additionally, although this presumption of con-
spiracy appears theoretical and therefore would be considered circumstantial
evidence, there is a good argument for reclassifying it as direct evidence.
First, the existence of a standardized product is usually readily provable.
Second, that uniform pricing and simultaneous price changes exist are simi-
one inference in preference to another, it will not be probative by itself. But an exami-
nation of the setting in which the uniformity occurred, such as the duration and extent
of uniformity, the progressiveness of the industry, and other indicia of competition or
the lack of it, may well give rise to an inference of conspiracy or conscious parallelism.
If such factors are not presented to the trier of fact, then a verdict should be directed
on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. Even in the presence of added back-
ground, uniformity may give rise to conflicting inferences, upon which reasonable men
could differ. In such a case, where enough probative evidence is before the court, the
trier of fact should be free to draw the more reasonable inference. If proof of uniform-
ity without more is to be rejected, it should be done only on the ground that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of a certain behavior pattern.
All courts do not seem to agree with this analysis. In Pevely Dary Co. v. United
States the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that proof
of uniform prices over a period of time did not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain
a criminal conviction of conspiracy under Section I of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 694.
79. See Pevely, 178 F.2d at 369.
80. See id. at 367. Specifically:
Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to establish the conspiracy or any other
essential facts, it is not only necessary that all the circumstances concur to show the
existence of such conspiracy and facts sought to be proved, but such circumstantial
evidence must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.
Id
81. See Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 696.
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larly provable. Third, as demonstrated earlier, the existence of a tight oli-
gopoly or duopoly can be defined numerically by the number of firms in a
market and their total percent of market share.8 2 Accordingly, the definite-
ness of proof inherent in this type of economic evidence lends itself to being
categorized as direct rather than circumstantial evidence.
The 1981 case of Weil v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Com-
pany83 followed both of the standards in Pevely mentioned above; specifically,
the erroneous doctrine that uniform prices involving a standardized product
in a tight oligopoly or duopoly do not create a presumption of a Sherman
Act violation, and the standard of proof required for economic circumstan-
tial evidence. The Welt case reemphasizes the connection between Pevely
and conscious parallelism. In Weit, it was argued that although parallel
pricing itself was insufficient evidence to prove price collusion, such pricing
combined with an opportunity to agree should be sufficient evidence to re-
quire a trial on the substantive issues.84 This standard should have been
applied by the court because the facts indicated the existence of a tight oli-
gopoly or duopoly. In any event, the court rejected the standard based on
the circumstantial evidence reasoning in Pevely, specifically that when a
party pursues a claim or cause of action based solely on circumstantial evi-
dence there must be a compelling suggestion of collusion.8 5 Weit involved a
standardized product similar to Pevel and, in fact, followed the erroneous
standardized product reasoning of Pevel; also.8 6 Fourteen years after Pevely,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had difficulty with another milk anti-
trust case, Beatrice Foods Company v. United States.8 7 Although the economic
scenario was substantially different from that in Pevely, the court had diffi-
culty distinguishing Pevely's standardized product reasoning in sustaining the
antitrust conspiracy conviction. 88 In Beatrice Foods, the court sustained the
conviction for conspiracy. Perhaps the court would not have encountered
such difficulty with Pevel if it had recognized and applied the correct eco-
nomic reasoning in 1949.
As precedent, Pevely constitutes a significant hurdle, but several courts
have distinguished Pevel in a variety of ways. In the 1966 case of Sanitay
82. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
83. 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981).
84. See id at 463.
85. See id.
86. "Similarly, in civil anti-trust cases, courts have noted that parallel pricing or conduct
lacks probative significance when the product in question is standardized or fungible." 641
F.2d at 463 (citations omitted). See also Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 819 (1973) (trial court's finding of improper price influencing over-
turned for lack of evidence); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963) (directed verdict for defendants on a concerted boycott claim affirmed).
87. 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 373 U.S. 904 (1963).
88. See Beatrice Foods, 312 F.2d at 43. In particular:
We recognize, too, that fluid milk is a highly standardized commodity which provides
little room, if any exists at all, for quality differences or for special or advantageous
purchases of the raw product from suppliers and which, because of uniform labor
contracts, encounters processing costs of rigid consistency. This court noted these very
factors in Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, . . . These stubborn facts of the milk business,
by their very existence, present difMculties in the prosecution of an antitrust case against commercial
dai- .
Id at 42-43 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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Milk Producers v. Berg/ans Farm Dai'l, Inc. 89 the Eighth Circuit impliedly criti-
cized Pevely by holding that an inference drawn by the jury and court from
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that the defendant
conspired to fix prices. 90 The court's rationale in Sanitary Milk is similar to
that used by Chamberlin when referring to an oligopolistic scenario, and as
such, provides a useful comparison to that of Chamberlin.91 In 1965, the
Eighth Circuit had already decided in National Dairy Products v. United States
9 2
that the circumstantial evidence rule articulated in Pevely was not determi-
native when there was direct evidence.9 3 As suggested earlier, the numerical
evidence, currently considered circumstantial evidence, establishing the
existence of a tight oligopoly or duopoly should be recharacterized as direct
evidence. The rigor of the circumstantial evidence principle established in
Pevely was challenged as early as 1952 by C-O-Two, 94 which is now Pevely's
companion case.
Despite these express and implied criticisms of Pevely and its circumstan-
tial evidence principle, even by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which
originally decided Pevely, the majority of cases have followed the erroneous
economic theories and the concomitant principles established by Pevely as
precedent. 95 Pevely needs to be reversed with regard to specific holdings.
V. CONCLUSION
While some courts have expressly and impliedly criticized Pevely Dairy
Co. v. United States, the case continues to be cited as precedent. Specifically,
Pevely set forth the principle that in the case of a standardized product, uni-
form pricing is a natural result of the competitive economic market and is
not indicative of an antitrust violation. However, this holding was the result
of erroneous expert testimony and misinterpretation and misapplication of
economic theory. The economic theory adopted by the court in Pevel did
not represent the predominate viewpoint of economists in 1949 and it does
not represent the viewpoint today, particularly in light of several empirical
studies of price behavior in a tight oligopoly or duopoly.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pevel did not consider the eco-
nomic behavioral significance of a tight oligopoly or duopoly. In a tight
oligopoly or duopoly, uniform pricing of a standardized product does not
usually occur in the absence of an express or implied agreement between
market participants to control prices. Therefore, uniform pricing in such a
89. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
90. Id at 690.
91. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
92. 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965).
93. Id at 325.
94. We are not unmindful of the standard suggested in Pevely . . . . But that is not to
say, as appellants would have us do, that such a rule must be separately applied to
each link in the chain of circumstances and if one such unit does not fit the standard
then the whole is likewise vulnerable.
197 F.2d at 494.
95. See Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 145 (6th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Outer Harbor Dock & Wharf Co., 124 F. Supp. 337, 340 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Ronson
Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, 112 F. Supp. 676, 682 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
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situation strongly suggests a conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. At the minimum, such a situation creates the presump-
tion of a violation. This presumption should be applied in both criminal
and civil cases.
Additionally, Pevely established a rigorous standard for the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence in antitrust cases. In light of the actual evidence of-
fered in Pvell, however, that was characterized as circumstantial, this
rigorous standard needs to be reexamined. Moreover, because the existence
of a tight oligopoly or duopoly can be determined with numerical factual
evidence, such evidence should more properly be recharacterized as direct
evidence. Finally, we suggest that Peveoy's association with conscious paral-
lelism be terminated or at least specifically qualified by the courts when the
opportunity arises, in order to bring the judiciary's antitrust economic analy-
sis more in line with current economic thought.





The old equitable remedy of ex parte temporary relief has been resur-
rected recently in federal law. Although known to English law since the
twelfth century,' temporary relief without notice has enjoyed only periodic
acceptance in America. For nearly a century after the federal courts were
created, ex parte injunctions were prohibited by statute.2 More recently,
their use was disfavored under procedural due process.3 During the last sev-
eral years, however, the owners of intellectual property rights have redis-
covered ex parte orders and, with the approval of many federal courts, have
developed a formidable weapon to be used against infringers and
counterfeiters.
Misappropriators, infringers, pirates, and smugglers have made millions
of dollars by the unauthorized use of valuable intellectual property rights
such as trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets. The increasing
caseload of federal courts has created delays which may outlast the brief
lifespan of advanced technological products, such as software and video
games. The problem is further compounded by the ease with which some
infringing merchandise can be hidden or destroyed. For example, suitcases
which contain millions of dollars in counterfeit jewelry or integrated circuits
can be removed from a court's jurisdiction in a matter of hours. Bootleg T-
shirts and other promotional products can be inconspicuously sold by anony-
mous vendors shortly before rock concerts and football games.4 Valuable
and highly sensitive trade secrets can be disclosed by an unfaithful employee
to a competitor in mere minutes.
The losses attributed to product counterfeiting, passing off, and copy-
right and patent infringement have reached dramatic levels. During 1982
alone, domestic industries lost an estimated six to eight billion dollars in sales
from unauthorized use of their intellectual property rights.5 The practice is
as widespread as it is lucrative. Products are counterfeited in forty-three
* Partner, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; Graduate University of Denver College of
Law, J.D.; Northwestern University, M.S.; and Milwaukee School of Engineering, B.S.E.E.
** J.D., March 1984, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., 1981, University of
Dayton.
I. Whitelock, Development ofthe Injunction in the United States, 46 AM.L. REV. 725 (1912).
2. Judiciary Act of 1792, Ch. 23, § 5, 1 Stat. 334, 335 (1793).
3. Bainton, Seizure Orders: An lnnovattweJudtcial Response to the Reahites of Trademark Counter-
feittg, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 459, 460 (1983).
4. Comment, Rock Performers and the 'yohn Doe" Temporary Restraning Order. Dressing Down
the T-Shit Pirates, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 101 (1982).
5. Figures for 1982 compiled by U.S. International Trade Commission. ITC Report Focuses
on Foreign Counterfeiting, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 666, at 360 (Feb. 9,
1984).
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countries, particularly in the Far East, for unauthorized sale in sixty-seven
countries, including the United States.6  Over 150 different products are
counterfeited, including computer hardware and software, jewelry, luggage,
and handbags.
7
Conventional requests for temporary injunctive relief require that no-
tice be served on the defendants. Although the concept of notice is deeply
ingrained in American notions of fundamental legal fairness, in the area of
infringement of intellectual property rights, notice merely warns counterfeit-
ers of impending legal action and hastens the concealment of infringing mer-
chandise.8 As a result, the plaintiff is left without a remedy. Efforts to
protect intellectual property are frustrated, defying the court's authority to
provide relief.
Long ago, the English chancery and American state courts realized that
swift, ex parte relief was justified when the defendants were likely to do seri-
ous mischief by destroying or concealing evidence.9 Federal courts, however,
have been slow to recognize the situations in which the plaintiff will be de-
prived of a remedy if the defendant is notified. Fortunately, the federal
courts in some circuits now appreciate the danger that serious mischief poses
to intellectual property rights. They have responded by resurrecting ex
parte temporary relief, such as injunctions and seizure orders under Rules
65(b)' 0 and 6411 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as powerful legal
6. Id. at 361.
7. Id.
8. See In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
9. See Shrewsbury & C. Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co., 1 SIM. N.S. 410,61 E.R. 159
(1851); 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 480 (1911).
10. Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration. A temporary re-
straining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or
his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposi-
tion, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that
notice should not be required. Every temporary restraining order granted without
notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in
the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state why it is
irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period
or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be ex-
tended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record.
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a pre-
liminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes
precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the
motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order
shall proceed with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not do
so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and
move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court shall proceed to hear
and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
11. At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies provid-
ing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances
and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, subject to the following qualifications:
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weapons to combat unfair profiteering. Although the current revival has
occurred in the field of intellectual property, the principles of ex parte tem-
porary relief have long been a part of general legal practice. Most of these
decisions are unreported because the wrongful action often ends at the pre-
liminary stages in district courts. Therefore, many lawyers and judges re-
main unfamiliar with the use of ex parte temporary relief. Unfortunately,
some federal districts cling to the past and refuse to grant ex parte temporary
relief despite accumulating precedent. These reluctant courts threaten to
fragment and confuse legal practice and to encourage both forum shopping
and illegal infringement of intellectual property rights.
The absence of reported case law and scholarly commentary on ex parte
temporary relief has created a need for a comprehensive examination of the
history and use of this ancient equitable remedy. This article will review the
historical development of ex parte relief, including its origin in England, its
abolition under early American federal law, its revival in the late nineteenth
century, and its long period of disuse in the twentieth century stemming
from nineteenth century abuses. This article will then examine the current
resurrection of ex parte temporary relief in trademark, trade secret, and
copyright disputes. Finally, it will discuss the various forms of temporary
relief available under Rules 64 and 65(b), including injunctions, inspections,
seizure and impoundment.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. English Chancery Praclt'ce
1. The Problem of Serious Mischief
It is not surprising that certain remedies which resemble modern inter-
locutory injunctions without notice have been known to the English legal
system since the earliest times. For example, in the twelfth century, Norman
kings regularly issued ex parte de recto writs to evict individuals who had
wrongfully usurped the property of rightful tenants.' 2 De recto t 3 writs were
issued at the request of one party and commanded the king's vassal simply to
do justice to the plaintiff. It was not until later that the writ praecipe in
capite t 4 gave the defendant an opportunity to dispute the king's order. t5
Centuries later, when the monarch's inherent judicial power had been
relegated to the courts, such injunctions were granted when the chancery
(1) any existing statute of the United States governs to the extent to which it is appli-
cable; (2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies is used shall be com-
menced and prosecuted or, if removed from a state court, shall be prosecuted after
removal, pursuant to the rules. The remedies thus available include arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or equivalent
remedies, however designated and regardless of whether by state procedure the rem-
edy is ancillary to an action or must be obtained by an independent action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
12. F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, 20-24 (1909).
13. A writ of right, which lay to recover a person's full rights to property. BALLANTINE'S
LAw DICTIONARY 339 (3d ed. 1969).
14. A writ of right which lay when one of the king's immediate chief tenants had possession
usurped by another. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (3d ed. 1969).
15. F. MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 23-24.
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was satisfied that the delay accompanying ordinary proceedings might entail
waste or "serious mischief."'
16
Other temporary injunctions were granted to prevent waste. A classic
example of this practice can be found in Vane v. Lord Barnard,17 in which
chancery issued an ex parte order enjoining the destruction of a castle. Lord
Barnard gave Raby Castle to his eldest son in tail male for a wedding gift.
Later, when Barnard was displeased with his son, he sent 200 workmen to
Raby Castle and stripped it of its furnishings, including windows, doors, and
floors. When Barnard failed to appear in court, his son obtained a tempo-
rary injunction, 18 which prevented Barnard from tearing down the castle.
Chancery later upheld this order to stay the commission of waste, and in fact
decreed that Lord Barnard repair the damage he had done.19
"Serious mischief" included taking advantage of the delay between a
hearing and the issuance of a decree to do the very act that was to be en-
joined. The English Chancery addressed this problem in the classic case of
Skip v. Harwood20 Skip and Harwood had been partners in the brewing
trade. Several years later, Harwood was on the brink of bankruptcy and had
not yet paid Skip his share of the partnership proceeds. Skip sued Harwood
and obtained a decree that Harwood should not dispose of any inventory
until the accounts could be settled. Even on the morning of entry of the
decree, Harwood proved himself a man not to be trusted, for he, "removed
no less than 250 butts of beer in a fraudulent collusive manner, in order to
evade the decree he expected would be made in the cause."' 2' Lord Hard-
wicke found Harwood guilty of contempt (and committed him "to the
Fleet"), even though Harwood acted before the decree was drawn up, be-
cause he knew of the pending injunction. Otherwise, Lord Hardwicke rea-
soned, "it would be extremely easy to elude decrees, some of which in their
nature require a considerable length of time before they can be completely
drawn up."22 Although the defendant had clear notice of the impending
injunction, the interlocutory punishment of Harwood clearly recognized the
harm to property rights caused by judicial delay and unscrupulous parties.
The reasoning of Skip v. Harwood is not reported in English law for an-
other one hundred years, but there is no reason to believe it fell out of judi-
cial favor. Nineteenth century cases relaxed the notice requirement to allow
simple notice by telegram, 23 granted ex parte injunctions at the beginning of
litigation and recognized the use of ex parte temporary orders to protect
intellectual property rights. 24 In Dalghish v. Jarvie,2 5 the plaintiff obtained an
16. 17 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND § 592 (1911). The early English treatises of Pome-
roy, Bispham, Storey, and Ames provide little or no discussion on the source of the Chancery's
authority for granting temporary injunctions. Note, Ex Parte Injunctions, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV.,
101, 107 n.16 (1932).
17. 2 Vern. 738 (1716).
18. Id. at n.4.
19. Id.
20. 3 Atk. 564 (1747).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 565. -
23. In re Bryant, L.R. 4 Ch. Div. 98 (1876).
24. Dalghish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G. 178, 20 L.J. Chanc. 475 (1850).
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ex parte injunction to prevent the defendant from selling textiles imprinted
with a copy of the plaintiff's copyrighted design. The High Court of Chan-
cery on review later dissolved the ex parte injunction, because it appeared
that the plaintiff had abandoned its copyright by publishing the design
before registration. 26 Lord Langdale believed that the plaintiff suppressed
the material fact of prior publication. Thus, disregarding the actual merits,
he dissolved the ex parte injunction. Lord Langdale emphasized, however,
that ex parte injunctive relief, regardless of inconvenience to the defendant,
would not be granted unless the facts indicate that it alone can provide the
injured party with a remedy.
27
2. Standards for Ex Parte Relief
The chancery was willing to issue ex parte injunctions in exceptional
situations, such as the threat of interference with or destruction of prop-
erty.28 This willingness was tempered by three considerations. First, the
court was unlikely to grant an ex parte injunction if the defendant's actions
would merely inconvenience or embarrass the plaintiff.29 The second con-
sideration is that the plaintiff must show a likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility, that the defendant will interfere with or destroy the property
prior to a decree.30 The third consideration was based on how promptly the
plaintiff sought ex parte relief. Because ex parte injunctions are extraordi-
nary remedies, the chancery carefully considered the time at which the
plaintiff first knew of the injury. If the plaintiff acquiesced for some time,
the chancery would not grant relief without notice to the opposing party.
31
25. Id.
26. Id. at 187.
27. Commissioner Langdale stated:
When a plaintiff comes for an injunction to restrain the defendant from the prosecu-
tion of his legal right, there are several things to be considered: not only is the amount
of the injury which may be done to be taken into account, but, also the extent to
which the decision at law upon the subject could go, and the degree of certainty, more
or less, in reference to that decision. Taking these several matters into consideration,
the Court will in some cases refuse to interfere at all, and in others refuse to interfere
otherwise than by postponing the question for a time, and giving the opportunity of
bringing an action in the mean while. But in certain other cases, where justice cannot be done
without it between the parties, the Court, notwithstanding the inconvenience, will grant the injunc-
tion in the ftrst instance, and will not leave the party to any other course ofproceeding to ascertain the
legal right. Which of these courses is the proper one to be followed must depend on all the circum-
stances of each particular case.
Id. (emphasis added). Lord Commissioner Rolfe concurred and stated:
[T]he application for a special injunction is very much governed by the same princi-
ples which govern insurances, matters which are said to require the utmost degree of
good faith, "uberrima fides." . . . . [I]f the party applying for a special injunction,
abstains from stating facts which the Court thinks are most material to enable it to
form itsjudmgnet, he disentitles himself to that relief which he asks the Court to grant.
Id.
28. Shrewsbury & C. Ry. Co., v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co., I SiM. N.S. 410, 61 E.R. 159.
29. Id.
30. Hooper v. Broderick, 11 Sim. 47 (1840). In Hooper, the owner of an inn obtained an cx
parte order preventing his lessee from closing the inn or discontinuing its licenses. The inn was
losing money for the lessee, who operated it, and the owner believed that the lessee would
endanger its operating licenses. The court disolved the injunction, because plaintiff could not
show that the lessee intended to forfeit the licenses.
31. 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 592 n.l (1911).
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3. Modern English Practice
This tradition of granting ex parte relief in exceptional circumstances
continues in England today. In fact, English courts expanded the use of ex
parte relief to include inspection and seizure orders to protect intellectual
property rights. In Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturng Processes, Ltd,32 a West
German manufacturer of computer equipment sued its English agent for dis-
closing copyrighted designs to competitors. The manufacturer obtained an
ex parte order authorizing it to inspect the agent's premises and to seize
documents and other evidence. This order was not a search warrant, for
English courts have no power to issue search warrants. 33 Rather, the court
ordered the agent to permit entry. If the agent refuses, the manufacturer
cannot enter, but may inform the court of the refusal. Contempt charges
and other unfavorable inferences may thus arise at trial.
In affirming the issue of the Anton Piller order, Lord Denning, Master of
the Rolls, commented that:
(S)uch an order can be made by a judge ex parte, but it should
only be made where it is essential that the plaintiff should have
inspection so that justice can be done between the parties; and
when, if the defendant were forewarned, there is a grave danger
that vital evidence will be burnt or lost or hidden, or taken beyond
the jurisdiction, and so the ends of justice be defeated; and when
the inspection would do no real harm to the defendant or his
case. 
34
Ormrod, L.J., agreed with the decision, and elaborated that the issuance of
such an ex parte order should require: 1) an extremely strong prima facie
case; 2) serious damage to the plaintiff; 3) clear evidence that the defendant
possesses incriminating evidence; and 4) a real possibility of its destruction
should before-the-fact notice be given.35 A recent House of Lords decision
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination to reduce the scope of Anton
Pd/er orders.
36
B. Earlv American Federal Practice
1. Prohibition of Ex Parte Injunctions
During the nineteenth century, American federal courts faced an insur-
mountable obstacle in developing ex parte relief. In accordance with its
power to create and regulate lesser federal courts, 37 Congress flatly prohib-
ited the first federal courts from issuing ex parte injunctions. 38 Although one
32. 1 All E.R. 779 (1976).
33. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 2 Wils. 275, (1558-1774) All E.R. Rep. 41.
34. 1 All E.R. at 783.
35. Id. at 784.
36. Rank Film Distributors, Ltd. v. Video Information Centre, 2 All E.R. 76 (1981). Cases
in Nigeria, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Canada adhere to the Anton PItler Doctrine. Bigger,
Notes/iom Other Nations, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 257 (1981); Cohen, Anton Piller to the Rescue-Ex
Parte Seizure Order in Counterfeittng Action in Canada, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 266 (1981).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 333 (1793).
38. Section 5 of the judiciary Act of 1793 provided that: "Nor shall a writ of injunction be
granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his attorney, of
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commentary maintains that the rule against ex parte orders was disregarded
in practice, 39 only one decision supports this argument. 40 Although unre-
ported cases may have ignored the rule against ex parte orders, reported
cases follow the statute.
41
The effect of the 1793 prohibition was to handicap federal courts, which
were helpless to assist in emergencies. For example, in Perry v. Parker,42 the
plaintiff, an upstream mill owner, requested an injunction without notice to
prevent the defendant from destroying dams. These dams provided water to
operate the plaintiff's mill, and defendants had already destroyed several of
them. Although the plaintiff had maintained the dams for over sixty years
and was threatened with immediate financial ruin, the court could not grant
ex parte temporary relief because of the Judiciary Act. 43 Thus, the federal
courts were essentially powerless against unscrupulous parties who would use
the delay of giving notice to accomplish the very act which the plaintiff
wanted enjoined.
By 1866, signs of judicial exasperation with the rule were obvious. In
Mowre; v. Indianapo/is & Cincinnati R.R.,4 4 the court grudgingly dissolved an
ex parte restraining order with these words:
Equity would seem to demand that, in cases of emergency, where
irreparable injury would follow unless an immediate injunction
were ordered, the national courts should have power to grant tem-
porary injunctions without notice of the application for them to the
party enjoined. But the act of congress of March 2, 1793, forbids
(such relief).
45
In Mowrey, the district judge granted an ex parte injunction pending hear-
ings on a temporary injunction. On the day of the hearing, he held that the
ex parte injunction was premature, and dissolved it.46 At the hearing, how-
ever, the plaintiff was granted a preliminary injunction. Therefore, even
though the judge rescinded his order for a restraining order without notice,
the order remained in place long enough to prevent the defendant from ir-
reparably injuring the plaintiff.
2. Early Standards for Ex Parte Injunctions
By the early 1870's, Congress apparently decided that federal law
should reflect the federal courts' needs for ex parte injunctions in certain
areas. In 1870, for example, Congress revised the patent laws and conferred
the time and place of moving the same." 1 Stat. 333, 335 (1793). U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 (1799).
There was also no inherent equity power.
39. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 183 (1930).
40. In Love v. Fendall's Trustees, 15 F. Cas. 993 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 8547), a circuit
court granted an injunction without notice, but no explanation was given for the decision.
41. See, e.g., Mowre v. Indianapolis & C. R. Co., 17 F. Cas. 930 (C.C.D. Ind. 1866) (No.
9891); Wynn v. Wilson, 30 F. Cas. 751 (C.C.D. Ark. 1855) (No. 18,116); Wilson v. Stolley, 30 F.
Cas. 226 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 17,839) and Perry v. Parker, 19 F. Cas. 291 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846) (No. 11,010).
42. 19 F. Gas. 291 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,010).
43. Id. at 292.
44. 17 F. Gas. 930 (G.C.D. Ind. 1866) (No. 9891).




general equity powers to the federal courts in patent matters. 47 Two years
later, Congress extended this freedom to all actions and suits before the fed-
eral courts.
48
This important change in federal court powers was first recognized in
Yuenghng v. Johnson,49 a patent infringement case. Relying on the revised
patent law and section 7 of the Judiciary Act of 1872, the court granted a
restraining order without notice. In Yuenghng, the plaintiff, who owned
rights to a patented invention, tried to prevent the state of Virginia from
buying an infringing device for tallying drinks sold in barrooms. The circuit
court granted an ex parte injunction because 1) the plaintiff had made a
solid case based on an earlier ruling by the Patent Office that the new device
infringed the patented invention, 2) the state government's intention to
widely distribute the infringing device to tavern owners for liquor taxation
would deprive the plaintiff of its exclusive right to exploit the invention and
would cause irreparable injury, 3) the court had statutory power to grant the
injunction without notice to the defendant, and 4) the plaintiff had posted
$10,000 bond should the injunction have been granted wrongly. 50 Although
the court in Yueng/ing pronounced that "There is no doubt of the power...
to instantly restrain in any urgent case,"'5 1 the use of ex parte relief was still
considered an exception to general federal practice in 1885.52
Gradually federal courts developed standards for granting motions for
ex parte restraining orders. One primary purpose in granting ex parte relief
was to maintain the status quo between the parties until both sides could be
considered at a preliminary injunction hearing. 53 Section 718 of the 1874
Revised Statutes specifically gave federal courts this equity power "to pre-
serve the status quo when there is danger of irreparable injury from delay in
giving notice."
'54
The most important criterion in the evaluations of the status quo, how-
ever, was whether the defendant would use notice of the hearing to his own
advantage. One court observed that the purpose of ex parte relief was to
preserve the status quo between the parties "where notice of the application
47. 16 Stat. 206 (1872); See Yeungling v. Johnson 30 F. Cas. 896, 897 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877)
(No. 18,195).
48. Section 7 of the Judiciary Act of 1872 states that: [W]henever notice is given of a
motion for an injunction out of a circuit or district court of the United States, the court orjudge
thereof may, if there appear [sic] to be danger of irreparable injury from delay, grant an order
restraining the act sought to be enjoined until the decision upon the motion. Such order may be
granted with or without security, in the discretion of the court or judge. Judiciary Act of 1872,
Ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), § 718 Rev. Stat. (1874). One federal court clarified this curi-
ous language by insisting that " 'Whenever' means 'at' whatever time notice is given, and does
not mean 'after' whatever time.'" Yuengling v. Johnson, 30 F. Cas. 896, 898 (C.C.E.D. Va.
1811) (No. 18,195).
49. Yuengling v. Johnson, 30 F. Cas. 896 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 18,195).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 898.
52. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
53. Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1893).
54. Houghton v. Cortelyou, 208 U.S. 149, 156 (1908); Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627
(D.C. Cir. 1921); Gring v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (D. Del.), cert.
dented, 212 U.S. 575 (1904); Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732,
738 (6th Cir. 1893).
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would itself be productive of the mischief apprehended by inducing the de-
fendant to accelerate the completion of the action sought to be enjoined
before process could be served. '" 5 The Third Circuit used this principle to
protect intellectual property rights in Thullen v. Triumph Electric Co.56 Tri-
umph Electric sought to compel an employee to honor a patent assignment
contract for an electric motor controller he had developed. The company
feared that the inventor was about to sell the patent rights to a competitor,
and cause the company irreparable injury. Because notice to the employee
would only hasten his attempts to sell the patent, leaving the company with-
out a remedy, the court granted a restraining order without notice.57 The
court founded its action on Equity Rule 73 of the Supreme Court.
58
The Supreme Court had promulgated Equity Rule 73 in 1912 to regu-
late the use of ex parte orders. Included among the requirements of Rule 73
was proof of immediate and irreparable loss demonstrated by specific facts,
shown by affidavit or verified motion. 59 Rule 73 also placed a ten day limit
on ex parte temporary restraining orders and permitted the defendant to
request its dissolution on two days notice. 60 The rule required two other
conditions: 1) an apparent danger of irreparable injury from delay,61 and
2) notice to the restrained party of a motion for preliminary injunction.
62
Courts required a clear showing of irreparable injury to grant ex parte
relief. The party requesting relief generally needed to submit documentary
evidence, such as affidavits, of the threatened injury to persuade the court to
use its extraordinary powers. 63 For example, an ex parte injunction would
not issue if the injurious behavior had existed for years, for then it repre-
55. Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1893).
56. 212 F. 243 (3d Cir. 1914).
57. Id. at 145.
58. The rule states:
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposite party.
Nor shall any temporary restraining order be granted without notice to the opposite
party, unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts, shown by affidavit or by the
verified bill, that immediate and irreparable loss or damage will result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice. In case a temporary restraining order shall
be granted without notice, in the contingency specified, the matter shall be made re-
turnable at the earliest possible time, and in no event later than ten days from the date
of the order, and shall take precedence of all matters, except older matters of the same
character. When the matter comes up for hearing the party who obtained the tempo-
rary restraining order shall proceed with his application for a preliminary injunction,
and if he does not do so the court shall dissolve his temporary restraining order. Upon
two days notice to the party obtaining such temporary restraining order, the opposite
party may appear and move the dissolution or modification of the order, and in that
event the court or judge shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expedi-
tiously as the ends of justice may require. Every temporary restraining order shall be
forthwith filed in the clerk's office.
226 U.S. 670.
59. Id. See also 212 F. at 145.
60. Rule 73 is nearly identical to section 17 of the Clayton Act, 28 U.S.C. § 381 (1982),
which Congress passed in 1914 in a vain attempt to prevent the abuse of labor injunctions, see
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 184 n.196 (1930), and which resembles
the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b).
61. Payne v. Kansas & A. V. Ry. Co., 46 F. 546, 552 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).
62. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 34 F. 481 (S.D. Iowa 1888),
in which a motion for ex parte restraint was denied because of failure to give this notice.
63. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
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sented no immediate harm.
64
The application for ex parte relief also required a firm legal basis, i.e., a
likelihood of success at the trial on the merits. If the moving party had no
legal argument supporting the request for ex parte relief, then the restraining
order would be dissolved immediately. 65 Also, the presence of many sub-
stantive legal questions, including the validity of a contract on which an
obligation is asserted, defeated motions for ex parte restraining orders.
66
Federal courts also considered the balance of convenience and hardship
between the parties. If little or no injury would be suffered by the restrained
party, but great injury could be suffered by the moving party if the court did
not act, then courts granted ex parte relief.67 Under this balancing test, for
example, a court restrained a businessman from selling property that was
alleged to be undistributed partnership proceeds owed to the plaintiff. Be-
cause the delay could leave the plaintiff without a remedy, and the defend-
ant would merely be inconvenienced by the delay, the court granted an ex
parte restraining order.
68
3. Abuses During the Labor Period
Ex parte orders remained uncommon until shortly before the industrial
warfare of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 69 It was here,
in the use of restraining orders against organized labor, that the authority to
grant ex parte injunctions was frequently abused.
During this period, the ex parte injunction became a favorite tool of
both management and government to quash industrial strikes. Apparently,
ex parte injunctions were issued on affidavits without comprehensive knowl-
edge of the facts. 70 Under the legal pretense that strikers were in contempt
of court orders, courts permitted police and government troops to rout and
imprison strikers.
Perhaps the most famous strike in which an ex parte injunction was
issued was the Pullman strike in 1894. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
the ex parte injunction granted to the U.S. Attorney General to break the
strike in In re Debs.7 ' Finding that the confusion caused to interstate com-
merce by a railroad strike was irreparable injury, the Supreme Court ruled
that the issue of an injunctib against the strikers without notice was justi-
64. Gring v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (C.C.D. Del. 1904), cert. dented,
212 U.S. 575 (1904); Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 116 F. 785, 789 (4th Cir. 1902).
65. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
66. Paine v. United States Playing Card Co., 90 F. 543, 544 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898).
67. Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Gring v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal
Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (C.C.D. Del 1904), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 5757 (1904).
68. Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
69. The Judiciary Act of 1872, supra note 46, granted federal courts the power to issue ex
parte injunctions. The federal courts made little use of the power before using it to quash
industrial strikes. See note, The Abolition of Ex Parte Injunctions in New York, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
1184 (1930).
70. Note, Ex Partelnjunctions, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 101, 102 n.4 (1932) (quoting New York
State Governor Smith's annual message of 1926).
71. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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fled. 72 A widespread belief arose that the federal courts were being used as
the tools of employers.
73
Popular resentment of the federal courts and injunctions without notice
quickly swelled, and soon they were under political attack. In 1896, political
parties denounced "government by injunction" as a dangerous form of op-
pression by the quasi-aristocratic federal courts. 74 The cry was raised again
in 1908, and one year later President Taft, a former Supreme Court Justice,
urged that Congress more strictly regulate the use of ex parte injunctions.
The plea was repeated in 1910. Several bills which would limit the power of
federal courts to issue injunctions without notice, and thereby prevent the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, were brought before Congress.
7 5
Although these efforts failed, the public outcry against ex parte injunctions
did not subside, and the fight was carried to state legislatures. By the late
1920's, several states had passed laws prohibiting the use of injunctions with-
out notice.
76
4. Limitations of Procedural Due Process
Although these states had misgivings about the issuance of orders with-
out notice, federal courts exhibited no uncertainty about continuing the use
of their comparatively new power. During the World War II era the
Supreme Court endorsed the use of ex parte orders to enforce administrative
action. Court orders without notice were considered in Fahey v. Mallonee,77
and Ewing v. Mytinger &Cassdberry.78 In Fahey, the Supreme Court reiterated
that it would dissolve ex parte temporary restraining orders if irreparable
injury is not threatened to the moving party, 79 but emphasized that federal
courts had the clear authority to issue such orders on behalf of administra-
tive agencies.
80
In Ewbig, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of ex parte seizure
orders grounded in statute. A food supplement company contested, as a vio-
lation of due process, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) statutory
power to seize misbranded foods and drugs without notice. The Supreme
72. Id. at 599-600.
73. Note, supra note 71, at 102 n.4 (1932). Although much of the legal community de-
fended the actions of federal courts during this time, see, e.g., Whitelock, supra note 1, the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor had another viewpoint and alleged that judicial power had been
abused in twenty-three strikes. Id. at 733. A study by the Columbia School of Business deter-
mined that, of 441 applications for labor injunctions in New York State between 1880 and 1930,
303 or 68.7% were immediately granted ex parte. Of these 303 orders, 70 or 23% were vacated
at hearings. Many others were probably never brought to a hearing to have their validity con-
tested. Note, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1187 n.24 (1930). By the time an order was vacated,
however, the strike usually would be broken. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNC-
TION, 183 n.189 (1930).
74. Whitelock, supra note 1, at 732.
75. See, e.g., Pearre Bill, Beveridge Bill, and Gilbert Bill as Whitelock, supra note 1, at 738-
40 (1912).
76. Among these were New York, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kansas, and Massachusetts.
Note, supra note 73 at 1186-87.
77. 322 U.S. 245 (1947).
78. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).




Court upheld the FDA's use of ex parte seizures and decided that due pro-
cess is not violated if a hearing is held before the administrative order be-
comes final. Perhaps more importantly, the majority opinion by Justice
Douglas discussed the probability that ex parte seizures could irreparably
injure the business reputation of defendants, but concluded that due process
does not require a full judicial hearing before the government can take ac-
tion in administrative matters.8 ' Douglas stated that when property rights
are involved due process requires only an opportunity for a hearing and a
judicial determination at some stage of the proceedings.
8 2
This case ushered in an era of due process attacks on the granting of ex
parte relief. One commentator observed that the procedural due process de-
velopments of the early 1970's, which restricted many traditional ex parte
remedies, created a judicial prejudice against the use of temporary re-
straining orders and seizure orders in intellectual property disputes. 83 Ad-
mittedly, procedural due process requirements have restricted the
opportunities for obtaining ex parte relief. The leading cases on procedural
due process, however, still recognize the need in some circumstances for
court orders without notice.
84
In a 1972 landmark case, Fuentes v. Shevin,8 5 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state replevin law which permitted ex parte seizures. The Court
limited its holding by stating that "There are 'extraordinary situations' that
justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing."86 This sentiment
was forecast in Carroll v. President and Comm's of Princess Anne,8 7 and echoed in
Mitchell v. W. T Grant Co.88 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld the valid-
ity of a state statute permitting creditors to seize the property of recalcitrant
debtors. The presence of procedural safeguards protecting the debtor, and
the "real risk that the buyer, with possession and power over the goods, will
conceal or transfer the merchandise to the damage of the seller were critical
to the decision." '89 Faced with such a situation, the Court observed that,
"the danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice
and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may furnish a
warning to the debtor acting in bad faith." 90
Fuentes identifies three circumstances that justify ex parte relief consis-
tent with procedural due process: 1) important governmental or general
public interests; 2) a special need for very prompt action; or 3) the seizure is
initiated by a government official, acting under a narrowly drawn statute,
who believes that the seizure was necessary and justified. 9 1 These circum-
81. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
82. Id.
83. Bainton, supra note 3, at 460.
84. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) and Granny
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Local 70, Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
85. 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
86. Id. at 90.
87. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
88. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
89. Id. at 608-09.
90. Id. at 609.
91. 407 U.S. at 91.
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stances qualify the use of ex parte remedies to protect property rights. Seri-
ous mischief creates a special need for prompt action if the intellectual
property owner is to have any relief at all. In addition, important public
interests are served by the use of injunctions and seizure orders issued with-
out notice. In trademark infringement disputes, for example, the Lanham
Act 92 provides for relief when there is a likelihood of public confusion. In
copyright and patent actions, ex parte orders serve an important governmen-
tal interest. The copyright and patent clause of the Constitution provides
that Congress shall promote the "Progress of Science and Useful Arts."
'9
Infringers violate this statutory plan and its constitutional basis by trading
on the efforts of others.
As Fuentes identified the circumstances which deserve ex parte relief, so
Mitchell suggested the procedures required to legitimate the relief. First, the
ex parte order should be personally issued by a judge, rather than a clerk.
Second, there must be a substantial risk of irreparable injury to a property
interest. Third, the plaintiff must establish the probability of success on the
merits. Fourth, the plaintiff must present documentary proof of the defend-
ant's wrongdoing. Fifth, the plaintiff must post bond to compensate the de-
fendant for wrongful restraint. Finally, a full hearing must be permitted
after the seizure to determine the rights between the parties.94 In intellec-
tual property disputes, temporary relief without notice can easily accommo-
date these procedural requirements. Judges should carefully scrutinize
seizure orders, especially those requesting assistance from federal marshalls.
Irreparable injury occurs, by statutory definition, whenever copyright, trade-
mark, or patent rights are infringed. At ex parte hearings, judges may con-
sider documentary evidence, such as affidavits, to determine the probability
of success on the merits. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require bonds
to protect the innocent defendant from the overzealous plaintiff.95 Finally,
Rule 65(b) requires that a full hearing be held within two days of the issu-
ance of an ex parte temporary restraining order.
96
II. CONTEMPORARY Ex PARTE TEMPORARY RELIEF
A. Overview
Despite the specific authorization and procedural safeguards of Rule
65(b), many federal district courts are still extremely reluctant to grant tem-
porary restraining orders unless notice is first provided.97 Some of this reluc-
tance may be attributed to healthy judicial skepticism. When immediate
and irreparable injury is threatened, however, the unwillingness of some
courts to issue ex parte orders in these situations can only be attributed to
misunderstanding, lassitude, ignorance, or even outright hostility.98 In Na-
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
94. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608-10 (1974).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). See supra note 10.
96. Id
97. See Katz and Cohen, Oblainig Ex Parte Injunctions and Impoundment Orders, MERCHANDIS-
ING REP. Nov. 1983, at 6.
98. Comment, supra note 4 at 116 n.j 1; see also Vuitton et Fils. S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3 n.5 (2d
19841
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tional Football League Properties, Inc. v. Coniglto,99 for example, a district court
judge believed that merely frightening bootleggers from the immediate area
would relieve threatened injuries and denied plaintiff's request for an ex
parte seizure order. The judge did not consider the possibility that bootleg-
gers would merely regroup elsewhere.
The use of ex parte temporary relief is rapidly expanding in the field of
intellectual property, where infringers and counterfeiters threaten the prop-
erty rights of inventors, artists, and businesses with irreparable injury to rep-
utation and profits. When notice is given, these covert dealers are more
often encouraged to flee than to account for their activities. Therefore, ex
parte temporary restraining orders, inspections, and seizure orders must be
permitted in intellectual property disputes to preserve the status quo and to
prevent irreparable injury until a hearing can take place.00
B. Statutoiy Bases for Relief
Several federal statutes authorize ex parte temporary relief, including
the Lanham Act' 1 for trademarks, the Copyright Act, 1° 2 and the Patent




The Lanham Act 105 protects intellectual property rights in trademarks.
The Act permits federal courts to issue injunctions "according to the princi-
ples of equity" to prevent trademark infringement. 106 Any unauthorized use
of a registered trademark is infringement if it "is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 0 7 Federal courts have consistently ruled
that a likelihood of confusion between registered trademarks and infringing
marks threatens irreparable injury to trademark owners and entitles them to
injunctive relief.10 8 Seizure of infringing merchandise is authorized by sec-
tion 36 of the Lanham Act.109
Ex parte temporary relief is primarily used to combat counterfeit and
Cir. 1979), (writ of mandamus directed a district court judge to stop considering motions for ex
parte temporary relief as "vexatious").
99. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
100. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
102. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1982).
103. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982).
104. 14 U.L.A. 539-51 (1980). In addition, three special situations are found in 28 U.S.C.
relating to temporary restraining orders, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2282 restrain the operation of the
state or federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 restrains state court proceedings and 28 U.S.C § 2284
provides for three-judge court injunction procedures. It is not the purpose of this section to set
forth and discuss the prima facie proof required of the ex parte movant. References are pro-
vided which discuss these requirements in detail.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1127 (1982).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
108. E.g., Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 830 (D.C. Pa. 1971).
109. The elements of proof including irreparable injury and the procedural aspects neces-
sary for proving entitlement in trademark cases are discussed in Dorr & Duft, Trademark relimi-
nag Injuntive Relief 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (Jan. 1980). See Bainton, supra note 3; Purcell, Use
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"gray market" goods. Counterfeit goods are goods of generally low quality
sold as genuine merchandise to the unsuspecting public. Gray market goods
are genuine merchandise, imported illegally to the United States without
authorization by the trademark owner." 0
2. Copyrights
Copyright protection applies to literature, computer software, music,
drama, motion pictures, sound recordings, business documents, fine arts, and
any other original work "fixed in a tangible medium of expression.""'
Copyright owners are entitled to the exclusive rights to reproduce, display,
perform, and distribute the work, as well as to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted material." 2 Any violation of these exclusive rights
is a copyright infringement"13 which may be restrained by temporary or per-
manent injunction 1 14 and is subject to a suit for damages. 115 Infringing arti-
cles may be impounded and destroyed by court order." 1 6 The Special Rules
of Practice, promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Copyright
Act of 1909, permit the U.S. Marshall to seize allegedly infringing materials,
including the materials used for making the infringing copies. "
7
Ex parte temporary relief has increased in copyright counterfeiting situ-
ations involving video games, software, and toys." 8
3. Patents
Patents have the attributes of personal property, and give patent owners
the exclusive rights to develop, market, license, or sell the invention to
others. 119 Anyone who makes, sells, or uses the invention without authoriza-
tion from the patent owner has infringed the patent.' 20 Federal courts have
been empowered since 1870 to protect patent rights by issuing injunc-
tions.' 2 ' In unusual situations, infringing articles may be destroyed by court
of'John Doe" TRO's Against Counterfeiters, Merchandising Rep., Oct. 1983, at 16; Comment, supra
note 4, at 701.
110. See Dorr and Traphagen, Lurking in the Shadows: The Gray Market Threat to Trademark
Owners, MERCHANDISING REP., Dec.-Jan. 1983-84, at 33.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
115. 17 U.S.C. §504 (1982).
!16. 17 U.S.C. §503 (1982).
117. See The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-13 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501).
These rules are considered applicable under the Copyright Act of 1978. Sugarman & Miller,
Prelminary Temporary Restraining Orders, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR
COMPETITION CASES, 271 n.4 (R. Sugarman, ed., 1983). They have also been found constitu-
tional. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494, 499-500
(D.N.J.), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 392, cert denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1973).
118. See Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 6; Dorr and Eigles, Resolving Claims to Ownership of
Software and Computer-Stored Data- The Importance of Temporaty Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Injunctions, COMPUTER L. REV. (1984).
119. 35 U.S.C. §261 (1982).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).




Ex parte relief in patent cases, although clearly based in history, is
rarely granted by a court. The reason appears to be the technical complex-
ity of the subject matter and the high rate with which litigated patents are
invalidated. 123
4. Trade Secrets
At present, there is no federal statutory law for the protection of trade
secrets. Trade secret protection is primarily based on the states' common
law of unfair competition.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 124 has been enacted in Kansas, Arkan-
sas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Idaho, North Carolina and Washington.125 Sec-
tion 2 of the Act provides that "actual or threatened misappropriation may
be enjoined. . . . (c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to pro-
tect a trade secret may be compelled by court order."'
126
It is unknown whether "affirmative acts" would extend to ex parte
seizures, impoundments, and inspections. One commentator with respect to
this provision states:
Among the "affirmative acts" that may be ordered are surrender of
physical embodiments of the trade secret and the taking of defini-
tive steps by the misappropriator to prevent further illegal disclo-
sure of the trade secret to others. This could sometimes entail
extraordinary measures, such as special directives to employees and
agents or a substantial revision of operations incorporating the mis-
appropriated trade secret. 127 (citations omitted).
C. Federal Court Standards for Ex Parte Temporary Relief
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the rule for
granting of temporary restraining orders.' 28 This rule is taken from 28
U.S.C. § 381, which was based upon former Equity Rule 73. This rule does
not confer the power to grant injunctive relief, but rather sets stringent pro-
cedural requirements for the court's use of equity powers. Most states have
122. See American Caramel Co. v. Thomas Mills & Bro., 162 F. 147 (C.C.A. Pa. 1907); Lion
Mfg. Corporation v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1939).
123. See Dorr and Duft, Patent Preliminay Injunctive Relief 60 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 597-635
(Oct. 1978). One commentator has called for the increased use of temporary injunctions in
patent cases and has challenged the new Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to clarify its require-
ments. See Duft, Patent Preliminag Injunctions and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 131-52 (March, 1983).
124. 14 U.L.A. 537-51 (1980).
125. La Fuze, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Oregon-Washington Patent Law Seminar,
Feb. 26, 1982. The Commission on Uniform Laws is now considering whether the Act is so
seriously flawed that it needs amendment. Telephone interview with William LaFuze, Chair-
man of the Intellectual Property Section of the Texas Bar Association (May 7, 1984).
126. 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
127. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secret Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 303-304 (1980). See
also Berryill, Trade Secret Litigation: Injuncttns and other equitable remedies, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 189
(1977).
128. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(b), supra n.10.
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statutes or civil practice rules similar to Federal Rule 65.129 Local practices
for temporary restraining orders must be studied on a court-by-court basis
before seeking ex parte temporary relief.
1. Duties of Movant Prior to Ex Parte Hearing
Rule 65(b) specifically permits the granting of a temporary restraining
order without written or oral notice to either the adverse party or to his
attorney provided:
a. An affidavit or verified complaint sets forth specific facts indi-
cating that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result if the defendant or his attorney receives notice. The
affidavit must be free of hearsay, should not contain conclusory
statements, and should be free from obvious evidentiary
problems. A statement by the plaintiff that he "fears" that ir-
reparable harm will occur or affidavits based on "information
and belief,"' 130 are clearly not sufficient and,
b. The applicant's attorney certifies in writing his reasons that
notice should not be required. These reasons include the de-
struction or secreting of evidence, or the removal of items from
the jurisdiction of the court.
13 1
From a practical viewpoint, the attorney faces a considerable amount of
activity in preparing the verified complaint, the support affidavits, the pro-
posed order, and any other documents required by the court. Time is of the
essence and all preparation must be completed in a matter of hours. There is
simply not enough time for carefully considered decisions. Spur-of-the-mo-
ment decisions may lead to fatal mistakes. In this "pressure cooker" environ-
ment, the movant's attorney must take great pains to state the facts in the
affidavit and verified complaint with painstaking accuracy and truthfulness.
In extreme emergencies, filing the verified complaint may be delayed
and the entire proceeding commenced by an order to show cause supported
solely by the affidavit. The complaint, however, must be filed before the
court's order issues. 132
129. Eg., Illinois Injunctions Act, ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, Ch. 69, § 3 and Colo. Rules of Civ.
Pro., Rule 65.
130. Marshall Durbin Farms v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir.
197 1). See Nussbaum, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS -
THE FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26 S.W. L.J. 265, 266-67 (1972), for practical suggestions in drafting
affidavits.
131. Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Style Toys, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,492
(D.C.N.Y. 1982). The requirement of attorney certification resulted from criticisms of the "for-
mal notice requirement" found in Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Transport Workers Union, 278
F.2d 693, 694 (3d Cir. 1960); Arvida Co. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1958); and
Lummus Company v. Commonwealth Oil Refinery Co., 297 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961) cert.
dented, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). However, the comments to the 1966 amendment to Rule 65b incor-
porating the certification requirement concluded by stating that "The amended subdivision
continues to recognize that a temporary restraining order may be issued without any notice
when the circumstances warrant." Federal Rules 146 (West 1983).




Under Rule 65, temporary restraining orders and seizure orders are, like
preliminary injunctions, forms of extraordinary relief that potentially can
seriously injure the defendant. For this reason, the plaintiff's burden of ob-
taining an ex parte order is heavy and the standards for granting prelimi-
nary injunctions are often instructive. One clear purpose of granting a
temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the court can
consider a preliminary injunction motion. 133 Therefore, at the temporary
hearing, the court ordinarily will not apply those standards determinative of
entitlement for a preliminary injunction, but will be concerned primarily
with preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable injury.
134
The following cases are typical of the requirements for obtaining ex
parte temporary orders. In Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Apprazsers,135 the
court required the plaintiff to prove the following four elements:
1. Irreparable harm to the plaintiff in absence of the temporary
restraining order,
2. The balance of public interest favored the temporary order,
3. Harm to other interested parties if the temporary restraining
order was not granted, and
4. Likelihood of success on the merits at trial.
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Vutton et Fils,
SA., 136 stated that Rule 65(b):
[B]y its very terms allows for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order when (1) the failure to issue it would result in
"immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" and (2) the
applicant sufficiently demonstrates the reason that notice "should
not be required." In a trademark infringement case such as this, a
substantial likelihood of confusion constitutes, in and of itself, ir-
reparable injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule
65(b)(1). 137
The court also observed that it would be unfair to require trademark owners
to give notice to counterfeiters because:
[N]otice all too often appears to serve only to render fruitless fur-
ther prosecution of the action. This is precisely contrary to the nor-
mal and intended role of "notice", and it is surely not what the
authors of the rule either anticipated or intended.
138
Attorneys must emphasize the clear irreparable harm to the plaintiff
133. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Weyenberg v.
Town of Menasha, 401 F. Supp. 801 (E.D.Wis. 1975); and Davis v. Emerson Ins. Agency, 423 F.
Supp. 561 (D.Neb. 1976).
134. Dow Chemical Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892, 901 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Black v. Trans-
port Workers Union, 454 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.N.Y.) affd, 594 F. 2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978);
Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent Baby Products Corp., 355 F. Supp. 438, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
135. 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (E.D.Wis. 1975), vacated, 544 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1976). Al-
though the district court denied the motion because of failure to show probability of success on
the merits, the court of appeals disagreed.
136. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
137. Id at 4.
138. Id at 5.
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and why notice must not be given in a particular case. Failure to fully pres-
ent the facts to the court on these two issues will result in denial of ex parte
requests. Only after satisfying these two requirements will the court weigh
the potential harm to the parties and the public, and consider the likelihood
of success on the merits. The court should not place too much emphasis on
the evidence at this stage in evaluating the likelihood of success, but rather
reserve this matter for the preliminary injunction hearing.
From a practical point of view, the movant's attorneys have little time
to present their case to the court because most courts will hear ex parte re-
quests only during breaks between pending litigation, before normal court
hours, and sometimes even on Saturdays. Understandably, the court will
not be in the mood to read lengthy documents, to listen to long oral
presentations, or to decide complex factual or legal issues. Sometimes courts,
especially those with new judges, are unfamiliar with the law itself. There-
fore, the plaintiffs attorneys must present the case cogently, and
succinctly. 139
Increasingly, district court judges have granted ex parte orders. Today,
these extraordinary remedies have become a standard weapon to protect in-
tellectual property rights. As ex parte orders become routine, however, the
danger increases that fundamental civil rights will be trampled in the zeal to
quash counterfeiters. For example, in National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Coniglzo,140 plaintiffs were denied seizure orders against suspected bootleg-
gers of football souvenirs during the Super Bowl.141 Although the court mis-
takenly applied the law, 14 2 the court's decision can be supported in its result
because the plaintiff requested relief that was offensive to civil rights. A
"John Doe" TRO and seizure order, in which the defendants remain un-
named, was requested. Also, the plaintiff intended to use its own private
security force, rather than U.S. Marshalls, 143 to enforce the proposed order.
Understandably, the court may have resented the plaintiff's desire to use its
own security guards to confiscate bootleg gifts throughout Washington, D.C.
This marked the boundary of acceptable ex parte orders until United
States v. Karen Bags,144 in which a federal court authorized a private under-
cover operation against businessmen who allegedly sold counterfeit Vuitton
handbags. In Karen Bags, U.S. District Court Judge Morris Lasker ap-
pointed Vuitton's attorney, Joseph Bainton, special prosecutor to conduct a
"sting" operation with Melvin Weinberg, who assisted the FBI with the infa-
mous ABSCAM investigation. 145 Using many of the investigation's tech-
niques, Bainton and Weinberg videotaped meetings with suspected
139. As one commentator has said:
An attorney has about four sentences to get the judge's attention and explain why the
temporary restraining order must be granted now. Regretably, the attorney must use
the first sentence to tell the judge who he and his clients are. That leaves about three
sentences. They should not be wasted on boring details. Bainton, supra note 3, at 470.
140. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
141. d at 1226.
142. See Bainton, supra note 3.
143. 554 F. Supp. at 1225.
144. 83 Cr. Misc. 1; see Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984, at 3, 44.
145. 83 Cr. Misc. 1, slip. op. at 3-6 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1984).
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infringers, who believed Weinberg to be an entrepreneur interested in coun-
terfeit manufacturing. One of the suspected infringers, Sol Klayminc, had
been convicted earlier of criminal contempt for violating an injunction
against the sale of counterfeit goods. The Vuitton operation resulted in an
Order to Show Cause against Klayminc and six other defendants.'
46
This case was the first in which a federal court authorized a private
attorney to conduct an undercover investigation, and its ramifications are
worrisome. The prospect of plaintiffs enforcing their property rights by
methods which border on unconstitutional entrapment is unpleasant for
counterfeiters, but it should also concern intellectual property owners them-
selves. Ex parte orders have been accepted because plaintiffs have a good
reputation for scrupulous investigation. Vuitton, for example, established
itself by conducting over eighty ex parte actions in New York alone.
147
Other owners may not be so scrupulous and may ride roughshod over indi-
vidual rights. This type of "cowboy" legal action endangers the willingness
of courts to grant ex parte orders when they are needed. Just as ex parte
orders were abused against labor unions, so they may be abused against
counterfeiters and other infringers. The result of such overenthusiastic en-
forcement can only be judicial disenchantment with a useful legal tool. The
ex parte order will fall into disuse until resurrected again.
3. Duties of Court
Requests for ex parte relief "take precedence of all matters except older
matters of the same character," and the court shall promptly set a hearing
on the request under Rule 65(b).' 48 If a temporary restraining order is
granted under this rule, the court must follow certain procedures such as:
a. Endorsement of the date and hour of issuance on the order,
b. Filling the order in the clerk's office for entry in the record,
c. Specifically defining plaintiff's injury and its irreparable harm
in the order,
d. Precisely stating why the order was granted without notice,
e. Setting the motion for preliminary injunction for hearing at
the earliest possible time,
f. Setting forth in the order the reasons for its issuance,
g. Describing in specific terms, and not by reference to another
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained, and
h. Binding only the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys and those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise. 1
49
The order can last no longer than ten days after entry. The ten day
146. Id at 6-7.
147. Matter of Vuitton et Fils, S.A. 606 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1979); Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984 at
3, 44.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Temporary restraining orders represent relief which is granted
only in the most compelling circumstances. Hence, such orders require these strict limitations.




period can be extended for good cause shown or by consent of the restrained
party. The reasons for the court's extension must be stated and entered in
the record. Also, the temporary restraining order automatically terminates
when the court rules on the motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants
are not bound by an ex parte order until they receive actual notice, although
this notice may be informal, as a telephone call.' 5 0 Therefore, plaintiff must
notify defendant of the order and what it forbids for the ex parte order to be
effective.15 1 If any ambiguities, omissions, or errors exist in the order, they
will be resolved in favor of the defendant.'
52
4. Posting of Bond
Rule 65(c) further requires that the movant give security "in such sum
as the court deems proper" 153 in the event that the defendant is wrongfully
enjoined or restrained in order to cover his costs and damages that may be
incurred or suffered. In copyright cases, the bond must be at least twice the
reasonable value of the infringing copies. 154 The bond required for the tem-
porary restraining order does not carry over to the bond requirements for the
preliminary injunction. i55 From a practical viewpoint, the movant must ar-
range for surety before requesting relief, if the movant does not wish to risk
delaying the order. It is important to check court rules for local practice
since some courts have an "emergency" hearing provision.'
56
6. Rights of Nonmovant
Rule 65(b) entitles the restrained party to appear before the court on
two days notice and move for the disillusion or for the modification of the ex
parte order. In its discretion, the court may permit less than two day's no-
tice. The court shall "hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as
the ends of justice require."
15 7
C. Appealability of Ex Parte Orders
Generally, rulings by district courts on ex parte motions for temporary
restraining orders under Rule 65(b) are not appealable unless permission of
150. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1964), a f'd, 384 U.S. 890
(1966).
151. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 270 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1965), afd, 388 U.S.
307 (1967). Copies of the order are routinely served on defendant. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10
at 107 (1973).
152. Ford v. Krammerer, 450 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1971).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
154. Rules of Practice 4, 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501.
155. Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 173 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1949).
156. For example, the Local Rules of Practice Rule 104 for the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado (December, 1983) set forth the following requirement for bonds:
a. An attorney in any case or a party in a civil case, or the spouse of a party in a civil
case, shall not be accepted as a personal surety on any bond filed in that case.
b. Where the surety on a bond is a surety company approved by the United States
Department of Treasury, a power of attorney showing the authority of the agent sign-
ing the bond shall be on file with the clerk.
c. No person, firm, association or corporation may act as his, her or its own surety in
a civil case.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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the Court is obtained and then only under certain guidelines set by the ap-
pellate court.' 58 These rulings generally cannot be appealed because tempo-
rary restraining orders are neither "final decisions,"' 159 nor appealable
interlocutory orders. 160
In exceptional circumstances, however, parties may appeal temporary
restraining orders as interlocutory orders.161 Because the substantial effect
of the order, and not its terminology, controls, ' 62 the parties may appeal the
order if it more greatly resembles a preliminary injunction than a temporary
restraining order. 163 This resemblance can be determined from the length of
the order or from the relief granted.
First, an order which continues longer than the ten day limit established
by Rule 65(b) can be appealed.' 64 A temporary restraining order which
issued or extended with the consent of all parties cannot, however, be ap-
pealed.' 65 Failure to file a motion to dissolve the order can indicate con-
sent.' 66 Second, the non-movant may appeal an interlocutory order that
grants a major part of the permanent injunctive relief sought by the claim-
ant. 16 7 For example, in a 1979 sixth circuit case, a district court granted an
interlocutory order which halted an administrative investigation. The order
granted a substantial measure of the permanent relief and thus was
appealable.' 68
D. Mandamus
In Vuilon el Fils S.A.,' 6 9 the Second Circuit Court issued a writ of man-
damus to the district court after the plaintiff could not obtain an ex parte
temporary restraining order from the Southern District of New York. Al-
though this is a rare procedure, it is appropriate when district courts ignore a
movant's rights under Rule 65(b). As such, writs of mandamus should not
be overlooked as a viable procedure until reluctant federal district courts
cast aside their unwillingness to grant ex parte relief when appropriate.
E. Contempt
A party commits contempt when it violates an ex parte temporary re-
158. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429 (1lth Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 627 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir.
1965). For special rules in arbitration, see Bainton, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Injunctions: It's Largely in the Lawyering, in R. SUGARMAN, LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, 1 11-130 (1982).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
161. Id.
162. Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
163. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.07 (1983-84).
164. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974); Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1972); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947).
165. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 427-30 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
166. Id. at 430.
167. American Motors Corp. v. F.T.C., 601 F.2d 1329, 1331-2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 941 (1979).
168. 601 F.2d at 1331.
169. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
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straining order. The movant has the burden to show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the alleged action is in violation of the order.' 70 Once
contempt is proven, the court is obligated to restore the plaintiff to the posi-
tion it would have held had the injunction been obeyed. 17 1 The court can
impose civil or criminal penalties. 172 Recently, a federal court broke new
ground when it authorized a private attorney to conduct an "Abscam" type
undercover operation. The judge appointed two of plaintiff's attorneys as
special federal prosecutors. After the undercover investigation, the judge is-
sued the defendants show-cause orders for criminal contempt.17
3
III. TYPES OF Ex PARTE TEMPORARY RELIEF AVAILABLE
Ex parte relief takes various forms such as injunctive, seizure, and im-
pounding. This section will discuss each of these forms.
A. Ex Parle Injunctions
Perhaps the most common form of temporary relief is injunction. In-
deed, Rule 65 is entitled "injunctions." For trademark infringement, injunc-
tions usually prevent wrongdoers from using the infringing mark, trade
dress, or counterfeit goods. In copyright cases, injunctions may enjoin in-
fringing works, the performance of the infringing work (such as playing a
video game), or the continued use of the infringing material (such as com-
puter software). In trade secret cases, injunctions prevent any disclosure of
the alleged trade secrets by the wrongdoer. In patent cases, injunctions pre-
vent further infringement of the patent by enjoining manufacture, use, or
sale of the invention. Injunctions can be limited geographically, by time, by
specific goods, by specific persons, or by any other device to precisely define
the extent of relief.'
74
170. Hart, Schaffner & Marx v. Alexander's Department Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 101, 102 (2d
Cir. 1965).
171. Vuitton & Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d at 130.
172. For criminal contempt, see, Smotherman v. United States, 186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir.
1950).
173. Natl' L.J., May 21, 1984, at 3, 44.
174. An example of a trademark clause in a temporary restraining order enjoining trade-
mark infringement is:
Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, officers and those persons in
active concert or participation with them [enjoined] from using in any unauthorized
manner the name CALVIN KLEIN or any terms confusingly similar thereto, in con-
nection with the buying, offering for sale, selling or holding for sale, tops, jeans or
other merchandise, or buying or selling any related goods or of any merchandise bear-
ing unauthorized or counterfeit labels, printings or hang tags bearing the name CAL-
VIN KLEIN; and from unfairly competing with plaintiffs in connection with the use
of the name CALVIN KLEIN, or otherwise unfairly competing with Plaintiffs, or in
connection with the use of the name CALVIN KLEIN otherwise interfering with
plaintiffs' businesses.
Calvin Klein Co. v. Fillipe Menswear, No. 82 Cn. 6060 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 1982).
Ex parte seizure orders may be enforced by the courts, or infrequently, by private parties.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1982), specifically authorizes a U.S. District Court to order
the U.S. Marshal's Office to seize and impound all infringing merchandise as well as all other
infringing material in the alleged infringers possession, custody or control:
In any action arising under this chapter, in which a violation of any right of the regis-
trant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office shall have been estab-
lished, the court may order that all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
B. Ex Parte Seizure
Authority for issuing seizure orders on an ex parte and temporary basis
is found in Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with provides for:
"Seizure of personal property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action." The Rule further pro-
vides: "Arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration and other
. . . equivalent remedies [are available] at the commencement of and during
the course of an action . . . under the circumstances and in the manner
provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held."' 175 It is
interesting that with respect to this rule, the peculiar law of each state must
be adhered to. In any event, courts use seizure orders in both trademark
(especially against counterfeiters) and copyright cases even though the power
to issue the orders is based upon separate federal statutes.
Ex parte relief has been used by state courts to quell unfair trade prac-
tices since the turn of the century. For example, in 1911 the Colorado
Supreme Court endorsed the use of ex parte relief to prevent railroad ticket
scalpers from continuing their unauthorized business. 176 In language re-
markably similar to that used in Vuitton et Fils SA.,' 77 the Colorado court
recognized that irreparable injury would result from ticket scalping, and
that the great delay required to notify sixty five defendants throughout the
state would permit them to, "as has been done under similar circumstances
in like cases, assign their business to others, not parties to the suit, and would
dispose of the tickets acquired by them to third persons, many of them be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court."
178
Counterfeiters display an adroitness once reserved to the drug trade and
make their operations covert. They typically use cash exclusively, maintain
few records, conceal counterfeit merchandise, and conceal their identities
from buyers. Although trademark owners could use ex parte temporary re-
straining orders to enjoin the sale of counterfeit merchandise, these surrepti-
tious methods used by counterfeiters still prevent trademark owners from
estimating damages. 
179
receptacles, and advertisements in the possession of the defendant, bearing the regis-
tered mark or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and
all plates, molds, matrices, and other means of making the same, shall be delivered up
and destroyed.
15 U.S.L. § 1118 (1982).
Some "novel" ex parte seizure orders have permitted the use of private investigators or
attorneys rather than U.S. Marshalls, to conduct the search and seizure. See Bainton, supra note
3, at 462-63; Johnson, supra note 4; and Appleson, "John Doe TROs" Stem Illegal T-Shirt Sales, 68
A.B.A.J. 30 (1982).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
176. Kirby v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 509, 119 P. 1042 (1911); Kirby v. Colorado
& Southern R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 545, 119 P. 1056 (1911).
177. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
178. Kirby v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 509, 544, 119 P. 1042, 1055 (1911).
179. Bainton has stated:
[O]nce a counterfeiter is caught and sued, a trademark owner cannot prove the vol-
ume of the counterfeiter's undocumented cash sales and, therefore, has no realistic
hope of recovering the counterfeiter's profits in civil litigation.
Bainton, supra note 3, at 462. See Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aj'd, 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the trademark owner collected
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In response to Vuitton, federal courts began issuing ex parte temporary
restraining orders supplemented by seizure orders, which permit trademark
owners to seize infringing merchandise and business records to assess the in-
jury suffered from counterfeit sales. Business records are also helpful in dis-
covering the counterfeit "pipeline" through which the merchandise has
traveled. Although the Lanham Act does not authorize the seizure of busi-
ness records, most federal courts now routinely issue such orders. 180
Two commentators suggest that the legal basis for court orders permit-
ting trademark owners to seize business records may be the little-known All
Writs Act,1 8 ' which confers broad power to the federal courts to issue any
order considered "necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions."
' 182
Numerous district courts have issued ex parte seizure orders in trade-
mark counterfeiting cases. 183 Ex parte seizure and impoundment orders in
copyright cases are also frequently granted. 184 The United States Supreme
Court has specifically provided rules for the ex parte seizure of allegedly
infringing copyrighted works and related materials. 18 5 These rules allow the
impoundment of goods and insure the eventual destruction of the infringing
articles. Defendants have attacked these copyright rules using constitutional
arguments under the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. All such attacks,
however, have not prevailed. 18 6 Plaintiff must file and sign an affidavit of
damages from the sale of no more than six counterfeit articles because no other counterfeit
merchandise could be found at defendant's premises.
180. See, e.g., Fimab-Finanziaria Maglifico, Etc. v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp., 248 (S.D. Fla.
1982). See Bainton, supra note 3 at 463 & n. 11; Katz and Cohen, Obtaining Ex Parte Injunctions and
Impoundment Orders, MERCHANDISE REP. 6, 8 n.12 (November 1983) (numerous citations).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Bainton, supra note 3; Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 10.
182. Id.; see Bainton, supra n.3, at 465. In United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434
U.S. 159, 172 (1977), the court interpreted the inherent powers in the act:
This statute has served since its inclusion, in substance, in the original Judiciary Act as
a legislative approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the ra-
tional ends of law. . . . Unless appropriately confined by Congress, a federal court
may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the
use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of
justice entrusted to it. The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate
circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in
wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration ofjustice. . .and encompasses even those who have not taken
an affirmative action to hinder justice. (citations omitted).
AccordBally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Paul Mazzilli 82 C. 2490, (E.D.N.Y. April 3, 1983), as reported
in Katz and Cohen, supra note 165, at 8.
183. See Bainton, supra note 3 at 463, n. 11; Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 6. Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) affd 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1980) explicitly recommended that such orders should be narrow in scope. But see NFL Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Coniglio, 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983), which allows plaintiffis request to take a
shotgun approach.
184. Under 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982):
At any time while an action under this title is pending, the court may order the im-
pounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies or phonorecords
claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles
by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.
185. The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-11 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501).
186. See, e.g., Bally Midway Mfg. Co., v. Paul Mazzilli, 82 C. 2490, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. April
6, 1983); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1142
(C.D.Calif. 1982). Cassidy v. Bowlin, 540 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D.Mo. 1982); Stern Electronics
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"value and location" of the infringing articles and must file a bond for at
least twice the value of the infringing material.
18 7
The ex parte temporary restraining order, when combined with the
seizure order, is a formidable weapon against trademark and copyright
counterfeiting. It is also a drastic remedy which deserves stringent safe-
guards. The ex parte seizure order permits trademark, copyright, and trade
secret owners to conduct unannounced searches and to impound whatever
they find that may bear on the infringement. Unlike the Anton Piller orders
of the English Commonwealth, in which the defendant may refuse to permit
the search at the risk of suffering adverse evidentiary presumptions, the
American seizure order is mandatory; courts may enforce them with their
criminal contempt power.' 8 8 In certain circumstances, the order will direct
the United States Marshal to use reasonable force as the circumstances war-
rant to gain entrance to defendant's premises in order to seize and impound
the infringing articles. 19
In Calvin Klein Company and Centerfold Industries, Inc. v. Filippe Mens
Wear,'90 the court, in part, ordered:
That the U.S. Marshal seize and impound, before 3:00 P.M. this
day, all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, ap-
parel and advertisements at Defendants' place of business [precise
address set forth] and in the possession of defendants bearing the
name CALVIN KLEIN, or duplications of other of Plaintiffs indi-
cia; and all plates, molds, matrices and other means of making the
same; and all business records, checkbooks, check registers and the
like relating to the foregoing; and allow Plaintiffs' attorneys to im-
mediately inspect and copy same, but Plaintiffs are to return all
records by Noon of the following day and take possession of only
one sample of each type of garment seized herein.
This order contains important restrictions: 1) only the U.S. Marshal is per-
mitted to seize and impound suspected goods and 2) the plaintiff must re-
turn confiscated business records by noon of the following day. Therefore,
plaintiff's attorney must be prepared to rapidly copy a large number of
records in little time.
Inc. v. Amusement Consultants, Inc., No. 81-2581 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1981); DollCraft Indus-
tries Ltd v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Dealer Adver-
tising v. Barbara Allen Financial Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611, 614 (W.D.Mich. 1977);
Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Cooperman, 206 F. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
187. The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-13 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501). See,
e.g., Piaget Watch Corp. v. International Confirmers & Financiers, Inc., No. 83-2058, (S.D. Fla.,
Aug. 15, 1983). Where the order read: "Failure to comply with this order may result in a
finding of criminal contempt and penalty of jail."
188. While the orders are mandatory, as pointed out by Katz and Cohen, supra, note 165 at
page 10, in Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Mischok Toy Co., 82 C 2490, slip op., (E.D.N.Y. April 3,
1983) the defendant's counsel successfully prevented the entry of the police officers serving the
ex parte order because the seizure bond was not attached to the papers. As in Skip v. Harwood,
3 Atk. 564 (1747), the defendants then removed business records during the night, destroyed
infringing evidence, and minimized the available evidence.
189. One commentator has indicated that it is impossible to obtain such an order in certain
jurisdictions. Bainton, Temporary Restraining Orders and Prehminay Injunctions.- It's Largely in the
Lawyering, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, 77, 84
(R. Sugarman, ed., 1982).
190. No. 828-6060-Civ.-JAG (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 1982).
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Later that year, the same court lifted both the restrictions and the stipu-
lation that counterfeit goods must be seized at a specific location:
1. That the U.S. Marshal for this district, and persons acting
under his supervision or persons acting under the supervision
of plaintiffs' attorneys, shall at any time from September 22,
1982 at 12:30 P.M. through September 23, 1982 at 6:00 P.M.
at or in the vicinity of 115 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Flor-
ida, or anywhere in the State of Florida, seize and impound
any and all infringing and counterfeit watches bearing the
mark CARTIER in the aforesaid defendants' possession or
control including any cartons or containers in which the said
watches are packaged, and deliver up same to the care and
custody of this Court or to plaintiffs' attorneys pending the fur-
ther order of this Court; and it is further ordered, that the U.S.
Marshal or persons acting under plaintiffs' attorneys' supervi-
sion, be directed to seize any documents relating in any man-
ner to the purchase, offering for sale or sale of counterfeit
CARTIER watches by the aforesaid defendants, and allow
plaintiffs or their attorneys to inspect and copy same
immediately. 191
There is no denying entry to plaintiffs and their use of photographers,
copying machines, and U.S. Marshals. In this respect, the ex parte seizure
order is fundamentally a civil search warrant. Substantial injury to business
and to reputation is likely to result from such intrusions and, therefore, the
courts must be vigilant to protect the defendant from the excesses of errant
plaintiffs but equally vigilant in protecting the plaintiff's constitutional and
statutory rights.
C. Ex Parte Inspections
Akin to seizing the infringing goods and business records is the order
permitting the plaintiff or its representative to enter the defendant's premises
to inspect documents relating to the infringing activities, to inspect the arti-
cles for purposes of identification, and to inspect other information pertain-
ing to the alleged wrongdoing. For example, the court may authorize a
person with suitable "technical qualifications" to inspect these documents,
articles, and information. This approach merits further consideration as it
appears to protect the rights of the defendant. Examples of typical inspec-
tion language follow:
Plaintiff may enter upon the business premises of defendants, in the
company of the U.S. Marshal, or other suitable individuals for the
sole purpose of photographing and inventoring (sic) the quantity of
counterfeit chemist's solvent upon the premises of the defendants,
and that the plaintiff will report and make available all the infor-
mation gathered to the court at the hearing on the Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction. 1
92
191. Cartier Inc. v. Lottie's Jewelry, Inc., No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1982).




D. Ex Parte Seahng of File
In view of frequent roving news reporters at federal court houses, many
movants for ex parte relief now consider sealing the file pending service of
the complaint, service of the order and a hearing on the preliminary injunc-
tion both to prevent the nonmovant from informing other wrongdoers or
members of the public about movant's enforcement action and to prevent
unnecessary and perhaps improper publicity concerning the defendant from
occurring. 19 3 In the latter case, such action by the movant may well prevent
a counterclaim of libel, slander or disparagement.
F. Ex Parte Acceleration of Discovey
Because of the propensity of defendants in counterfeit situations to leave
the jurisdiction of the court, because of their tendency to remove evidence,
and because of the other urgent necessities of these types of cases, it may
become imperative to accelerate discovery under Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, in Cartier, Inc. v. Lotties Jewelry,
Inc.,' 94 the district court looked at the tendency of defendants in similar
counterfeiting cases to remove or destroy evidence and granted accelerated
discovery along with a temporary restraining order and seizure. 195 The ac-
celeration of discovery may include an accelerated answer from the defend-
ant, and the court may set specific standards for the service of process.1
9 6
CONCLUSION
The current situation between intellectual property owners and infring-
ers is anything but fair. Undeniably, the infringer has the upper hand and
the trademark owner needs extraordinary measures to protect his property
rights. One commentator at the turn of the century wrote that "It has been
observed that 'the modern uses of the writ [i.e., ex parte temporary injunc-
tions] bear no more resemblance to its ancient uses than the milky way bears
193. Cartier Inc. v. Lottie's Jewelry, Inc., No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1982)
provides an example of such an order:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Sealing the File is granted. The Clerk shall
seal the file until plaintiffs' attorneys notify the clerk that the file may be re-opened.
194. No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1982).
195. The order for accelerated discovery read:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Discovery is granted. The aforesaid individual de-
fendant and representatives of the aforesaid corporate defendant are instructed to ap-
pear for depositions at the office of plaintiffs' counsel on September 30, 1982 at 9:00
A.M. Each defendant or representative of a corporate defendant is instructed to bring
to the deposition all documents, invoices, correspondence, or other materials referring
or relating in any way to the manufacture, sale, advertisement, or distribution of
watches or other items of jewelry bearing the mark CARTIER or "intertwined C".
Id. at 4-5.
196. The Cartier order gave defendants six days to answer:
FURTHER ORDERED that personal service on the aforesaid defendants shall be
made at the time of seizure by the U.S. Marshall, plaintiffs' attorneys and/or their
authorized representatives, and that such service shall be deemed sufficient. Copies of
all the other previously-served pleadings shall be made available to defendants or their
counsel upon request. Answering papers, if any, are to be served upon the attorneys
for plaintiffs on or before 5 P.M. September 28, 1982, and that they be ready without




to the sun.' ",197 In contrast, this brief historical review of the more impor-
tant developments in ex parte relief provide a firm basis for understanding
and properly using the modern law. From the viewpoint of honest business
practices, there is little difference between cutting down a dam, as in Perry v.
Parker,198 and the intentional disclosure of a company's valuable trade
secrets to competitors. The anti-competitive harm is the same, the injury is
just as irreparable, and the response of the court must be swift and ex parte.
Pirates, infringers, and unfair competitors fully appreciate the limitations of
the law, and if the courts do not respond with ex parte orders, then truly
"serious mischief" will occur, just as it did in 1747 in Skip v. Harwood.'99
Two hundred fifty years after Skip v. Harwood,2° ° courts and plaintiffs
must continue to deal with defendants who use delay to frustrate any chance
for relief. Serious mischief has in fact provided impetus for the current revi-
val of ex parte temporary relief in the federal courts. After years of ineffec-
tual efforts, plaintiffs realize that ex parte orders are essential to policing
property rights and preventing some unscrupulous parties from using the
delay of notice to their own advantage. In intellectual property disputes, for
example, counterfeiters and infringers often use the delay between notice
and hearing, just as Harwood did, to conceal their inventories, which will
eventually reappear and plague the rightful owner. The development of ex
parte orders to prevent serious mischief was a response to situations similar
to those in Skip v. Harwood,20 1 in which the right to notice has been subverted
to serve illegal purposes.
Ex parte relief in the United States has had a roller coaster history. In
the early 1800's, federal courts were simply not authorized to grant ex parte
relief in any case. This federal statute was repealed and, by the turn of the
century, ex parte relief was commonly used, if not fully abused, in handling
labor strikes. With the advent of procedural due process arguments, ex parte
relief became so rare in many federal district courts that even today many
such courts simply refuse to grant ex parte relief.
This article has set forth the entirely necessary procedural guidelines for
ex parte relief clearly indicated by historical precedence. Ex parte relief
often provides the only viable legal remedy to owners of intellectual property
against pirates, counterfeiters, and smugglers. If uniform application of ex
parte relief does not occur, such wrongdoers will quickly profit and capitalize
on this type of legal confusion.
It is clear that this problem is not confined to the territorial limits of the
United States of America, but finds application, upon similar just grounds,
in England and its former colonies. 20 2 Hopefully, the present prevalent use
of ex parte relief in counterfeiting cases will not be overused and cause a
cyclical return to an era of non-use, as was the case after the use of ex parte
orders to quell labor strikes. Rather, the courts should view ex parte tempo-
197. Whitelock, supra n.1.
198. 19 F.Cas. 291 (C.C.D.Mass. 1846) (No. 11, 010).
199. 3 Atk. 564, 26 Eng. Rep. 1125 (1747).
200. Id
201. Id
202. See Bigger, ,otes From Other Nations, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 257, 259-60 (198 1).
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rary relief according to well established judicial principles, discussed above,
and grant or deny such requests based on these principles as they have dis-
pensed with justice under other legal principles.
FEDERAL IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS FROM STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION: A SURVEY OF RECENT
DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES
SEALY H. GAVIN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution of the United States does not expressly pro-
hibit state and local taxation of federal activities, the federal courts have
developed a constitutionally implied tax immunity. The immunity doctrine,
although a fundament of our federalism, has undergone a number of trans-
formations. These transformations have caused confusion in the area and
have compelled the Supreme Court to observe that "the line between the
taxable and the immune has been drawn by an unsteady hand."' More
recently, the Court described the tax immunity doctrine as "a 'much liti-
gated and often confused field,' one that has been marked from the begin-
ning by inconsistent decisions and excessively delicate distinctions." 2 It is
not, however, the purpose of this article to criticize the Court for its judicial
wanderings. Instead, this article is designed to provide practical guidance to
federal procurement officials concerning the extent to which the federal im-
munity doctrine may be applied to immunize government contractors and
their activities from state and local taxation. Part I traces the development
of the federal immunity doctrine and, in particular, the development of Gov-
ernment contractor's immunity from state and local taxation. Part II dis-
cusses three recent decisions concerning federal immunity and its application
to Government contractors. Part III discusses the impact of these decisions
on Government procurement policies. Part IV concludes the article.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Few constitutional concepts have been as elastic as the federal immu-
nity doctrine. Following the announcement of the doctrine in M'Culloch v.
Maland,3 the Court went through two distinct phases. First, for more than
* Associate of Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Albuquerque, New Mexico. B.S.
1977 New Mexico State University. J.D. 1980 Texas Tech University School of Law. L.L.M.
1984 Georgtown University Law Center.
At the time this article was written the author served as an Attorney/Advisor in the Air
Force General Counsel's Office and was a member of the Department of Defense Tax Policy
and Advisory Group.
1. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944).
2. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 730 (1982) (quoting United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958)).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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a century, the Court expanded the scope of the doctrine to encompass almost
every conceivable entity and activity related to the activities of the Federal
Government. Second, there was a significant contraction of the expanded
doctrine. Part I is designed to give the reader a general understanding of the
historical development of the federal immunity doctrine as it applies to Gov-
ernment contractors and has been divided into two subparts: (A) the origin
and expansion of the federal immunity doctrine; and (B) the contraction of
the federal immunity doctrine.
A. Origin and Expansion of the Federal Immunity Doctrine
In M'Culloch, the State of Maryland sought to impose a tax on the oper-
ations of the Bank of the United States. The Maryland statute required any
bank established in Maryland, without authority of the State, to purchase
stamped paper for the printing of certain notes. The amount of the tax was
two percent of the face value of the notes.4 In the alternative, the Bank
could make an annual, advance payment of $15,000 to the State.5 Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, rejected the Maryland
taxing scheme as unconstitutional.
6
After disposing of the state's assertion that Congress was without consti-
tutional authority to create the Bank, the Court proceeded to answer the
question of whether the State of Maryland could constitutionally tax a fed-
eral instrumentality. The supremacy clause is clearly the foundation upon
which M'Culloch rests. While noting that there is no express provision in the
Constitution exempting the Bank from the power of the state to tax its oper-
ations, Marshall stated that it was the essence of supremacy to exempt the
Federal Government from the influence of subordinate governments' activi-
ties, and such result was necessarily implied by the declaration of
supremacy.7 And, in response to the state's argument that the Constitution
leaves it the power to tax with the confidence that the state will not abuse
that power, Marshall noted:
The only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the
structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security
against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a
right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the exigencies
of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the
exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legis-
lator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representa-
tive, to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by
the Government of the Union have no such security, nor is the
right of a state to tax them sustained by the same theory. Those
means are not given by the people of a particular state, not given
by the constituents of the legislature, which claim the right to tax
4. Id. at 320-21.
5. Id. at 321.
6. Id. at 436.
7. Id. at 427.
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them, but by the people of all the states. They are given by all for
the benefit of all-and upon theory, should be subjected to that
government only which belongs to all.8
Thus, finding that there were no political checks to prevent the state from
abusing its taxing power with respect to federal activities, the Court initiated
the doctrine of federal immunity from state and local taxation. The doctrine
"is so deeply rooted in American constitutional law that it seems fair to char-
acterize it as a cornerstone of our federal system." 9 And, although "the doc-
trinal declarations and limitations on state and local taxing power set forth
in M'Culloch have subsequently been reinterpreted, and in some respects very
materially changed, ... the basic immunity concept has never been
abrogated."'°
For more than a century after the M'Culloch decision, the Court sub-
stantially expanded the federal immunity concept. In addition to federal
instrumentalities, the federal immunity umbrella was extended to, inter aha,
Government employees, lessees of Government property, and independent
contractors providing supplies and services to the Government. Since many
of the cases rendered during this expansionary period have been subse-
quently overruled or significantly limited, they do not deserve extended cov-
erage. However, in order to understand the significance of the subsequent
contraction of federal immunity which is discussed at subpart B of this Part,
a brief survey of the more notable decisions is appropriate.
Ten years after M'Culloch, in Weston v. Charleston, ' the Court ruled that
a property tax imposed by a local government on federal securities owned by
private parties was unconstitutional. The issue in Weston was whether a lo-
cal government could require private parties to include federal securities in
their property tax base. A divided Weston Court held that the tax was an
unconstitutional interference with the power of Congress to borrow money
on the credit of the United States. The tax was, in the Court's view, "a tax
on the contract [between the Government and the individual that owned the
securities], a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United
States, and . . . repugnant to the Constitution." 12 Thus, Weston expanded
M'Culloch's federal immunity umbrella by extending it to contractual rela-
tionships between private parties and the Government.
In Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erte Couny, '3 the doctrine of federal immu-
nity was expanded to cover state and local taxes on employees of the Federal
Government. In Dobbbns, the State of Pennsylvania authorized the imposi-
tion of a tax, roughly measured by compensation, on "all offices and posts of
profit." 14 The taxpayer was a captain in the United States revenue cutter
service; his office was created by an Act of Congress to regulate the collection
8. Id at 428-29.
9. P Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation, § 6:2, at 236-37 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Hartman].
10. Id. at 237.
11. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
12. Id at 469.
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
14. Id at 445.
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of duties on imports.1 5 The taxing authority assessed a tax measured by the
taxpayer's compensation and taxpayer challenged the tax on constitutional
grounds. The Court, holding for the taxpayer, found the tax to be constitu-
tionally offensive under the federal immunity doctrine announced in
M'Culloch. The Dobbins Court noted that the congressionally created office
of the taxpayer was a means chosen by Congress to execute its sovereign
powers.' 6 As such, taxation of the taxpayer is no less objectionable than the
taxation of the vessel he commands, which is clearly not subject to tax by
state or local authorities.' 7 The Court then noted that its decision was not
based on a technical reading of the statute, and was "applicable to exempt
the salaries of all officers of the United States from taxation by the states."1 8
In this context, the Court expressed that Congress had absolute discretion to
determine the compensation of an officer of the United States, and that a
state may not constitutionally diminish this compensation. 19
The case of Gillesp/'e v. Oklahoma 2° extended the federal immunity doc-
trine to cover lessees of Government lands. In Gllespie, the State of
Oklahoma imposed a nondiscriminatory tax on net income derived by a
lessee of Government lands from sales of oil and gas received under the
lease.2 ' With regard to a tax on leases, the Gillespie Court cited the following
passage from an earlier opinion: "A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the
power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make
them."'2 2 The Court also noted that a tax on the net profits from those leases
constitutes a "direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the
best terms that it can for its wards."'23 Therefore, because the tax upon les-
sees profits from the lease might interfere with the negotiation process, Gilles-
pie extended federal immunity to lessees of Government property whose only
connection with the Government was the leased property.
Shortly after Gillespie, in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mssissipp', 24 the Court ap-
plied the federal immunity doctrine to exempt an independent contractor
from a state sales tax on the sale of goods to the Federal Government. In
Panhandle, the State of Mississippi imposed an excise tax of one cent per
gallon on the contractor for the privilege of selling gasoline. The contractor
argued that with respect to its sales to the Federal Government the federal
immunity doctrine conferred immunity. The Panhandle majority agreed
with the taxpayer finding the tax a burden on the constitutional powers of
the United States. In this regard, the Panhandle majority, noting that the
right to make sales to the United States Government was not given by the
15. Id. at 436.
16. Id at 448.
17. Id
18. Id at 449. While the tax was expressly on "all offices and posts of profit," the state
argued that the subject of the tax was the compensation received. The Court did not agree with
the state's interpretation, but noted that its decision was not based on such a technicality. Id.
19. Id at 450.
20. 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
21. Id at 503.
22. Id at 505 (quoting, Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530
(1916)).
23. Id at 506.
24. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
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state nor dependent on state laws, held that states could not impose any tax
upon transactions with the United States. 25  But, Panhandle is best
remembered for the telling dissent by Justice Holmes which predicted the
upcoming constriction of the federal immunity doctrine.
Holmes felt that the Mississippi tax should be sustained. He recog-
nized, however, in light of the dicta in M'Culloch that "the power to tax is the
power to destroy," that his view was not plainly right.26 Holmes responded
to Marshall's famous, absolutist dicta in the following fashion:
In those days it was not recognized as it is today that most of the
distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the states had
any power it was assumed that they had all power, and that the
necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this court
which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can
defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without
wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits.
2 7
In conclusion, Holmes noted that the question of interference is not one of
absolutes but rather "one of reasonableness and degree and it seems to me
that the interference in this case is too remote [to support the majority's
position]. "28
B. Contraction of the Federal Immuni'ty Doctrine." The Legal Incidence Test
In subpart A the origin and expansion of the federal immunity doctrine
were covered. Following this expansionary period, the doctrine was signifi-
cantly contracted. The contraction of the doctrine, as it relates to contrac-
tors of the Federal Government and their activities, will be covered in this
subpart.
The judicial constriction of the federal immunity doctrine began in
1937 with the James v. Dravo Contractig Co. 29 decision and has generally con-
tinued to date as evidenced by recent Supreme Court decisions. 30  But,
"[e]ven the Court's post-James decisions . .. cannot be set in an entirely
unwaivering line." 31 The "post-James decisions" referred to by the Court in
New Mexico will be examined in this subpart. These decisions can be profita-
bly divided into two groups according to the nature of the tax involved:
(1) those concerning other than possessory use taxes;32 and (2) those concern-
25. Id at 221.
26. Id at 223.
27. Id
28. Id at 225.
29. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
30. 455 U.S. 720; Washington v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1344 (1983).
31. 455 U.S. at 732.
32. Other than possessory use taxes is meant to encompass all other taxes, but in this paper
it principally concerns gross receipts, sales and compensating use taxes. Although the definition
of these taxes may vary from state to state, the model state legislation suggested by the Multi-
state Tax Commission provides generally accepted definitions. In this regard, Article II of the
model legislation provides in part:
6. "Gross receipts tax" means a tax, other than a sales tax, which is imposed on or
measured by the gross volume of business, in terms of gross receipts or in other
terms, and in the determination of which no deduction is allowed which would
constitute the tax an income tax.
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ing possessory use taxes. 3 3 Each group will be treated separately below. A
separate section will also be devoted to the development of the legal inci-
dence test and the issue of discrimination.
1. Other Than Possessory Use Taxes
TheJames case was a landmark decision which marked the end of an
expansionary period spanning more than a century and the beginning of a
period of contraction that has carried the Court to the present day. The case
involved a West Virginia gross receipts tax on the privilege of conducting
business within the State. 34 The taxpayer, an independent contractor con-
structing locks and dams for the Government, argued that the tax as applied
to these activities was an unconstitutional interference with the Govern-
ment's activities.3 5 In sustaining the tax, the closely divided James Court
noted by way of comparison the various debilitating characteristics of the
taxes which the Court had scrutinized before.3 6 In this context, the Court
stated: "The tax is not laid upon the Government [or] its property . . . [; it]
is not laid upon an instrumentality of the Government . . . [; it] is non-
discriminatory [; and it] is not laid upon the contract of the Government.
'37
And, notwithstanding the Court's assumption that the tax in issue might be
an economic burden to the Government, the Court would not invalidate the
tax.38 Instead, the Court, after making an effort to distinguish and limit its
prior decisions in the area, concluded that "the West Virginia tax . . . does
not interfere in any substantial way with the performance of federal func-
7. "Sales tax" means a tax imposed with respect to the transfer for a consideration of
ownership, possession or custody of tangible personal property or the rendering of
services measured by the price of the tangible personal property transferred or
services rendered and which is required by State or local law to be separately
stated from the sales price, but does not include a tax imposed exclusively on the
sale of a specifically identified commodity or article or class of commodities or
articles.
8. "[Compensating] use tax" means a nonrecurring tax, other than a sales tax, which
(a) is imposed on or with respect to the exercise or enjoyment of any right or
power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership, possession or
custody of that property or the leasing of that property from another including
any consumption, keeping, retention, or other use of tangible personal property
and (b) is complementary to a sales [or gross receipts] tax.
Multistate Tax Commission, Suggested State Legislation And Enabling Act Art. II.
33. In general, the possessory use tax, often referred to as a possessory interest tax, is as-
sessed on the privilege of using or possessing tax-exempt property. It resembles an ad valorem
property tax assessed against the owner of the property. But, because the owner is exempt from
taxation, the tax is levied on the privilege of using the property and assessed against the non-
exempt user. The distinction between an ad valorem property tax and a privilege or excise tax
measured by the value of that property, albeit formal, has been critically important to the
judicial review of these taxes. The possessory use tax is similar to an ad valorem property tax in
that it is a recurring tax which is often based on the fair market value of the underlying prop-
erty. The possessory use tax is often confused with the compensating use tax which is a non-
recurring tax used to complement a sales or gross receipts tax. In this regard, the possessory use
tax is typically assessed annually and without regard to the payment of a sales or gross receipts
tax.
34. 302 U.S. at 138.
35. Id. at 149. The Federal Government, however, provided an amicus brief to the Court
supporting the State's contention that the tax was valid. Id.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 160.
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tions and is a valid exaction."
39
In a strong dissent, Justice Roberts argued for the continued application
of the economic burdens test and objected that the Court was "overrul[ing],
sub silentio, a century of precedents."'40 After making a survey of the Court's
earlier decisions, Justice Roberts concluded that the tax was imposed upon
the Federal Government, and was therefore prohibited by M'Culloch v.
Mayland.4 1
The James case is important because it provided the foundation upon
which the legal incidence test would later be built, and marked the demise of
the economic burdens test that had theretofore prevailed. In this regard, the
following excerpt from James is instructive:
[I]t is not necessary to cripple the [state's authority to tax] by ex-
tending the constitutional exemption from taxation to those sub-
jects which fall within the general application of non-
discriminatory laws, and where no direct burden is laid upon the
governmental instrumentality, and there is only a remote, if any,
influence upon the exercise of the functions of government.
42
Thus, James held that a non-discriminatory tax would not be rejected on
federal immunity grounds unless it was laid directly upon the Government,
its instrumentalities, or a contract of the Government.
43
In Alabama v. King & Boozer,4 4 the Court went a step further thanJames
and sustained a sales tax as applied to Government cost-plus contractors. In
King & Boozer, the taxpayer sold lumber to Government cost-plus contrac-
tors which were constructing an army camp for the Government.4 5 The
Government argued that the legal incident of the tax was on the Govern-
ment, and therefore invalid.
46
In an unanimous decision, the Court expressly overruled the Panhandle
case and the economic burdens test expressed in that case. 47 In this regard,
the Court stated:
So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor
enters into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but
a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of
two independent taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one
to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from
paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who
furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no
tax immunity.
48
The Court adopted the Government's legal incidence test, but disagreed
with the Government's assertion that the incidence of the tax in issue was on
39. Id. at 161.
40. Id
41. Id at 185-86.
42. Id. at 150.
43. Id. at 149.
44. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id at 9.
47. Id For a discussion of the Panhandle case see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
48. Id at 8-9.
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the Government. 49 The Court concluded instead that the incidence of the
tax was upon the contractors, and the fact "that they were bound by their
contract to furnish the purchased material to the Government and entitled
to be reimbursed by it for the cost, including the tax," was of no event. 50
The King & Boozer decision is important because it sanctioned a tax
which was passed through in total to the Government. The tax went further
than theJames tax which was merely a possible or potential burden on the
Government; it was a clear and ascertainable economic burden on the Gov-
ernment. More importantly, the Court's focus in these cases shifted to the
legal formalisms such as the legal incidence of the tax and away from the
economic impact of the tax. The King & Boozer case suggested, however,
that the Federal Government might provide immunity to the contractor by
making the contractor its purchasing agent. 5 1 The Government, in Kern-
Limerck, Inc. v. Scurlock, 52 seized upon this dicta and successfully argued that
a cost-plus contractor, under the terms of the contract, was merely a procure-
ment agent of the Federal Government and therefore immune from state
and local taxation.
In Kern-Limerzck, with three judges dissenting, the Court held that a
sales tax had been unconstitutionally applied by the state to a contractor
who had purchased two diesel tractors for use in the construction of a Naval
ammunition depot.5 3 The contract between the Government and the con-
tractor clearly indicated that the contractor was acting as an agent for the
Government and that the Government, and not the contractor, was legally
obligated to the seller for the purchase of the two tractors.5 4 Furthermore,
title to all materials and supplies purchased by the contractor passed directly
to the Government. 55 Based on these considerations, the Court concluded
that the Government was the purchaser under the contract and, since the
legal incidence of the tax was on the purchaser, that the tax was invalid.
5 6
The dissenting Justices in Kern-Limerick argued that the "legal inci-
dence" of a state tax is a question with constitutional implications which
should not be determined by the contract. 57 In this regard, the dissent was
displeased with the possibility that the mere alteration of a few words in the
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id.
51. Id at 13. There the Court stated:
But however extensively the Government may have reserved the right to restrict or
control the action of the contractors in other respects, neither the reservation nor the
exercise of that power gave to the contractors the status of agents of the Government
to enter into contracts or to pledge its credit.
52. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
53. Id at 111.
54. Id at 119-20.
55. Id.
56. Id at 122. Although the Government prevailed in the Supreme Court, the victory,
presumably because of political pressures, was short-lived for the Department of Defense
(DOD). In 1955, only one year after Kern-Limerck, DOD issued a policy statement to the effect
that the Kern-Lthmerick procurement agent concept should not be used to avoid otherwise validly
imposed state or local taxes. But, as indicated below, other federal agencies, most notably the
Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), con-
tinued to rely on the procurement agent concept.
57. Id at 126-27.
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contract could alter the constitutional line of demarcation. 5 The dissent
stated: "We should hold that, until the Congress says differently, the states
are free to tax all sales to cost-plus government contractors. ' 59 In other
words, the dissent would hold that the facts in Kern-Limerick provide no basis
for constitutionally implied immunity and, until Congress provides statutory
immunity, the states' authority to tax sales to cost-plus Government contrac-
tors should not be disturbed.
The statutory immunity referred to by the dissent in Kern-Limerick was
found by the Court in Carson v. Roane - Anderson Co. 60 In that case the State
of Tennessee imposed a sales and compensating use tax on certain Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) contractors. 6' The Government argued that the
contractors were immune from taxation pursuant to the statutory exemption
provided by section 9(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.62 That provi-
sion provides in pertinent part: "The Commission, and the property, activi-
ties, and income of the Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from
taxation in any manner or form by any state, county, municipality, or subdi-
vision thereof."'63 Based on this language and the legislative history, the
Court had little difficulty holding for the Government.
In reaching its decision the Court initially examined the nature of con-
gressional power to create tax immunities. The power does not depend on
the nature of the agency or instrument doing the work for the Government,
but rather it "stems from the power to preserve and protect functions validly
authorized-the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers vested in the Congress." 64 Having determined
that Congress had the requisite authority, the Court then defined the scope
of the statutory provision in issue to include "all authorized methods of per-
forming the governmental function."'65 Accordingly, finding that Congress
was constitutionally empowered to create tax immunities and that the stat-
ute in issue was intended by Congress to immunize AEC contractors from
state and local taxation, the Court held that the contractors were immune
from such taxation.
66
Yielding to political pressure, however, Congress later repealed the stat-
utory language upon which statutory immunity had been found in the Car-
son decision. 67 While the repeal resolved the question of statutory immunity
for AEC contractors, it did not resolve the question of constitutional
immunity.
68
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id at 127.
60. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
61. Id at 233.
62. 60 Stat. 765 (1946). The provision in issue was repealed by Act of August 13, 1953, 67
Stat. 575 c. 432.
63. Id.
64. 342 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
65. Id at 235-36.
66. Id. at 236.
67. Act of August 13, 1953, 67 Stat. 575, c. 432.
68. See United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), ad per curiam, 364
U.S. 281 (1960); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964). In these cases the Court noted that
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The Court in United Slates v. Livingston69 affirmed without opinion a
lower court finding of constitutional immunity for an AEC contractor. In
Livingston, the State of South Carolina sought to impose its sales and com-
pensating use tax upon the purchases of materials by an AEC contractor.
70
The contractor was paid cost and a nominal fee of one dollar to design,
construct and operate an atomic energy plant for the AEC. 7 ' The contract
contained a title vesting provision whereby title to materials purchased
under the contract would pass directly from the vendor to the Govern-
ment. 72 To facilitate and expedite payment, the contract provided for a re-
volving fund to be deposited for the payment of purchases and expenses.
73
Finding that the contractor was an agent of the Government by implication,
and citing the Kern-Limerick decision, the lower court concluded that the con-
tractor's "procurement activities resulted in the sale of goods and services to
the United States, that the purchases were those of the United States and
immune from ordinary sales and use taxes upon the purchaser or upon the
purchasing agent."' 74 With respect to the issue of the contractor's beneficial
use of the property purchased, the court made a factual determination that
there were no benefits, profit or otherwise, to the contractor.
75
The Court, however, did not find constitutional immunity in the next
case concerning AEC contractors-United States v. Boyd. 76 In Boyd, the State
of Tennessee collected from certain AEC contractors a sales and compensat-
ing use tax upon purchases made by them under their contracts with the
AEC. 77 The Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Kern-Limerick, deter-
mined that the contractors were merely acting as procurement agents on the
Government's behalf and refused to sustain the State's application of the
sales tax. 78 That court, however, sustained the collection of the compensat-
ing use tax, 79 the only issue which reached the Supreme Court.8 0
The Court, like the Tennessee Supreme Court, sustained the state's col-
lection of the compensating use tax. In sustaining the tax, the Court initially
summarized the state of the law with the following passage:
The Constitution immunizes the [United States from] taxation
repeal of the language providing statutory immunity was only intended to place AEC contrac-
tors on an equal footing with other Government contractors.
69. United States v. Livingston, 179 F.Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), adper curiam, 364 U.S.
281 (1960).
70. 179 F.Supp. at 11.
71. Id at 16.
72. Id at 17.
73. Id.
74. Id at 22 (citations omitted).
75. Id at 22-23. The Court distinguished the Delrott cases, discussed in a, where the con-
tractors used the property in their profit-making capacity. The Court also rejected the State's
argument that the contractor was benefitted by the valuable experience received by its employ-
ees. Then the Court noted: "There is every indication that [the contractor] accepted this con-
tract and its obligations out of the high sense of public responsibility, despite deprivation, which
its president expressed to its stockholders in 1950." Id at 23.
76. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
77. Id at 43.
78. Id at 43 n.5.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id at 43 n.5.
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by the States, .. .but it does not forbid a tax whose legal inci-
dence is upon a contractor doing business with the United States,
even though the economic burden of the tax, by contract or other-
wise, is ultimately borne by the United States. . . . Nor is it for-
bidden for a State to tax the beneficial use by a federal contractor
of property owned by the United States, even though the tax is
measured by the value of the Government's property, . . . and
even though his contract is for goods or services for the United
States. . . . The use by the contractor for his own private ends-
in connection with commercial activities carried on for profit-is a
separate and distinct taxable activity.8 1
Then, noting that the Government had accepted these principles, the Court
rejected the Government's contention that the contractors had not used the
Government property for their own commercial advantage but exclusively
for the benefit of the United States.8 2 The Court found this contention "in-
credible. '" 3 The critical factor is that the contractors used the property for
their own commercial, profit-making activities.
84
In Boyd the Government urged that the work done by the contractors
"should be viewed as though the Commission was doing its own work
through its own employees, the legal incidence of the tax therefore falling on
it."8" The Court, however, would not indulge in this fiction.8 6 The Govern-
ment may perform its functions either "directly through its own facilities,
personnel and staff," or with the assistance of private enterprise.8 7 The Gov-
ernment is well aware of these possibilities and in this case it chose the lat-
ter.88 "We cannot conclude that [the contractors], both cost-plus contractors
for profit, have been so incorporated into the Government structure as to
become instrumentalities of the United States and thus enjoy governmental
immunity.'
'89
2. Possessory Use Taxes
At this juncture a brief word about possessory use taxes and two related
taxes-the ad valorem general property tax and the compensating use tax-
is appropriate.
The "old and widely used ad valorem general property tax" was dis-
cussed in detail by the Court in United States v. County of Allegheny. 9° In that
81. Id. at 44.
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id
84. The Boyd Court noted that reliance by the Government on the Livingston case was
misplaced. In Livingston, the lower court had made a factual determination that the contractor
received no benefits from the contract. In this regard, the facts in Boyd make it clearly distin-
guishable as the contractor's receive a substantial fee in the course of their commercial opera-
tions. Id at 45 n.6.
85. Id at 46-47.
86. Id at 48.
87. Id. at 47.
88. Id. at 48.
89. Id
90. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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case, the Court described the ad valorem general property tax scheme as
follows:
This taxation plan involves the identification and valuation of the
variable individual holdings to be taxed, commonly called the as-
sessment, the application of a uniform rate calculated on the need
for public revenues, and the collection, in default of payment, by
distraint and sale of the property assessed and taxed. . . . While
personal liability for the tax may be and sometimes is imposed, the
power to tax is predicated upon jurisdiction of the property, not
upon jurisdiction of the person of the owner, which often is lacking
without impairment of the power to tax. In both theory and prac-
tice the property is the subject of the tax and stands as security for
its payment. 9'
These property taxes are typically assessed annually. The compensating
use tax92 is usually complementary to either a sales or gross receipts tax.
Like the sales or gross receipts tax it is a nonrecurring tax. Unlike those
taxes, however, the subject of the tax is the use or enjoyment of the property
rather than the sales transaction over which the state may lack taxing
authority.
The possessory use tax9 3 is seemingly the result of cross-breeding be-
tween the ad valorem general property tax and the compensating use tax. It
is similar to the ad valorem general property tax in that it is typically mea-
sured by the fair market value of the property and assessed on a recurring
basis. It is like the compensating use tax in that the subject of the tax is the
use or enjoyment of the property rather than the property itself. The posses-
sory use tax is like the compensating use tax in that it is complementary to
the ad valorem general property tax. It complements the ad valorem gen-
eral property tax by reaching some of the property that is otherwise exempt
from that tax, vtz., Government property used by private contractors.
91. Id. at 184.
92. See supra note 32.
93. The Court first reviewed the possessory use tax in United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S.
466 (1958). The tax statute was quoted by the Court as set forth in the passage below. It is
representative of the tax statutes that have followed.
An Act to provide for the taxation of lessees and users of tax-exempt property.
Section 1. When any real property which for any reason is exempt from taxation
is leased, loaned or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual,
association or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, except
where the use is by way of a concession in or relative to the use of a public airport,
park, market, fair ground or similar property which is available to the use of the gen-
eral public [sic], shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and to the same
extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such property: Provided, how-
ever, That the foregoing shall not apply to federal property for which payments are
made in lieu of taxes in amounts equivalent to taxes which might otherwise be law-
fully assessed or property of any state-supported educational institution.
Section 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such lessees or users of real property and
collected in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners of real property, except that
such taxes shall not become a lien against the property. When due, such taxes shall
constitute a debt due from the lessee or user to the township, city, village, county and
school district for which the taxes were assessed and shall be recoverable by direct
action of assumpsit.
355 U.S. at 467 n.l.
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In Allegheny, the Court was faced with an assessment by a local taxing
authority which, under what the Court described as an ad valorem general
property tax, sought to tax the full value of Government-owned machinery
located on the taxpayer's facilities for use in performance of its contracts
with the Government.9 4 Notwithstanding state law, 95 the Court determined
that title to the machinery was in the Government and that in substance the
tax was on the property owned by the Government.9 6 The Court recognized
that the contractor had some legal and beneficial interest in the Govern-
ment's property.9 7 The assessment, however, did not segregate the contrac-
tor's limited interest in the property. 98 On this basis, the Court rejected the
tax as unconstitutional holding "that Government-owned property, to the
full extent of the Government's interest, therein, is immune from taxation,
either as against the Government itself or as against one who holds it as a
bailee." 99 But the Court saved for another day the question of whether a
contractor's limited interest might be taxed by appropriate proceedings. 0 0
This question was addressed by the Court in 1958 in three companion cases:
United States v. City of Detroit (Detroit),lO' United States v. Township of Muskegon
(Muskegon) ,102 and City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. (Murray). 103 Except for a
few factual differences, the Detroit and Muskegon cases were substantially the
same and presented the same basic questions. The contractor in Detroit
leased Government property for his private business.10 4 The contractor in
Muskegon used the Government's property under a permit in the perform-
ance of his contracts with the Government.1
0 5
In Detroit, with two dissenting, the Court sustained the possessory use
tax' 06 which was imposed on the contractor and measured by the value of
the tax-exempt property in issue.' 0 7 In doing so the Court rejected the Gov-
ernment's argument "that since the tax is measured by the value of the prop-
erty used it should be treated as nothing but a contrivance to lay a tax on the
property."' 1 8 In this regard, the Court noted "that it may be permissible for
a state to measure a tax imposed on a valid subject of state taxation by
taking into account Government property which is itself tax-exempt."' 1 9 It
was on this basis that the Court distinguished Allegheny where the subject of
94. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
95. In the face of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to sustain the tax, the Court
set out its authority as the final arbiter in matters concerning federal rights as follows: "Where a
federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state
courts or legislatures, or relieved by it from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax
and its effect upon the federal right asserted." Id at 184.
96. Id at 181-86.
97. Id at 186.
98. Id. at 187.
99. Id. at 189.
100. Id at 186.
101. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
102. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
103. 355 U.S. 493 (1958).
104. 355 U.S. at 486.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 93.
107. 355 U.S. at 468.
108. Id. at 470.
109. Id. at 471.
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the tax was the Government's property. I 10  Noting that all users of tax-ex-
empt property were treated the same and that there were several organiza-
tions with tax-exempt property, the court determined that "[t]he class
defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one."' t
To Justice Whittaker, however, the majority's position was a victory of
form and label over substance.'1 2 The Justice was convinced that it was
"crystal clear" that the tax was a "direct imposition upon the Government's
property interests."' 13 In the dissent's view, relying on Allegheny, the states
were constitutionally prohibited from taxing the entire value of Govern-
ment-owned property." 14 Instead, the States must segregate the private in-
terest and tax only that interest.
1 5
In a shorter opinion, the Court concluded that Muskegon was controlled
by the same principles at work in Detroit." 6 The Court referred to the dis-
tinction between a lease and a permit as insubstantial." 7 With respect to
the fact that the property was being used in the performance of a Govern-
ment contract, the Court stated that if the Government had retained control
over the contractor's activities and financial gains, so that the contractor
could properly be called a "servant" of the United States, the tax might not
have attached.'" 8 Notwithstanding this potential distinction for private par-
ties which were excessively controlled by the Government, the Court sus-
tained the tax, finding that the contractor was using the property in
connection with its own commercial activities." 19
Over the dissent of four Justices, the Court in Murray sustained a differ-
ent tax scheme than that examined by the Court in Detroit and Muskegon.
The statutory provisions in Murray provided in pertinent part: "The owners
or persons in possession of personal property shall pay all taxes assessed
thereon."'2 0 The Court rejected Murray's argument that the tax, like the
tax in Allegheny, was an ad valorem property tax.' 2' In this context, the
Court declared that it was concerned only with the "practical operation" of
the tax and not "empty formalisms."' 122 Then, the Court concluded that the
tax in Murray and in Detroit and Muskegon were substantially the same: "We
see no essential difference so far as constitutional tax immunity is concerned
110. Id.
Ill. Id at 473.
112. Id at 478.
113. Id.
114. Id at 480-83.
115. Id
116. 355 U.S. at 484-85.
117. Id at 486. The Court's reference to form over substance is anomolous considering the
fact that under the Detroit and Muskegon cases the constitutional viability of a tax depends al-
most entirely on the craft of the statutory draftsman. Under these cases a tax measured by the
value of Government-owned property would be sustained if "on the use of" the property but
rejected if on the property itself. Accordingly, procedurally different taxes with the same eco-
nomic impact on the Government might yield different constitutional determinations. Cer-
tainly this is not a distinction with economic substance. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 355 U.S. at 489, 491 n.L
121. Id. at 492-93.
122. Id at 493-94.
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between taxing a person for using property he possesses and taxing him for
possessing property he uses when in both instances he uses the property for
his own private ends."'
123
The Court distinguished Murray from Allegheny on two grounds: (1) the
state law in Murray specifically authorized assessment against the person in
possession; and (2) the "taxing authorities [in Murray] were careful not to
attempt to tax the Government's interest in the property."'' 24 Although the
Court could not find any constitutional limitations on the tax in issue, it
reminded the Government that Congress should make the policy decisions,
determining whether and to what extent private parties doing business with
the Government are immune from state taxes.' 2 5 The dissent, however,
finding that the title to the property in question was vested in the Govern-
ment,126 and that the tax was nothing more than an ad valorem tax on the
property of the Government, 127 found Allegheny "entirely controlling.' 1 28
Although the Michigan trilogy of cases concerned the use of tax-exempt
property by a business for profit, in United States v. County of Fresno,'129 the
Court determined that the principles enunciated in the Michigan cases were
equally applicable where the tax-exempt property was put to a beneficial
personal use.130 The tax in Fresno was imposed on users of "nontaxable pub-
licly owned real property."' 3' Unlike Allegheny, the measure of the tax was
only on the portion of the total value of property attributable to the users
interest.' 32 After finding that the legal incidence of the tax in Fresno was not
123. Id at 493.
124. Id at 494. The Murray case cast considerable doubt on the precedential value of Alle-
gheny. In this context, the Court stated:
Petitioners on the other hand contend that the decision in Allegheny is inconsistent with
the general trend of our decisions in this field, that it has already been distinguished to
the point where it retains no meaningful vitality and that it is erroneous. However
that may be, we do not think that case is controlling, essentially for the reasons set
forth in United States v. Detroit ....
Id
And, Justice Harlan in dissent noted:
Although the Court here purports to distinguish Allegheny, it seems to me that the
authority of that case has now been reduced almost to the vanishing point, for neither
the tax statute here nor that in Allegheny qualified application of the tax to property
employed in private commercial activity.
Id. at 508-09 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 495.
126. Id at 514-24.
127. Id at 524-30.
128. Id at 530-33.
129. 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
130. Id at 467.
131. Id at 455 n.3.
132. Id. at 466. With respect to the precedential value of Allegheny and the distinguishing
characteristics of the tax in Fresno, the Court noted:
Insofar as United States v. Allegheny County . . .holds that a tax measured by the
value of government-owned property may never be imposed on a private party who is
using it, that decision has been overruled by United States v. City ofDetroit . . .and its
companion cases. . . . Insofar as it stands for the proposition that Government prop-
erty used by a private citizen may not be taxed at its full value where contractual
restrictions on its use for the Government's benefit render the property less valuable to
the user, the case has no application here. Appellee counties have sought to tax only
the individual appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses and have reduced their
assessments to take account of the limitations on the use of the houses imposed by the
Government.
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on the Government, the Court focused on the issue of whether the tax was
discriminatory as to the Government or its employees. 133 The Court con-
cluded that the tax was not discriminatory and sustained the tax on constitu-
tional grounds. 1
34
3. Legal Incidence and Discrimination
A review of the cases discussed above in this subpart reveals a fairly
consistent approach used by the Court in determining the constitutional va-
lidity of the various tax schemes. Initially, the Court determines whether the
legal incidence of the tax falls on the Government or its instrumentalities. If
necessary, the Court then examines the question of whether the tax discrimi-
nates against the Government or those with whom it deals.
Although the Court often refers to the legal incidence test as though its
meaning were self-evident, it has on occasion considered in detail different
aspects of the test. In particular, the Court has noted certain factors to be
considered in applying the test and considered whether state or federal law
should be applied in determining the legal incidence question. The primary
factor considered by the Court in its determination of legal incidence is legis-
lative intent.' 35 More precisely, the Court considers legislative intent with
respect to the intended payor of the tax and not with respect to legal liability
for the tax.136 Generally the legal incidence will be on "the statutorily desig-
nated taxpayer from whom the tax is to be collected, unless it is clearly di-
rected that the tax is to be passed on to another."' 37 In this regard, in Uni'ted
States o. M'ss'sst'ppi, the Court held that when a "[sitate requires that its sales
tax be passed on to the purchaser and be collected by the vendor from him,
this establishes as a matter of law that the legal incidence of the tax falls
upon the purchaser."' 38 The court, in Gurley v. Rhoden, 139 made it clear that
while the economic burden of a tax incident to the sale of goods is typically
shifted to the purchaser, that fact alone is of little consequence to a determi-
nation of legal incidence. Although the economic burden of a tax is tradi-
tionally shifted to the purchaser, that fact does not mean that the legal
incidence of the tax is on the purchaser, unless, as a matter of law, the eco-
nomic burden must be passed on to the purchaser.'
40
Even if a tax passes the legal incidence test, it may be rejected as dis-
criminatory. As the Court in United States v. City of Detroit' stated: "A tax
may be invalid even though it does not fall directly on the United States if it
operates so as to discriminate against the Government or those with whom it
deals." 4 ' The question then becomes what is discriminatory in this context.
Id. at 462 n.10.
133. Id. at 464-68.
134. Id. For a discussion of the discrimination aspects of the Fresno case see infra notes 142-44
and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Tax Comm'n, Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599 (1975).
136. Id. at 607, citing First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
137. Hartman, supra note 9, §6:17, at 328 (1981).
138. 421 U.S. 599, at 608.
139. 421 U.S. 200 (1975).
140. Id. at 204.
141. 355 U.S. 466, at 473 (1958).
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While the Court has answered this question on an adhoc basis, some general
principles have been established. The basic rule in this area, stated by the
Court in United States v. Couno of Fresno, is that the burden placed on a federal
function by a state tax imposed on a federal contractor is not unconstitu-
tional so long as it is imposed equally on others similarly situated. 142 This
does not mean that all similarly situated parties must be treated in precisely
the same manner; 14 3 it does mean, however, that the states may not impose a
heavier tax burden on those dealing with the Federal Government than
others similarly situated.' 44 It apparently also means that the states may not
impose a heavier burden on those dealing with governmental or public con-
cerns than on similarly situated parties dealing with the private sector.
The underpinning for the principles concerning discriminatory taxation
was summarized by the dissent in Montana v. United States 145 as follows:
There is good reason to insist that a state tax be "imposed equally"
on all "similarly situated constituents of the state" . . . whether
connected with the public sector or private. Broad application of a
tax is necessary to guarantee an efficacious "political check" on po-
tentially abusive taxation. The Montana gross receipts tax, limited
as it is to public sector contractors, provides little such assurance.
Taxation of contractors dealing directly with the State or state
agencies affords no safeguard against discriminatory treatment of
federal contracting agencies and the contractors with whom they
deal. Any tax increase passed along by a contractor would be
borne fully by a federal agency but would be offset by the corre-
sponding tax revenues in the case of the State; from the State's
perspective the tax is a washout.
1 46
It is for these reasons that a discriminatory tax on the Federal Government
or those with whom it deals must be rejected on constitutional grounds.
II. RECENT DECISIONS
Part II is a survey of recent decisions in the federal immunity area
142. 429 U.S. 462 (1977).
143. See 355 U.S. 466, at 473; 429 U.S. 452, at 462-65.
144. See Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960);
Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
145. 440 U.S. 147, 164 (1979). In this regard, the dissent was of the opinion that the imposi-
tion of Montana's one percent gross receipts tax upon contractors of public, but not private,
construction projects was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. In support of his posi-
tion, Justice White stated:
In any event, ! see no basis whatsoever for extracting from the principle that a State
may not favor itself over the Federal Government the further proposition that a State
may favor its private-sector constituents so long as contractors working for public bod-
ies are taxed. Indeed, in Fresno the Court sustained the tax only after assuring itself
that persons who rented federal property were "no worse off under California tax laws
than those who work for private employers and rent houses in the private sector."...
Such laws, reaching broadly across the public and private sectors, are characteristic of
those this Court has sustained.
Id. at 170. While this is only the dissent of one justice, Justice White, it is persuasive because
Justice White was the author of Fresno, and because the majority's decision in Montana did not
address the Supremacy Clause issue but was decided on the grounds of collateral estoppel. Id
at 147, 164.
146. Id. at 170-71.
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which are of considerable importance in the Government procurement
arena. The decisions to be covered, in order of their discussion below, are
United States v. New Mexico, "' Washington v. United States 148 and United States v.
Colorado. 149 The first two cases involve gross receipts and sales tax schemes,
respectively, and the last case involves a possessory use tax.
A. United States v. New Mexico-Federal Immunity of Government Contractors
Based On An Agency Relationship Between The Government and Its
Contractors
The linchpin of the federal immunity doctrine is that the states cannot,
without permission, levy a tax directly on the Federal Government.
1 50 Fed-
eral immunity in its present form, however, is not conferred merely because
the tax has an economic impact on the Government. 15 1 This is true even
when the Government bears the entire burden of the tax. 152 By virtue of
these rules, Government contractors are not immune from state taxation re-
gardless of where the economic burden falls. Nonetheless, when the contrac-
tor is "so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot
realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity be-
ing taxed is concerned," tax immunity may be appropriate. 153 The question
thus becomes under what circumstances are the contractor and the Govern-
ment so closely related as to provide for the unity described above. This was
the issue confronting the Court in United States v. New Mexico, an issue which
is largely dependent on the substantive contractual relationship between the
parties. '
54
Before commenting on the specific contractual arrangements, the New
Mexico Court made some general observations about the contracts in is-
sue.' 55 The Court noted that the Department of Energy (DOE) contracts in
issue, contracts for the management of Government-owned research and de-
147. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
148. 103 S.Ct. 1344 (1983).
149. 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980),summariya~fdsub nom Jefferson County v. United States,
450 U.S. 901 (1981).
150. 455 U.S. at 733, cing Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943).
151. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. 455 U.S. at 735.
154. Id at 722-27.
155. Id. The Court also discussed the distinguishing characteristics of the three contractors
and their contracts with the Government. First, the Sandia Corporation-a subsidiary of West-
ern Electric Company, Inc-engages exclusively in Government-sponsored research; is reim-
bursed for its costs but receives no fee under its contract; and owns no property except for an
amount constituting its paid-in capital. Second, the ZIA Company-a subsidiary of Santa Fe
Industries, Inc-provides services to both the Government and to the private sector; receives its
costs and a fixed fee for its Government work; and owns property used primarily in the perform-
ance of its nongovernment work. Third, Los Alamos Constructors, Inc-a subsidiary of ZIA-
engages exclusively in Government efforts; owns no tangible personal property; and is reim-
bursed for costs and receives a fixed fee. While the Court did not view the distinguishing char-
acteristics as sufficient to yield different results, it found it more difficult to distinguish Sandia's
situation from the Livingston decision wherein the contractor, like Sandia, received no fee. Id at
724, 740 nn. 3, 13. For a discussion of the Livingston case see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying
text.
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velopment facilities, were a unique species of Government contracts.' 56 Be-
cause of the complexity of the contractual relationship, the Court observed
that it was virtually impossible to apply traditional agency rules. 157 With
regard to the degree of Government control over the contractors, the Court
stated: "While subject to the general direction of the Government, the con-
tractors are vested with substantial autonomy in their operations and pro-
curement practices."'
158
Having set the tone, the Court then proceeded to discuss some of the
more salient factors concerning the contracts in issue. 159 On the one hand,
the Court noted that the contract provided that title to all tangible personal
property purchased by the contractors passed directly from the vendor to the
Government and that the Government was to bear the risk of loss for prop-
erty procured by the contractors. The contract also provided for Govern-
ment control over the disposition of all Government-owned property and,
most importantly, for an advance funding procedure whereby the Govern-
ment provided funds in advance of contract performance to meet contractor
costs.' 6° These factors, of course, are indicative of a close connection be-
tween the Government and the contractors; they portray the contractors as
mere agents of the Government. On the other hand, the Court listed the
following factors indicative of a more casual relationship: the contractors
held themselves out to third-party suppliers as the buyer; the Government
disclaimed liability for acts committed by the contractors' employees; and
the contractors' employees have no direct claim against the Government for
labor-related grievances.' 6 1 The Court then noted that the contracts had
been amended two years after the commencement of litigation to provide
that the contractors were agents of the Government for certain purposes.1
62
The taxes at issue in the New Mexico case were the New Mexico gross
receipts and compensating use taxes.16 3 The subject of the gross receipts tax
is the privilege of engaging in business in New Mexico; its measure is a per-
centage of gross receipts.' 64 The subject of the compensating use tax is the
use of property in New Mexico; it only reaches property not previously sub-
ject to the gross receipts tax; and it is equivalent in amount to the gross
receipts tax that would have been imposed.' 6 5 The "receipts of the United
156. Id at 723.
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id. at 723-27.
160. Id at 724-26.
161. Id at 725.
162. Id at 726-27. With some cynicism, the Court observed: "At the same time, however,
the United States denied any intent 'formally and directly [to] designat[e] the contractors as
agents,'. . . and each modification stated that it did not 'create rights or obligations not other-
wise provided for in the contract.'" Id at 727. The Government's ambivalence toward the
contractors was important in the Court's eyes. The court was not impressed by the Govern-
ment's selective approach concerning the agency status of the contractor.
163. Id. at 727. For a general description of the gross receipts and compensating use taxes
see supra note 33.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-4 (Supp. 1975),amendedby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4 (Supp.
1981).
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (Supp. 1975),amenddby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (Supp.
1981).
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States or any agency or any instrumentality thereof" and "the use of prop-
erty by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof" are ex-
empt from the gross receipts and compensating use taxes, respectively.' 66 A
deduction from gross receipts is allowed for receipts from the sale of tangible
personal property to the United States. '
6 7
Unable to convince the state that the contractors were constitutionally
immune from state taxation, the United States initiated suit in the District
Court requesting a declaratory judgment that (1) the use of Government-
owned property by the contractors was not subject to the state's compensat-
ing use tax; (2) advanced funds used for Government operations under the
contracts were not taxable gross receipts to the contractors; and (3) receipts
of vendors selling tangible property to the Government, through its manage-
ment contractors, could not be taxed by the state.1 68 The District Court,
granting summary judgment for the Government, determined that an
agency relationship existed and that the contractors were immune from state
taxation.1 69 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that the contractor's were sufficiently independent of the Government to
justify the imposition of the New Mexico taxes and directing the District
Court to enter summary judgment for the State.' 70 The United States
sought and was granted certiorari.
17 '
In an unanimous decision the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Cir-
cuit. The Court, noting that the Government had conceded that the legal
incidence of the taxes was on the contractors, focused on the decisive issue of
"whether the contractors can realistically be considered entities independent
of the United States."' 72 Having focused on the pivotal issue the Court then
proceeded to address the specific issues raised by the Government.
First, relying on United States v. Boyd,' 7 3 the Court upheld the State's
application of its use tax.174 After finding that "[tihe tax, the taxed activity,
and the contractual relationships" in New Mexico did not differ from those in
Boyd,' 75 the Court, as in Boyd, concluded that "the contractors remained
distinct entities pursuing 'private ends,' and that their actions remained
commercial activities carried on for profit."' 76  Stressing the independent
nature of the contractors, the Court stated:
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-12.1 (Supp. 1975), amendedby N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-13
(Supp. 1981); and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-16A-12.2 (Supp. 1975), amended by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-
9-14 (Supp. 1981).
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1975), amended by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54
(Supp. 1981).
168. 455 U.S. at 728.
169. Id at 728-29, citing 455 F. Supp. 993, 997 (D.N.M. 1978).
170. 455 U.S. at 429-30, citing 624 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1980).
171. 624 F.2d II1 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
172. 455 U.S. at 738.
173. Id at 738-40. For a discussion of the Boyd case see supra notes 76-89 and accompanying
text.
174. Id at 738-41.
175. Id at 740.
176. Id at 739 (citing United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, at 44 (1964)). With respect to
Sandia, however, the Court stated: "Sandia does not receive a cash fee, but it obtains obvious
benefits from its contractual relationships." Id at 740 n. 13.
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It is true, of course, that employees are a special type of agent, and
like the contractors here employees are paid for their services. But
the differences between an employee and one of these contractors
are crucial. The congruence of professional interests between the
contractors and the Federal Government is not complete; their re-
lationships with the Government have been created for limited and
carefully defined purposes.1
77
Based on these considerations, the Court held that the state's application of
its use tax was not constitutionally offensive.
178
Having already determined that the contractors were independent tax-
able entities in its discussion of the use tax, the Court addressed the Govern-
ment's contention that the gross receipts tax had been improperly applied to
the advanced funds used by the contractors to meet salaries and internal
costs. 179 On this issue, noting the independent nature of the contractors and
citingjames v. Dravo Contracting Co. ,180 the Court had little difficulty holding
for the State.18'
Finally, with greater difficulty, the Court concluded that the state had
properly applied its gross receipts tax to sales from other vendors to the con-
tractors in issue.18 2 On this point the Government had argued that the con-
tractors were procurement agents of the Government under Kern-Limerick v.
Scurlock. 8 3 The Government argued, as in the Kern-Limerick case, that the
receipts of vendors selling tangible property to the contractors could not be
taxed by the state. 184 In passing on this issue, the Court carefully distin-
guished it from the other two issues by pointing out that a procurement
agent can be so closely related to the government that his activity is, in es-
sence, a sale to the government.' 8 5 Observing that this was the Court's con-
clusion in Kern-Limerzck ,186 the Court then proceeded to highlight the factual
differences between Kern-Limerick and the instant case.
18 7
In Kern-Limerick the contractor identified itself as a federal procurement
agent; title to property purchased by the contractor passed directly to the
Government; the purchase orders declared that the purchase was made by
the Government; the Government, not the contractor, was liable for the
177. Id. at 740-41.
178. Id. at 741. In passing, citing two possessory use tax cases, Murray and Colorado, the
Court noted: "While a use tax may be valid only to the extent that it reaches the contractor's
interest in government-owned property, . . . there has been no suggestion here that the contrac-
tors are being taxed beyond the value of their use." Id at 741 n. 14. By this passage the Court
has unnecessarily obscured the inherently different characteristics of possessory use and compen-
sating use taxes. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
179. Id at 741.
180. 302 U.S. 134 (1937). For a discussion of thejames decision see supra notes 34-43 and
accompanying text.
181. 455 U.S. at 741. In passing, the Court compared the use of Government-owned prop-
erty and advanced funding as follows: "In any event, [the use of advance funding] to achieve
contractual ends is not significantly different from using property for the same purpose." Id
182. Id at 741-43.
183. 347 U.S. 110 (1954). For a discussion ofKern-Limneric seesupra notes 52-59 and accom-
panying text.
184. 455 U.S. at 741-43.
185. Id at 742.
186. Id
187. Id. at 742-43.
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purchase price; specific Government approval was required for each transac-
tion; and the statutory procurement scheme envisioned the use of federal
purchasing agents. 188 The New Mexico case is different from Kern-Limerick in
the following respects: the contractors made purchases in their own names;
there was no formal intention to denominate the contractors as purchasing
agents; and two of the three contractors were not required to obtain advance
Government approval for purchases. 189 These factors, the Court concluded,
"demonstrate that the contractors have a substantial independent role in
making purchases, and that the identity of interests between the Govern-
ment and the contractors is far from complete."' t Moreover, the Court
continued, the fact that title passes directly to the Government from the
vendor is not in itself sufficient to immunize the Government from
taxation. 191
Although not necessary to its holding in New Mexico, the Court made
two noteworthy points concerning federal immunity under the Constitution.
First, the Court expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the Government's attempt
to confer immunity with cosmetic contractual provisions drafted by Govern-
ment functionaries. 192 Second, while holding that the Constitution did not
immunize the contractors in New Mexico, the Court invited the agencies to




190. Id at 743.
191. Id
192. Id at 737. On this point, the Court expressed its views as follows:
Granting tax immunity only to entities that have been "incorporated into the Govern-
ment structure" can forestall, at least to a degree, some of the manipulation and
wooden formalism that occasionally have marked tax litigation-and that have no
proper place in determining the allocation of power between co-existing sovereignties.
In this case, for example, the Government and its contractors modified their agree-
ments two years into the litigation in an obvious attempt to strengthen the case for
nonliability. Yet the Government resists using its own employees for the tasks at
hand-or, indeed, even formally designating Sandia, Zia, and LACI as agents-be-
cause it seeks to tap the expertise of industry, without subjecting its contractors to
burdensome federal procurement regulations. . . .Instead, the Government earnestly
argues that its contractors are entitled to tax immunity because, among other things,
they draw checks directly on federal funds, instead of waiting a time for reimburse-
ment. . . .We cannot believe that an immunity of constitutional stature rests on such
technical considerations, for that approach allows "any government functionary to
draw the constitutional line by changing a few words in a contract." Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. at 126 (dissenting opinion). [emphasis added].
Id.
193. Id at 737-38, 743-44. In this regard, the Court stated:
[I]t is Congress that must take responsibility for the decision, by so expressly providing
as respects contracts in a particular form, or contracts under particular programs ...
And this allocation of responsibility is wholly appropriate, for the political process is
"uniquely adapted to accommodating the competing demands" in this area .... But
absent congressional action, we have emphasized that the States' power to tax can be
denied only under "the clearest constitutional mandate."
Id at 737-38. And, the court observed in conclusion:
[lit is worth remarking that DOE is asking us to establish as a constitutional rule
something that it was unable to obtain statutorily from Congress. For the reasons set
out above, we conclude that the contractors here are not protected by the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of federal supremacy. If political or economic considerations suggest
that a broader immunity rule is appropriate, "[s]uch complex problems are ones which
Congress is best qualified to resolve."
Id. at 744.
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B. Washington v. United States-Federal Immunity and Discrmnation
Against Federal Contractors
The question of constitutional immunity of the United States from state
and local taxation has evolved over the years into a two-tiered analysis.' 94
First, without the consent of the United States, the legal incidence of a tax
may not be placed on the United States. This is the underpinning of federal
immunity; it is the test for determining whether a tax is directly on the
United States.1 95 Second, even though the legal incidence of a tax is not on
the United States, the tax may not discriminate against the United States or
those with whom it deals.19 6 This is a necessary corollary to the technical
legal incidence test. It is the second part of the two-tiered analysis that was
the focal point of the Court's recent decision in Washington v. United States.
197
Before considering the Washington case, it is useful to note that the con-
cept of tax discrimination does not carry a universal meaning. Even within
the confines of the United States Constitution the tax discrimination concept
has many different faces. For instance, the Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution prohibits the states from invidiously
discriminating between different classes of taxpayers.' 9 8 This principle is
distinguishable from the federal immunity tax discrimination inquiry. 19 9
194. This two-tier approach is discussed at Part I.B.3, supra.
195. The Court in New Mexico expressed "the underlying constitutional principle" as fol-
lows: "[A] state may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, . . . lay a tax 'directly upon
the United States.' " 455 U.S. at 733. And, noting the fundamental nature of the principle, the
Court observed: "[Tihe Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute federal immunity
from state taxation." Id.
196. In passing, the Court in New Mexico observed the discrimination aspect of the two-tier
analysis as follows: "It remains true, of course, that state taxes on contractors are constitution-
ally invalid if they discriminate against the Federal Government, or substantially interfere with
its activities." Id at 735, n. 11.
197. 103 S. Ct. 1344 (1983).
198. The Court has allowed the states a great deal of latitude in the tax area. So long as a
scheme of taxation is not "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious" it will be sustained by the Court.
In this context, the Court in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) stated:
There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome 'only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes.' . . . The burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.
Id at 364. And, on the difficulty of upsetting a tax under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court noted:
A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the
limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete cata-
logue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of
such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its in-
formed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it
was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its actions. Only by faithful
adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to
preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.
Id at 364-65. According to this, then, it is abundantly clear that the states may, inter a/ia,
impose a heavier tax burden on some taxpayers than others. But as discussed, intra, when the
classification of taxpayers is based on the taxpayer's relationship with the Federal Government,
the Supremacy Clause imposes more stringent restrictions on the states.
199. In general, under the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Government and those with
whom it deals may be taxed in a different manner so long as there is not discriminatory eco-
nomic impact. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text. The distinction between tax
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and tax discrimination under the Supremacy
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But the Court's decisions are not always clear on this point. 200 Notwith-
standing occasional judicial indiscretions in this area, the Court has gener-
ally kept the various tax discrimination theories disentangled.
The tax discrimination concept in general, and in particular as it relates
to federal immunity, is not an absolute limitation. Instead, it is a characteri-
zation of various discriminatory classifications as permissible or impermissi-
ble based on legal and policy considerations. This was the approach taken
by the Court in the Washington decision. By a 5-4 majority, the Court in
Washington sustained as nondiscriminatory the Washington sales and use tax
scheme as applied to Government construction contractors. 20' The tax
scheme in issue is best understood against its distinct three-stage develop-
ment.20 2 In the first two stages all construction contractors were treated the
same. In the final stage, however, Federal Government construction con-
tractors were singled out for special consideration. From its inception in
1935 until 1941, the Washington sales and use tax was applied to all con-
struction contractors in a similar manner.2 03 The sales tax was applied to all
sales of tangible personal property to the contractors, and the use tax was
applied to the use of tangible personal property by the contractor not previ-
ously subjected to the sales tax.20 4 The legal incidence of these taxes were on
the contractors.
20 5
In 1941, Washington changed its tax scheme by redefining "consumer"
Clause was alluded to by the Court in Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District, 361
U.S. 376 (1960) as follows:
It is true that perfection is by no means required under the equal protection test of
permissible classification. But we have made it clear, in the equal protection cases,
that our decisions in that field are not necessarily controlling where problems of inter-
governmental tax immunity are involved. In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 1358
U.S. 522 (1959)], for example, we noted that the State was "dealing with [its] proper
domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Govern-
ment." . . . When such is the case, the State's power to classify is, indeed, extremely
broad, and its discretion is limited only by constitutional rights and by the doctrine
that a classification may not be palpably arbitrary. . . . But where taxation of the
private use of the Government's property is concerned, the Government's interest
must be weighed in the balance. Accordingly, it does not seem too much to require
that the State treat those who deal with the Government as well as it treats those with
whom it deals itself.
200. See, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1958). In Detroit, refer-
ring to the class of taxpayers covered by the Michigan possessory use tax, the Court observed:
The class defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one. As suggested
before the legislature apparently was trying to equate the tax burden imposed on pri-
vate enterprise using exempt property with that carried by similar businesses using
taxed property. Those using exempt property are required to pay no greater tax than
that placed on private owners or passed on by them to their business lessees. In the
absence of such equalization the lessees of tax-exempt property might well be given a
distinct economic preference over their neighboring competitors, as well as escaping
their fair share of local tax responsibility.
Id at 473-74.
201. The Washington sales and use tax is imposed on the buyer or consumer in all retail
sales and consumer uses of tangible personal property. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4306. The sales tax is
imposed by Chapters 82.08 and 82.14 of the Revised Code of Washington. The use tax is
imposed by Chapters 82.12 and 82.14. The terms "buyer" and "consumer" are defined at sec-
tions 82.04.190, 82.08.010, and 82.12.010.
202. 103 S.Ct. at 1346-47, 1352.
203. Id at 1352.
204. Id at 1346, 1352.
205. Id. at 1346.
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as the landowner who purchases construction work from the contractor.
20 6
The legal incidence of the tax was thereby shifted to the landowner and the
tax was measured by the total amount paid to the contractor. 20 7 The effect
of this change was to increase the overall tax base, which theretofore in-
cluded only the cost of the material, by including the contractor's mark-up
on materials, labor costs and profit.20 8 As before, the federal contractors
were treated essentially the same as state and private contractors. Under this
system, when the Federal Government was the landowner, Washington did
not collect tax on the sale of tangible personal property to the contractor or
of the completed project to the Government. 20 9 The tax base was decreased
in this respect.
210
In 1975, in order to reach federal construction projects without reducing
the tax base of other construction projects, the sales and use tax statute was
once again amended.2 11 The consequence of this change was to divide con-
struction contractors into two categories: (1) those performing construction
services on real property owned by the United States; and (2) those perform-
ing construction services for the state or a private party.2 12 In the first in-
stance, the legal incidence of the sales and use taxes was on the federal
construction contractors and they were liable for the taxes on material incor-
porated in their projects. 213 With respect to construction contractors for the
state or private parties, however, there was no sales or use tax liability for
materials incorporated in their projects. Instead, for non-federal projects,
the legal incidence of the taxes falls upon the landowner and they are liable
for tax on the full price of the project including labor costs, costs of materials
and mark-ups thereon, and profit. 2 14 Thus, while the sales and use taxes are
in each case applied at only one level, the levels for each are different.
Whereas the taxes on federal projects are applied at the contractor level,
they are applied at the landowner level for non-federal projects. The Gov-
ernment argued that this difference is unconstitutionally discriminatory
against those dealing with the Federal Government.
21 5
The United States prevailed in the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, with that Court holding that the taxes were unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory against federal contractors. 21 6 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.2 17 The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction.
218





210. Id at 1352.
211. Id at 1347 n. 3. This change was affected by redefining certain critical terms, viz.,
"consumer, retail sale and sale at retail." Id.
212. Id. at 1353.
213. Id
214. Id. at 1347.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Washington, 654 F.2d 570 (1981).
218. 103 S. Ct. at 1347.
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ment of federal contractors was unconstitutionally discriminatory, the Court
noted that the tax rate imposed on all construction transactions was always
equal, and the difference between the tax imposed on the private contractor
and the federal contractor was that the amount of tax was less for the lat-
ter.2 19 This could hardly be considered discriminatory as to the Federal
Government, as the court pointed out. 220 The Court refused to look only at
the tax the contractor is legally required to pay. 22 1 Instead, considering the
"whole tax structure of the state," the Court focused on the economic forces
that dictate which party ultimately bears the burden of the tax.
222
The appropriate question is whether a contractor who is consider-
ing working for the Federal Government is faced with a cost he
would not have to bear if he were to do the same work for a private
party. If he works for the Federal Government, the contractor is
required to pay a tax on the materials he buys. The contractor will
count the tax among his costs in setting a price for the Govern-
ment. Depending on his bargaining power, he may pass some or
all of the tax on to the Federal Government when he sets his price.
If he works for a private party, the contractor is required to collect
the tax from the purchaser and remit it to the state. The purchaser
will count the tax as part of the price of the building. Depending
on his bargaining power, the contractor may reduce his price to
make up for some or all of the tax the purchaser must pay. If the
tax is the same, and the parties have the same bargaining power,
the amounts the purchasers pay and the amounts the contractors
receive will be identical in the two cases. Thus, it makes no difrence to
the contractor (or to the purchasers) which of them is [legally required to
pay the tax to the State, as long as they have the opportunity to allocate the
burden among themselves by adjusting the price.223
In light of these observations and conclusions, the Court discussed its prior
decisions in the area.
Looking at the "whole tax structure" rather than the isolated tax on
Federal contractors, the Court easily distinguished Washigton from its prior
decisions invalidating state tax schemes which placed a heavier tax burden
on those dealing with the Federal Government than on those dealing with
the state.224 Again looking at the "whole tax structure," the Court rejected
the notion that the Washington statutory scheme did not provide a political
check on abusive taxation by the state.2 25 Instead, the Court concluded that
in light of the broad application of the tax scheme in issue, "there is little
chance that the State will take advantage of the Federal Government by
increasing the tax."
'226
219. Id. at 1348.
220. Id
221. Id at n. 4.
222. Id at n. 4, 1348.
223. Id at 1348 n. 4 (emphasis added).
224. Id at 1348-44 (distinguishing Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School
Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
225. 103 S. Ct. at 1350. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that there was "no
broad state constituency taxed as are the prime contractors who deal with the Federal Govern-
ment." 654 F.2d at 577.
226. 103 S. Ct. at 1350.
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The Court also recognized striking similarities between the Washington
tax system and those in United States v. Cit of Detroit 22 7 and United States .
County of Fresno. 228 In those cases the Court had sustained the differential tax
treatment used by Michigan and California, respectively, to get at otherwise
tax-exempt property.
In the Detrot case, Michigan provided differential tax treatment for
users of property depending on the tax status of the property. 229 If the prop-
erty being used was taxable, the user would not be subject to the tax. In-
stead, the owner of the property would be assessed with a general ad valorem
property tax.230 On the other hand, if the property enjoyed tax-exempt sta-
tus, the tax, measured as though the user were the owner of the property,
would be imposed on the user. 23' The Detroit Court approvingly described
the impact of the tax by pointing to the legislature's attempt to equalize the
tax burden on a private enterprise using tax-exempt property and the tax
burden of a business using taxed property.232 In the Fresno case, the Court
sustained a similar tax scheme.
Finding the tax schemes in Fresno and Detroit indistinguishable from
that in Washitgton, the Court concluded:
This answers the United States' contention that the Washington
tax is invalid simply because it is an attempt to circumvent the
Federal Government's tax immunity. The Washington statute is
no different from any other taxing scheme that switches the inci-
dence of the tax from one party to a transaction to another when
the party that would ordinarily be taxed is immune. In this re-
spect, this case is no different from Fresno or Detroit.
233
The Court then observed that the "important consideration . ..is not
whether the state differentiates in determining what entity shall bear the
legal incidence of the tax, but whether the tax is discriminatory with regard
to the economic burdens that result." 234 This does not require, however,
that the economic burdens of the tax be equal, in fact, on all similarly situ-
ated parties. 235 It does require, however, that the parties have an opportunity
227. 355 U.S. 466 (1958). See supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
228. 429 U.S. 452 (1977). See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
229. 355 U.S. at 467, 473.
230. Id
231. Id
232. Id. at 474.
233. 130 S. Ct. at 1349 n.9.
234. Id. at 1349.
235. Id. at 4307. On this point the Court was responding to the Ninth Circuit opinion
wherein that court commented on the state's burden in tax discrimination cases as follows:
Nor is there anything in the record from which to conclude that the economic inci-
dence of the sales and use taxes would necessarily be shifted from the owners of non-
federal land to their prime contractors. Therefore, it has not been demonstrated that
the tax burdens on all contractors are, in fact, equalized.
654 F.2d at 576.
And, in a footnote the Ninth Circuit suggested the nature of the documentation to be
provided as follows:
In the instant case, there are no findings, economic data, or demonstrated market
assumptions in the record from which to conclude that: 1) the owners of non-federal
property have sufficient market power vis-a-vis prime contractors to pass on the eco-
nomic incidence of the subject tax; 2) even if such market power exists generally, why
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
to allocate the economic burden of the tax by adjusting the price. 236 Since
in the Court's view Washington's tax system satisfied these requirements, it
was determined to be nondiscriminatory. The Court concluded: "Washing-
ton has not singled out contractors who work for the United States for dis-
criminatory treatment. It has merely accommodated for the fact that it may
not impose a tax directly on the United States as the project owner.
'237
The four dissenting Justices, however, cast the Washington tax scheme
as a circumvention of "the United States' absolute constitutional immunity
from state taxation. '238 They questioned the Court's decision as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact.
First, as a matter of law, the dissenters cited three of the Court's earlier
decisions which, in their view, compelled an affirmance of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision. 239 And, in passing the dissenting mentioned Fresno by point-
ing out that in that case "the United States expressly abandoned any claim
that the tax treated federal employees differently from state employees who
lived in state owned houses". 24° But it was the omitted discussion of the
Detroit case that was most noteworthy. 24 1 The dissent also challenged as
"glib" and "unwarranted" the majority's conclusion "that the Federal Gov-
ernment is really better off than others because the tax consequence to it is a
lesser amount inasmuch as the contractor's labor costs and markup are not
included in the tax base."'242 The dissent questioned the Court's holding on
this point by noting that the cost of putting the tax money "up front" and of
maintaining special records required only of the Federal contractor, could
well exceed the tax increments on the labor and profit components. 24 3 The
dissent also found "highly suspect" the Court's assumption that a federal
contractor will be able to pass the tax through to the Federal
Government.
24 4
all owners of non-federal property would necessarily have sufficient market power to
allow each of them to pass on all of the economic incidence to prime contractors; and
3) even if both of these conclusions are now true, that they will remain so, notwith-
standing any changes in economic conditions.
Id at 576 n. 12.
236. 103 S. Ct. at 1348 n.4.
237. d at 1350.
238. Id at 1351.
239. Id at 1354. The cases cited were Miler v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927); Phillps
Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 379 (1969); Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365
U.S. 744 (1961). It is clear from a reading of these cases, however, that they are far from
compelling and, in fact, easily distinguished from the Washington situation. Moreover, these
cases were apparently considered by the dissent without regard for the Court's other decisions in
this area. Most notably among these are the Fresno and Detroit cases.
240. 103 S.Ct. at 1355 (quoting 429 U.S. at 452, 464 n. 13). The import of this cryptic
revelation is not entirely clear. Was it intended to vitiate the majority's comparison of Fresno
and Washington?
241. Clearly, Fresno and Detroit present problems to the dissent's position; a position that is
not easily reconciled, if at all, with those cases.
242. 103 S. Ct. at 1353.
243. Id. at 1355.
244. Id. at 1355 n. 4. The dissent states two reasons for its position on this issue:
First, the assumption hardly can be applied to a contract made prior to the 1975
legislation. A contractor trapped with such a contract has the burden of the tax; a
private contractor is not at the same risk. Second, the Court seems to believe that a
federal contractor has the same amount of bargaining power with the Federal Govern-
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On a practical note, the dissent observed that "the Court, in order to
prevent abuse, will have to dissect and carefully measure every state system
that imposes a tax burden upon the United States."'245 In this regard, the
dissent noted "that courts as institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate the
relative burdens of various methods of taxation.1
246
C. United States v. Colorado--Constitutional Limitations on the Application of
the Possessory Use Tax to Government Contractors
The possessory use tax compliments the general ad valorem property
tax by taxing the private use of tax-exempt property.24 7 The subject of the
tax is the private use of tax-exempt property. The tax is typically measured
and assessed as though the user were the owner of the property. Although
the possessory use tax has been sustained by the Court under certain circum-
stances, 248 its imposition is not without limits. In particular, questions have
been raised concerning the imposition of a tax, measured in terms of full
value, on the private use of tax-exempt property when there are contractual
restrictions on the use of the property rendering such use less valuable.
2 49
This was the nature of the Tenth Circuit's inquiry in United States v.
Colorado .250
The Colorado case involved a Department of Energy contract with
Rockwell International Corporation for the operation and maintenance of
the Rocky Flats Plant-Government-owned facilities operated for the devel-
opment and production of nuclear weapons-located in Jefferson County,
Colorado. 25' In return for its services, Rockwell was reimbursed its costs and
paid a fixed fee. 252 In light of these contractual undertakings, the Jefferson
County Tax Assessor assessed Rockwell with a possessory use tax for the use
of tax-exempt property-the Rocky Flats Plant. 253 The tax assessed against
ment as his private counterpart has with his contractual partner. I suspect that in
most circumstances this is not correct. Under Washington's tax, a private contractor
charges his client the amount of the state tax on top of the contract price; it is far from
clear that a federal contractor is able to pass the tax on in the same way to the Federal
Government.
Id
245. Id at 1356.
246. Id (quoting Minneapolis Star Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'n v. Revenue, 103 S. Ct.
1365, 1374 (1983)).
247. For a discussion of the possessory use tax see supra notes 32-33, 90-134 and accompany-
ing text.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Township of
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
249. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 n.10 (1977).
250. 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980),sumarnaffdsub nom Jefferson County v. United States,
450 U.S. 901 (1981).
251. 627 F.2d at 218.
252. United States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184, 1185-87 (D. Colo. 1978).
253. The Colorado statute, a typical possissory use tax, provides in part:
(1) When any property . . .exempt from taxation is leased, loaned, or otherwise
made available to and used by a . . . corporation in connection with a business con-
ducted for profit, the lessee or user thereof shall be subject to taxation in the same




Rockwell for 1976 was in excess of 4.5 million dollars.254
The issue before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Colo-
rado case was whether the possessory use tax, as applied against Rockwell for
its use of the Rocky Flats Plant, was a constitutional enactment by the State.
As expressed by the court, the key to this issue "is the relationship between
Rockwell and the United States and the nature of the activity which the
State of Colorado seeks to tax."'255 The district court determined that the
tax as applied was unconstitutional and entered a summary judgment for
the Government. 256 The state appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit
and ultimately to the Supreme Court.
2 57
In reaching its decision, the district court first distinguished UnitedStates
v. Boyd where the Supreme court sustained the application of the Tennessee
compensating use tax to Government contractors. 258 In discussing Boyd, the
district court stressed that the Boyd Court had determined that the contrac-
tor had a "separate taxable interest." In this context, the district court dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's implicit notion that a tax on the cost of supplies
and materials obtained with government funds would constitute an appro-
priate measure of the separate taxable interest. 259 After setting up Boyd in
this fashion, the court proceeded to distinguish it from the assessment in
issue.
The distinction noted by the court was that Colorado, unlike Tennessee
in the Boyd case, had made no effort to separate out the Government's own-
ership interest in the property.26° And, following up on this theme the court
observed:
The Supreme Court has said there is no constitutional impediment
to state and local taxation of the benefit to Rockwell as measured
by its separate interest in the Government-owned property used in
the performance of the contract. When, however, a tax is imposed
upon the whole value of the property, it is obvious that the tax is
also being imposed upon the Government's interest and that is con-
trary to the Constitution.
26 1
The district court had less difficulty distinguishing the United States v. County
254. Id The District Court expressed concern about the tax liability as compared to
Rockwell's fee under the contract. Id at 1188.
255. 627 F.2d at 219.
256. 460 F. Supp. at 1189.
257. 627 F.2d 217, summarily afdsub nom Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901
(1981).
258. For a discussion of the Boyd decision see supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
259. 460 F. Supp. at 1188. The district court's reading of Boyd is strained. Boyd was con-
cerned with legal incidence of the tax rather than the measure of the tax. See supra notes 82, 179
and accompanying text. The Court in Boyd was clearly not concerned with comparing the
relative interests of the Government and its contractors. Indeed, the Court's focus was on the
transaction in issue (the use of property not previously subject to a sales tax) and not the relative
interests in the property being used.
260. Id. To reiterate, it seems that the district court has strayed. The court in Boyd did not
attempt to segregate the various interests of the parties because the compensating use tax in
issue was assessed on a transactional (sale or use) basis. But, the possessory use tax in Colorado
is complementary to the general ad valorem property tax which is a tax on ownership. Thus, it
is important to keep in mind that the taxes in Boyd and Colorado are substantially different. Id
261. Id
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of Fresno case in which the Supreme Court had sustained a possessory use tax
which segregated the user's limited interest in the property. 262 Conversely,
the Colorado statute provided that the user would be taxed as though it were
the owner.2 63 With this, the district court concluded that the tax was "noth-
ing less than a general ad valorem property tax imposed on United States
property. It is a tax on the property itself rather than Rockwell's beneficial
use of it.
' 2 6
In reaching its decision, the district court determined that the Colorado
tax was the same as that invalidated in United States v. Allegheny County where
the tax assessor had included Government-owned machinery in the assess-
ment of a private plant.2 65 Citing footnote 10 of the Fresno case, the court
noted the continuing validity of Allegheny. 266 In particular, with respect to
segregating the contractor's limited interest in Government-owned property,
the court cited the following excerpt from footnote 10 of Fresno:
Insofar as [Allegheny] stands for the proposition that Government
property used by a private citizen may not be taxed at its full value
where contractual restrictions on its use for the Government's bene-
fit render the property less valuable to the user, the case has no
application here. Appellee counties have sought to tax only the
individual appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses and
have reduced their assessments to take account of the limitations
on the use of the houses imposed by the Government.
267
Thus, without any meaningful discussion of United States v. City of Detroit or
its companion cases, the district court, based on the decisions discussed
above, held that the tax constituted an unconstitutional infringement on the
Government's immunity from taxation.
268
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court but found it necessary to
distinguish three cases relied on by the State of Colorado-United States v.
Boyd,269 United States v. City of Detroit ,270 and United States v. Township of Mus-
kegon. 27 I First apparently rejecting the lower court's "separate interests"
262. 429 U.S. at 452. For a discussion ofFresno see supra notes 129-134, 142-144 and accom-
panying text.
263. See supra note 253.
264. 460 F. Supp. at 1189. In light ofUnitedSlates v. Ciy of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), and
its companion cases, see supra notes 102-129 and accompanying text, the district court's conclu-
sion, without more, that the Colorado possessory use tax was nothing more than a general ad
valorem property tax on the owner of the property is confusing.
265. Id For a discussion of Allegheny, see supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
266. Id. See supra note 132.
267. 429 U.S. at 463 n.10.
268. 460 F. Supp. at 1189.
By taxing the totality of the land, improvements and personal property used in the
operations of the Rocky Flats Plant, without accounting for any of the imposed limita-
tions on Rockwell's use of the property, the defendants have subjected the property
and activities of the Federal Government to state and local taxation and thereby in-
fringed upon the immunity of the United States from the imposition of taxes on its
own property. Id
269. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
270. 355 U.S. 466 (1958). For a discussion of the Detroit case see supra notes 101-115 and
accompanying text.
271. 355 U.S. 484 (1958). For a discussion ofMuskegon see supra notes 120-128 and accom-
panying text.
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analysis of Boyd ,272 the court distinguished Boyd from Colorado in terms of the
different tax schemes involved. 273 In Boyd a sales and compensating use tax
was measured by the purchase price or fair market value of the property
used by the contractor and collected on a one-time basis. 274 The contractor
in Boyd had purchased the property from third parties for use in performing
its contract. 275 In comparison, the court noted that Colorado was not seek-
ing to impose a tax on goods acquired by Rockwell for its contract with the
United States, but rather the tax was measured by the value of the Govern-
ment-owned Rocky Flats Plant and based on Rockwell's use such facility.
276
The court found this a significant distinction between Boyd and Colorado .277
While the lower court made no effort to distinguish Detroit or Muskegon
from the Colorado case, the Tenth Circuit distinguished these cases based on
the nature of the use of the Government-owned property in issue. 278 In De-
troit, the contractor leased part of a Government-owned industrial plant for
its private manufacturing business.2 79 In Muskegon, the contractor used a
Government-owned manufacturing plant for the production of goods for the
Government. 2 0 The court concluded that " [nleither [Detroit nor Muskegon]
is akin to the instant case, where Rockwell is merely performing its contrac-
tual obligations on Government owned property.28 1 Like the lower court,
the Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. County of Allegheny 28 2 in rejecting
as unconstitutional the Colorado possessory use tax applied to Rockwell.
283
As in Allegheny, the court concluded that in substance the tax was an ad
valorem general property tax on property owned by the United States.
2 84
The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.28 5
D. Federal Immunity of Government Contractors from State and Local Taxation-
Impact of New Mexico, Washington and Colorado on the State of
the Law
Of course, it is not enough to recount the historical development of the
272. See supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
273. 627 F.2d at 220. The court distinguished Boyd on the particulars of the taxes involved.
But the decision in this context is short on analysis; it does not provide any justification for the
different treatment of the different tax schemes; and it does not in any meaningful way explain
the legal significance of the different characteristics. Implicit in the decision, however, is that
these distinctions are of a constitutional dimension. Id
274. Id.
275. Id But the compensating use tax could be applied under the Tennessee statute even if
the property had not been purchased by the contractor and, therefore, the court may be over-







281. Id As discussed with respect to Boyd, the court concludes that the distinctions between
these cases are constitutionally significant. And, as in its discussion of Boyd, the court appar-
ently believes that the legal significance of these distinctions are self-evident.
282. 322 U.S. at 174.
283. 627 F.2d at 220, 221.
284. Id. at 221.
285. Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981).
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federal immunity doctrine as it relates to Government contractors and the
recent decisions cited above. Indeed, the import of these recent decisions can
only be understood in light of their historical background. In this context,
three points should be recalled from Part I. First, the doctrine of federal
immunity has gone through two distinct phases-an expansionary period
and then a period of contraction. Second, a two-tiered test has evolved for
determining the constitutional validity of state and local taxes on the Gov-
ernment and those with whom it deals. Third, state and local taxes come in
various forms each with different characteristics. These points each bear
upon the discussion which follows.
Two of the three decisions-New Mexico and Washington-mark the con-
tinuance of the unmistakeable trend of the Court to constrict where possible
the once expansive federal immunity doctrine. Colorado, on the other hand,
was a departure from this trend. There was, however, unanimity that the
constitutional standard for reviewing state taxes was the two-tiered test re-
ferred to above. Two of the cases, New Mexico and Colorado, were decided on
the first tier, the legal incidence test, and the other, Washington, was decided
on the second tier, the discrimination test.
The most direct impact of New Mexico on prior law is its effect on the
Kern-Limerck decision and the procurement agency concept announced
therein. 28 6 While not expressly overruling Kern-Limerick, it appears that the
Court will carefully consider each case on its particular facts and will apply
Kern-Limerick strictly, if at all, when considering the agency issue. This im-
plication is evident from the Court's lack of enthusiasm for the Govern-
ment's attempt to avoid state taxes by creating an agency relationship
through contracts with private contractors. The Court stated that "a finding
of constitutional tax immunity requires something more than the invocation
of traditional agency notions: to resist the state's taxing power, a private
taxpayer must actually 'stand in the Government's shoes.' ",287 Along the
same lines, the Court, citing in part in Kern-Limerick dissent, noted:
Granting tax immunity only to entities that have been "incorpo-
rated into the Government structure" can forestall, at least to a
degree, some of the manipulation and wooden formalism that occa-
sionally have marked tax litigation-and that have no proper place
in determining the allocation of power between co-existing sover-
eignties. In this case, for example, the Government and its contrac-
tors modified their agreements two years into the litigation in an
obvious attempt to strengthen the case for nonliability ...
[Moreover,] the Government earnestly argues that its contractors
are entitled to tax immunity because, among other things, they
draw checks directly on federal funds, instead of waiting a time for
reimbursement. . . . We cannot believe that an immunity of con-
stitutional stature rests on such technical considerations, for that
approach allows "any government functionary to draw the consti-
286. For a discussion of the Kern-Limerick decision see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying
text.
287. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 236.
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tutional line by changing a few words in a contract.
'288
So, in addition to its severe constriction of Kern-Limerick, the Court expressed
its concern for the drawing of constitutional lines based on technical provi-
sions in Government contracts.
2 89
Although the impact of New Mexico on prior law is essentially limited to
its restriction of the procurement agent concept, the Court's recap of the
development of the federal immunity doctrine will also be remembered.
2 90
In addition, the invitation by the Court for congressional intervention in this
area is noteworthy.
2 9'
A reading of Detroit and Fresno make it difficult to view Washington as a
significant development in the area of tax discrimination. 29 2 In those cases,
as in Washington, the Court sustained a tax scheme which provided a differ-
ent method of taxation for the Government and those dealing with it than
for others similarly situated. Although the tax methodology in all three cases
was different for different classes of taxpayers, the economic burden of the
tax was in each case judged to be the same for all. Thus, while the legal
incidence test had developed into a very formalistic test, the tax discrimina-
tion doctrine was concerned with the economic substance of the tax
scheme. 29 3 This theme, expressed in Detroit and Fresno, was described in
greater detail in Washington.
While it is clear that the tax discrimination doctrine enunciated by the
Court does not allow the states to impose a heavier tax burden on the Gov-
ernment or those with whom it deals, the question of what constitutes a
heavier tax burden is not so clear. But the Court in Washington did indicate
that it considers the tax rate and tax base to be important factors. 294 With
respect to the tax rate, the Court noted that it was the same for all construc-
tion transactions.2 95 And, regarding the tax base, the Court observed that
the Government and its contractors were treated more favorably than others
because they were taxed on a smaller proportion of the project value.
296
Considering these two characteristics of the tax, the Court concluded that
the Government and its contractors are both better off than other taxpayers
because they pay less than anyone else in the state.2 9 7 But the majority was
clearly not interested in a detailed examination of the relative burdens of the
288. Id at 737.
289. This is seemingly at odds with the Colorado case wherein the lower court and the Tenth
Circuit held that contractual restrictions on the contractor's use of Government-owned property
required the state to segregate the contractor's limited interest in the property. Such contrac-
tual restrictions are seemingly the same sort of technical considerations and subject to the same
manipulation as those provisions referenced by the Court in New Mexico.
290. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1344.
291. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
292. 103 S. Ct. at 1349-50. "The only difference between [Washington ] and Fresno and Detroit
is that the taxpayer here is a vendor of services to the United States, rather than one who
receives an economic benefit from the Federal Government. To rest upon such a distinction
would be to elevate form over substance." Id
293. Id at 1348-49.
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tax scheme and, in particular, the majority did not consider in its opinion
the burdens outlined by the dissent.
298
Washington does not, it seems, constitute a departure from previous deci-
sions. But it does put beyond doubt the broad power of the state and local
governments to fine tune their tax laws in any manner that does not have a
discriminatory economic impact on the Government or those with whom it
deals.
Of the three cases, Colorado has had the most unsettling effect on the
state of the law. It cuts against the basic trend to constrict the once broad
federal immunity concept and it raises specific issues concerning both the
compensating use and possessory use taxes. The questions raised concerning
compensating use taxes revolve around the attempt by the Colorado District
Court and the Tenth Circuit to distinguish Colorado from Boyd. The District
Court plainly missed the essential nature of the compensating use tax in its
analysis of Boyd. The compensating use tax complements the sales tax,
which taxes a particular transaction-sales, it is a transactional tax. On the
other hand, the possessory use tax complements the ad valorem property tax,
which taxes property ownership interests. Unfortunately, the District Court
was seemingly unaware of this distinction.2 99 Without clarifying the lower
court's opinion on this point, the Tenth Circuit, in a conclusory fashion,
noted that the tax in Boyd was sufficiently different from the tax in Colorado
to justify a different result.
3 ° °
But Colorado is more unsettling because of its limitations on the posses-
sory use tax cases Detroit and Muskegon, and its resurrection of Allegheny. In
distinguishing Detroit and Muskegon, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the na-
ture of the contractors' activities. 30 While both Detroit and Muskegon con-
cerned the use of government property in manufacturing businesses, the
contractor in Colorado was merely going onto the property to perform its
management services. 30 2 From this it is clear that the nature of the activity
has taken on a new dimension in possessory use tax cases. But, of course, this
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, what activities may be
taxed under these schemes and what is the proper measurement of the tax.
Following its discussion of Detroit and Muskegon, the Tenth Circuit, rely-
ing on Allegheny, determined that the Colorado tax was in substance an ad
valorem general property tax on property of the United States and, there-
fore, prohibited by the Constitution. 30 3 This determination is significant in
two ways. First, the court's reliance on substance over form is a marked
departure from the formalistic legal incidence test. Second, the court leaves
open the question of what measure short of full valuation is constitutionally
acceptable under the Colorado circumstances.
298. Id at 1355. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 272-276 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
302. Id
303. See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
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III. THE IMPACT OF NEW MEXICO, WASHINGTON AND COLORADO ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES
At one point in its opinion, the New Mexico Court stated: "We cannot
believe that an immunity of constitutional stature rests on such technical con-
siderations, for that approach allows 'any Governmentfunctionay to draw the
constitutional line by changing a few words in the contract.' -304 The "tech-
nical considerations" referred to by the Court were certain contractual pro-
visions included in the contracts between the taxpayer-contractors and the
Government. And, of course, the Government functionaries are the Govern-
ment bureaucrats that prepare, negotiate and administer the Government's
contracts, viz., contracting officers and their legal counsel. While the Court
may be correct in its assertion that constitutional lines should not be drawn
by Government functionaries by merely changing a few words in a contract,
it is the same Government functionaries which must react to the constitu-
tional lines drawn by the Court's "unsteady hand. ' 30 5 In this regard, con-
tracting officers and their legal counsel must be ready to adjust procurement
policies and procedures to comply with the Court's decisions and at the same
time, to the extent feasible, protect the federal fisc from over-zealous state
and local governments. This task is complicated because many states, al-
ready sensitive to the President Reagan's "new federalism" and facing sub-
stantial budget deficits, are searching for additional revenues.
To make matters worse, these cases, particularly New Mexico, have cre-
ated a heightened awareness of the potential revenues that may be obtained
under the proper tax scheme. While it is true that Supreme Court cases
generally have a certain degree of notoriety, New Mexico is especially notable
because of the unprecedented amount of the tax liability finally stipulated
by the parties. The amount agreed to and ultimately paid to the state was
roughly $280 million. 30 6 This figure will undoubtedly arouse other states to
take a hard look at their tax structures to ensure that they are not unnecessa-
rily or unwittingly missing Government contractors.
A. Problems in Contract Formation and Admiistration
Government contracts typically deal with state and local taxes in one of
two ways depending upon the type contract involved. With respect to cost-
type contracts, state and local taxes are generally allowable costs and reim-
bursable to the contractor. 30 7 But if there is a claim of illegality or erroneous
assessment, the taxes are allowable only if the contractor, prior to payment
of such taxes, requests instructions from the contracting officer and takes all
304. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 737 (1982) (emphasis added).
305. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 176 (1944).
306. This situation has drawn considerable attention from the highest levels of the New
Mexico State Government and the Federal Government. Of course, a payment of more than a
quarter of a billion dollars in times of enormous budget deficits attracts considerable attention
and scrutiny by those concerned with such matters.
307. Federal Procurement Regultions, 41 CFR §1-15.205-41 (1983); Defense Acquisition
Regulation 15-205.41 (1983). "In general, taxes ... which the contractor is required to pay
and which are paid or accrued in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles are
allowable .. " Id at §1-15.205-41(1).
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action directed by the contracting officer.308 Thus, under cost-type con-
tracts, contractors are essentially conduits for the payment of taxes; however,
their position is not without risk as they have primary responsibility for the
proper payment of taxes. Improper payment of taxes or the failure to seek
the contracting officer's instructions may result in nonreimbursable costs to
the contractor.
Conversely, fixed-price contracts generally provide that the contract
price includes all applicable taxes. 30 9 Thus, as opposed to a cost-type con-
tractor, a fixed price contractor must include its estimated taxes in the con-
tract price and is not otherwise compensated for such expenses. There are
circumstances, however, when special tax clauses which include or exclude
from the contract price a specific tax may be approved. 310 For example,
"[sluch special treatment may be required . ..where the State or local tax
law has been recently changed, where there is doubt as to the applicability
or allocability of the tax, or where the applicability of the tax is being liti-
gated.13 11 In addition to an amount for those taxes which are clearly valid,
the contractor may also wish to include in the contract price an amount for
questionable taxes.
3 12
To the extent the cases discussed above provide clear and straightfor-
ward guidance they generally make the contracting process less cumber-
some. When liability for tax is not in issue cost-type contractors need not
seek guidance concerning the propriety of the tax and fixed-price contractors
can estimate contract prices with some certainty, obviating the need for spe-
cial tax clauses. A degree of certainty in the tax area facilitates the forma-
tion and administration of Government contracts. On the other hand,
uncertainty in the tax area has just the opposite effect. Cost-type contractors
will find it necessary to seek guidance concerning questionable tax laws and
procedures and fixed-price contractors may, in the absence of a special tax
clause, find it necessary to bid in a contingency amount to cover potential
tax liability.
As noted above, Colorado has had the most unsettling effect on the state
308. The Procurement Regulation provides in pertinent part:
(b) Taxes otherwise allowable under paragraph (a) of this section, but upon which
a claim of illegality or erroneous assessment exists, are allowable provided the contrac-
tor prior to payment of such taxes:
(1) Promptly requests instructions from the contracting officer concerning such
taxes; and
(2) Takes all action directed by the contracting officer arising out of paragraph
(b)(1) of this section or an independent decision of the Government as to the existence
of a claim of illegality or erroneous assessment, including cooperation with and for the
benefit of the Government to (i) determine the legality of such assessment, or
(ii) secure a refund of such taxes. 41 CFR §1-15.205-41.
309. 41 CFR §1-11.401 (1983).
310. Id at §1-11.401-4(a).
311. Id These special tax clauses must typically be approved at a high level within the
various agencies. Id at § I-I 1.401-4(d).
312. If adequate price competition exists, it is unlikely that the bidding contractors will
include an unnecessary contingency amount for questionable taxes and, therefore, a special tax
clause may not be warranted. In a non-competitive atmosphere, however, contractors cannot
be expected to take such risks upon themselves. But, even in a competitive environment, if the
potential tax liability is substantial as compared to the contract price, the competing contrac-
tors may not be willing to accept the risks and a special tax clause may be in order.
19841
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of the law. It has left the states and the Federal Government scrambling to
ascertain the constitutional parameters of the possessory use tax; and, by
necessity, it has left in its wake a litigious atmosphere. This situation has
resulted in numerous contractor requests for guidance and special tax
clauses; it has further burdened an already overburdened procurement
process.
The New Mexico decision left little room for dispute and, therefore, will
not complicate matters in the same way as Colorado. But for those agencies
using the procurement agent concept before New Mexico, it seems that a re-
view of the complex contract provisions used to support the procurement
agent concept is in order. To the extent such provisions serve no other useful
purpose, they should be abandoned.
B. Contracting- Out for Goods and Services or In-House Performance
An Agency may satisfy its needs in one of three ways. It may use its
own employees, requisition its needs from another agency, or procure its re-
quirements from the private sector. While there are many instances where
the choice will be clear-cut, there are other situations where more than one
of the three alternatives is practicable. But because of concern that the Gov-
ernment should not compete with private enterprise, the executive branch
has expressed a policy favoring the use of the private sector to the maximum
extent practicable. 3 13 In this context, the Office of Management and
Budget Circuilar A-76 provides in part:
In a democratic free enterprise economic system, the Government
should not compete with its citizens. The private enterprise sys-
tem, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the pri-
mary source of national economic strength. In recognition of this
principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of the
Government to rely on competitive private enterprise to supply the
products and services it needs.
314
Of course, there are other factors to be considered. Among other things, the
agency must determine whether it is more cost-effective to perform the func-
tion in-house or to contract with the private sector.31 5 This is done by a
"cost comparison" study, using detailed cost data to compare the cost of in-
house performance with the cost of contracting-out.
31 6
One major cost issue associated with contracting-out is state and local
taxes. In this regard, tax provisions like those upheld in New Mexico and
Washington and rejected in Colorado could have a significant impact on the
cost comparison study and, ultimately, on the decision to contract out rather
than provide the products or services with in-house capability.
In passing, it should be noted that it is decidedly more difficult to bring
in-house a function previously contracted out than to contract out for a
313. OMB Circular A-76, Poliies for Acquiring Commercial or Industrial Products and Services
Needed by the Government (1982).
314. Id
315. Cost Comparison Handbook, Supplement No. I to OMB Circular A-76 (1979).
316. Id
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function previously performed in-house. First, the agencies may lack the ex-
pertise or facilities necessary to bring a function in-house. But also, there is a
general reluctance to expand the structural bureaucracy. Thus, notwith-
standing that it may be more cost effective to perform the function in-house,
the institutional bias for contracting out may prevail. In the same context,
while state and local taxes may make it more costly to contract out than to
perform in-house, as noted above, the reality of the situation may well be
that the agency will continue to contract out.
C. Budget Considerattwns
It is estimated that during fiscal year 1982 the Government spent $158
billion on the procurement of supplies and services. 3 ' 7 Assuming an aggre-
gate state and local tax of 5% on the gross amount of $158 billion, the impact
on the procurement budget is $8 billion. But whatever the actual liability
may be, it seems certain that it is a significant amount. What is more signifi-
cant though is that the amount of state and local taxes paid in connection
with Government procurements is not considered in the budget process.
Moreover, in spite of the substantial amounts involved, the executive agen-
cies do not have any systematic means of ascertaining the amount of state
and local taxes paid. The problem is that Congress is generally unaware of
this situation when it considers the agencies budget submissions. The prob-
lem is exacerbated by the serious fiscal problems facing most state and local
governments that have forced them to search out additional revenues.
Aside from the aggregate impact of state and local taxes on the federal
budget, there is also a question concerning the allocation of this amount to
the various states. Naturally, those states with the largest dollar share of
Government procurement activities are in the best position to increase their
revenues at the expense of the Federal Government. 3 18 While there is noth-
ing inherently wrong with such disparate sharing of federal revenues, and
while it may be true that there is a rational basis for allocating federal reve-
nue based on the amount of Government activity within a state, it seems
that Congress should be made aware of the issue so that there can be a
meaningful discussion of the varied and competing interests involved.
319
In brief, if the Congress is to make any meaningful policy decisions con-
cerning the state and local taxation of Government contractors, the agencies
must provide information to the Congress concerning the aggregate taxes
paid and the allocation of these taxes. 320 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
317. Obtained from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Federal Procurement Data
System.
318. Of course, the extent to which a community takes advantage of the Federal Govern-
ment's largesse, will depend on its tax policies and procedures.
319. There are many competing interests in this area and plenty of room for reasonable men
to differ. For example, the federal agencies might argue that the states are sufficiently benefit-
ted by the performance of Government contracts within their states. On the other hand, the
states may argue that the Government and its contractors receive benefits and increase the costs
of providing services to the community and, therefore, must share in the responsibility of paying
for such service.
320. While the information may not be available in a precise form, particularly with regard
to fixed price contracts, it can certainly be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
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how the Congress and the agencies can develop a budget without fully un-
derstanding the impact of state and local taxes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Government and its contractors may find relief from state
and local taxes in one of two ways: (1) under the constitutional immunity
implied by the courts from the Supremacy Clause; or (2) by congressional
statutory immunity. With respect to the former, the Court has established a
two-tiered test for determining the constitutional validity of these tests.
First, the tax may not be laid directly on the Federal Government, and sec-
ond, the tax may not discriminate against the Federal Government or those
with whom it deals. In practice, these principles have provided little relief to
the Government or its contractors when the contractors and their activities
are the subject of taxation. Significant questions remain, however, concern-
ing the extent to which possessory use taxes may be applied to the Govern-
ment and its contractors. But aside from this vestige of the once broad
immunity doctrine, it is apparent that if the executive branch wants addi-
tional relief from state and local taxation, it must be through the Congress.
If Congress is to consider this complex problem with such vast political
and economic implications, the federal agencies must document the magni-
tude and nature of the problem. The executive branch should begin now to
develop the necessary data to demonstrate the aggregate tax burden and the
allocation of this amount to the various states. If the agencies expect statu-
tory relief from state and local taxes, they must make a case by demonstrat-
ing, inter ah'a, that the state and local taxes are excessive in light of the
services provided by the state and local governments. Any effort by the
executive branch to obtain statutory immunity will no doubt be met with
violent opposition and intense lobbying. But Congress and the agencies
should be made aware of the situation if for no other reason than because of
the significant impact on the procurement budget. It should be understood
by those who scrutinize the budget that state and local taxes are more than
an incidental cost of contracting.
In addition to documenting the state and local tax situation, the execu-
tive agencies must continue to ferret out and challenge improper tax
schemes. In particular, the agencies must remain vigilant in challenging, as
appropriate, possessory use tax schemes. And the agencies must make the
most of the situation by developing procurement policies and procedures to
minimize the impact of the proper tax schemes. To the extent practicable,
the agencies may want to channel their procurements to states that impose
lesser tax burdens. In the same context, the agencies may want to encourage
contractors to locate in such states. Depending on the particular tax scheme,
the agencies may also find that it is more economical to purchase the sup-
plies and provide them to the contractor for use in performance of the con-
tract rather than have the contractor purchase the supplies. And, of course,
the agencies may find it more economical to perform certain functions in-
house rather than contract out for them.
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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS PROVIDING
FOR FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW SELECTION
ANNE E. COVEY*
MICHAEL S. MORRIS**
This article shall examine the enforceability of agreements providing for
forum and choice of law selection. The forum selection clause and the
choice of law clause will be analyzed separately. The enforceability of a
forum selection clause involves a question of the court's jurisdiction. The
enforceability of a choice of law clause involves the determination of the
appropriate law to be applied.
Each type of clause is a separate and distinct issue, providing for differ-
ent considerations in resolution of whether the clause is enforceable. How-
ever, pertinent to both issues are the following Conflict of Laws values: (1)
predictability, (2) advancement of the relevant policies of concerned states,
(3) advancement of the basic policies underlying the field of law, and (4)
simplicity.
I. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
A. Introduction
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in M/S Bremen and Unterweser
Reederei v. Zapata Offshore Co.' departed from the traditional American view
that forum selection clauses are unenforceable because they are contrary to
public policy and oust the courts of jurisdiction.2 The Court framed the
issue to be addressed in determining the enforceability of the forum selection
* B.A., University of Delaware, 1981; J.D., Delaware Law School, 1984; member of the
Pennsylvania Bar.
** B.A., Holy Cross College, 1978; J.D., 1984, LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University,
1985; member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The Bremen decision has been extensively analyzed. See Collins,
Choice ofForum and the Exercise ofJudicial Discretion - The Resolution of an Anglo-American Conflict, 22
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 332 (1973); Collins, Forum Selection and An Anglo-American Conflict - The Sad
Case of The Chaparral, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 550 (1971); Delaume, Choice of Forum Clauses and the
American Forum Patriae; Something Happened on the Way to the Forum.- Zapata and Silver, 4 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 295 (1973); Farquhason, Choice ofForum Clauses - A Brie/Survey of Anglo-American Law, 8
INT'L LAW. 83 (1974); Juenger, Supreme Court Validation ofForum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 49 (1972); Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata." Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal
Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387 (1973); Nadelman, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United
States. The Road to Zapata, 21 Am. J. COMp. L. 124 (1973); Reese, The Supreme Court Supports
Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAw. 530 (1973); Note, The Enforcement of Forum
Selection Provisions in International Commercial Agreements, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1972);
Note, Choice of Forum, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 145 (1973).
2. 407 U.S. at 9. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957).
Judge Learned Hand in addressing the issue of the enforceability of forum-selection clauses
in 1949 said:
be the original reasons good or bad, courts have for long looked with strong disfavor
upon contracts by which a party surrenders resort to any forum which was lawfully
open to him. . . . In truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute
taboo against such contracts at all; in the words of the Restatement, they are invalid
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
clause as follows: whether that court should have exercised its jurisdiction to
do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, mani-
fested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the fo-
rum selection clause. 3 The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that
forum selection clauses "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the
circumstances." 4
The Bremen case involved a private international towage agreement
whereby the plaintiff, Zapata, an American corporation, contracted with the
defendant, Unterweser, a German corporation, to tow Zapata's drilling rig
from Louisiana to Italy.5 While the flotilla was in international waters a
severe storm arose which resulted in serious damage to the drilling rig.
6
Zapata instructed the Bremen to tow its damaged rig to Tampa, Florida, the
nearest port of refuge.
7
Subsequently, Zapata instituted an admiralty suit in Florida against
Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in rem, alleging negligent towage
and breach of contract.8 Unterweser responded by invoking the forum selec-
tion clause which provided that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before
the London Court of Justice," and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 9
The Court, in addressing the issue of the enforceability of the forum
selection clause, reasoned that the expansion of American business and in-
dustry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we
insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws in our courts.10 The Court noted that "manifestly much uncertainty
and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could be
maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if juris-
diction were left to any place where the Bremen or Unterweser might hap-
pen to be found."' "I Thus, the Court ruled, "the elimination of all such
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is
an indispensable element in international trade, commerce and
only when unreasonable .... What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more
than a general hostility, which can be overcome, but which nevertheless does persist.
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 560-61 (2d Cir.) (Hand. J., concurring), cert.
denizd, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
In the Bremen case the Court stated that "the argument that such clauses are improper
because they tend to oust a court ofjurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction. No
one seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause 'ousted' the District Court of
jurisdiction over Zapata's action." 407 U.S. at 12.
3. 407 U.S. at 12.
4. Id at 10.
5. Id at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. I at 3-4.
9. Id. at 4. Unterweser also argued forum non conveniens, or in the alternative to stay the
action pending submission of the dispute to the London Court of Justice. Id
10. Id at 9. The Court noted that the enforceability of forum selection clauses is in accord
with other common-law countries including England, noted scholars, and the RESTATEMENT
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. Further, "it accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract
and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of American contractors who seek busi-
ness in all parts of the world." 407 U.S. at 11.
11. 407 U.S. at 13.
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contracting." 12
The Court established a four-prong test in determining the enforceabil-
ity of a forum selection clause. The Court held that the forum clause should
be specifically enforced unless the party resisting enforcement of the clause
can clearly show that, first, enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,
or second, the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.13
Moreover, the "contractual choice-of-forum clauses shall be held unenforce-
able if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought," 14 or if the resisting party can "show that trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court."'
5
B. The Aftermath of Bremen
Although the Bremen Court specifically limited its holding to federal dis-
trict courts sitting in admiralty, 16 the ruling and rationale of the Bremen deci-
sion has been applied by the courts to forum selection clauses generally.17
12. Id at 13-14. In support of this conclusion the Court cited National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964), which held, "that parties to a contract may agree
in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether."
A forum selection clause may also be interpreted as a consent or submission to the desig-
nated court's jurisdiction. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 101 (1977).
13. 407 U.S. at 15. The party resisting enforcement of the forum clause bears a heavy
burden of proof. Id. at 18, 19.
14. Id. The Court ruled that the public policy may be declared by statute or judicial deci-
sion. The Court rejected Zapata's argument that the exculpatory clause contained in the agree-
ment violated American public policy as expressed in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349
U.S. 85 (1955). It held that these cases were inapposite because they involved a towage business
in American waters and the policy expressed did not extend to the instant case. 407 U.S. at 15-
16.
15. 407 U.S. at 18. The Court reasoned:
where it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time they entered the con-
tract, the parties to a freely negotiated private international commercial agreement
contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of
inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause unenforceable.
Id at 16.
16. Id. at 10.
17. In support of expanding the Bremen holding to forum selection clauses generally, the
courts have relied on the fact that the Bremen Court cited cases to sustain its position that were
not limited to admiralty suits. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing
an arbitration forum clause based on Bremen); See also Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am.
Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982) (the Bremen Court's reasoning applies to domestic suits in light
of the Scherk Court's adoption of Bremen which involved federal jurisdiction other than admiralty
and the Bremen Court's statement that the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is simply the
other side of the proposition recognized in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311 (1964), a case which involved no international question); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Va. 1982) (while the court in Bremen stated that this is
the correct doctrine to be followed in admiralty, the court relied, in support of the rule it ac-
cepted, on cases that are not so limited, and that also indicates that this is the proper doctrine to
apply to forum selection clauses generally); Hoes of Am. Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D.
I1. 1979) (rationale of Bremen extends beyond admiralty to civil actions in contract and tort as
well); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (although the Supreme Court deci-
sion came in the context of a choice between a forum in this country and one in England, the
principles announced in it would seem equally applicable to domestic choice of forum ques-
tions). C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COPPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803
(1976).
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Thus, the Bremen decision has become the focal point in determining the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.
The issue of the enforceability of agreements providing for forum selec-
tion usually arises when the contractual parties have stipulated in their
agreement that suit shall be maintained in a specified forum and the plain-
tiff commences suit in violation of that agreement.' 8 In defense to this ac-
tion the defendant raises the forum selection clause and moves to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. Where the action is commenced in a state court the
forum will determine the enforceability of the forum selection clause accord-
ing to its law.' 9 However, where the action involves diversity jurisdiction,
the federal courts are divided on whether state law under the Erie doctrine
20
or federal law applies.2 ' The importance of this determination is based on
18. A typical forum clause provides that jurisdiction or venue arising from any causes of
action between the parties to the contract shall be in state X. Frequently, the language of the
forum selection clause is a decisive factor in the court's determination of which court is the
proper forum to hear the dispute. See Bense, 683 F.2d at 720 (any dispute arising directly or
indirectly from this agreement); Miller Concrete Prod. Corp. v. Quickset Vault Sales Corp., 309
F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (any cause of action interpreted as providing for either state
or federal court); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. at 974 (language interpreted to mean suit
could be brought only in state court not in federal court).
Even where the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary seeking to enforce the contract, it has
generally been held that he is bound by the forum clause. The basis for the courts' rulings in
applying the Bremen rule to third party beneficiaries is the general contract principle that a third
party beneficiary has no greater rights than those of the contracting party through which it
claims. Further, the third party beneficiary is sufficiently protected by the "reasonableness"
requirement. See Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205
(W.D. Va. 1982); Process and Storage Vessels v. Tank Service, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725, 733 (D.
Del. 1982); Hoes, 493 F. Supp. at 1209.
This Note examines a written forum selection clause, not an oral forum selection clause.
19. Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 A.2d 231 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Kronovet
v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980).
20. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (in a diversity case the federal court shall
follow the substantive law of the state in which it sits).
21. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965), held that the rule of Erie is rooted in part
in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation to materially
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court rather than a state court.
The following cases held that state law determined the enforceability of the choice of forum
clause: Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Leasewell Ltd. v. Jake
Sheton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. l011, 1015 (S.D. Va. 1976).
The following cases held that the federal rule in Bremen governed the enforceability of the
choice of forum clause: Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp.
815, 818 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 401 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D.
Mass. 1975); Gaskin v. Stumn Handel Gmb H, 390 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The following cases did not resolve the issue, because the state and federal laws on the
enforceability of forum selection clauses were substantially the same: Coastal Steel Corp. v.
Tilghman Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 709 F.2d 190, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. National
Equip. Rental, 643 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1981); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966); Process and Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725, 732-33 (Del. 1982); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967, 980 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The Supreme Court in The Bremen and in Scherk appears to have assumed without
saying so that in a federal forum the enforceability of a forum selection clause is deter-
mined by a generally applicable federal law. This court in Copperweld Steel Co. v.
Kemag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 956-66 (3d Cir. 1978), appears to have
made the same unarticulated assumption. It is not entirely clear why, absent a statute
such as the Federal Arbitration Act, the enforceability of a contractual forum selection
clause should properly be divorced from the law which in other respects governs the
contract.
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the fact that not only is there an issue regarding the enforceability of the
clause, but also its impact on procedural rules.
22
Therefore, the federal court's determination of whether state or federal
law applies not only affects the decision of whether the clause is enforceable,
but also whether the issue is one of jurisdiction or venue, which affects the
status of the case and the costs incurred. As a consequence of this uncer-
tainty, the predictability to be afforded by the insertion of the forum clause
is substantially lessened.
Choice of forum clauses have become more prevalent in commercial
contracts since the Bremen decision, which pronounced the presumptive va-
lidity of such clauses. The Bremen Court cited several reasons for the enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses. First, the transaction involved a freely
negotiated private international agreement. 23 Second, the parties sought to
provide for a neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes. 24 Third, "the
elimination of all uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum accepta-
ble to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, com-
merce and contracting."'25 Additional reasons for upholding an agreement
containing a forum clause are freedom of contract, 26 predictability, 27 expec-
tation of the parties28 and that the clause was part of the bargained for
agreement.
29
709 F.2d at 201.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) provides that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought" (change of venue).
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982) provides that "the district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought" (defec-
tive venue).
There is a distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction is the power and au-
thority of a court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding. Venue is the geographical area
in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
766, 1396 (5th ed. 1979).
Central Contracting Co. v. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (1965),
held:
The modern and correct rule is that, while private parties may not by contract prevent
a court from asserting its jurisdiction or change the rules of venue, nevertheless, a court
in which venue is proper and which has jurisdiction should decline to proceed with the
cause when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in another
forum and where such agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation.
23. 407 U.S. at 13.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 11.
27. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (a contractual provision specifying
in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated is an almost indispensable precondi-
tion to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction); V. Tilghman Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 709 F.2d 190, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1983) (the
primary rationale for enforcement of forum selection clauses, is that those clauses promote sta-
ble and dependable trade relations); Gordonsvdle Indus. 549 F. Supp. at 205 (by including the
forum clause in the contract, the two parties eliminated the uncertainties and great inconve-
niences that both parties could confront by being forced to adjudicate the contract in a forum
unfamiliar to both parties).
28. 407 U.S. at 12.
29. Id. at 14 (the court noted, "There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital
part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause
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Notwithstanding these reasons in favor of upholding a forum selection
clause, the enforcement of such a clause is not an absolute right.30 The
Bremen decision and its progeny have pronounced limitations to the enforce-
ability of forum selection clauses. The primary limitations as discussed be-
low are fraud, public policy, adhesion, statutory restrictions and
inconvenience of the contractual forum.
C. Limitations
1. Fraud
The Bremen Court ruled that the forum clause should be specifically en-
forced unless the resisting party could clearly show that the clause was inva-
lid for reasons of fraud or overreaching. 3 1 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. the
Supreme Court further defined this rule:
This qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising
out of a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud . . .the
clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that [a] . ..forum selec-
tion clause in a contract is not enforceable if the incluszon of that
clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion.
32
Thus, when the issue of fraud is raised it must first be determined
whether the fraud was in the inducement of the forum selection clause or in
the inducement of the agreement. If the fraud relates to the agreement and
the forum selection clause is otherwise valid the clause will be given effect.
The issues involved are separate and distinct and the mere allegation of the
invalidity of the agreement will not avoid enforcement of the forum clause.
33
2. Public Policy
Similarly, agreements providing for forum selection have been held un-
enforceable where they contravene a public policy of the forum state. 34 The
Bremen Court ruled that a contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held
figuring prominently in their calculations"); Hoes, 493 F. Supp. at 1207 (it is uncontradicted
that the defendant considered the forum provision essential and would not have entered the
contract unless agreed to by the plaintiff).
30. Coastal Steel Corp. 709 F.2d at 196. Leflar contends that "[c]hoice-of-forum contract
provisions are today generally regarded as neither absolutely binding nor absolutely void, but
rather as factors which help a court to exercise its discretion on a reasonable basis as to whether
its legally existent jurisdiction ought to be exercised." LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 100.
31. 407 U.S. at 15 (a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by
fraud should be given effect).
32. 417 U.S. at 519 n.14 (emphasis original).
33. Giordano v. I.R. Witzer, Co., 558 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (the plaintiff's charge of fraud in
the inducement of the agreement of sale is not sufficient to invalidate the forum selection
clause); A.C. Miller Concrete Prod. v. Quikset Vault Sales, 309 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 n.2
(notwithstanding "plaintiff's attack against the substance of the agreement ... to allow him to
upset the venue provisions as well . . . would be to provide an easy escape from such provisions
by merely calling the entire contract into question"). See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT
§ 3(4), which provides that a choice-of-forum clause will be enforced unless it was obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means. (The
Act was cited with approval in Bremen).
34. Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963); Bisso v.
Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon,
642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981); Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
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unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision. 35 The Court illustrated this limitation by indicating that selection
of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to an essentially American
controversy might otherwise contravene an important public policy of the
forum.
3 6
However, what constitutes a strong public policy is not adequately de-
fined and the courts may interpose other reasons for upholding the clause.
For example, in Hoes of America, Inc. v. Hoei 7 the plaintiff objected to trial in
Germany, the stipulated forum, on the grounds that there was no right to
trial by jury, limited opportunity for discovery that was deemed essential to
the dispute, and no right to punitive damages. 38 The Court rejected the
public policy argument and held that the German law was well settled on all
of these points at the time of contracting.
39
Thus, the issue of whether a forum clause will be unenforceable as con-
travening a public policy depends on (1) the strength of the policy in relation
to the policy of upholding forum clauses, and (2) the impact such decision
will have on the forum.
3. Adhesion Contracts
In Bremen the Court emphasized that the agreement containing the fo-
rum selection clause was consummated in an arm's-length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen. 40 This fact was decisive to the
Court's ruling that forum clauses are prima facie valid, for the Court noted
that such a rule would be inapplicable where the agreement was affected by
undue influence, overweening bargaining power or overreaching.
4 '
Adhesion contracts 42 providing for forum selection are generally held
35. 407 U.S. at 15. See supra note 14.
36. 407 U.S. at 17. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 906 (5th Cir. 1970)
Judge Wisdom in his dissent reasoned:
In cases of bunkruptcy, divorce, successions, real rights and regulation of public au-
thorities, for example, courts cannot remit the dispute to a foreign forum lest a foreign
court render a decree conflicting with our ordering of these affairs. And in cases where
objectionable activity within our jurisdiction would be encouraged by the foreign
court's decree, we would reach a similar result.
37. 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. 11. 1979).
38. Id at 1209.
39. Id The court noted that under Bremen parties can waive important substantive and
procedural rights. However, the plaintiff cannot waive his right to some type of full and fair
hearing on his claims. Id MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(2) provides that a choice-of-
forum clause will be enforced unless the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the state of the
contractual forum. See J. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
Ky. L.J. 1, 43 (1976).
40. 407 U.S. at 12.
41. Id at 12, 15. Where it is found that the contract providing for forum selection is one of
adhesion the clause will not be enforced. However, the contrary is true where the contract is
invalid for reason of fraud and the forum selection clause is otherwise valid. See supra notes 32-
33 and accompanying text.
42. The term adhesion contracts originated as "contract d'adhesion" as used by Raymond
Saleilles in his book DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE 229 (1901). He defined adhesion con-
tracts as those:
in which one predominant unilateral will dictates its law to an undetermined multi-
tude rather than to an individual . . . as in all employment contracts of big industry,
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unenforceable. 43 However, notwithstanding this defense to the enforcement
of a forum selection clause, the courts give weight to a showing of inequality
of bargaining power and lack of free negotiations. 44 The mere allegation
that the contract was a pre-printed form issued by a large corporation and
the plaintiff had no opportunity to read the agreement is not sufficient to
overcome the Bremen rule.
45
4. Statutory Restrictions
An additional limitation or defense to the enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause is statutory restrictions. 46 The primary considerations in the
strength of this defense are the statute involved and the court's interpreta-
tion of the statute.
Generally, a forum selection clause will be held unenforceable where
the statute expresses a public policy which would be contravened by enforce-
ment of the clause. An example of this type of statute is the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).4 7 The Act provides that any clause in a con-
tract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability or lessening
transportation contracts of big railroad companies and all those contracts which, as
the Romans said, resemble a law much more than a meeting of the minds.
Ste also Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1970); FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 295 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Union Ins. Socy, 642 F.2d at 724 (denied enforcement of the forum clause,
holding that the terms of the bill of lading were not agreed to through hard bargaining, but
rather represented the forum clauses of an adhesion contract); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510
F. Supp. 905, 908-09 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (refusing to enforce a forum-enforcement clause not freely
bargained for between the parties). But see, Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 873
(D. Minn. 1980) (finding the forum selection clause not unreasonable).
The remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or that
the parties did not have the particular controversy in mind when they made their agreement;
yet even there the party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof. 407 U.S. at 17. See
LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 101.
44. See e.g., Hoffman v. National Equipment Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d at 991 (4th Cir. 1981)
(the fact that the forum and process clauses appeared in a form contract used by a large corpo-
ration is not sufficient to nullify the plaintiffs consent; ignorance due to failure to read is not an
excuse; this was not a common "take-it-or-leave-it" form of contract); Mercury Coal & Coke,
Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (each party pos-
sessed a sophisticated knowledge of the coal industry; although the defendant was the more
substantial concern, the plaintiff did not suffer from a dearth of commercial expertise; ignorance
due to failure to read the contract is no excuse); Richardson Engineering, 554 F. Supp. at 469
(holding that plaintiff, an experienced and sophisticated business entity, cannot complain of
overweening bargaining power). See also North River Ins. Co. v. Fed Sea/Fed Pac. Line, 647
F.2d 985, 988 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia,
Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1974); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir.
1973); Giordano v. Witzer, 558 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Quick Erectors, Inc. v.
Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351, 356 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Paterson, Zochones (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Compania United Arrows, 493 F. Supp. 626, 630 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Full-Sight Contact Lens
Corp. v. Soft Lenses Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) comment a provides: a fo-
rum selection clause will be disregarded if it is the result of overreaching or the unfair use of
unequal bargaining power. See also MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT, § 3(4) (1968).
45. See Hoffman, 643 F.2d at 991.
46. This defense is similar to the defense of public policy. The Brenen court ruled that a
contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or
by judicial decision. 407 U.S. at 15.
47. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void and of no effect. 48 The congressional purpose which led to the enact-
ment of the COGSA was to reduce uncertainty concerning the responsibili-
ties and liabilities of carriers, shippers and underwriters who insure
waterborne cargo.
49
The Act has been interpreted as invalidating any contractual provision
that would prevent cargo able to obtain jurisdiction over a carrier in an
American court from having that court entertain the suit and apply the sub-
stantive rules Congress had prescribed. 50 Thus, it has been held that the
general policy of the enforceability of forum selection clauses must abdicate
before the specific policy enunciated by Congress through COGSA. 5 ' The
Bremen decision has been held not to control because forum selection clauses
are presumptively valid only in the absence of any congressional policy on
the subject.
52
However, the courts are divided regarding the issue of whether the
Bremen rule governs agreements providing for forum selection when COGSA
is not otherwise applicable but has been incorporated by contract. 53 It has
48. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8). COGSA applies to every bill of lading or similar document which
is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in
foreign trade. 46 U.S.C. § 1300.
49. H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
50. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (1967). The Court interpreted
§ 1303(8) of COGSA to prohibit forum selection clauses:
A clause making a claim triable only in a foreign court would almost certainly lessen
liability if the law which the court would apply was neither the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act nor the Hague Rules. Even when the foreign court would apply one or the
other of these regimes, requiring trial abroad might lessen the carrier's liability since
there could be no assurance that it would apply them in the same way as would an
American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the Supreme Court, and § 3(8)
can well be read as covering a potential and not simply a demonstrable lessening of
liability.
377 F.2d at 203-04. Indussa overruled Wm. H. Muller &Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903. See also Union Ins. Soc>, 642 F.2d at 725 n.4; Zima
Corp. v. M.V. Roman Pazinski, 493 F. Supp. 268, 276 nn.13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Cf Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296 (lst Cir. 1974); Roach v.
Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
51. See Union Ins. Soc)', 642 F.2d at 725. See also supra note 50.
52. See Union Ins. Soc), 642 F.2d at 724. This court also suggested that COGSA was not
applicable to the Bremen case because no bill of lading was involved and a mobile offshore
drilling rig is not a "good" while being towed within the meaning of the Act. 642 F.2d at 724
n.3. See 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b) and (c). See also 407 U.S. at 10 n. 11.
53. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 provides that any bill of lading for the carriage of goods by sea be-
tween domestic ports, "containing an express statement that it shall be subject to the provisions
of this chapter, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject hereto by the express provisions of
this chapter."
§ 1312 applies only when COGSA is incorporated into domestic carriage contracts otherwise
governed by the Harter Act. North River Ins. Co., 647 F.2d at 988.
See, Pan American World Airways v. California Stevedore & Ballast, 559 F.2d 1173, 1175
n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (held that when the parties contracted for the application of COGSA to
domestic carriage, all terms inconsistent with the Act were invalid); Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. M.V.
Glory River, 464 F.Supp. 1004, 1004 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
The following cases held that under the language of § 1312 parties may contract for terms
inconsistent with COGSA while at the same time agreeing to incorporate the Act into their
contract of carriage: North River Ins. Co. 647 F.2d at 989 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948
(1982); Ralston Purina Co. v. Barge Juneau & Gulf Carribbean Marine Lines, Inc., 619 F.2d
374, 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Commonwealth Petro-chemicals, Inc. v. S/S Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322
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been held that COGSA does not preempt all contract terms when its sole
force is by incorporation into a contract for foreign transportation. 54 There-
fore, Bremen is the correct rule to follow in such circumstances in determining
the enforceability of the forum clause.
5 5
The Federal Railway Labor Act 56 has also been interpreted as expres-
sing a public policy which has resulted in the invalidation of forum selection
clauses.5 7 The Act has been interpreted as prohibiting any agreement limit-
ing liability, including liability to be sued in the forum of the plaintiff's
choice.5 8 Therefore, in effect, a forum selection clause has been held as limit-
ing the defendant's liability and thus unenforceable as contrary to statutory
policy.
Cases involving the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts 59 have raised
similar issues of whether a forum selection clause is unenforceable as contra-
vening congressional policy. Contrary to the previously cited cases, it has
generally been held that enforcement of the forum clause would not subvert
any congressional purpose and the Clayton Act venue provision may be
(4th Cir. 1979); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Ashland Oil Co.-Thomas Petroleum Transit Div., 527 F.2d
502, 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
54. North River Ins. Co., 647 F.2d at 989. See supra note 53.
55. 647 F.2d at 989.
56. 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1982).
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to
the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon free-
dom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or
otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the
complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization
to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151a.
57. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); Krenger v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949). The Boyddecision was cited with
approval in Bremen. 407 U.S. at 15. See also Aacon Auto Transp., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (applied Boydto the
Interstate Commerce Act § 20(11), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1982)). § 20(11) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act provides:
Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of
this chapter . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to
the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury. . . and no contract, receipt,
rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability imposed; . . .
any such limitation . . . [is] unlawful and void ...
58. See supra note 57. The same result has been reached in cases involving the Miller Act,
40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(d) (1982). See United States ex. rel. Giglielle v. Sovereign Constr. Co., 311 F.
Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1970). Contra In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979).
§ 270(b) of the Miller Act provides:
Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of the United
States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District Court for any
district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere,
irrespective of the amount in controversy in such suit.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). 15 U.S.C. § 22 provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found to transact business; and all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
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waived by contract.
60
Similarly, in Scherk the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the forum selection clause to arbitrate disputes was unenforceable under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereun-
der.6 ' The Court held
[aln agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the
situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dis-
pute. The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us
would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn prom-
ise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.
62
It was found that no congressional policy would be violated by enforcement
of the forum clause.
The Bankruptcy Code 63 has also been interpreted as not prohibiting the
enforcement of forum selection clauses.64 The congressional policy underly-
ing the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a broad protective federal jurisdiction
to facilitate the collection and distribution of debtors' estates. Notwithstand-
ing this policy it has been held that the parties' forum selection clause will be
upheld.
65
Therefore, the determination of whether a statutory restriction will pre-
vent enforcement of a forum selection clause is dependent on the particular
statute at issue and the court's interpretation of the underlying policy.
5. Inconvenience of the Contractual Forum
The first prong of the Bremen test provides that a forum clause shall be
specifically enforced unless the resisting party could clearly show that en-
forcement would be unreasonable or unjust. 6 6 The Court defined unreason-
ableness to be that the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the plaintiff will for all practical purposes be deprived of
60. Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 720; Full-Sight Contact Lens, Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc.,
466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT § 3(2).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a), provides: "[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any
rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
62. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. at 519. The Court distinguished the present case from Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which held the arbitration forum clause as violative of the policy
expressed in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982). The basis for the Court's distinc-
tion was the language and purpose of the two Acts.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982).
64. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 202.
65. Id. The Court noted:
when relying on a contract in proceeding brought under section 1471(b), a trustee or
debtor takes the contract as the parties made it. Nothing in the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code has been called to our attention suggesting that Congress in-
tended to make a change in the public policy favoring forum clauses which is mani-
fested in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976), or in the common law
announced in the Bremen and similar state and federal cases.
709 F.2d at 202.
66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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his day in court. 6 7 However, the Court qualified this limitation by adding a
foreseeability element. The Court reasoned that where it can be said with
reasonable assurance that at the time the parties entered into the contract
they contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any
such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause un-
enforceable. 68 Notwithstanding the element of foreseeability, the courts ad-
dress the issue of inconvenience as of the time of litigation.
69
Although there are few guidelines in determining what constitutes un-
reasonableness, it has been unanimously held that a mere claim of inconven-
ience or additional expense is not unreasonable. 70 However, the location of
the parties and witnesses is generally a factor in determining the reasonable-
ness of the contractual forum.7 Thus, the determination of whether a forum
clause is unreasonable is decided on a case-by-case basis depending upon the
particular facts involved.
72
Similar to the claim of inconvenience of the contractual forum is the
67. 407 U.S. at 17. The Court observed that where an agreement between two Americans
provided for resolution of their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum, the serious
inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater weight
in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause; yet even there the party claiming incon-
venience should bear a heavy burden of proof. Id.
68. Id at 16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 which provides
that the parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot deprive a state court of jurisdic-
tion, but such an agreement will be given effect if it is fair and reasonable. Comment a explains
further that such a provision will be disregarded, however, if the forum chosen by the parties
would be seriously inconvenient for the trial of the particular action. The MODEL CHOICE OF
FORUM ACT § 3(3) provides that a choice-of-forum clause will be enforced unless the contrac-
tual forum would be substantially less convenient for trial of the action.
69. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co., 209 A.2d at 816, cited with approval in Bremen, held an
agreement containing a forum selection clause "is unreasonable only where its enforcement
would, under all circumstances existing at the time of the litigation, seriously impair plaintiffs
ability to pursue his cause of action." See also Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at 344; Anastasi
Bros., Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 863-64; Full-Sight Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 73; Process and Storage
Vessels, 541 F. Supp. at 733. (All courts holding that although the contractual forum may not
be the most convenient forum it is by no means an unreasonable site).
70. Central Contracting, Co., 209 A.2d at 816. The Court ruled:
Mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness since it
can be assumed that the plaintiff received under the contract consideration for these
things. If the agreed upon forum is available to [the] plaintiff and said forum can do
substantial justice to the cause of action then [the] plaintiff should be bound by his
agreement.
Id. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203; Bense, 683 F.2d at 722; Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at
344; Gordonsville Indus., 549 F. Supp. at 205; Anastas, Bros., 519 F. Supp. at 864; Full-Sight 466 F.
Supp. at 344; Spatr, 364 F. Supp. at 981 (lack of proof of unreasonableness is fatal to the plain-
tiff's claim); Elia Corp., 391 A.2d at 216. See supra note 29.
71. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203; Mercuq Coal &Coke, Inc., 696 F.2d at 318; Bense, 683
F.2d at 722; Copperweld Steel Co., 578 F.2d at 965; Central Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at 344; Richard-
son Engineering, 541 F. Supp. at 73; Process and Storage Vessels, 519 F. Supp. at 864; Full-Sight
Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 73; Elia Corp., 391 A.2d at 216 (The Elha court rejected the follow-
ing factors in determining whether the forum selection clause was unreasonable: The law gov-
erning the formation and construction of the contract, the residences of the parties, the place of
execution and/or performance). Even where the contractual forum may inconvenience wit-
nesses because of the distance, the courts' normal response is the use of depositions. See 407 U.S.
at 19 (there is no reason to conclude that Zapata could not use deposition testimony to equal
advantage if forced to litigate in London as it bound itself to do).
72. The Bremen Court remanded the case to the district court on the issue of unreasonable-
ness. 407 U.S. at 19-20.
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defense of forum non conveniens. 73 However, these limitations or defenses
are separate and distinct issues, involving separate considerations, and are
recognized as such by the courts. 74 The primary consideration under a
claim of forum non conveniens is that the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed, placing a heavy burden of proof upon the defendant to
show that the balance is strongly in his favor. 75 Whereas, under an allega-
tion of inconvenience of the contractual forum the plaintiff has the heavy
burden of proving not only that the balance of convenience is strongly in his
favor, but also that trial in the contractual forum will effectively deprive him
of a meaningful day in court. 76 Thus, the inconvenience of the contractual
forum is a more stringent test to satisfy.
73. The forum non conveniens doctrine was defined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). The Court stated, "The principle ofform non corwenies is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a
general venue statute." Id at 507 (emphasis original). The Court established the following
guidelines:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the
enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advan-
tages and obstacles to fair trial. . . . Factors of public interest also have a place in
applying the doctrine.
Id. at 508. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
[In the determination of a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion, a forum selection clause is
merely one of many factors to be considered by the court.] Only one of these - the
convenience of the parties - is properly within the power of the parties themselves to
affect by a forum-selection clause. The other factors - the convenience of witnesses and
the interest of justice - are third party or public interests that must be weighed by the
district court; they cannot be automatically outweighed by the existence of a purely
private agreement between the parties. Such an agreement does not obviate the need
for an analysis of the factors set forth in § 1404(a) and does not necessarily preclude
the granting of the motion to transfer.
Plum Tree, Inc. 488 F.2d at 758; Full-Stght Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 74. See supra notes 22 &
68-71 and accompanying text. Where a case is transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court
must apply the choice of law rules of the state from which the case was transferred. Van Dusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 643 (1964).
74. Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 204; Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 725 (denied enforcement
of the forum selection clause under COGSA, but remanded on the issue of forum non-
conveniens).
75. GulfOtl, 330 U.S. at 508 (unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed). See In re Unterweser Reedere, 428 F.2d at
905-06; Hoes, Inc., 493 F. Supp. at 1208; Full-Sight Contact Lens, 466 F. Supp. at 74; A.C Miller
Concrete Prod., 309 F. Supp. at 1095.
76. 407 U.S. at 19. Another defense to enforcement of a forum selection clause frequently
raised is that the cause of action did not arise under the contract. However, the courts have
generally rejected this argument on the basis that the plaintiff cannot escape enforcement of the
forum clause based on his form of pleading. See, e.g., Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 203 (where
the relationship between the parties is contractual, the pleading of alternative non-contractual
theories of liability should not prevent enforcement of such a bargain; bankruptcy proceeding);
Bense 683 F.2d 718 (franchise agreement with forum clause and antitrust claim); Giordano, 558 F.
Supp. 1261 (forum selection clause and tort claim); Gordonsvillelndus., 549 F. Supp. 200 (contract
for industrial installation with forum clause and state law design defect, negligence, and war-
ranty claims); Hoes, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 1205 (distributorship agreement with forum selection
clause and state law business tort claim); Full-Si&ht Contract Lens, 466 F. Supp. 71 (distributorship
agreement and antitrust claim). See also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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D. Summaiy
Although the courts' primary rationale for enforcing forum selection
clauses is based on the expectations of the parties and to provide certainty in
the contractual relationship, these objectives have not been achieved. Limi-
tations to the enforceability of forum clauses were established in the Bremen
ruling and subsequent decisions have further eroded the prima facie validity
of such clauses. The courts have been restrained in not creating numerous
other exceptions to the general rule. However, in light of the parties' pur-
pose for including a forum clause in their agreement in order to insure pre-
dictability in their relationship, such objective has not been attained.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Introducti on
The general rule regarding the enforceability of agreements providing
for choice of law selection is that where parties to a freely negotiated con-
tract have stipulated the law of a particular state to govern any disputes,
arising out of their agreement, will be enforced in accordance with the stipu-
lated clause. 77 This view has superseded the traditional approach that
choice of law clauses are unenforceable because it empowers the parties to
perform a legislative act. 78 The prevalent legal theory justifying the modern
trend is as follows:
Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the legislative function,
77. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274
U.S. 403 (1927); Woods - Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744
(5th Cir. 1981); Zenith Labs. Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); Delta Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974);
Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1970); Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service
Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969); First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Insurance Centers,
Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Mo. 1983); R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp.
201 (N.D. I11. 1981); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980); Falcon Tankers,
Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 A.2d 231 (Del. 1972).
The Boase Court held that conflict of laws principles generally are not offended by the
application of a contractual choice of law provision. 437 F.2d at 529. See Prebble, Choice of Law
& Contracts, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (1973); Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and
Directionsfor the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I (1977).
78. F. MADL, FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 101 (1967)
(the parties are not making up their own law but rather merely exercising a right of choice, the
right to select one of the legal systems containing provisions for the very transaction to which
they then submit themselves); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 637 (1982) (the choice-
of-law clause is merely a shorthand expression for a more detailed definition of the rights and
obligations of the parties); Prebble, supra note 77, at 495 (jurisdictions adopting the autonomy
doctrine simply predicate certain legal consequences (the application of the chosen law) upon
the factual conduct of the parties (the making of the choice)); see Reese, supra note 77, at 19 (the
parties do not of their own authority determine the applicable law; it is the choice-of-law rule of
the forum which directs that the law chosen by them should be applied).
A further rationale for rejecting the traditional approach is that the contents of a contract
are determined by the parties and where the parties have not provided for certain matters then
contract law serves as a gap-filler. See Prebble, supra note 77, at 491 (if the parties would have
been at liberty to provide for their own solutions at the time of making their contract, there is
no reason why they should not be able to do the same thing indirectly by expressly stipulating
-that such questions should be dealt with according to the law of a particular state or nation);
Reese supra note 77, at 22 (majority of contract law rules are designed to fill gaps in the contract
that the parties could have filled by express provision).
1984] FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW SELECTION
it seems more realistic to regard them as relieving the courts of the
problem of resolving a question of conflict of laws. Their course
might be expected to reduce litigation, and is to be commended as
much as good draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities. . . . A tendency toward certainty in com-
mercial transactions should be encouraged by the courts.
79
In addition to judicial authority, the general enforceability of choice of
law clauses has also been adopted by the legislatures in their enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code80 and by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws."' The majority of jurisdictions now enforce proper choice of law
clauses relying on either the U.C.C. or the Restatement. 82 In synthesizing
the legal authorities it is readily apparent that the presumption is in favor of
the enforceability of agreements providing for choice of law selection.
The issue of the enforceability of a choice of law clause involves the
determination by the forum court as to which state law will govern the con-
tractual relationship. Unlike the forum selection clause, the choice of law
clause does not negate the court's authority to adjudicate the suit, but rather
addresses the court's willingness to apply the parties' choice of state law.
83
As a prerequisite to the enforceability of an agreement providing for a choice
79. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pakistan, 307 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. N.Y 1969); Siegel-
man v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955). See, Denicola v. Cunard Line
Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1981).
80. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1978) provides: "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to
this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
The U.C.C. has been adopted in some form in all but one state. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at
749 citing In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) provides:
Law of the State Chosen by the Parties (1) The law of the state chosen by the parties
to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transac-
tion and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamen-
tal policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule
of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effec-
tive choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local
law of the state of the chosen law.
82. See, e.g., Unionlns. Soc., 642 F.2d at 748-51 (the purpose of the U.C.C. is to establish a
national uniform law to govern commercial transactions); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471
F.2d 1304, 1307 n. 3 (lst Cir. 1973) (Restatement); First Nat'l Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263-64
(U.C.C.); R &L Grain Co., 531 F. Supp. at 206 (U.C.C.); Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites
De Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (U.C.C.); Southern Int'l Sales Co. v.
Potter & Brumfield Div. of AMF, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Restatement);
Kronovet, 288 Md. at 44-47, 415 A.2d at 1104-06 (Restatement). Falcon Tankers, 300 A.2d at 235
(U.C.C.); Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271, 292-93 (W.D. Mo.
1973) (Restatement).
83. State is used in a generic sense not only encompassing the territorial lands of the
United States, but also those of foreign countries.
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of law selection, the contract must involve a multistate transaction. 84 An-
other condition, depending upon state procedural rules, is where the defend-
ant seeks to have the law as provided in the agreement govern the
adjudication of the suit.8 5 The forum court in determining the enforceabil-
ity of the clause will apply both its own substantive and conflict of laws
rules.86 Where suit is brought in federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion, the court will apply the law of the forum state in which it is sitting,
including the forum state's conflict of law rules.
87
Once the forum state holds the choice of law clause valid, the court will
examine whether the clause is enforceable under the law of the chosen
state.8 8 Assuming the clause is held enforceable, it then must be determined
whether the parties intended the application of only the substantive law of
the designated state or in addition, its conflict of law rules. 89 Resolution of
this issue is focused primarily on the language of the choice of law clause.90
Choice of law clauses, like forum selection clauses, have become more
84. See Prebble, supra note 77, at 501 (parties to a wholly domestic or local contract may
not avoid mandatory rules of domestic or local law by purporting to select some other law to
govern their relationship); Reese, supra note 77, at 24. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment d which provides that the rule does not apply when all
contacts are located within a single state and when, as a consequence, there is only one inter-
ested state.
85. The procedure for raising the issue of the enforceability of the choice of law clause,
whether by affirmative defense or otherwise, depends on the procedural rules of the forum state.
It is usually the defendant who seeks to have the clause enforced which is dissimilar to a forum
selection clause where the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
86. Kronovet, 288 Md. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1106.
87. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in a federal diversity suit the federal court must follow the state conflict of
laws rules in which it sits). Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514 (choice of law rules of the forum
state); Delta Airlines, 503 F.2d at 243 (in a diversity case the federal court must follow state law
including state conflict of law rules); Boase, 437 F.2d at 529 (choice of law rules of the forum
state); Potter &Brumftld, 410 F. Supp. at 1341 (choice of laws rules of the forum state).
88. See Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514; Gavlick Constr. Co., 526 F.2d at 785 n. 18; Delta Air
Lines, 503 F.2d 243-45; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529-31; First Natl Bank 560 F. Supp. at 1263-64;
Kronovet, 288 Md. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1106.
89. See Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529; Farris Eng'g Corp., 406 F.2d
at 521; R &L Grain Co., 531 F.Supp. at 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 comment h provides that, "[tihe cases generally support the news that it is the local laws
of the state chosen by the parties that should be applied."
90. In order to ensure predictability and the desired interpretation of the choice of law
clause, the parties should clearly express whether they intend only the substantive law of the
chosen state to apply or also its conflict of law rules.
A typical choice of law clause reads as follows: The validity of this agreement or any of the
provisions thereof shall be determined under and shall be construed according to the laws of the
state of X.
This clause would create an ambiguity as to whether the parties intended only the state's
substantive law to apply or also its conflict of law rules. Such an ambiguity could frustrate the
expectations of the parties and therefore their intent should be clearly expressed.
Another ambiguity which may arise in choice of law clauses is whether the law of the
selected state is to govern the validity of the parties' agreement or merely its construction.
Again, the parties' intent should be clearly expressed in order to prevent frustration of their
expectations.
Some commentators argue that it is beyond the capacity of the parties to choose the law
that shall govern the validity of their agreement because such power may be invoked to have an
otherwise invalid contract enforced. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 361 (2d ed. 1980).
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prevalent in commercial contracts.9 1 The primary reasons advocated for en-
forcement of a choice of law clause are party autonomy, 92 expectation of the
parties,93 predictability, 94 certainty95 and the promotion of business transac-
tions.96 The Supreme Court in Scherk observed that a "contractual provision
specifying in advance the. . . law to be applied is. . .an almost indispensa-
ble precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essen-
tial to any international business transaction.
' 9 7
Notwithstanding the benefits to be achieved by enforcement of choice of
law clauses, there are limitations to the parties' capacity to choose what law
will govern their contractual relationship. 98 These limitations which are dis-
cussed below include a reasonable relationship to the state of the chosen law,
absence of fraud, not violative of public policy, non-adhesion, and neither
evasion of law nor choice of invalidating law.
91. WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 360 (choice-of-law clauses are becoming "ubiquitous
boiler plate" in commercial agreements); LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 303.
Under some circumstances a choice of forum clause might also be viewed as implicitly
selecting the law of that place to govern the transaction. Alberto-Culver, 471 U.S. at 519 n.13.
92. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 751; Kronovet, 288 Md. at 42-47, 415 A.2d at 1103-05 (courts
should give recognition to party autonomy in conflict of laws relating to contracts). Scoles, supra
note 78, at 632-52; Weintraub, supra note 90, at 355-57 (the reason advanced for the party-
autonomy choice-of-law rule on questions of contracts is that this rule best accords with the
need of the commercial community and predictability in interstate and international transac-
tions). Levin, Party Autonomy. Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260
(1957-58); Prebble, supra note 77, at 491-533; See Weinberger, Party Autonomy and Choice-of-Law:
The Restatement (Second), Interest Analysis, and the Search for a Methodological Synthesis, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 605 (1976); Note, Efectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conifcts of Law: Party Auton-
omy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, which adopts the principal of party autonomy.
93. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 751 (the courts, by yielding to the parties' choice of law in
multistate transactions, will achieve uniformity arising from the ability of multistate con-
tractants to select the law that will govern their transactions in the full expectation that their
choice of law will be respected by whatever court might chance to hear their dispute); First Natl
Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263 (the rationale behind the rule that the parties to a contract have the
right to agree that their contract will be governed by the law of a particular state is to protect
the expectations of the parties and make it possible for them to foresee their rights and liabilities
under their contract); Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722. See Reese, supra note 77, at 22 (enforce-
ment of a choice of law clause provides the best means of assuring that the parties' expectations
will be satisfied). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e provides
that the prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the parties
and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities
under the contract.
94. First Natl Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263 (by allowing the parties to choose the law to
govern the validity of their contract and any resulting rights created thereunder, certainty and
predictability can be assured). See Reese, supra note 77, at 24 (giving effect to a choice-of-law
provision is the best and perhaps the only way of bringing certainty and predictability to the
field of choice of law in contracts); LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 302. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e.
95. See supra note 94.
96. WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 355-58.
97. 417 U.S. at 516. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 comment e
provides that the demands of certainty, predictability and convenience dictate that, subject to
some limitations, the parties should have power to choose the applicable law.
98. Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750-51; WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 355 (contractual
parties may within reasonable limits choose the law to govern their contract).
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B. Limitations
1. Reasonable Relationship
The primary qualification on the general enforceability of choice of law
clauses is that the parties' transaction must bear a "reasonable relationship"
to the state whose law is stipulated to govern their agreement. 99 Although
the courts' terminology of this limitation may differ, 0 0 it is unanimously
held that the state whose law is stipulated to govern the contractual relation-
ship must have an interest in having its law applied. It is further held that
the parties cannot evade an otherwise applicable law by insertion of a choice
of law clause in their agreement. 10 ' In other words, there must be a real
connection between the state whose law is to be applied and the
transaction. 102
Although they apply the reasonable relationship requirement, the
courts have supplied few guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable rela-
tionship. Rather, such decision is made on a case-by-case basis. 13 Some of
the factors relied upon by the courts in making this determination are: the
parties principal place of business, place of incorporation, location of the
contracted property (real or intangible), place of performance, place of pay-
99. Although the courts' terminology differs with regard to this limitation, reference will be
made to "reasonable relationship" for reasons of simplicity and consistency.
100. Seaman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927) (the parties' choice
of law is limited only to the extent that it precludes them from selecting a jurisdiction which has
no normal relation to the transaction); Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 749-50 (although the forum
contacts with the transaction are the most significant, the determinative issue is whether there is
a reasonable relationship between the chosen law and the transaction so as to require the courts
to honor the parties' express choice of law to apply to their transaction); Boa.re, 437 F.2d at 530
(the court rejected the grouping-of-contacts theory as the test in determining the enforceability
of a choice of law clause which it held applied only to tort cases); Fuller Co., 421 F. Supp. at 942
(the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making
or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs); Potter & Brumftld, 410 F. Supp. at 1341
(most significant relationship test or governmental interest analysis).
It has been argued that where there is a reasonable basis for the parties' choice of law,
notwithstanding that the factual connection is lacking, such clause should be enforced. Exam-
ples of situations when this may arise is where the parties are contracting in countries whose
legal systems may be hostile, undeveloped or unfamiliar to the parties. See Weinberger, supra
note 92, at 613-16; WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 362. Although this position rarely finds sup-
port in the cases, the Supreme Court in Alberto-Culver reasoned that a choice of law provision in
a contract obviates the danger that a contract dispute might be submitted to a forum hostile to
the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved. 417 U.S. at 516.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment f provides that contracts are
entered into for serious purposes and rarely, if ever, will the parties choose a law without good
reason for doing so.
101. Seamen, 274 U.S. at 408; Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750. See E. SCOLES, & P. HAY, Supra
note 78, at 644.
102. Seaman, 274 U.S. at 408 (there must be a natural and vital connection with the transac-
tion); Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 753 (contacts between the transaction and the state whose law
was stipulated to govern the agreement must be real); First Nat'l Bank, 560 F. Supp. at 1263.
It has been contended that the choice of law clause in the parties' agreement is but one
factor to be considered in determining whether there exists a reasonable relationship between
the transaction and the state whose law was selected to govern the agreement. Potter & Brum-
flid, 410 F. Supp. at 1341; see Note, supra note 92, at 1677.
103. Fuller Co., 421 F. Supp. at 942 (the reasonable relationship criteria appears to constitute
a flexible standard which the courts apply on a case-by-case basis). See Prebble, supra note 77, at
502; Note, supra note 92, at 1682.
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ment, purpose of the contract and place of execution of the contract. 0 4
This analysis, predicated on a case-by-case basis, provides no stability to
the contractual relationship. Since there is no quorum of opinion this frus-
trates the predictability which the choice of law clauses were designed to
protect.
2. Fraud
The rules on fraud in both forum selection and choice of law clauses are
similar in that both require a showing of fraud in the inducement of the
clause itself, in order for it to be unenforceable. 10 5 If a court were to hold to
the contrary this would provide a loophole for the resisting party to circum-
vent the agreement by alleging that the contract is invalid by reason of
fraud. 106
3. Public Policy
The public policy limitation applicable to forum selection clauses is also
applicable to choice of law clauses.'0 7 This limitation was recognized in the
Supreme Court's decision of Laurtzen'0 8 where the Court held that except as
forbidden by some public policy the law to be applied in contract matters is
the law which the parties intended to apply.'0 9 This ruling has been the
foundation of other court opinions seeking to justify the confines of the pub-
lic policy. 1'0
The public policy limitation was defined as follows:
While the failure to enforce the parties' choice of law does invali-
date their contract to some extent, fulfillment of the parties' expec-
tations is not the only value in contract law; regard must also be
had for state interests and for state regulation. The chosen law
should not be applied without regard for the interests of the state
104. See Union Ins. So., 642 F.2d at 749; Zenith Laboratories, 530 F.2d at 514; Fuller Co., 421 F.
Supp. at 943; Kronovet, 288 Md. at 45, 415 A.2d at 1104.
105. See Nakhleh v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 359 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Swanson v.
United-Greenfield Corp., 239 F. Supp. 299 (D. Conn. 1965); Freedman v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260, 401 N.Y.S.2d 176, 372 N.E.2d 12 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment c.
106. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
107. See Warren Bros. Co., 471 F.2d at 1307 n.3; Potter & Brumfwld, 410 F. Supp. at 1342;
Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271, 292-93 (W.D. Mo. 1973); American Eutectic
Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 353 F. Supp. 850, 855 (D.P.R.), rezod on other
grounds, 480 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1973); Goff v. Aamco Transmission, 313 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.
Md. 1970); Heede, Inc. v. West India Mach. and Supply Co.. 272 F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, . . ." See SCOLES, supra note 78, at 637-40; Prebble, supra note 77, at 509-
17; Reese, supra note 77, at 25 (the author contends that the more closely the state of the chosen
law is related to the contract and the parties, the more fundamental the policy must be for the
state of the otherwise applicable law to justify denying effect to the choice-of-law provision).
108. 345 U.S. 571. Although Lauritzen involved the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), the
court referred to conflict of law rules in contract matters.
109. See generally 345 U.S. at 588-89.
110. Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V., 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980); Croft & Scully Co. v. M.V.
Skulptor Vuchetich, 508 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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which would be the state of the applicable law with respect to the
particular issue involved in the absence of an effective choice by
the parties. I1I
Thus, the circumvention of the parties' intentions may arise due to a strong
judicial or legislative policy.' 12
The elusiveness of this limitation is further demonstrated by the re-
quirement that the public policy must be fundamental in nature, in order to
hold the agreement providing for choice of law selection unenforceable."
13
This determination of what constitutes a fundamental policy is resolved by
the forum court."14 Initially, the court must ascertain the public policy of its
own state and if the public policy would not be violated then it must ascer-
tain the public policy of the state chosen pursuant to the agreement.' " 5 The
conjecture by the forum court regarding its own public policy and that of
the state stipulated involves a high degree of subjectivity which inevitably
produces further uncertainity in this area.
4. Adhesion Contracts
Choice of law clauses, similar to forum selection clauses, will not be
enforced where the contract involved is one of adhesion. 1 6 The adhesion
contract limitation is most frequently applied to insurance and usury agree-
ments which provide for a choice of law selection." t 7 These two types of
contracts are perceived by the courts as bastions of power: the party writing
111. 410 F. Supp. at 1343 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
comment g).
112. 410 F. Supp. at 1342.
U.C.C. § 1-105 (2) provides: "Where one of the . . . provisions of this Act specifies the
applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent
permitted by law (including the conflict of laws rules)."
113. 410 F. Supp. at 1341-42; 288 Md. at 47, 415 A.2d at 1106 (public policy held not to be
so fundamental to prevent application of another state's laws).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g illustrates the elu-
siveness of the public policy limitation by providing that although there is no precise definition
of what constitutes a "fundamental" policy it must in any event be a "substantial" policy. See
Prebble, supra note 77, at 512.
Although what constitutes a "fundamental" public policy remains undefined, it is gener-
ally agreed that simply because the chosen law differs in some respects from forum law it will
not be held to constitute a "fundamental" public policy. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 78, at 637-
38.
114. Unon Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 748; Delta AirLines, 503 F.2d at 243; Potter &Brumfltd, 410 F.
Supp. at 1341; Reese, supra note 77, at 25.
115. See supra note 114.
116. McQuillan v. "Italia" Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 386 F. Supp. 462, 467 n.l I
(S.D.N.Y 1974); Boase, 437 F.2d at 530-31. See supra note 42; LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 303;
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflicts of/Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075 (1953);
Prebble, supra note 77, at 514.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment b provides:
A choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual provision, will not be given effect
if the consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in the contract was secured by
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or mistake. . . . [T]he forum will scruti-
nize such contracts with care and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provision they
may contain if to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adherent.
117. See Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 749; Boase, 437 F.2d at 529-31; Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861,863-64 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.Polak, 312 F. Supp. 112, 116 (E.D.
Pa. 1969); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). SCOLES & HAY, SUpra
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the contract dictates terms to the individual consumer.' 18 Thus, it is seen as
effectively eliminating any arm's length bargaining between the parties over
the choice of law selection, which has led the courts to conclude that it is a
contract of adhesion.' 1 9 However, the courts draw a distinction when the
party resisting enforcement of the choice of law clause is a group as opposed
to an individual consumer. 120 The underlying rationale for this distinction
is that a group of employees or investors have the ability to receive conces-
sions from these otherwise unyielding institutions and therefore are not enti-
tled to avail themselves of this defense.
12 '
A choice of law clause will be unenforceable where there existed an ine-
quality of bargaining power by the parties at the time the contract was exe-
cuted. Although there is no definitive definition as to what constitutes
inadequate bargaining position, the case law indicates that a factor to be
considered is whether the party resisting enforcement is an individual or a
group.
5. Evasion of Law
This limitation addresses the scenario in which the parties have inserted
into their agreement a choice of law clause for the sole purpose of validating
their otherwise unenforceable actions. t 22 In such contracts the parties'
transaction lacks a normal connection with the state whose law was selected
or the contact did not occur in the normal course of the transaction.
123
Without a reasonable relationship or real contacts, the courts will hold that
the only reason for that choice of law was to evade the otherwise applicable
law and as such will render the clause unenforceable. 124 Much uncertainty
still clouds this limitation, because it is based on the court's subjective deter-
mination of whether "sufficient" contacts have been demonstrated.
6. Choice of Invalidating Law
Under this limitation, when the chosen law would frustrate the express
intention of the parties, the courts are split on whether to render the choice
note 78, at 641-42; see Paul & Plain, Choice of Law in Life Insurance Litigation, 6 A.B.A.F. 1, 3
(1970).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203(2) provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substan-
tial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.
18. See supra note 117.
119. Seesupra note 117.
120. Base, 437 F.2d at 529-30; Polak, 312 F. Supp. 1186.
121. See supra note 120; Paul & Plain, supra note 117.
122. See Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750.
123. See Seaman, 274 U.S. at 408; Union Ins. Soc., 642 F.2d at 750.
[T]he parties' choice should be upheld unless the transaction lacks a normalconnection
with the state whose law was selected. Only when it is shown that the contact did not
occur in the normal course of the transaction, but was contrived to validate the par-
ties' choice of law, should the relationship be held unreasonable ...
642 F.2d at 751 (emphasis original) (quoting Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial
Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 625, 628).
124. See supra note 122.
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of law clause unenforceable based on mutual mistake or enforce the clause
under its own terms.' 25  A cornerstone of contract law is that contracts
should not be interpreted so as to frustrate the intention of the parties.
12 6
Another well-established axiom is that the courts do not make contracts for
the parties and therefore the parties' expressed intent must govern the inter-
pretation and application of the contract.127 A court's decision in this area is
uncertain because there are rules supporting both enforcement and
invalidation.
C. Summary
The choice of law clause is used by parties to a contract because of their
desire to be certain and confident of their rights under the state law stipu-
lated in the agreement. The parties understand when they execute the docu-
ment that their performance and disputes will be settled by the state's law as
set forth by the choice of law clause.
The problems addressed by the courts today in either upholding the
parties' agreement containing a choice of law clause or rendering it unen-
forceable depends on several different factors. The court must first deter-
mine whether the choice of law clause bears a reasonable relationship to the
transaction. This has been interpreted as meaning the state whose law is
agreed upon to govern the contract must have an interest in seeing its law
applied to the transaction and to prevent the parties from evading an other-
wise applicable law. If the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable state
interest and no evasion of another applicable state law, then it will sanction
the parties choice of law clause.
The reasonable relationship doctrine is viewed as undermining the cer-
tainty and confidence of the parties in their choice of law because the courts'
standard is subjective. Absence of predictability by the courts reduces the
certainty of such clauses now being drafted.
In addition to having sufficient state interest, the court also determines
whether the choice of law clause violates the areas of fraud, adhesion, eva-
sion of law and public policy. Except for public policy the other limitations
can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, but public policy is ex-
pressed by the composition of the court. Because public policy can be an
extremely nebulus concept, this further frustrates parties to a contract who
125. Kronove, 288 Md. at 46 n.18, 415 A.2d at 1105 n.18; Pisacane v. "Italia" Societa Per
Azione Di Navigazione, 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); General Electric Credit Corp. v.
Beyerlein, 55 Misc. 2d 724, 286 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Painton & Co., Ltd. v.
Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e provides:
On occasions, the parties may choose a law that would declare the contract inva-
lid. In such situations, the chosen law will not be applied by reason of the parties'
choice. To do so would defeat the expectations of the parties which it is the purpose of
the present rule to protect. . . . If the parties have chosen a law that would invalidate
the contract, it can be assumed that they did so by mistake.
Ste WEINTRAUB, supra note 90, at 358-60; Reese, supra note 77, at 25-26; Prebble, supra note 77,
at 627-30.
126. See Interstate Battery, 683 F.2d at 722. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 203 a (1979).
127. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 312 (1977).
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seek exactitude in the law that will control their legal relationship with other
parties.
In sum, the law is currently addressing the problem from a multitude of
approaches in search of a single standard. From these cases and treatises
hopefully there will emerge an objective doctrine which will enable parties
to contract in the belief their choice of law clause will be controlling between
themselves and will not be countermanded by the courts.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the enforceability of agreements providing for
choice of forum and choice of law selection. These two clauses have as their
goal to fulfill the expectations of the parties through predictability of the
courts. A review of the cases has indicated that the current decisions of the
courts have been neither definite nor consistent, thus frustrating the desires
of the contracting parties.
In a provision providing for choice of forum the controlling decision is
Bremen. This Supreme Court case held that parties can determine in ad-
vance their choice of forum. The reasons in favor of allowing choice of fo-
rum as annunciated by the court were to promote expansion of business,
freedom of contract, predictability, and expectation of the parties, and that
the clause is part of the bargained for agreement.
Since this landmark decision the positive attributes which were to inure
to the contracting parties have been eroded by such elusive classifications as
fraud, adhesion, statutory restrictions and the ever mercurial public policy.
Under the guise of these subjective standards the ability of contracting par-
ties to control their legal relationship has been stripped from them and is
now possessed by the courts. This intermeddling by the judicial process
without clearly defined standards has left contracting parties both disap-
pointed and uncertain as to how to proceed with an agreement that the
courts will interpret and uphold to fulfill their expectations.
With respect to provisions setting forth a choice of law clause, the courts
have scrutinized it in much the same manner as has been done with choice of
forum clauses. The courts in construing a provision providing for choice of
law first apply the reasonable relationship test. If the provision passes, then
it must also not suffer from fraud, adhesion, evasion of law or public policy.
The court's subjectivity in this area has produced the same results as in the
choice of forum clauses, with the consequence that contracting parties are
uncertain whether the clause will be able to perform the function for which
it was designed.
The courts and treatises must both refrain from supplying complex and
confusing doctrines which thwart the objectives which were designed to be
met by the mechanisms of choice of forum and choice of law selection. It is
time for a re-examination of the varying standards in light of the ideals of
clarity of law, predictability of result, and furtherance of economic activity.
In an era of ever-increasing contracting by these parties these objectives need
to be interpreted by a standard which is both objective and fair; whereby,
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contracting parties are able to be confident and certain that they control
their interactions with other parties.
SMITH V. WADE: A GREEN LIGHT FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
Section 1983,' originally enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was an
effort by Congress to put teeth into the guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Section 1983 provides a federal forum for the redress of the "depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." Although compensatory damages are routinely awarded in section
1983 actions where actual injury has been proven, the availability of puni-
tive damages has only been recognized in theory by the Supreme Court.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Wade3 the Court for the first time squarely addressed the
appropriate circumstances for an award of punitive damages where a viola-
tion of plaintiffs constitutional rights has occurred. The central question
posed in Smith was whether actual malice on the part of the defendant is
required before punitive damages can be awarded, and if not, whether a
showing of some circumstances or conduct in excess of that needed to estab-
lish liability for compensatory damages is required.
This comment will outline the history of section 1983, define the consti-
tutional tort, discuss eighth amendment standards, and analyze damages in
the context of a constitutional tort. This comment takes the position that
punitive damages should be available in a proper section 1983 action where
either actual or implied malice on the part of the defendant is proven.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hzstooy of Section 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. 4 The Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was
enacted by Congress as an attempt to deal with widespread legal abuses and
physical violence perpetrated against southern blacks and union sympathiz-
ers. The Act represented an early exercise of congressional power under sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the amendment's equal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); cf Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (punitive damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)).
3. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
4. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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protection provisions. 5 The main goals of the legislation were: 1) to override
discriminatory state laws;6 2) to provide a remedy when state law was inade-
quate;7 and 3) to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy, although
theoretically adequate, was not available in practice.
8
The interpretation given section 1983 recently has been considerably
broadened. Early holdings, as evidenced in the Slaughterhouse Cases,9 were
quite restrictive, interpreting the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment as protecting only rights of national citizenship.'o
This interpretation was expanded slightly in 1939 when the Court held, in
Hague v. CIO. ,It that certain personal liberties were within the scope of
section 1983. Gradual recognition of the expanded scope of the fourteenth
amendment protections' 2 led to the Court's 1961 landmark decision in
Monroe v. Pape13 that a denial of fourteenth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures by a state official was actionable as a
section 1983 claim. Equally as important, Monroe also held that specific in-
tent to violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights is not required under section
1983,14 and that section 1983 is to be interpreted "against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions."'
15
5. Note, Section 1983 and Federahm." The Burger Court's New Directtin, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
904, 905 (1976). The Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Section five of the fourteenth amendment further provides that,
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."
6. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 173 (196 1); overruled on the localgovernment immunity issue alone, Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 672; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
8. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 672; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
10. Among the limited rights of federal citizenship is the right to travel. Under this inter-
pretation, the fourteenth amendment did not reach the types of outrageous conduct by state
officials that inspired the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Gressman, The Unhappy
Histoy ofCivil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1330-37 (1952). See alro Note, Develop-
ments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1157-58 n. 130 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Developments].
11. 307 U.S. 496, 531-32 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (limiting the scope of§ 1983'sjuris-
dictional counterpart to non-property rights).
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment). See generally, S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES LITIGATION 37-38 (1979); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 567-
69 (1978); McClellan and Northcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violation ofConstitutional Rights, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 409, 415-16 n.40 (1980) (rights incorporated by way of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment).
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
14. Id. at 187. The Court arrived at this conclusion by comparing § 1983 to its criminal
counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), which had been interpreted in Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 103 (1945) to require "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." Al-
though intent was not a primary issue, both the majority and dissent concluded that specific
intent to deprive a person of a federally protected right is not necessary in a § 1983 action.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 206-07 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
15. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
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B. The Constitutional Tort
There are several reasons why Justice Douglas may have suggested in
Monroe that violations of constitutional guarantees be examined against the
backdrop of tort common law. Professor Katz has suggested that tort law is
used as a reference point because statements of causes of action in tort are
simple, traditional, effective and commonly understood means of redressing
harms to personal liberty interests. 16 In addition, Katz asserts that, espe-
cially in constitutional matters, a tort framework provides consistency in re-
quirements for causes of action and remedies, and is an effective method of
deterrence in that government officials may be held accountable for consti-
tutional violations.
17
In many instances, there is not a tort perfectly analogous to a constitu-
tional violation. Even when the common law and constitutional tort are
nearly identical,' 8 the differences in the purposes underlying tort law as op-
posed to section 1983 must be examined.
A plaintiff alleging a section 1983 claim must establish that she has been
deprived of a right secured by the federal Constitution and laws, by a de-
fendant acting under color of state law.1 9 Section 1983, however, is silent as
to the basis of liability, i.e., whether liability results from intentional or negli-
gent conduct, or even from conduct without fault.2 0 Tort liability requires a
determination of the duty owed the plaintiff, and the standard of conduct
against which the tortious act is to be measured. Consequently, in every
section 1983 case involving the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed
right, the constitutional duty and standard of conduct must be identified
and the constitutional policy considered.
2 1
Likewise, civil rights law allows for affirmative defenses which will insu-
late a defendant from liability where a constitutional tort has been commit-
ted. Absolute immunity from prosecution, afforded judges,22 legislators,
23
16. Katz, The Jursprudence of Remedies. Constitutional Legalit and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1968).
17. Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
18. For instance certain fourth amendment violations very closely parallel the common
law torts of assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.) (false imprisonment), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
19. See generally, Note, Section 1983-A Change in the Meaning of Under Color of Law: Polk
County v. Dodson, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 151 (1983); Note, Section 1983 Liability of Private Actors Who
Conspire With Immune State Oftcials, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1980); Comment, The Supreme Court
Corrals a Runaway Section 1983, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1073 (1983) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme
Court Corrals a Runaway].
20. Section 1983 does indicate however, that the defendant's conduct must cause the "dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Thus, in Kish v.
County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971), the court found that prison assaults re-
sulted not from defendants' breach of their eighth amendment duty, but from the construction
of, and overcrowding in, the jail.
21. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L. J. 5, 13 (1974).
Cf Cox, Constitutional Duty and Section 1983. A Response, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 453 (1981) (duty
analysis necessary, but relevant duty is not constitutional, but rather a statutory duty, albeit
punctuated by constitutional values). But see, Note, Section 1983 Liabilityfor Aegligence, 58 NEB.
L. REV. 271, 285 (1979) ("The constitutional duty approach does not, however, appear to pro-
vide a more definitive standard for determining liability under section 1983 than existing
standards.").
22. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349. 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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and prosecutors, 24 will defeat a section 1983 action at the outset, provided
the defendant official acted within the scope of her duties. Other govern-
ment officials may avoid liability by pleading qualified immunity, the so-
called "good-faith defense".
25
The Supreme Court first recognized the availability of the good-faith
defense in Pierson v. Ray. 26 The Court indicated that just as a police officer
could defend against a common law action for false arrest by proving that
she acted reasonably and in good faith, such a defense was also available in a
section 1983 action. 27 Wood v. Strickland,28 a case in which students alleged
due process violations by a school official, further defined the particulars of a
good-faith defense, holding that good faith must exist both objectively and
subjectively. The objective test would impose liability where it could be
shown that the defendants had not, under the circumstances, acted in good
faith.2 9 The subjective standard would require proof that the defendant had
acted maliciously. 30 A further refinement of the qualified immunity defense
occurred in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,3 1 a case which held that presidential aides
are entitled to qualified (but not absolute) immunity. While most commen-
tators feel that Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of the qualified im-
munity test 32 as articulated in Wood v. Strickland,33 it is unclear whether this
is a thorough interpretation of the Harlow34 language.
However, if a judge acts "in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction' " he will be subject to liability.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)).
23. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
24. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
25. The terms "qualified immunity" and "good-faith defense" are interchangeable. See
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally, McClellan and North-
cross, supra note 12, at 454-59; Nahmod, supra note 21, at 26-30; Rushing and Baxter, Section
1983 Defenses, 14 URB. LAW. 149, 154-56 (1982); Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1210-13.
26. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
27. Id at 556-57.
28. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
29. Id at 314.
30. Id at 322.
31. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
32. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 n. 14,
7-8 n.53 (1982); Note, Remedies-Immunity--President absolutely Liable From Civil Damages Liability
For Ofjiial Acts-Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982); Presidential Aides Entitled to Quahfled
Immunity From Civil Damages Liability For Oftiial Acts-Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727
(1982), 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 374, 391 (1983); Comment, Immunity.- Eliminating the Subjective
Element fom the Qualified Immunity Standard in Actions Brought Against Government Ofials, 22 WASH-
BURN LJ. 577, 587 (1983).
33. 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). The Court in Harlow states that: "[r]eferring both to the
objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if
an official 'knew or reasonably shouldhave known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action
with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitution rights or other injury...' " 102 S.
Ct. at 2737,quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). After noting
that the subjective element of the Wood qualified immunity test "frequently has proved incom-
patible with our admonition. . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial" (Harlow,
102 S.Ct. at 2737), and that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore
hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 2738 (citations
omitted).
34. A plausible interpretation of the Hlarlow decision regarding the appropriate standard
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C Cruel and Unusual Punishment-The Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment 35 prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is one of the constitutional guarantees without a direct counterpart in
tort law. Claims of cruel and unusual punishment, most often made by pris-
oners of a correctional facility, often look to the law of negligence for gui-
dance.36 In a negligence case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
foresaw or should have foreseen an unreasonable risk that his conduct would
invade another's protected interest. 3 7 Negligence involves the departure
from a standard of conduct determined by weighing the probability that
harm will occur, the gravity of such harm, and the cost of avoiding the risk-
creating conduct. 38 The constitutional duty that a defendant owes to the
plaintiff, usually a prison inmate, is that the defendant not subject or cause
the inmate to be subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment. 39 This duty
can be violated by either an affirmative act on the part of the defendant, or
by an omission on her part. In Estelle v. Gamble40 the Supreme Court held
that a violation of the standard of conduct prescribed by the eighth amend-
ment occurs when one commits acts or omissions sufficiently harmful as to
evidence deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
4 '
Thus, the plaintiff in Estelle was required to demonstrate deliberate or cal-
lous indifference to his serious medical needs, rather than mere substandard
care. 42 While prison authorities are not guarantors of the inmates' safety,
there exists a constitutional right to protection from attacks by fellow in-
mates.4 3 Thus, where a prison official knows or should have known of the
high likelihood of an assault on an inmate, and does nothing to prevent such
an assault, the nonfeasance of the official constitutes an actionable violation
of the prisoner's eighth amendment rights.
44
for qualified immunity is that both an objective and subjective test be applied; however, the
objective test would be the "primary" or "threshold" (Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2739) requirement.
Thus, only if the objective "knew or should have known" standard was met, would inquiry into
the official's subjective state of mind be permitted. See also id. at 2740 (Brennan, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring) preserving, in some instances, an inquiry into the subjective state of
an official's level of knowledge; Nahmod, supra note 32 at 8 n.53.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments afflicted."
36. See, e.g., Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528 (10th Cir. 1979); Parker v. McKeithen,
488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
37. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145-49 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 145-49.
39. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("incompatible with evolving standards of
decency", citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292,
1294 (E.D. Va. 1972) ("intolerable to accepted notions of decency"); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) ("of such character or consequences as to shock general conscience or to
be intolerable in fundamental fairness.").
40. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
41. Id at 104.
42. Id at 106.
43. See Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294; Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir.
1971); Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. La. 1971); Note, Decency and Fairness.: An
EmergingJudtcial Role 6? Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 858 (1971).
44. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras, 507
F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974); Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435, 437 (E.D. La. 1971).
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D. Damages
Section 1983 gives no indication of what types of damages are to be
awarded for constitutional violations, or how such damages are to be mea-
sured. Section 1988,1 5 however, specifically authorizes the use of common
law remedies in section 1983 actions. Common law tort rules of damages
cannot always provide a complete solution to the damages issue in a section
1983 case. 46 The damages should reflect compensation for a deprivation of
the protected interest, 47 and are meant to provide a consistent remedy, i.e., a
remedy unaffected by differences in tort law from state to state.48 Compen-
satory damages, meant to compensate the aggrieved party for the injury suf-
fered, may be awarded in section 1983 actions.49 In the absence of proof of
actual injury, however, the courts have refused to allow more than nominal
damages;50 no recovery is allowed solely for the loss of a constitutional
right. 5'
The availability of punitive damages in tort law has been justified his-
torically as a means of "redressing affronts to personal feelings not suscepti-
ble of measurement, financing deserving litigation where only small
compensatory damages can be expected, diverting [a] plaintiffl's] desire for
revenge into peaceful channels, and serving as a punishment for and deter-
rence from socially disapproved conduct."'52  In Carey v. PzphusS 3 the
Supreme Court made it clear that the main purpose of damages in a section
1983 action was compensation for actual injuries suffered. 54 The Court also
45. The jurisdiction in civil matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions
of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protec-
tion of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object; or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suita-
ble remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having juris-
diction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
46 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
47. Id. at 258-59.
48. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 ("prevailing view [of the common law] in this coun-
try.") See also Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1211 n.126.
49. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 259-64; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350 (1974); Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528-31 (10th Cir. 1979).
50. Sve, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (procedural due process); Thompson v.
Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 1977) (parole revocation); Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33,
34 (1st Cir. 1973) (unreasonable search and assault).
51. Libel is an exception to this common law rule requiring proof of actual injury as are
certain forms of slander. See W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 751-77. Se also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 620-33 (1977).
Damages have also been presumed where plaintiff has been deprived of the right to vote. See
Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919). Several commentators have taken the position
that presumed damages should be allowed for plaintiff's loss of an inherently valuable constitu-
tional right. See generaly Love, Damages: A Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1242 (1979); Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v.
Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980).
52. Riley, Punitive Damages. The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 199
(1978) (citing Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)).
53. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
54. Cf Nahmod, supra note 21, at 10. "The Supreme Court, however, emphasized in
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noted in Carey that exemplary or punitive, damages might be proper in a
section 1983 action to deter or punish violations of constitutional rights,
55
without expressly approving or disapproving lower court decisions56 award-
ing punitive damages. Another important purpose served by punitive dam-
age awards is that of vindication; 5 7 in view of the fact that damages are
generally not presumed for the deprivation of a constitutional right,58 the
importance of the vindicatory element of punitive damages is enhanced.
III. FACTS
Daniel R. Wade was an inmate at the Algoa, Missouri State Reforma-
tory for youthful first offenders. In the summer of 1976, Wade voluntarily
checked into Algoa's protective custody unit, available to inmates who, for
safety reasons, wish to be segregated from the general prison population.
59
During his stay in the protective custody unit, Wade violated some of the
unit's rules, and was disciplined by being placed in punitive segregation. On
October 27, 1976, Wade was transferred to the administrative segregation
unit and initially placed in a cell with one other prisoner.
William H. Smith is a guard at the Algoa Reformatory, and was re-
sponsible for placing a third prisoner, Thompson, into the administrative
segregation cell with Wade and his cellmate on October 27. The third in-
mate had been sent to administrative segregation for fighting, and it had
been recommended that he be isolated for his own safety and that of the
other prisoners. Shortly thereafter, both inmates began to harass Wade, and
eventually beat and sexually assaulted him.
As a result of the assault, Wade brought suit under section 1983 against
Smith and four other guards and correctional officials, alleging that his
eighth amendment rights had been violated. Wade asserted that Smith and
Monroe that even where the plaintiff has adequate resource against a state official under state
law, the 1983 remedy is still available, indicating that compensation is not currently thought to
be the major function of section 1983."
55. 435 U.S. at 257 n.l 1. Both the punishment and deterrent functions are strengthened
by the ability of the court to take into account the defendant's financial circumstances. See D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.9 (1973). See also Project, Suing the Police in
Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809-14 (1979) (empirical study suggesting that § 1983 damages
have very little deterrent effect). Punitive damages, however, are often deemed uninsurable, D.
DOBBS, supra § 3.9; Comment, Insurancefor Punitite Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L. J.
431 (1977); Burrell and Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1978).
56. 435 U.S. at 265.
57. See Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Such awards may be
particularly appropriate as a means of vindicating the public interest in preventing violations of
civil rights by state officials."); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (punitive damages
serve the congressional purpose of "vindicating civil rights in civil suits."). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982), which explicitly recognizes the vindicatory function of § 1983, supra note 45.
58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Cf Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1639
n.21 ("Moreover after Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in
some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot
prove compensable injury," citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n.9 (1980)).
59. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1981). At this time Wade was eighteen
years old, five feet, eight inches tall, and weighed approximately 130 pounds. Due to his small
stature, Wade would qualify, in prison parlance, as a "pretty boy". See Punitive Damages in Section
1983 Actions: The Eighth Circuit's Requirement of Malicious Intent, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 898, 917
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Pumtmie Damages].
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the other defendants knew or should have known that under the circum-
stances an assault was likely to occur because: 1) Wade previously had
placed himself in protective custody due to prior incidents of violence
against him by other inmates; 2) although there was another cell in the ad-
ministrative segregation unit available with only one other inmate, Wade
was placed in a cell with two prisoners from the general prison population;
60
and 3) only a few weeks earlier, another inmate in the same unit had been
beaten to death during Smith's shift.
The district court upheld the trial court's instruction that punitive dam-
ages could be assessed against Smith if he was found to have acted recklessly,
with callous disregard of, or indifference to Wade's rights of safety.6 ' Smith
was found to harbor no ill will or spite (actual malice) toward Wade; the
Eighth Circuit judge thus implied malicious intent from Smith's reckless and
callous disregard of known dangers.
62
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision, holding that either actual malicious intent, or reckless indif-
ference to the rights of others, would justify an award of punitive damages in
a section 1983 action.63 Additionally, the majority held that the standard
for punitive damages need not be higher than the underlying standard of
liability for compensatory damages. 64
IV. SMITH V WADE
The theoretical availability of punitive damages in a "proper" section
1983 action was never an issue in Smith v. Wade, 65 despite the absence of
authority in the statute itself. The primary issue, and the reason for granting
certiorari in this case, was to decide what standard of conduct would justify
an award of punitive damages.
66
The Supreme Court had indicated in Carey v. Pphus6 7 that "malicious
intent" on the part of the defendant would be required to justify an award of
punitive damages. The majority in Wade found that a malicious intent
could be manifested either as reckless indifference to or callous disregard of
60. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d at 781.
61. Id. at 784.
62. Id at 786.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1637. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
64. Id at 1639. The Court noted further that the deterrent purpose of punitive damages
was not harmed by the standard of liability being the same for both compensatory and punitive
damages, and that the standards enunciated for awards of compensatory and punitive damages
under § 1983 did not depart from the common law rules.
65. Id at 1628-31,cting, inter alia, Brief for Petitioner at 8, Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625
(1983). Cf id at 1629-30 n.5, where Justice Brennan notes that Justice Rehnquist's dissent
"without squarely denying that punitive damages are available under § 1983, does its best to
cast doubt on the proposition."
66. Id at 1627.
67. 435 U.S. at 265 (punitive damages not awarded because petitioners found not to have
acted with "malicious intention").
[Vol. 61:4
SMITH v. WADE
the plaintiffs constitutional rights, as well as by actual malicious intent. 68
The dissent defined malicious intent in a more restrictive manner, requiring
evidence of ill will or spite to prove the presence of actual malice. 69 The
majority and dissent reached these separate conclusions often relying on the
same cases for support.70 This irony is largely due to the varying and often
imprecise labels used to define damages standards.
A related issue decided in Smith v. Wade is whether the standard of lia-
bility for exemplary damages must be higher than the standard of liability
for compensatory damages under section 1983. Again receiving no guidance
from the statute, the Court looked to the common law of torts, noting that
the common law has never required that the threshold for punitive damage
liability must be higher than that for compensatory liability. 7' The majority
cited with approval the purposes of punitive damages (punishment and de-
terrence) in relation to the violation of a plaintiffs constitutionally guaran-
teed rights. 72 While recognizing that the recklessness standard is somewhat
ambiguous, Justice Brennan did not find it so vague as to be unfair or not
useful. 73 The Court rejected Smith's argument that recklessness was too
vague a standard to enable potential defendants to conform to the law and
avoid the proposed sanctions, 74 finding such reasoning valid only assuming
that prison officials would base their conduct on the punitive damage
standard.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Traditional Tort Analysts
1. Duty owed
Mindful of the "background of tort liability" 7 5 against which section
1983 actions should be examined, the analysis in a section 1983 case begins
with constitutional right/duty considerations. Based on prior eighth amend-
ment cases, it is clear that there are two ways in which the "accepted notions
of decency" 76 standard of the eighth amendment can be violated. First,
prison inmates collectively have the right to exist in a prison environment
where violent assaults are the exception, rather than the rule; and second,
the deprivation of an eighth amendment right happens when an egregious
failure to provide for the security of a particular inmate occurs. 77 Implicit in
the description of the second possible eighth amendment deprivation is the
assumption of a certain level of knowledge by prison officials of the circum-
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1631-37.
69. Id at 1642-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91
U.S. 489 (1875); Philadelphia, W. & B. R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858); Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
72. Id. at 1639.
73. Id. at 1637.
74. Id. at 1636.
75. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187.
76. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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stances of a specific prisoner. 78 It would clearly be unfair to charge a prison
official with an egregious failure to protect a particular inmate if the official
had no knowledge, or reason to suspect that the prisoner was in danger.
Once the requisite level of personal knowledge is (or should be) present, how-
ever, the constitutional duty to protect an inmate, wherever possible, 79 from
violence is activated.
2. Standard of Conduct/Breach of Duty
In examining the appropriate standard of conduct to which prison offi-
cials should aspire, past eighth amendment decisions have attempted to ac-
count for the fact that a prison sentence is, in itself, a punishment.8 0 The
difference, then, between the punishment evidenced by a prison sentence,
and the prohibited cruel and unusual punishment, is the requirement of
proof by the plaintiff that the prison official intended8 ' the violation of his
eighth amendment rights.
This was the position taken by the circuit court in Wade v. Haynes; 82 the
court cited as authority Schaal v. Rowe, 83 where the Seventh Circuit Court
required an inmate to show that a prison official had deliberately deprived
him of his constitutional rights in not preventing an attack by another in-
mate.8 4 "Deliberate deprivation may result from actual intent to deprive
him of rights or from recklessness in ignoring known threats."8 5 This stan-
dard of conduct was also upheld in Estelle v. Gamble,86 where "deliberate
indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs was held to state a cause of
action under section 1983.87
B. Qualifed Immunity
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of malicious intention in
the context of the qualified immunity defense in Procunier v. Navarette.88 The
78. See Punitite Damages, supra note 59, at 918.
79. "In determining whether a given act or omission by prison authorities rises to the level
of deprivation of the right to security, the Court takes notice of the violent nature of the men
who inhabit . . .prisons." Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. at 1294.
80. People v. Upchurch, 76 Cal. App. 3d 721, 143 Cal. Rptr. 113, 114 (1978); In re Baker,
183 Misc. 113, 50 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (1944); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33
N.E. 648, 649 (1893).
81. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 32, at 23. "[In Roberts v. Williams] [t]he Fifth Circuit
may have been concerned with the possibility of numerous 1983 claims based on alleged eighth
amendment violations if use of the eighth amendment were not limited to extreme situations
involving intentional conduct. Thus it appears that, for § 1983 purposes, unintentional conduct
may not constitute an eighth amendment violation . . ." Cf McClellan & Northcross, supra
note 12, at 440 n.163. "The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition
[in] the prison context. . .[does] not depend on the state of mind of the actor." Id at 451-
52. "The defendant's state of mind should not control the determination of whether a right
[secured by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the due process clause-
such as eighth amendment rights] has been violated."
82. 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981).
83. Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ill. 1978).
84. Id at 157.
85. Id, cting Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
87. Id at 105.
88. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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Court, through its reliance on section 8A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS,8 9 seems to require proof that an official either actually intended
harm to the plaintiff, or took an action which, although not intended to
harm, was so likely to produce injury that the harm was certain to result. 90
In other words, malicious intent is found by examining the defendant's in-
tention in causing the act which resulted in the deprivation, rather than
examining the act itself. The plaintiff therefore must prove that the prison
official intended the act which violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, or
that the official acted with reckless disregard of whether she was violating
such a right.
This analysis is necessary where an eighth amendment violation has
been alleged, despite the Court's recent pronouncement in Harlow v. Ftzger-
ald.91 In Harlow the Court held "that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' 92 Nu-
merous cases, 93 including the 1976 Supreme Court decision, Estelle v.
Gamble94 have held that implied malicious intent, characterized as "deliber-
ate indifference", 95 or "callous indifference" 96 would state a valid cause of
action against prison officials under section 1983. Therefore, even if Harlow
did eliminate the "subjective" prong9 7 of the qualified immunity defense,
proof that a prison guard had acted with malicious intent, either actual or
implied, 98 would defeat the immunity defense "since a reasonably compe-
tent public official should know the law governing his conduct." 99 In sum-
mary, because the law regarding the standard of conduct necessary to state
an eighth amendment deprivation is well-settled, failure to abide by that
standard will defeat even the "objective"' 00 prong of the good-faith immu-
nity test.
C Standard of Liabiity
The question the Court addressed in Smitlh o. Wade examines the suffi-
ciency of an implied malicious intent standard with regard to the imposition
of punitive damages. The majority in Smith v. Wade determined that the
standard of conduct required to defeat the immunity defense will also justify
the imposition of punitive damages, where implied malicious intent was the
basis for both compensatory and punitive damages in the lower court. ° i
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977).
90. 434 U.S. at 566.
91. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
92. Id at 2738 (citations & footnotes omitted).
93. See supra footnotes 82-85 and accompanying text.
94. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
95. Id. at 105.
96. Fiedler v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1979).
97. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
98. See Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2739.
100. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
101. 663 F.2d at 784-86.
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As Justice Brennan initially points out, even though the standards
which justify awards of compensatory or punitive damages are described by
the same words, they are not identical. Once liability is established, imposi-
tion of compensatory damages against the defendant is mandatory. Punitive
damages, on the other hand, "are never awarded as of right, no matter how
egregious the defendant's-conduct."' 10 2 The decision in this case regarding
the award of exemplary damages was an expression by the jury that Smith's
conduct seemed to them outrageous.
The question remains, however, whether the standard articulated for an
award of punitive damages should be higher than for compensatory dam-
ages. The dissent cites numerous reasons why the more stringent actual mal-
ice requirement is appropriate as a prerequisite to an award of punitive
damages, among them that punitive damages have always been viewed with
disfavor.10 3 Justice Rehnquist also expressed fears that quasi-criminal puni-
tive damages would be awarded without adequate safeguards in civil ac-
tions, and that punitive damages would be awarded capriciously by jurors,
especially where the standards forming the basis of the award are vague.1
0 4
Further, the dissent contends that, at least where the standards are ill-de-
fined, the costs of punitive damages, such as the encouragement of unneces-




Although it is true that punitive damages are not a "favorite in the
law", 10 6 it is equally true that punitive damages have been awarded in the
past, and continue today to be assessed where the court feels that their deter-
rent or vindicatory purposes are served."-07 The dissent insists that a reckless-
ness standard is too vague for a jury to base a quasi-criminal award of
punitive damages, apparently overlooking the fact that the recklessness stan-
dard is also used to describe criminal violations, such as manslaughter. 10 8
Concern is expressed that punitive damages will be awarded against
unpopular defendants, producing a possible chilling effect on officials' devo-
tion to duty. While it is certainly possible that punitive damages may be
awarded by a jury prejudiced against a defendant official, an equally plausi-
ble theory is that the jury's sympathies will be with the prison official, who
may be perceived as a hard working employee trying to make the best of a
bad situation, and who will certainly have severe problems satisfying a large
102. 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
103. Id at 1641 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. Id at 1641-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 1641 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Historically, punitive damages are thought to be as old as the right to trial by jury. 25
CJ.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966). Some courts have suggested they would be willing to award
punitive damages whenever they would serve a deterrent function. Keker v. Procunier, 398 F.
Supp. 756, 768 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (dictum); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (S.D. Ohio
1975) ("where the conduct is found to be willful or wanton or where a deterrent effect will be
accomplished.").
108. Brief of Respondent at 4, Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).
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damage judgment. 10 9 Further, the concern that the "Damoclean sword" of
potential punitive damage awards may undermine the "ability of officials to
take decisive, efficient action" would seem more than adequately protected
by the Court's recent qualified immunity pronouncements. While it may
appear at first glance that the majority requires only a showing of reckless-
ness," 0 this contention is amply refuted by an examination of the objective
portion of the qualified immunity test-that an official knew or reasonably
should have known that his or her actions would violate a clearly established
constitutional right. III
Viewed against the backdrop of other section 1983 cases, Smith v. Wade
appears as a logical next-step in a continuing progression. In Monroe v. Pape,
the Supreme Court explained that section 1983 actions should be viewed
against the background of tort liability. Wood and Navarelte provided an out-
line of the proper standard of conduct against which an official afforded a
qualified immunity could measure her actions. Although sketchy, the CareY
v. Piphus requirement of malicious intention transposed over Justice Bren-
nan's views on punitive damages in Adickes v. Kress, 1 12 lead logically to the
Court's statement in Smith v. Wade that the malicious intention required for
punitive damages may be manifested as either actual malice or as reckless
disregard of known dangers.
Prior decisions in common law tort cases regarding standards for impo-
sition of punitive damages are not unequivocably supportive of the Court's
holding. It seems safe to say, however, that the rule in the great majority of
jurisdictions was that punitive damages could be awarded without actual ill
will, spite, or intent to injure being shown.'' 3 Inquiries into the legislative
intent of the 42d Congress regarding the propriety of punitive damages are
even less definitive."14
109. Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1225-26.
110. See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IA. L. REV. 1, 6-7,
10 (1982). In a discussion of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532-35 (1981), Nahmod states that
" ... the Court concluded that negligent conduct could be a proper basis of liability in section
1983 cases." Thus, in the absence of a qualified immunity, reckless conduct would clearly state
a § 1983 cause of action, based on the Parratt holding. The cases are distinguishable because, in
addition to the qualified immunity defense in Wade not plead in Parratt, another important
difference between these two cases involving prison inmates exists; the 1983 claim in Parratt was
based on a fourteenth amendment due process claim, while the alleged violation in Wade was of
an eighth amendment right. The Paratt Court held for the defendant, finding that, although a
deprivation under color of law had occurred, the plaintiffs due process rights had not been
violated, as he was afforded a post-deprivation due process hearing.
11. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The statement of the dissent that punitive
damages could be awarded on the basis of mere negligence is not entirely accurate. 103 S. Ct. at
1657 n.16.
112. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). "To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more
than a bare violation of § 1983. It is sufficient for plaintiff to show . . . that the defendant
acted with reckless disregard of whether he was violating such a right." 1d.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 1632. But cf. id at 1650 n. 10 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
114. One commentator has suggested that a strict or "historical" interpretation of the intent
of the 42d Congress would limit § 1983 actions to "racial problems" alone, while a "functional"
approach would recognize actions for violations of all constitutional rights. Neither interpreta-
tion expressly ratifies punitive damages, although a good case for the imposition of punitive
damages can be made under either approach. See Eisenberg, Section 1983. Doctrinal Foundations




In her separate dissent, Justice O'Connor identifies the primary pur-
poses of section 1983 actions as compensation and deterrence.'1 5 Balancing
the chilling effect on the performance of duties by public officials, and the
"ever-increasing flood of section 1983 claims"' 16 as costs of punitive dam-
ages, against the deterrence of constitutional violations as a benefit, Justice
O'Connor found the costs attendant prospective awards of punitive damages
to be too high.
Admittedly, before punitive damages can be imposed in a section 1983
action under either the actual or implied malice standard, the qualified im-
munity of the defendant official must be overcome. As the majority notes," 7
the presence of the qualified immunity defense protects the need for discre-
tion in making day-to-day decisions. This discretion would seem to go a long
way toward dispelling the chilling effect the dissent fears. However, the fact
that a prison official's immunity is qualified and not absolute indicates that
the protected sphere of privilege can be exceeded. Given that public officials
are capable of committing recurrent constitutional violations, there is no rea-
son why the officials should not be liable for reckless misconduct on the same
basis as private citizens." 8 Additionally, the presence of insurance to cover
assessments of compensatory damages would seem to completely negate any
possible deterrent effect, absent punitive damages. The final "cost" factor
cited by both dissenting Justices is the overcrowding of the courts, a problem
that would be further exacerbated unless a very high standard was imposed
before punitive damages could be awarded.
While it is true that there have been an increasing number of civil rights
cases filed in the court system recently," 9 the dissents' argument appears
logically inconsistent. First, there exist numerous barricades to the mainte-
nance of frivilous actions, such as dismissal on the pleadings for failure to
state a claim, 120 and summary judgment, 12' and the cost to plaintiffs for
initiating suits and pursuing their claims.' 22 Where a section 1983 claim is
presented, especially one alleging the deprivation of eighth amendment
rights, the qualified immunity of the official must be overcome. Even when
all these hurdles have been cleared, punitive damages are never awarded as
clearly has been interpreted to provide a forum affording protection of constitutionally guaran-
teed rights, especially where violated by state officials. See Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1640 n.23. Cf
103 S. Ct. at 1658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981)); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. at 254-57.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. 103 S. Ct. at 1639-40.
118. Love, supra note 51, at 1276.
119. See Note, The Supreme Court Corrals a Runaway, supra note 19, at 1075 n.24; Note, Section
/983 Liabtdityfor Negligence, supra note 21, at 274 n.22. "Between 1961 and 1979, non-prisoner
civil rights cases filed in federal district courts increased from 296 to 13,168; state prisoner filings
in federal courts showed a similar jump, increasing from 218 in 1966 to 11,195 in 1979." (foot-
notes omitted) Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 523.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
122. Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1222.
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a matter of right.' 23 Second, a survey' 2 4 of the range of punitive damages
allowed by lower federal courts in section 1983 actions indicates that the
awards normally do not exceed $10,000, and often consist of much smaller
sums. 125 Given the various procedural obstacles a plaintiff must surmount,
the uncertainty of any award of punitive damages, and the fact that punitive
damages are awarded only for egregious deprivations of constitutional
rights,' 26 it would seem that cases where the potential for punitive damages
exist are exactly the type of meritorious actions which should be encouraged
(rather than denying awards of punitive damages to prevent an ever-increas-
ing flood of section 1983 claims, which will threaten the ability of the federal
courts to handle those that are meritorious). 12 7 Finally, an empirical
study' 28 of section 1983 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 in the Central District
of California (Los Angeles) 12 9 concluded that the sheer volume of section
1983 cases pose no serious threat to the federal court system, noting that oft-
quoted statistics130 on the volume of cases in all likelihood are seriously over-
stated. The study also found evidence that courts generally view section
1983 actions with disfavor, despite the presence in the vast majority of cases
of "classic rights of obvious importance."'
3'
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Wade, when placed in perspective, reaffirms the protec-
tions afforded valuable constitutional rights, privileges and immunities de-
lineated in Monroe. When interests as important as constitutional rights are
at stake, the argument for the punishment and deterrence of persons who
engage in reckless conduct seems compelling. When integrated with the
Court's standard of conduct decisions in Wood, Navarelte, and Harlow, and
past eighth amendment decisions, Smith v. Wade's potentially vague reckless-
ness standard crystallizes quite clearly to define the breach of duty necessary
to merit an award of punitive damages.
The Wade outcome is troubling only as it reflects a continuing division
on the Court as to the proper uses of section 1983 litigation. Although ar-
guably based on a misperception' 32 of the current burdens of section 1983
litigation on the federal courts, the fear that Smith v. Wade will open the
123. See Riley, supra note 52, at 201 (generally, punitive damages are not given as a matter
of right, but as a matter of grace or gratuity.). See also Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
124. See Love, supra note 51, at 1275 n.274.
125. See generall Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973) (punitive damages in actions for viola-
tions of federal civil rights). Wade was awarded $5,000 in punitive damages.
126. 103 S. Ct. at 1628. The trial court instructed the jury that Wade could only recover if
the defendant was grossly negligent or guilty of "egregious failure to protect Wade." Id.
127. Id. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. See Eisenberg, supra note 114.
129. Eisenberg's findings appear consistent with other empirical studies. id. at 525 n.182.
130. Id. at 523 n.175, and 533-36. Statistics collected by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts do not distinguish between civil rights cases brought under § 1983 and
cases brought under other civil rights statutes. Currently, employment claim cases constitute a
huge fraction of all civil rights cases. Id at 533 n.230.
131. Id at 536-37.
132. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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floodgates leading to a torrent of frivolous actions appears the most likely
explanation for the closeness of this decision.
Lynn Hahn
MUELLER V ALLEN: CLARIFYING OR CONFUSING
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF STATE AID
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mue/er v. Allen', the latest chapter in the continuing controversy over
state aid to parochial schools, the United States Supreme Court resolved the
conflict between the circuits regarding the constitutionality of tax benefits
for parents of nonpublic school students. The court did not, however, suc-
ceed in clarifying its own inconsistencies in this area.
2
In Mueller, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' de-
cision to uphold a Minnesota statute 3 granting parents of children attending
both public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools tax deductions
for tuition, textbook and transportation expenses. Taxpayers had chal-
lenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing it violates the establishment
clause4 because it provides impermissible aid to sectarian schools.
5
A similar challenge had previously succeeded in Rhode Island Federation of
Teachers v. Norberg6 when the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invali-
dated the tax relief provided under a Rhode Island statute7 virtually identi-
1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) aJ'g 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd 514 F. Supp. 998 (D.
Minn. 1981).
2. See Comment, Church and State.- The Past, Present, and Future of State Aid to Parochial
Schools, 9 Sw. UL. REV. 1211, 1211 (1977) (describes the law regulating state aid to nonpublic
schools as a "chaotic compilation of inconsistent decisions"). See generally Note, Rebuilding the
Wall The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1463 (1981) (general discussion of the Supreme Court's contradictory applications of the estab-
lishment clause).
3. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982), repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws c. 342, art. 1, § 44. The
statute allowed the following deductions from gross income in computing net taxable income:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an ele-
mentary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's com-
pulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision,
"textbooks" shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and
equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects
legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state
and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of reli-
gious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets,
doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation
to, extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. U.S.
CONST. amend. 1, cl. 1. The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); accord
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Mueller, 514 F. Supp. at 999.
6. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980). This statute provides the following
deductions:
(c) Modifications Reducing Federal Adjusted Gross Income.-
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cal to the Minnesota statute challenge in Mudler.'
This direct conflict between the Eighth and First Circuits reflects the
overall confusion regarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause constraints on government aid to religion 9 and suggests that
lower courts as well as state legislatures do not have the guidance necessary
to formulate constitutionally permissible aid programs.10 Whether the
Court's decision in Mueller provides this needed guidance is doubtful.
This comment will describe the development of the establishment
clause doctrine in the area of state aid to church-affiliated schools and will
explain the three-part inquiry applied in contemporary establishment clause
cases. It will discuss the Mueller holding and analyze the Court's rationale in
terms of the contemporary three-part test and in view of establishment
clause precedent. Finally, it will suggest the impact Mueller V. Allen may have
on future establishment clause analysis in the area of state aid to parochial
schools.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND STATE
AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
A. Evolution ofthe Three-Part Test
The first amendment of the United States Constitution contains two
references to religion: the establishment clause,"' which forbids laws "re-
specting an establishment of religion"; and the free exercise clause, which
forbids laws "prohibiting the free exercise" 1 2 of religion. Through these two
clauses the framers intended, at the very least, to protect individual expres-
There shall be subtracted from federal adjusted gross income... (2) amounts paid to
others, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each dependent in kindergarten
through sixth (6th) grade and seven hundred dollars ($700) for each dependent in
grades seven (7) through twelve (12) inclusive, for tuition, textbooks, and transporta-
tion of each such dependent attending an elementary or secondary school situated in
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire or Maine,
wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance
laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As used in this section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books
and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary
schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elemen-
tary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of
which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship.
8. Compare MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982), supra note 3, with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-
12(c)(2) (1980),supra note 7. Both statutes provide tax deductions from taxpayers' gross income
for the tuition, textbook and transportation expenses of each dependent attending either a pub-
lic or nonpublic elementary or secondary school and both statutes set forth three criteria for
determining the eligibility of the schools: the schools must conform to the state's compulsory
attendance laws; the schools must not be operated for profit; and the schools must adhere to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
9. See Note, The Constitutionatity of Tax Reteffor Parents of Children Attending Pubic and Non-
pubhc Schools, 67 MINN. L. REV. 793, 806 (1983) (noting the lack of clarity and predictability in
the Supreme Court's approach to school aid cases).
10. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1245-46 (concluding that the Supreme Court's inconsis-
tent treatment of school aid cases has resulted in confusion in the state legislatures and lower
courts).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
12. Id.
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sion of religious beliefs and to guarantee the separation of church and
state. 13
Originally, at the urging of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the
free exercise and the nonestablishment' 4 of religion were promoted as insep-
arable concepts.' 5 Over the past three decades, however, the Supreme Court
has not adopted such an approach 16 and has reviewed the clauses indepen-
dently, analyzing each case under the establishment clause or the free exer-
cise clause. 17 Cases involving government aid to parochial schools have
13. Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establishment Clause? 68
IowA L. REV. 539, 542 (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, § 14-4, at 818-19
(1978). Tribe suggests that two fundamental principles underlie the establishment and free
exercise clauses: voluntarism and separatism or "neutrality." Designed to prevent any direct or
indirect compulsion in matters of belief, the free exercise clause is a mandate of religious volun-
tarism. The establishment clause embodies the voluntarism concept in terms of ensuring that
the church sustains itself only through voluntary support of its followers, not from political
support of the state. The separatism principle requires that the state refrain from involvement
in religious affairs and prohibits fragmentation of the body politic by reason of sectarian differ-
ences. L. TRIBE, supra, at 818-19.
14. Because the establishment clause is prohibitive, it is often referred to as the nonestab-
lishment principle. See, e.g., Case Comment, Statute Granting Tax Deduction for Tuition Paid by
Parents of Sectarian and Nonsectarian School Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause: Mueller
v. Allen, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 272 (1983).
15. Case Comment,supra note 14, at 271-72. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at § 14-2, 814
(noting that the framers considered the clauses "at least compatible and at best mutually sup-
portive"). James Madison believed that the separation of religion and government was essential
for each to achieve its highest purposes. In contrast, Thomas Jefferson supported separation
primarily as a means to protect the state from the church. Jefferson believed that only the
strictest "wall of separation between church and state" would eliminate the formal influence of
religious institutions from politics and preserves free choice among political views. L. TRIBE,
supra note 13, at 817.
When in 1785 the General Assembly of Virginia attempted to renew the state's tax levy in
support of the Episcopal Church, Virginia's established church, Jefferson and Madison led the
opposition against this bill. In 1786 Madison issued his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance"
denouncing the tax. His views received strong support throughout Virginia and the bill died in
committee. Upon the tax levy's defeat, the Virginia legislature enacted Jefferson's "Virginia
Bill for Religious Liberty." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947).
Scholars have treated the Virginia experience as the origin of the first amendment's free
exercise and establishment clauses. Comment, supra note 2, at 1212 n.4. The Everson Court
suggested that Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" was, in fact, the basis of the first
amendment's religious liberty provisions. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
In the midst of conflicting interpretations of the first amendment, many commentators
have criticized the emphasis given the views of Madison and Jefferson, recognizing that "a too
literal a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" is often futile, Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note
13, at § 14-3 (discussing the problems involved in relying too heavily on the framers' intent).
16. Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Reliion: An Inquig Into Tuition Tax Benefits, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 207-8 n.5 (1983); Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272.
17. The Supreme Court has recognized that the two clauses may overlap. See Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (a Pennsylvania statute which required that
Bible verses be recited daily in the public schools was held to be violative of the establishment
clause). There is a natural antagonism between a prohibition against establishing a religion and
a prohibition against inhibiting its practice. An example of the tension between the clauses that
arises from this natural antagonism was offered by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in
Schempp: Spending federal funds to employ chaplains for the army would be a violation of the
establishment clause, "[y]et a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely com-
plain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was
affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion." See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(italics in original). "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
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traditionally been analyzed under the establishment clause.' 8
Government assistance to religious education was widespread in the
United States when the first amendment was adopted' 9 and controversies
over public aid to sectarian schools have erupted sporadically at both the
state and federal levels since colonial times. 20 The establishment clause,
however, supported few challenges to state and federal legislation prior to
World War 11.21
It wasn't until 1947, in Everson v. Board ofEducation,22 that the Supreme
Court first applied the establishment clause to state legislation.2 3 In Everson
the Court adopted the first tier of modern establishment clause analysis: the
secular purpose test.
2 4
The New Jersey statute2 5 challenged in Everson authorized local school
districts to provide transportation to nonpublic as well as public school
pupils. Writing for the majority, Justice Black reasoned that only a strict
extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69
(1970).
Several commentators have urged that consideration of both clauses is essential to a full
and fair determination of any individual case arising under them. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELI-
GION AND LAW 16-18 (1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at § 14-7, 833-34; Choper, The Relgion
Clause of the First Amendment. Reconciling the Conftict, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 673 (1980). Professor
Philip Kurland proposes that the clauses be read together to state a single precept: the prohibi-
tion of classification in terms of religion whether to confer a benefit or to impose a burden. P.
KURLAND, supra, at 112. The Court, however, has never adopted this theory. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1034 (2d ed. 1983) (noting the theoreti-
cal appeal of Kurland's theory and contrasting it with the Court's present treatment of claims
under the religion clauses).
18. Note, supra note 16, at 207-8 n.5; Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272. Arguments
that the free exercise clause mandates government funding of parochial schools' secular func-
tions have been rejected by the courts. See Brusca v. Missouri ex. rel. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F.
Supp. 275, 278-79 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (state constitutional provision and statutes prohibiting pub-
lic aid to sectarian schools are not violations of the free exercise clause), admem., 405 U.S. 1050
(1972). Further, the Supreme Court has not accepted the free exercise argument that while
government does not have to support such schools, it should be allowed to do so if it chooses. See
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973) (ac-
knowledging that a law interfering with a parent's right to have a child educated in a sectarian
school could "run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause," but finding this insufficient justification
for "an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause").
19. See Note, supra note 9, at 797, n.20 (between 1770 and 1820 virtually all American
schools were private, religiously affiliated and publicly supported); see also R. MORGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 48 (1972) (prior to 1830, private education was the only edu-
cation available in America).
20. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 797, & n.21 (describes several of the colonial and
nineteenth century controversies arising out of opposition to various forms of state aid to reli-
gious education).
21. Although the Court had handled religious issues prior to Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), it never squarely faced the establishment clause question. Id. at 15,
n.21. See, e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (approving loan of
texts because of the public purpose); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding use of
Indian trust funds by government for payment of tuition to parochial schools on reservations
because of private nature of the funds); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (allowing
funds for expansion of hospital operated by religious order because institution's purpose not
religious).
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272.
24. Id
25. N.J. REV. STAT. § 18-14-8 (Curi. Supp. 1944).
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policy of no-aid 26 to parochial education could preserve the original mean-
ing of the establishment clause. 27 Nevertheless, incidental benefits to reli-
gious institutions are permissible if the legislation encompasses a valid
secular purpose. 28 Applying this test, the Court held that legislation ensur-
ing the safe delivery of children to and from school had a public welfare
rather than religious goal, 29 and consequently, the program was
permissible.
30
For sixteen years after Everson, the Court searched for valid secular pur-
poses as it struggled with first amendment challenges to Sunday closing
laws, 3  released time arrangements 32 on 33 and off34 public school premises,
and prayer recitation in public schools. 35 When it became apparent that
lawmakers were attempting to circumvent constitutional challenges by sup-
plying clearly religious legislation with statements of legitimate secular pur-
pose,36 the Court added a second level to the establishment clause inquiry:
the primary effect test.
The primary effect test demands that the principal consequences of a
law neither positively nor negatively bear upon religion. 37 Under this ra-
tionale, although a statute has a purported secular purpose, the courts may
invalidate it if it has the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting
26. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272-73. Justice Black stated that the Constitution
forbids the state to pass laws that aid one religion, all religions, or show a preference for one
religion over another. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. Despite that pronouncement, however, the Court
has not followed a strict no-aid policy. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 272-73 n.31. See also
Kauper, The Walz Decision.- More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REV.
179, 180 (1970) (asserting that in the Court's view, complete separation of church and state is
impossible).
27. The Court sought to adhere to the meaning of the clause as envisioned by Madison
and Jefferson in determining that a strict nonestablishment theory prohibits a state from setting
up a church or passing laws to aid one or more churches. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Seegenerally
supra note 15.
28. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
29. This public welfare rationale has been recognized as the child benefit theory. Case
Comment, supra note 14, at 273 n.34; Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523, 529 (1980). For a general discussion of the child benefit theory, see
Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab/ishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 576-
81 (1968).
30. The Court suggested, however, that it had approached the limit of constitutionality.
See 330 U.S. at 16.
31. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws be-
cause of the secular value of receiving a day of rest).
32. A released time arrangement allows public school students time away from their secu-
lar studies for religious instruction when they do not have access to sectarian schools. Case
Comment, supra note 14, at 274 n.38.
33. See Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating re-
lease time program with religious instruction on public school property).
34. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (relied on free exercise clause to approve
release of students for religion classes outside public school premises).
35. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting prayer in public school
classrooms).
36. See Case Comment, supra note 14, at 274. Generally the Court accepts legislative state-
ments of secular purpose at face value and does not strike down legislation authorizing aid to
nonpublic schools on this ground. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp.
1316, 1318 n.l (D. Minn. 1978).
37. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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religion. 38 The Supreme Court first applied the primary effect test in Abing-
ton School Distrct v. Schempp 39 to invalidate statutes requiring Bible readings
and prayer recitation in public schools.
The Court utilized the two-prong purpose-effect test five years after
Schempp in Board of Education v. Allen 4 0 to uphold a New York textbook loan
program which provided for the loan of textbooks to private and public
school pupils. The Court reasoned that since the financial benefit of the
state aid flowed to the parents and children, not directly to the schools, the
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
4 1
Two years later, in Walz v. Tax Commission,42 the Court adopted the
third and final prong of the establishment clause test when it denied chal-
lenge to the tax exempt status conferred on church property by the New
York Constitution. The Court stated three primary reasons for its holding.
First, the Court explained that state and federal history support the accept-
ance of such an exemption. 43 Second, the Court looked to the breadth of the
class benefiting from the New York statute. 44 The Court noted that religious
institutions represented merely one of the several nonprofit, quasi-public cor-
porations and institutions deemed exempt from taxation under the statute.
45
Finally, the Court noted that the state involvement caused by the tax ex-
emption was "minimal and remote" 46 compared to the contact that would
result between the church and state officials if religious institutions were sub-
ject to taxation. Such taxation would result in greater entanglement in the
form of "tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the
direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes." 47  Concern with this last element, excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state, represents the third factor in subsequent establish-
ment clause analysis.
The entanglement test was developed more fully and received its clear-
est articulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman ,48 which invalidated state subsidy of
38. In practice two criteria determine whether a statute will pass the primary effect test.
See generally Comment, Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending Pubh& and Nonpubl& Schools:
Mueller v. Allen, 71 Ky. L.J. 685, 687-90 (1982-83) (discussing application of the primary effect
test). The first criterion demands that the activity aided is such that its secular aspects are
identifiable and separable from its religious aspects so that a court can be certain only secular
activities are aided. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
480 (1973). The second criterion looks to the breadth of the benefitted class. If the class is too
narrow, the statute is suspect. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religous Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
39. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
41. Id. at 243-44. This rationale is an application of the child benefit theory which had its
origin in the public welfare rationale employed in Everson. See supra note 28.
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
43. The federal government and every state grant churches a property tax exemption mod-
elled after a Virginia statutory scheme adopted in 1800. Id. at 676-77.
44. The provision exempted all property owned by nonprofit educational facilities and
charitable organizations including hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, his-
torical, and patriotic groups. Id at 672-73.
45. Id
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id. at 674.
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
[Vol. 61:4
1984] MUELLER v. ALLEN
parochial school teachers salaries. The Court invalidated the program not
only because it promised certainly to entangle church and state in compli-
cated administrative procedures, but because legislative debates over such
annual appropriations would immerse the state in heated church-related de-
bates as well.49 The Court treated this second concern with excessive polit-
ical entanglement as separate from the problem of potential administrative
entanglement the Court discussed in Walz v. Tax Commission.
B. Recent Estabhshment Clause Analysi's of State Aid Programs
Using the three-pronged purpose-effect-entanglement inquiry, the
Supreme Court has invalidated several different attempts to aid parochial
elementary and secondary schools. 50 The Court has struck down reimburse-
ments for the administration of teacher-prepared tests, graded by sectarian
personnel but mandated by the state; 5 1 appropriation of funds for auxiliary
services for pupils; 52 salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
religious schools;5 3 loans of secular instructional materials; 54 and funds for
field trip transportation.
55
The Court's rationale in these cases has often been a circular one. 56 A
49. Id at 620. This concern with political entanglement is the problem of political divi-
siveness. The Court warned that religious concerns fostered by aid programs will find their way
into the political process, thereby intensifying "political fragmentation and divisiveness on reli-
gious lines." Id. at 623.
50. Aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools is generally subject to a higher level
of scrutiny than assistance to church-affiliated colleges and universities. Case Comment, supra
note 14, at 276 n.58. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (disal-
lowing a state grant to church-affiliated elementary and secondary schools for the repair and
maintenance of secular buildings) with Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (approving
state grants to sectarian colleges for the erection of secular classrooms).
In Lemon the Court acknowledged the District Court's conclusion that parochial schools
constitute an "integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church." Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). This process of inculcating religious doctrine, the Court noted,
is "enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools particularly." Id
51. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
52. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Meek examined the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania plan which provided aid directly to nonpublic schools in the form of textbook
loans, loans of instructional materials and auxiliary services. The auxiliary services, which were
to be provided by state employees within the parochial schools, included: guidance, counseling
and testing services; remedial and therapeutic services; speech and hearing services; and services
for the educationally disadvantaged. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-972(b) (1974). The Meek
Court upheld the portion of the Pennsylvania plan that provided for the loan of textbooks to
parochial school children, but struck down the provisions for the loan of instructional materials
and auxiliary services. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart reasoned that the textbook provi-
sion was constitutionally indistinguishable from the aid approved in Board ofEducation v. Allen
392 U.S. 236 (1968). justice Stewart distinguished the provision for instructional materials
which, although secular in nature, would have the "unconstitutional primary effect of advanc-
ing religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools..." Meek, 421 U.S.
at 363. With respect to the auxiliary services authorized under the statute, Justice Stewart
concluded that excessive entanglement would result from efforts by the state to regulate the
activities of the state employees who rendered the services within a predominantly religious
environment. Id at 371-72.
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. Meek, 421 U.S. at 349. See supra note 52.
55. McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 446 U.S. 970 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
56. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 276-77 (discussing the perplexing circular-
ity in the Court's reasoning in state aid cases).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
program may be deemed unconstitutional if no surveillance or auditing pro-
cedure is included to ensure the continued nonreligious use of the granted
aid. On the other hand, under the Walz rationale, the assistance program
may demand too much government surveillance and consequently violate
the excessive administrative entanglement test.
The Supreme Court has recently approved several aid programs barely
distinguishable on the facts from those rejected earlier.5 7 The provisions up-
held included: reimbursements to private schools for the cost of therapeutic
and diagnostic services;58 administration of state-prepared and graded
tests; 59 and maintenance of state-mandated records.
6 °
The obvious inconsistencies of the Burger Court in delineating the
boundaries of nonestablishment in aid to private education have drawn
sharp criticism. 6 1 Prior to Mueller v. Allen, however, the Court was consistent
in its treatment of tax benefit programs for parents of children attending
nonpublic schools.
62
The Supreme Court grappled with the issue of the constitutionality of
tuition tax benefit programs for the first time in 1973 when it decided Com-
mite for Pub/ic Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyqulst 6 3 and Sloan o. Lemon .6
Sloan examined the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which
57. See generally Note, supra note 2 (discussing the Burger Court's tendency to decide estab-
lishment clause cases on "very narrow" factual grounds).
58. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Wolman questioned the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute which provided many of the types of auxiliary services struck down in Meek v.
Pillenger. See supra note 52. The Ohio aid plan differed from the program invalidated in Meek in
that the services and materials were directed to the school children, rather than to the parochial
schools themselves. Further, the Ohio statute distinguished diagnostic services, which involve
the detection of health problems, and therapeutic services, which concern the treatment of
health problems. The therapeutic services would be offered only in designated public centers,
off the private schools' premises. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976). The
distinctions the Court drew between Meek and Wolman have been criticized as "distinctions
without substance." Hunter,supra note 29, at 544. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 1236-
43 (comparing Wolman and Meek).
59. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229.
60. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
61. Justice White claims the Court "sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Id
at 662. Justice Stevens, however, implored the Court to try to patch together the "blurred,
indistinct and variable barrier" between church and state. Id at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
62. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (struck down tuition reimbursements to
parents of children attending private elementary and secondary schools which were to be paid
out of revenues from a state tax); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (held unconstitutional tuition reimbursements, grants and income tax credits to
parents of children attending private schools); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d
514 (3rd Cir.) (denied tax deduction of up to $1,000 for each dependent child of the taxpayer
attending a private school), afdmem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979). Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp.
744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (invalidated tax credits to parents with excessive educational expenses),
aJ'dmem sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399
(S.D. Ohio) invalidated gifts to parents of $90 for each child enrolled in a private school, afd
mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972), Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216, 224
N.W.2d 344 (1974) (struck down tax credits for educational costs to parents of children attend-
ing private schools), cerl. denied 421 U.S. 988 (1975). See generally Case Comment, supra note 14,
at 277-83 (general discussion of the Court's treatment of Nyquist and other tax benefit cases
following that decision).
63. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
64. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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provided direct tuition reimbursements to parents of children attending non-
public schools. The statute authorized a $75 reimbursement for each private
elementary school student and $150 for each secondary school student at-
tending a private school, providing such reimbursements did not exceed ac-
tual tuition paid. 65 This financial assistance was funded by revenues
generated from a state sales tax on cigarettes. 66 The Court determined that
this plan violated the establishment clause because of its "intended conse-
quence . . .to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions.
'6 7
In Nyquisl,68 decided the same day as Sloan, the Court considered a tax
benefit statute similar to the one challenged in Mueller v. Allen. Nquist inval-
idated a New York statute which provided a tuition relief program for par-
ents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools. The
statute provided parents with a tuition reimbursement if their income was
less than $5,000, or with a tuition deduction if they didn't qualify for the
reimbursement and their income was less than $25,000.69
Determining that both provisions violated the primary effect test, the
Court dispensed with the argument that the payments were not aiding sec-
tarian institutions per se since they were directed to the parents, not the
schools. 70 The Court found that the ultimate effect of the tuition reimburse-
ment was "unmistakably to provide financial support for nonpublic sectar-
ian institutions," because it provided financial incentive for parents to send
their children to sectarian schools 7' and ensured their financial ability to do
SO.
7 2
In striking down the tax deduction, the Court reasoned that like the
reimbursement, the deduction rewarded parents for sending their children to
nonpublic schools. 73 The Court noted that the deduction operated, in effect,
as a tax credit since it yielded a fixed amount of "tax forgiveness" in ex-
change for performing an act which the state desired to encourage. 74 The
65. Id. at 828.
66. Id. at 829.
67. The Court reasoned:
The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit. Whether
that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to parents to send
their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its
intended consequence is to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions.
Id. at 832.
68. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
69. Id at 764-66.
70. The Court in effect rejected the child benefit theory, supra note 29, when it recognized
that a law need not provide direct aid to the schools to be constitutionally invalid. See 413 U.S.
at 786.
71. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786.
72. Id at 783.
73. Id at 791.
74. Id. at 789. For a general discussion of tuition tax credits and an explanation of the
credit-deduction distinction, see Comment, Social Implications and Constituttnahy of Recent Propos-
als for Tuition Tax Credits for Parents of Private School Children, 51 UMKC L. REV. 286 (1983).
Tuition tax credits permit taxpayers to offset their income tax liability with a designated
amount of the tuition they paid during the taxable year. Unlike the tuition tax credit, a tuition
tax deduction is an amount subtracted from the taxpayer's taxable income, not from the actual
amount of tax due. The tax credit has an equalizing effect in that both high and low income
taxpayers get the same size benefit, providing that they have pre-credit liability equal to or
greater than the designated credit. See id. at 287.
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Court then specifically reserved decision on the constitutionality of a "genu-
ine tax deduction."
75
With the exception of one federal district court decision in the Eighth
Circuit, 76 in the decade following Nyquist courts uniformly struck down a
variety of tax benefit plans granting relief to parents of children attending
nonpublic schools.
77
Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg78 is a reflection of the solid
consensus 79 that has developed outside the Eighth Circuit in opposition to
the tax benefit packages that provide indirect aid to nonpublic, sectarian
schools. In Norberg the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on Ny-
quist to invalidate a Rhode Island statute8° granting parents of all elemen-
tary and secondary school students a personal income tax deduction for
tuition, textbook and transportation expenses.
8 '
The district court determined that the fact the statute was applicable to
parents of students attending public as well as nonpublic schools was "mere
window dressing." 8 2 Relying heavily on statistical evidence 3 demonstrating
the unequal impact of the deduction, the court of appeals concluded that the
primary effect of the Rhode Island statute was to aid religion.
84
75. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
76. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). The
statute upheld in Roemer was the same one challenged in Mueller v. Allen. The statute withstood
constitutional scrutiny in Roemer in part because it purported to benefit the parents of children
in sectarian and nonsectarian schools, as well as children enrolled in public schools. 452 F.
Supp. at 1320-22. The Court also emphasized that the statute provided a true tax deduction.
Id at 1321.
77. Case Comment, supra note 14, at 279-80. For examples of the federal courts' treatment
of tax benefit plans, see supra note 62. State courts have also had the opportunity to scrutinize
tuition aid statutes. See, e.g., People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129
(1973) (relied on Nyquist to invalidate a similar grant program); Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974) (invalidated tax credits for educational
costs incurred by parents of children attending nonpublic schools), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988
(1975).
Several state courts have struck down tuition aid programs as violative of their state consti-
tutions. See, e.g., Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979) (college tuition
grant program held a violation of Alaska Constitution); California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29
Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981) (textbook loan program to nonpublic
school students found violative of state constitution). Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509
P.2d 973 (1973) (grants of $100 for elementary school students and $300 for secondary school
students, at least 85% of which were used to fund nonpublic school students, were invalidated).
78. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
79. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 279-83 (discussing Norberg and other ex-
amples of the judiciary's general opposition to tax plans conferring relief on parents of private
school children).
80. R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980). Provisions of this statute are identical to the
Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller. See supra note 8.
81. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 863.
82. Norberg, 479 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (D.R.I. 1979).
83. Id. at 1366. The Court of Appeals used a de facto, rather than de jure analysis in
determining the breadth of the benefitted class. A de jure analysis involves examining the face
of a statute to determine whether the benefitted class is legislatively drawn along religious lines.
In contrast, a de facto approach demands a statistical or factual inquiry into the breadth of the
benefitted class. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 549 (discussing distinction between de
jure and de facto analysis).
84. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 860.
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III. MUELLER V. ALLEN
A. Facts
From 1955 until their state legislature repealed section 290.09(22) in
1983,85 Minnesota taxpayers were permitted tax deductions for elementary
and secondary school expenses. Under the statute, all parents were allowed
to deduct from their gross personal income all expenses incurred for tuition,
transportation and textbooks (including secular instructional materials and
equipment), not to exceed $500 for elementary school dependents and $700
for secondary school children.
86
In Mueller v. Allen8 7 Minnesota taxpayers challenged the state's tax ben-
efit scheme, claiming the statute amounts to an establishment of religion and
restrains free exercise of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. 88 The district court summarily dismissed
the free exercise claim, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to specify how
their religious beliefs were infringed.8 9
In support of their establishment clause claim the plaintiffs alleged that
an overwhelming majority of taxpayers who utilized the deduction had de-
pendents attending parochial schools. 90 The plaintiffs submitted statistical
evidence indicating that over 95 percent of nonpublic school students in
Minnesota attended parochial schools during the 1979-80 school year.9'
The plaintiffs further asserted that although the number of parochial stu-
dents constituted only slightly more than 10 percent of the total elementary
and secondary school population in Minnesota, 92 71 percent of the approxi-
mately $2,400,000 in revenue lost by the state through the tuition portion of
the deduction was attributable to use of that deduction by parents of paro-
chial school students.
93
These facts, the plaintiffs argued, in conjunction with the fact that Min-
nesota public schools are tuition free to most residents,94 show that the over-
whelming percentage of tax relief granted under the statute was for tuition
expenditures for religiously affiliated education. Consequently, the primary
effect of the statute was the advancement of religion. The plaintiffs further
85. Act of April 23, 1955, c. 741, sec. 1, § 290.09(19), 1955 Minn. Laws 1148, 1154 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)), repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws c. 342, art. 1, § 44. Text of
statute appears at note 3.
86. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). Amendments in 1976 added the provision for text-
books, defined to include instructional materials and equipment, and raised the deduction from
$200. See Act of March 8, 1976, c. 37, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 93.
87. 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981),,.fd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), afd, 103 S. Ct.
3062 (1983).
88. 514 F. Supp. at 999.
89. Id at 1003.
90. 676 F.2d at 1197.
91. Id at 1198.
92. The evidence indicated that a total of 820,000 students were enrolled in the Minne-
sota's elementary and secondary schools during the 1979-80 school year. Of these children,
90,954 attended private schools, and of these, 86,906 were enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools. These 86,906 students comprised 10.6% of the total elementary and secondary school
population. Id
93. Id. at 1199.
94. Id at 1199.
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contended that the statute did not have a valid secular purpose and that it
fostered an impermissible entanglement between church and state.
95
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that the statute is neutral on its face and as applied, and that
its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion. 96 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the
statute does not violate the establishment clause. 97
Because of the conflict between the First and Eighth Circuits98 regard-
ing the constitutionality of the type of tax benefit package challenged in
Mueller, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.99
B. Rationale
1. Majority Opinion
In a five to four split,'0° the Supreme Court affirmed the court of ap-
peals decision, upholding the Minnesota statute. 1 1 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Rehnquist focused on Nyquzst1 0 2 to determine whether
Minnesota's tax deduction better resembled the forms of state aid to paro-
chial schools that have been approved by the Court, than those aid packages
that have been struck down.' 0 3 After applying the three-part establishment
clause test, the Court concluded that the Minnesota arrangement bore a
greater resemblance to the assistance programs upheld in prior decisions
than to the program struck down in Nyquzst. 1
04
a. Secular Purpose
The Court found three valid purposes behind the Minnesota statute,
each of which would be sufficient to satisfy the secular purpose requirement
under the three-part establishment clause inquiry.'0 5 First, the state's deci-
sion to offset the cost of educational expenses incurred by all parents of ele-
mentary and secondary school children helps to ensure an educated
populace, thereby protecting the political and economic health of the
community. 1
06
Second, assuring the continued financial health of private schools helps
to relieve the public schools of their corresponding financial burdens. Thus,
the Court maintained, this program functioned for the benefit of all
95. Id. at 1197.
96. 514 F. Supp. at 1003.
97. 676 F.2d at 1205.
98. See supra notes 78-83 discussing and accompanying text Rhode Island Federation of Teachers
v. Norberg.
99. 103 S. Ct. 48 (1982).
100. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice Marshal filed the dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
101. 103 S. Ct. at 3064.
102. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).








Finally, the Court found that private schools afforded "wholesome com-
petition" for the public schools, promoting the state's interest in providing
the highest quality education for all children within its boundaries. 108
b. Przna, Efct
Justice Rehnquist devoted most of his attention to the primary effect
inquiry, determining whether the statute has the "primary effect of advanc-
ing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools."' 1 9 In concluding that the
statute does not have such a primary effect,' 1° the Court looked to several
''particularly significant" features of the Minnesota arrangement."'
First, the Court recognized that Section 290.09(22) is merely one of
many deductions available under the Minnesota tax laws and acknowledged
that legislatures have "broad latitude" 1 2 in creating classifications and dis-
tinctions in such tax statutes. The Court concluded that the Minnesota leg-
islature's judgment that a deduction for educational expenses equally
distributes the tax burden between its citizens "is entitled to substantial
deference."' 13
Next, the Court focused on the breadth of the benefited class under the
statute, emphasizing that the deduction is available to all parents regardless
of whether their children attend public, non-sectarian private or sectarian
private schools. The Court determined that the fact the Minnesota statute
"neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens" 114 signif-icantly distinguishes Mueller from Nyquzil. The statute in Nyquist authorized
benefits only for parents of nonpublic school students.
The Court then considered the nature of the beneficiaries of the Minne-
sota tax deductions. The Court found that in channelling its assistance to
individual parents rather than directly to the schools, Minnesota "reduced
the Establishment Clause objections."' 15 Conceding that such assistance to
parents has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to
the schools, the Court nevertheless determined that the fact the aid is dis-
bursed to the parents is a material consideration in establishment clause
107. Id
108. Id (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 3067 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
110. 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
111. The Court considered the statute in its entirety and did not invoke a separate primary
effect analysis for each of the textbook, tuition and transportation deductions. The Court
noted, however, that its conclusion was unaffected by the fact that the statute permitted text-
book and transportation deductions. These, it reasoned, should be approved under Everson and
Allen. Id. at 3070 n. 10.
112. Id at 3067 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002
(1983)).
113. Id at 3067. The Court asserted that this finding does not conflict with Nyquist since
that ase did not involve a tax benefit plan having the elements of a "genuine tax deduction."
Id. 3067-68 at n.6.
114. Id. at 3068-69.




Because the public funds under the Minnesota arrangement became
available only as the result of "numerous, private choices of individual par-
ents,"11 7 the Court explained, such assistance cannot be viewed as conferring
state approval "on any particular religion, or on religion generally." 1 8 The
Court further maintained that this type of "attenuated financial benefits
. . . that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available
tax benefit" 119 is not an evil against which the establishment clause was
designed to protect.
The Court rejected the argument that, notwithstanding the facial neu-
trality of Section 290.09(22), in application the statute primarily benefited
religious institutions. 120 The Court dismissed the petitioner's statistical anal-
ysis of the type of persons claiming the tax deduction, declining to "engage
in an empirical inquiry."' 12' Evaluating the constitutionality of a statute on
the basis of such evidence, reasoned the Court, "would scarcely provide the
certainty that this field stands in need of.'
122
The Court concluded its primary effect inquiry with recognition of the
contributions private schools make to the communities in which they oper-
ate. The Court suggested that any "unequal effects" the Minnesota statute
might confer on sectarian schools be regarded as a "rough return" for the
benefits these schools provide to the state and its taxpayers.1
2 3
c. Excessive Church-State Entanglement
Focusing on the potential administrative entanglement the statute
might create, the Court determined that the only possible source of excessive
government entanglement under Section 290.09(22) was the statutory requi-
site that state officials determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a
deduction.' 24 However, such involvement, asserted the Court, does not dif-
fer substantially from the government involvement in programs the Court
has approved in Board of Education v. Allen, Wolman v. Walter, 125 and Meek v.
Piltenger.126 Thus, concluded the Court, the Minnesota statute does not ex-





120. Id. at 3069-7 1. Petitioners argued that most parents of public school children incur no
tuition expenses and that other expenses deductible under § 290.09(22) are negligible in value.
Further, they claimed that 96% of the children in private schools attend sectarian institutions.
Id at 3070.
121. Id at 3070.
122. d.
123. Id.
124. Under the Minnesota statute, no deductions are allowed for instructional books and
materials used in teaching religious tenets, doctrines or worship. See Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22)
(1982).
125. Like Allen, Wolman upheld a statutory provision authorizing the state to loan textbooks
to pupils in private and public schools. Woman, 433 U.S. at 236-38.





In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's conclusion that the
Minnesota statute is "vitally different" 127 from the New York statute at issue
in Nyquist. On the contrary, asserted Marshall, the Minnesota tax provision
violates the establishment clause for the same reason the statute was struck
down in Nyquist. Like the New York statute, he explained, the Minnesota
statute had "a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."' 28 In his
dissent, Marshall focused on the tuition and textbook deductions allowable
under the statute.
a. The Tuition Deduction
Marshall conceded that the Minnesota statute served a valid secular
purpose, but this, he cautioned, is not enough to "immunize from further
scrutiny a law which. . . has a primary effect that advances religion."' 129 In
concluding that Minnesota's statutory tuition deduction has the primary ef-
fect of promoting religion, Marshall discounted the fact that the deduction
was in the form of indirect assistance to parochial schools. He asserted that
indirect aid in the form of assistance to parents for tuition payments is as
impermissible as direct assistance to the schools when there is not an effective
means to ensure that the aid supports only the secular functions of the
institution. 130
Marshall noted that because there is no such means of restricting the
aid provided under the Minnesota statute to the secular functions or services
of the schools, Mueller is distinguishable from Board of Education v. Allen and
Everson v. Board of Education which upheld aid "carefully restricted to the
purely secular side of church-affiliated institutions."'
3'
Comparing the Minnesota deduction to the aid struck down in Nquist,
Marshall maintained that, like the New York statute, the Minnesota provi-
sion operates as "a financial incentive to parents to send their children to
sectarian schools."' 32 Whether or not this incentive is in the form of a tax
credit or tax deduction is irrelevant in determining the primary effect of the
assistance. 133 Marshall suggested that the majority's formalistic distinction
between these types of assistance is "a distinction without a difference.'
34
Likewise, Marshall rejected the majority's contention that Mueller is sig-
nificantly distinguishable from Nquzst by the fact that the Minnesota statute
was facially neutral, providing assistance to eligible parents regardless of
whether their children attend nonpublic or public schools. Marshall empha-
sized that the Court has in the past "unequivocally rejected"' 35 the notion
that it should look exclusively to what the statute on its face purports to do
127. 103 S. Ct. at 3072.
128. Id.
129. Id (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774).
130. 103 S. Ct. at 3073.
131. Id. at 3076 (quoting Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973)).
132. 103 S. Ct. at 3073 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786).
133. Id. at 3075-76.
134. Id at 3075.
135. Id at 3074 (citing yqu~it, 413 U.S. 756).
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and ignore the effect of its actual operation. He noted that in Sloan v.
Lemon 136 the Court, in concluding that a Pennsylvania statute violated the
establishment clause, took into consideration the fact that more than 90 per-
cent of the children enrolled in private schools were attending religious insti-
tutions. 1 37 Further, Marshall noted, the Nyquist Court recognized that the
bulk of New York's nonpublic schools were sectarian in orientation1 38 and
that the tax reductions authorized under the New York statute primarily
benefited parents of children attending those sectarian schools.1
39
Marshall points out that the fact that the Minnesota statute has the
primary effect of promoting religion can be determined "without any resort
to the type of 'statistical evidence' that majority fears."' 140 He reasons that
"[h]istory and experience . ..[indicate] that any generally available finan-
cial assistance for elementary and secondary school tuition expenses mainly
will further religious education because the majority of schools charging tui-
tion are sectarian."'
4 1
b. The Textbook Deduction
Marshall charged that the textbooks and instructional materials subsi-
dized under the textbook deduction "plainly may be used to inculcate reli-
gious values and belief.' 1 42 Marshall reiterated the finding in Meek that the
secular education parochial schools provide goes "hand in hand with the
religious mission" of those schools. 143 Thus, he concluded, secular texts and
instructional materials contribute to the religious mission of those schools.
Marshall distinguished Allen, noting that the textbooks at issue in that
case "had been chosen by the state for use in the public schools.' 1 4 4 By
comparison, "the Minnesota statute does not limit the tax deduction to
books the state has approved .. .[but] permits a deduction for books that
are chosen by the parochial schools themselves."'
145
In concluding his dissent, Marshall praised the limits articulated in Ny-
quist. Such limits he writes, were drawn "with appropriate regard for the
principles of neutrality embodied by the Establishment Clause."'1 46 Com-
paring Mueller, he attacked the majority's decision as "flatly at odds with the
fundamental principle that a state may provide no financial support whatso-
ever to promote religion.'
4 7
136. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
137. See id. at 830.
138. Nyqutkt, 413 U.S. at 780.
139. Id at 794.
140. 103 S. Ct. at 3074.
141. Id. at 3075.
142. Id at 3077.
143. Id (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
144. Id (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 244-45).
145. Id




C. Analysts of the Mueller Decision
Although Everson v. Board of Education precludes an attack on the trans-
portation deduction granted under Minnesota's tax laws, 148 the deductions
granted for tuition and textbook expenses do not satisfy the three-part in-
quiry -of modern establishment clause analysis.
The majority's decision to uphold the statute conflicts with the solid
judicial consensus that has developed in opposition to such tax benefits. 1
49
Modern establishment clause analysis demands a stricter application of the
three-part inquiry than that relied on by the Mueller Court.
1. Secular Purpose
The Mueller majority correctly recognized several valid secular purposes
attributable to the Minnesota statute. As the dissenters cautioned, however,
a valid purpose "should not immunize from further scrutiny a law which
.. .has a primary effect that advances religion."'
150
2. Primary Effect
In determining the primary effect of the statute, the Court totally disre-
garded an essential criterion of the primary effect test: whether the statute's
secular aspects are identifiable and separable from its religious aspects. 5 '
This criterion requires that the form of aid and the nature of the beneficiary
are such that a legislature can be certain that only secular educational activi-
ties are aided.
As Marshall noted in his dissent, the Minnesota statute provides no ef-
fective means of restricting the aid it provides to the secular functions of the
private schools.' 52 Although the statute requires state officials to disallow
deductions taken for books and materials used for the purpose of teaching of
religious tenets or doctrines or for religious worship, it does not prescribe any
method for monitoring the types of materials parents base their deductions
on. Moreover, the tuition deduction fails the separable and identifiable cri-
terion since tuition charges at the elementary and secondary school level are
generally not apportioned on a course-by-course basis. Parents, then, cannot
accurately separate the secular course costs from the costs of the religious
instruction their children receive.
Treating the Minnesota statute as merely one of many deductions avail-
able under the state's tax laws, comparable to deductions for charitable con-
tributions, is inappropriate.' 53 Tuition payments are distinguishable from
charitable contributions because the parents receive a service for their pay-
148. See id. at 3070 n. 10. See also Case Comment, supra note 14, at 284.
149. See generally supra note 77.
150. 103 S. Ct. at 3072. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nyquisi, 413 U.S. at 774).
151. See generally supra note 38.
152. 103 S. Ct. at 3073.
153. See generally Case Comment, supra note 14, at 285 (discussing distinctions between char-
itable contribution deductions and tuition deductions). See also Note, supra note 16, at 231-33




ments. A contribution, on the other hand, is simply a direct gift to an insti-
tution. Moreover, unlike tuition deductions, charitable contributions
generally benefit a broad class of institutions, with religious organizations
merely one category among the larger class of nonprofit groups receiving
donations.
Contrary to the Court's footnote suggestion, 154 it is likewise irrelevant
that the Minnesota tax benefit scheme resembles more a "genuine tax de-
duction" than the tax credit form of assistance at issue in Nquist. The Ny-
quist Court emphasized the arbitrariness of the challenged tax benefit,
which, unlike a genuine tax deduction, enabled parents to decrease their
adjusted gross income in an amount unrelated to the amount actually spent
on tuition. 155 But the apparent emphasis on this distinction is minimized by
the yquist Court's focus on the substantive impact of the New York tax
benefit plan. 
156
The Nyquist majority had noted that whether the assistance is labelled a
reimbursement, a reward or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the
same. 157 The form of the aid, the Court held, should be examined only "for
the light that it casts on the substance."' 158 This suggests that, under a pri-
mary effect analysis, the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute should
not have turned on the fact that the tax benefits were true tax deductions.
Rather, the statute should have been evaluated in terms of its substantive
impact on religious institutions.
In determining the substantive or primary effect of the statute, the
breadth of the benefited class has been recognized as a "pivotal factor"'
59
and, thus, deserves the attention the Mueller Court accorded it. But in de-
clining to engage in an empirical inquiry' 6° regarding the actual impact of
the Minnesota deductions, the Court employed a de jure analysis of the stat-
ute, focusing on its facial neutrality.
Emphasizing the fact that the statute provides deductions to eligible
parents of students attending either public or nonpublic schools, the Court
virtually ignored the glaring evidence that the overwhelming majority of
parents eligible for the deductions are parents of children attending private,
sectarian schools. 16 1 As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, this is
154. 103 S. Ct. at 3067-68 n.6.
155. Nyquzst, 413 U.S. at 789. The New York statute invalidated under Nyquust authorized
for parents of children enrolled in nonpublic schools tuition reimbursements of $50 per grade
school child and $100 per high school student, so long as such amounts did not exceed 50% of
actual tuition paid. To qualify, parents' annual income had to be less than $5,000. Id at 764.
For parents with adjusted gross incomes of $25,000 or less who did not qualify for the tuition
reimbursement, the statute authorized a deduction unrelated to the amount actually expended
on tuition, but calculated on the basis of a formula contained in the statute. Id. at 765-66 &
n. 18.
156. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 815 (discussing Nyquist and the "true tax deduction
test").
157. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786.
158. Id at 790.
159. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 861; see also Comment, supra note 13, at 547 (discussing the signifi-
cance of the breadth of the benefitted class).
160. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
161. Mueller, 676 F.2d at 1195.
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obvious even without statistical data, in light of the fact that most schools
charging tuition are nonpublic and most of those nonpublic schools are
sectarian. 162
Although prior to Mueller the Court had not determined whether a de
jure or de facto analysis would be more appropriate in determining the
breadth of the benefited class, '6 3 by adopting a de jure approach the Court
renders the primary effect test meaningless. The primary effect test requires,
by definition, an inquiry into the actual, primary impact of the statute.
1 64
By looking only to what the statute, on its face, purports to do, the Court is
granting the state legislature deference with respect to the primary effect test
in the same way it grants such deference under the secular purpose test.
165
The primary effect requirement, then, ceases to be an effective limit on state
aid to religion. In essence, this means that legislatures would be permitted to
subsidize religious institutions as long as they provided similar aid to public
facilities, regardless of the incidental nature of the assistance to the latter.
It is not possible to adhere to the establishment clause principle and
ignore the substantive impact of a statute. Evaluating this impact requires a
factual determination of the breadth of the benefited class.'66 The Nyquist
Court made such a determination when it recognized that 85 percent of New
York's nonpublic schools are church-affiliated. 16 7 Similarly, the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Norberg relied on evidence that 94 percent of the
students who attend nonpublic and tuition-funded public schools in Rhode
Island are enrolled in sectarian schools. 16
In discussing the primary effect of the Minnesota statute, the Mueller
Court emphasized that whatever benefit flowed to the parochial schools was
an "attenuated" one, since the actual benefits of the deduction flowed to the
parents, rather than directly to the schools. 169 The Court seems to be apply-
ing the child benefit rationale 170 the Court relied on in Board of Educati'on v.
A//en to uphold the loan of secular textbooks. Under the child benefit the-
ory, state aid that would be struck down if given directly to the parochial
schools is upheld if given, instead, to the parents and children. This theory,
however, was effectively rejected when the Nyquisl Court recognized that a
162. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. 3074-75.
163. See Comment, supra note 38, at 695-96.
164. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Court stated that a
"[sitate may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education ... even though it
makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike." Id. at 747. See also Minnesota
Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1978) (facial neutrality of a
statute and the fact that its operative reach may extend beyond sectarian class is constitution-
ally insufficient if the statute, in fact, supports religious activity). See generally Comment, supra
note 13, at 549-50 (discussing distinctions between the dejure and de facto analysis with respect
to the primary effect test).
165. See generally Roemer, 452 F. Supp. at 1318 n.l (the Court generally accepts legislative
statements of secular purpose at face value).
166. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 817-23 (discussing the significance of the breadth of
the benefitted class and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's treatment of this in
Mueller).
167. Nyqujis, 413 U.S. at 768.
168. NAorberg, 630 F.2d at 859.
169. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
170. See generally supra note 41.
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statute does not have to provide direct assistance to parochial schools to have
an unconstitutional effect. 17 1 The Nyquist majority, in fact, cautioned that
the fact aid is disbursed to parents rather than directly to the schools is "only
one among many factors to be considered."
1 72
3. Excessive Entanglement
The Mueller Court's analysis under the excessive entanglement prong of
the three-part establishment clause inquiry is defective for two primary rea-
sons. First, the Court focuses on administrative entanglement, disregarding
the potential political government entanglements the statute could create.
Such a political entanglement could arise when a private school selects text-
books not clearly secular in content and parents claim a deduction for the
cost of those texts. State officials may challenge this deduction and the con-
troversy between the parent and government could conceivably evolve into a
dispute between the state and the sectarian school regarding the secular clas-
sification of the textbooks. This is precisely the kind of entanglement the
first amendment prohibits.
Secondly, the Court's application of the excessive entanglement test is
defective because its administrative entanglement analysis is deficient. The
Court fails to recognize that the primary effect inquiry and excessive entan-
glement tests are interdependent. 73 Some government entanglement is re-
quired to ensure that the primary effect requirement is satisfied, but the
excessive entanglement test may be violated in the process.
As Justice Marshall observed, the Minnesota statute did not guarantee
the separation of the religious and secular education functions of the reli-
gious institutions it benefited and thus failed to ensure that the state aid
supported only secular functions. Ensuring that deductions such as those
prescribed by the Minnesota legislature are not used for sectarian materials
would require the continuous government surveillance or auditing declared
constitutionally impermissible by the Wale Court.
174
In comparing the entanglement involved under the Minnesota statute
to the types of entanglement permitted under Allen, Woman and Meek, the
Court fails to recognize an important factual distinction between these cases
and Mueller. Unlike the Minnesota program, these programs allowed the
state to pre-select and pre-screen the materials loaned to the private schools
171. Nyquutt, 413 U.S. at 756.
172. Id. at 781.
173. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Wakz Court recognized that no
perfect or absolute separation between church and state is really possible. The Court stated
that "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." Id at 670. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), the Court grappled with the problem of determining the nature and degree of state
entanglement permissible to ensure a state aid program did not violate the establishment clause.
The Lemon Court invalidated a Rhode Island statute subsidizing salaries paid to teachers em-
ployed by nonpublic schools. The Court acknowledged that to avoid the effect of fostering
religion, comprehensive and continuous state surveillance would be necessary to ensure that the
subsidized teachers did not inculcate religious beliefs or engage in any religious instruction. The
Court found, however, that such surveillance would involve excessive entanglement between
state and church. Id. at 619.
174. See Wakz, 397 U.S. at 675.
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to ensure their secular nature, thus obviating the need for continued surveil-
lance.175 Such surveillance would be necessary under the Minnesota statute
since it allows the private schools to select the texts eligible for deductions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Court did not overrule Nyquist, it has significantly cur-
tailed Nyquist's utility as a guidepost in the area of state aid to church-affili-
ated schools. In distinguishing the Minnesota tax benefit scheme from the
New York statute struck down in Nyquist, the Mueller Court has limited
Nyquz'st applicability in tax benefit cases.
The Mueller Court implies that the Nyquist precedent will only be trig-
gered when the tax benefit at issue is in the nature of a tax credit and when
the statute is not neutral on its face, providing benefits only to nonpublic
schools. The Court appears to be making "distinction[s] without a differ-
ence,"' 176 rejecting a de facto analysis of the statute's actual impact in favor
of a less scrutinizing de jure review of what the statute on its face purports to
do. By adopting a dejure approach to the establishment clause analysis, the
Court has succeeded in granting legislative deference to both the stated pur-
pose and effect of statutes providing tax benefits for parents of parochial
school students. This approach signifies a departure from the rigid three-
part inquiry the Court has previously relied upon in analyzing establishment
clause cases and perhaps foretells a less structured constitutional analysis of
state aid programs in the future.
The Mueller case exemplifies the unpredictable pattern characterizing
establishment clause cases. Instead of bolstering the structured analysis that
has developed over the past three decades, the Court appears to be once
again "sacrificing clarity and predictability for flexibility."'
77
Justice Rehnquist's opinion provides state legislatures with a less de-
fined constitutional framework to work within as they draft tuition tax relief
plans. Although the Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller may become the
model for state assistance programs conferring tax benefits on parents of pa-
rochial school children, these state programs will still face constitutional
challenges and will still be subject to the judiciary's unpredictable line
drawing.
The Mueller decision has, perhaps, provided the lower courts with more
freedom in evaluating the constitutionality of state aid programs by relieving
them of the burdensome rigidity of the three-part test. Such judicial flexibil-
175. The statute upheld in Allen authorized the loan of secular textbooks to nonpublic
schools, but required prior approval of such loans by public school authorities. A//en, 392 U.S.
at 244-45. Similarly, the statute upheld in Wo/man authorized public funding for the purchase
and loan of textbooks to pupils attending nonpublic schools, but required that requests for the
books be filtered through the superintendent of the public schools and local school district offi-
cials. See Wo/man, 433 U.S. at 236-37. In Meek, the Court upheld a program providing for the
laon of texts and instructional materials "acceptable for use in any public elementary, or secon-
dary school of the Commonwealth." Meek, 421 U.S. at 353-54. The statute mandated that
requests for such materials be approved by the State Secretary of Education. Id
176. Mue//er, 103 S. Ct. 3075 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Regan, 444 U.S. at 662.
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ity, however, is the source of the conflict between the circuits that brought
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